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This study centers on the potential scope and significance of trans-spatiality as a 
new literary concept. I employ the concept of trans-spatiality as a means of understanding 
Asian immigrants’ transnational experiences as represented by Asian immigrant writers 
in the Anglophone world. Trans-spatiality is a grounding term and methodological 
orientation, and its scope is relational and appositional. Thus, previous studies such as 
postcolonialism, cosmopolitanism, transnationalism, diaspora studies, and globalization 
are related to trans-spatiality, but, in this dissertation, I strictly limit its use to an ethico-
ontological and aesthetic understanding of Asian immigrant writers’ literary works. For 
this methodology, I explore and analyze various Western philosophers’ theories, 
especially Giorgio Agamben’s ethico-ontology. Also, I employ Édouard Glissant’s 
poetics of relation and commonplace (lieux communs) as well as Walter Benjamin’s 
constellation to transit this theoretical exploration to literary studies. 
 In chapter one of my study, which follows a brief preface, I address Asian 
immigrants’ negative (animalized or Otherized) humanities by analyzing two Asian 
American poets’ poems and Glissant’s poem alongside a theoretical critique of 
Heidegger’s Western-oriented ontology and ethics. In chapters two and three, I analyze 
Chang Rae Lee’s Native Speaker and Joy Kogawa’s Obasan to discuss Lee’s trans-spatial 
beings in terms of coming community and form-of-life, and Kogawa’s aesthetic 
testimony of Japanese Canadians’ internment during WWII via artistic signs. The fourth 
chapter shifts away from trans-spatiality in America-centered and anthropocentric 
narratives to a clone-centered science fiction and the critical space created by Kazuo 
Ishiguro, an Asian English novelist. This chapter ends with aesthetic and ethical inquiries 
into the clone as artist as a cornerstone of the relations between life and art. In the last 
chapter, I take on the topic of the relations between life and art via an overarching image 
of a bowl with the void in the center as a form of constellation in Theresa Hak Kyung 
Cha’s Dictée. I conclude this dissertation with a brief analysis of my own trans-spatial 
teaching experience.  
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PREFACE 
 
 
Happy are those ages when the starry sky is the map of all possible 
paths 
—ages whose paths are illuminated by the light of the stars.  
Everything in such ages is new and yet familiar,  
full of adventure and yet their own.  
The world is wide and yet it is like a home,  
for the fire that burns in the soul is of the same essential nature as the 
stars;  
the world and the self, the light and the fire, are sharply distinct,  
yet they never become permanent strangers to one another,  
for fire is the soul of all light and all fire clothes itself in light. 
(Georg Lukács, The Theory of the Novel 29) 
 
Tell me, enigmatical man, whom do you love best, your father, your 
mother, your sister, or your brother?  
I have neither father, nor mother, nor sister, nor brother.  
Your friends?  
Now you use a word whose meaning I have never known.  
Your country? 
I do not know in what latitude it lies.  
Beauty?  
I could indeed love her, Goddess and Immortal.  
Gold? 
I hate it as you hate God.  
Then, what do you love, extraordinary stranger?  
I love the clouds…the clouds that pass…up there…up there…the 
wonderful clouds! 
(Jean Baudelaire, “The Stranger,” Paris Spleen 1) 
 
During my honeymoon in New York, I stayed a day at an inn owned by an old 
Korean man. In our conversation, he told me that he had immigrated in the 80s, and I 
asked how he felt about the immigration. His tone was melancholic as he answered 
that he had been “a renter” in this nation; disconcertingly, his melancholic voice 
resonated with that of another Korean American, Cho-Seung Hui, who notoriously 
killed thirty-two fellow students at Virginia Tech in 2007. It is perplexing that despite 
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Cho‟s rampage and the subsequent media onslaught, his racial and national identity 
has been erased from both the media and the general American population‟s memory. 
If you ask non-Asian people who Cho was, most of them would be unable to identify 
him as a Korean American or know his name. His racial identity was so easily 
forgotten even though teratology ordinarily leaves behind traces of similar violent 
social outcasts in people‟s minds (Song 21). Why is Cho erased from Americans‟ 
minds? This question leads to another question about media‟s reproduction of 
unidentifiable Asian images. 
For example, Cho‟s performances in the video clips posted on YouTube 
consist of corny pastiches of the poses of white loners seen on screen many times; in 
the videos, he acts like the disturbed hero full of moral angst frequently represented in 
various Hollywood movies. Perhaps this accounts for why he is so easily erased from 
the identity map on which only white loner gunmen can achieve notoriety; or, even 
more troubling, Cho must be forgotten because the US ideology of the model 
minority necessitates that his identity becomes a media spectacle in which his name 
and appearance are scribed.
1
 Cho‟s identity becomes more and more empty since he 
is forced to represent an evil monster that frightens people; Cho is at most a spectacle 
in the society in which non-human properties, such as animality, foreignness, or alien 
identity, stand out. In the New York Times, for example, Mike Nizza proposes that we 
can call Cho a man with a “heart of darkness.” Additionally, a member of the 
Virginia Tech community describes Cho as “evil. pure, unadulterated” in April 16th: 
                                                 
1 Pointing out these phenomena, Sylvia Shin Huey Chong describes how Cho‟s case was racially 
ambivalent by explaining not only how his identity as a 1.5 generation of a Korean immigrant family 
was erased from the media, but also how his radicalized subject is interpellated as an unidentifiable 
Asian monster. 
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Virgina Tech Remembers (139). Shrewdly reproduced by media and across the 
racialogical map, Cho, from Baudrillard‟s perspective, becomes a code of “the 
aestheticization of the whole world, its cosmopolitan spectacularization, its 
transformation into images, its semiological organization” (The Transparency 16). 
Cho‟s glossy, vivid and transaesthetic images in media create a “transpolitical mirror 
of evil” that captivates people (The Transparency 81). His empty identity even 
expunges his spirit under the transaesthetic image of evil and the invisible stranger.  
How Cho‟s body is forgotten while his images swarm the media is a synopsis 
of the dynamic of Asian male stereotypes throughout Asian immigration history in 
the U.S. In “Theoretical profile of Cho Seung Hui: from perspective of forensic 
behavioral scientist,” Roger L. Depue psychologically profiles Cho‟s personality and 
describes Cho as physically immature and emotionally troubled by “selective 
mutism,” and then strangely argues that “[s]piritually, [Cho] showed little interest and 
dropped out of his church before experiencing a growth in faith” (N-3). This 
description of physical weakness and incommunicable silence reflects widespread 
prejudices against the barbarian Asian American male who lacks spirit. Moreover, Dr. 
Depue‟s description defines Cho‟s as spiritually depraved, apparently evinced by his 
failure to attend church; according to Dr. Dupue‟s rhetoric, Christianity determines 
the quality of Cho‟s spirit. In turn, Dr. Depue concludes his so-called “theoretical 
profile,” by asserting that “[Cho] had become the instrument for the destruction of 
human dignity and precious potential.” So, according to Dr. Depue, Cho is an evil 
stranger whose evilness has the potential to destruct Western humanity. In this vein, 
Cho is the most negative manifestation of Asian immigrants and represents the failure 
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of the American dream and the ambivalence of stereotypes facing Asian immigrants, 
from the model minority to the barbarian without Western spirit.  
Nonetheless, transaesthetic images and ambivalent racial stereotypes over 
Cho‟s body paradoxically testify to the importance of his body. Under these 
illusionary ideological identities, Cho‟s real body persists but is ignored. 
Accordingly, Viet Thanh Nguye argues, in Asian American studies, “importance of 
body” gains urgency (8). Asians‟ bodies maintain a contentious relationship with 
transaesthetic images perpetrated by the state‟s racial formation. Asian writers in the 
Anglophone world have resisted this cultural and political production of Asians‟ 
transaesthetic images of bodies by representing unalienable real bodies. For example, 
John Okada‟s No-No Boy shows Asian bodies that cannot be identified or 
subordinated into the state system. In this novel, Ichiro Yamada‟s Japanese American 
body loses its authenticity as soon as the state reclaims it to employ it as a weapon 
against Japan; for this purpose, the state and the state apparatuses even deprive 
Yamada of citizenship and human rights. This deprivation strips him of 
representability in the bio-politics of the U.S.  
However, these unrepresentable Asian bodies subvert the ideological 
apparatus of American citizenship. In the U.S. and other Western countries, 
citizenship has been “the contractual and volitional principles of democratic political 
membership” (Li 2); but American citizenship, in the history of Asian American 
immigration, has created zones of exception or exclusion such as the “Asiatic barred 
zone” in 1917 where all Asian immigration was banned. These barred zones later 
create ethnic enclaves (for example, Chinatown) that hide unrepresentable Asian 
 5 
bodies that roam without identities. These trans-spatial beings‟ “[m]ovement and 
multiplicity frustrate any logic that seeks to reduce everything to the same, to the 
apparently transparent discourse of „history‟ or „knowledge‟” (Chambers 27).  
In this way, under the illusionary ideals of a multicultural utopia and an 
immigrants‟ heaven, the unrepresented presentation of Asian bodies demands a new 
spectrum of Asian American literary studies. As an answer to this demand, this 
dissertation will explore the potential scope and significances of the concept and 
phenomenon of what I call “trans-spatiality.” Horizontally, in the venue of trans-
spatiality, diasporic and migrational experience reveals conjunctions that are trans-
spatial. Vertically, trans-spatial experience is reflected within the “virtual” registers of 
literary spaces. Additionally, trans-spatial beings include moving bodies across 
imaginary, symbolic, and real borderlines; this concept extends to such people as 
migrants, immigrants, emigrants, refugees, and so on.
2 
In short, trans-spatiality is 
related to geo-political viewpoints of (im)migration and (im)migrants‟ bodies, but its 
scope, in this dissertation, is narrowed to the parameters of the literary term.  
Trans-spatiality consists of two elements: “trans” and “spatiality.” First, the 
prefix, “trans” means transcendence and pertains to this dissertation‟s aim to 
transcend previous theories of Asians‟ (im)migration in the Anglophone world and to 
present a nascent view of their experiences in Asian immigrant writers‟ literary 
works. Second, this transcendence does not present a general and idealized vision of 
the (im)migrants‟ world, but considers differential trans-spatial experiences and their 
discourses to search for the commonalities of each singular being‟s differential bodily 
experience as explored by Asian immigrant writers. Also, “trans” in trans-spatiality 
                                                 
2 I am using “being” here in light of ontology.  
 6 
signifies “across” and “relation.” In this regard, trans-spatiality does not create unity 
but rather a constellation of literary relations among ethnic writers‟ presentation of 
singular trans-spatial or cross-border experience. This reflects a literary and 
theoretical turn in literary studies of these Asian immigrant writers‟ works. 
If the “Asian turn” is a legitimate turn, as Eric Hayot in his article “The Asian 
Turns” claims, trans-spatiality is a part of this turn that emphasizes the global 
mapping of Asians‟ presences and voices in the West and the Western literature.3 In 
this turn, “spatiality” in trans-spatiality signifies the critical mapping of different 
literary spaces and a critical production of relations among singular trans-spatial 
experience that each space shows.
4 
On the geopolitical level, this critical mapping is 
pertinent to “border thinking.”5 Crossing imaginary (ideological), symbolic 
(linguistic), and real borderlines, Asian (im)migrants‟ mobile bodies perceive 
differences, map their positions, and move across the Pacific. Asian immigrant 
writers in this dissertation use this critical mapping in diverse ways to present the 
validity of singular form-of-life and their universal community in these related 
                                                 
3  Hayot‟s PMLA article critically proposes the transnational turn as the Asian turn though he also 
acknowledges the limit in transnationality “whose turn in literary studies has the odd distinction of 
having largely been theorized before having been practiced” (908). His project of creating global 
relations of aesthetic and material transnationality largely converges with this dissertation‟s aim.  
4 This mapping of trans-spatiality corresponds with Nicholas Spencer‟s “critical space” in American 
literature that is a critical lens to identify “a continuous process of transformation in fictional 
spatiality” (2). Spencer‟s critical space, in the regard of post-Marxism, mainly focuses on “subverting 
lopsided scholarly dichotomy of aesthetics and politics in fiction” (10). 
5 This critical mapping also correlates with Walter D. Mignolo‟s “border thinking,” namely “moments 
in which the imaginary of the modern world system cracks” (23). Mignolo‟s border thinking 
imagination discloses subalterns‟ voices because those global stationary or mobile subalterns cannot 
speak or be identified. This imagination demands literary representation and aesthetic tropes as well as 
ontological and ethical inquiries of those unidentifiable, un-politicized beings; in other words, in 
providing a universal vision of “the modern/colonial world system” of diverse geocultures, trans-
spatial beings‟ humanity in crisis crack up these geocultures to present the imagination of these beings‟ 
negative presences and unspeakable, indelible experiences. Colonial differences across different 
Asians‟ singular experiences are put into relation by trans-spatiality. 
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spaces. This also entails a theoretical leap from the traditional orientation of Asian 
American literary studies, such as identity politics or cultural studies insofar as these 
Agambenian concepts deny any identities or unified meanings of community. These 
concepts even cross out “Asians.” This dissertation uses these radical steps to disclose 
the foundational universality of Asianness and Asian immigrant communities and 
their future relations with other minorities and their communities. Only in this 
fundamental conceptualization is it possible to add infinite combinations of identities 
and communities without exclusion. In this radical potentiality, Asianness does not 
operate to exclude those who traditionally cannot be considered “Asians” in the West 
such as refugees, illegal migrants, boat people, on-line community, bi-racial people, 
and so on.
6
 
Indeed, the scope of trans-spatiality challenges the identity politics and 
cultural studies that have prevailed in Asian literary studies in Anglophone world. 
Identity politics and cultural studies have concentrated on the solidification of ethnic 
subjectivity or collective identities vis-à-vis a revamp of split and traumatized 
identities due to racism, global exploitation, and colonialism, as well as the 
invigoration of cultural difference. In many senses, celebrating ethnic difference and 
desiring assimilation into the majority share one final cause—the establishment of an 
authentic Asian subject and Asian community. However, these legitimate claims of 
solid Asian identities contradict with (im)migrants‟ unidentifiable identities, their 
                                                 
6 One of examples can be North Korean refugees, a few of whom were able to visit the U.S. without a 
visa because there is no visa treaty between the U.S. and North Korea. After the 2005 North Korean 
Human Right Act, it has been reported that there are around 50 North Korean refugees in the U.S. 
However, traditional Asian American studies cannot include their voices in the studies without more 
inclusive theoretical framework. This is global phenomena, and as Derrida in Cosmoplitianism and 
Forgiveness argues, this refugee issue “calls for an urgent responses” (23). 
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continuous exiles and their exclusions from the global system.
7 
Identity politics and 
cultural studies easily exclude those who have not achieved citizenship, those who are 
constantly moving across borderlines or those who deny fixed national or ethnic 
identities. But I do not claim that these two registers are obsolete now; rather they 
have to be reconsidered through more fundamental philosophical and ethical ideas of 
“life” and “community” per se. In trans-spatiality, culture is secondary, while 
philosophy and aesthetic are primary. This philosophical grounding in trans-spatial 
study will render identity politics and cultural studies resilient. 
Therefore, trans-spatiality is a grounding term and methodological orientation, 
and its scope is relational and appositional. Indeed, previous theories such as 
postcolonialism, cosmopolitanism, transnationalism, and globalization have already 
engaged with certain issues of this trans-spatiality. These theories emerged in 
resistance to the rigidity of identity politics and cultural studies. Therefore, it is 
reasonable to ask why this trans-spatiality is necessary now and how this theory is 
different from other theories. All these theories, including trans-spatial study, started 
with the necessity of discursive wars against Orientalism, imperialism, colonialism, 
global capitalism, the modern world system, global racism and the newly emerging 
multitude of (im)migrants whose collective presences foil ideological state 
apparatuses‟ interpellation. Yet, trans-spatiality transcends certain limits of these 
theories that are often vexed by their dependence on dichotomies between 
nation/internationality, nationality/assimilation, local/global, and 
colonial/postcolonial, which insufficiently address the more complex trans-spatial 
                                                 
7 In Diaspora Literature and Visual Culture, Sheng-mei Ma claims, “identity politics in the spirit of the 
1960s need to be reassessed amidst globalization and in the new millennium” (98).  
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phenomena of crossing borderlines and multitudinous immigrations. Crucially, trans-
spatiality‟s transcendence is not the dialectic sublation of theoretical differences 
among these theories but an attempt to create appositional conjunctions of these 
theories‟ differences and to find underlying relations by posing the ontological and 
ethical questions hidden beneath these theories. Rhetorically speaking, trans-spatiality 
functions like a semicolon because it relays and relates various forms of border-
crossing bodies and the literary representation of these bodies without limits. 
Likewise, differential beings and their experiences across different local/global 
situations can be represented in literary works. 
After its institutionalization as a discipline, postcolonialism has expanded its 
spectrum beyond the concepts of post-coloniality or decolonialism. Moreover, its 
theoretical basis in French poststructuralism reveals the limit of its capability to 
properly explain newly emerging global events such as Wall Street Occupy, post 9/11 
geopolitics, and the rapid development of technology and on-line community. In a 
PMLA panel discussion, Sunil Agnani points out that even Gayatri Spivak, one of the 
founders of postcolonialism, pronounced “the postcolonial moribund in an age of 
globalization” (638).8 Nonetheless, trans-spatiality does not deny the persistent 
necessity of postcolonial decolonization and constant engagements with nationalism 
vs. globalism. Imperialism still lurks under various global phenomena in such forms 
of antagonisms against Islam or Chinese.  
                                                 
8 In 2007, a special PMLA edition featured a roundtable, “The End of Postcolonial Theory,” on the 
topic of “potential exhaustion of postcolonialism as a paradigm.” In this conversation, all of the 
participants agreed on the limit of postcolonialism and the necessity of new theoretical approaches to 
rapidly changing globalization. For example, Jennifer Wenzel problematizes postcolonial studies after 
9/11 as being “caught politically flat-footed, facing criticism from right and left” (634). 
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The “New Cosmopolitanism” cannot deny its own dilemma originating in the 
Kantian definition of “commonwealth” and “cosmopolitan citizenship” as the ideal 
vision of “world citizens,” which I will critically review in the chapter three. 
Moreover, its subordination into multiculturalism, which is “a name for the genuine 
striving toward common norms and mutual translatability” (Robbins 13), reveals its 
complicity with white supremacy and colonialism. From its origin, cosmopolitanism 
has been a Western ideal. Yet, trans-spatiality appropriates such substantial ideas as 
“common” humanity and global “community” from cosmopolitanism.  
Likewise, transnationalism is full of complex contention, though an increasing 
number of scholars in Asian American studies are employing this theory to explain 
various material and discursive relations. If we grant that the widely-accepted 
hypothesis that the nation is a fictive narrative and imaginary community, how can 
we claim that this does not apply to trans-nationalism which mostly focuses on local 
to local, local to global, and global to local relations? What‟s more, material 
transnationality is mostly influenced by post-Marxism and discursive transnational 
theorizations have lost the currency they once had. On a material level, multinational 
corporations becomes a “transnational corporation” that is “no longer…tied to its 
nation of origin but is adrift and mobile, ready to settle anywhere and exploit any 
state including its own” (Miyoshi 86). On a discursive level, theorizations of 
transnationality lack universality. Transnational relations among African countries 
cannot be the same as transnational relations among Asian countries. Colonial 
differences, different economic situations, and different theoretical demands in each 
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case turn transnational entities into a set of infinitely multiple examples. Still, the 
geo-political background of trans-spatiality is indebted to the transnationalism. 
On the other hand, Antonio Negri and Micheal Hardt‟s ideas of “Empire” and 
more recently, “Commonwealth” are not as ideal as implied. Though Negri and Hardt 
propose a legitimate vision of a non-centered and without-in-and-out Empire and a 
utopian space of Deleuzian nomads and the multitude, their international but 
anarchistic vision is tethered to the Western teleology.
9 
This limit also corresponds 
with the limit of their post-Marxist perspective. (Im)migrants or multitude are not 
new proletariats that have potentiality to bring about international revolution, because 
the logic of internationalism is not totally different from world capitalism or 
capitalistic ideals of the world as a flat economic community without borders. Empire 
and neo-liberal world order are, in essence, utopian and anarchistic. These socio-
political and utopian visions of the world, resonating with Kant‟s ideal 
cosmopolitanism, presuppose a utopian world without taking the negative aspects of 
(im)migrating bodies‟ singular experience into account. Without philosophical, more 
specifically ontological speculation on mobile bodies‟ realities and their 
unidentifiable voices, it is not possible to present the worldview in which those 
bodies‟ trans-spatial experiences are recounted.  
Last, diaspora studies shows how (im)migrants, through transnational exiles, 
create “for themselves a fresh mode of relation toward their present and the past, a 
                                                 
9 In Empire’s New Clothes, a collection of essays mostly critiquing Negri and Hardt‟s Empire, most 
contributors do not agree with their visions of the world. It is worthwhile to think over Slavoj Zižek‟s 
questions of “The Ideology of the Empire and its Traps”: “is today the state really withering away…? 
Is, on the contrary, the „War on Terror‟ not the strongest-yet assertion of state authority? Are we not 
witnessing now the unheard-of-mobilization of all (repressive and ideological) state apparatuses?” 
(264).  
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way of seeing themselves within a new order” (Manuel 39). However, such 
exceptions as refugee camps, concentration camps, sex camps, and so on reveal 
uncharted zones of humanity that require more extensive research insofar as those 
beings‟ consequential temporary habituation cannot fully explain these conditions of 
humanity on the verge of inhumanity. 
Unlike the geopolitical emphasis of these theories, this dissertation does not 
expand its scope into socio-political research. Trans-spatiality in this dissertation is 
limited to only Asians‟ experience and Asian immigrant writers‟ representation, even 
though other ethnic writers and thinkers heavily influence this trans-spatiality. That 
is, this dissertation, though centered on Asian immigrants‟ writings, emphasizes 
“relation” rather than authenticity in terms of trans-spatiality. Moreover, “relation” in 
trans-spatiality is a philosophical concept and an aesthetic metaphor. In literary and 
ethico-ontological spaces, imagination and humanity create universal relations among 
the singularities of thinkers and writers. What this dissertation proposes is that Asian 
immigrant writers‟ literary works in the Anglophone world are creating a poetic 
constellation of “trans-spatial literary spaces.” This constellation encompass a 
“spatialised aesthetic...[where] indistinct and indefinite diasporic identities are 
negotiated” (Bromley 67). Admittedly, this project could not be possible without the 
“commonplaces” among Asian immigrants‟ literary works. As I will explain fully in 
the first and other chapters, the “commonplace,” heavily influenced the key heuristic 
lieu commun of Édouard Glissant‟s “poetics of relation,” is the main linchpin that 
connects these universal registers.  
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In fact, the works in this dissertation share similar commonplaces. In this 
preface, I will introduce three commonplaces: the writers‟ experience of immigration 
from Asia or of internment, their experiments with genres, and the ethico-ontological 
signs of animal cries and voices from the dead in their works. First, most writers in 
this dissertation were born in Asia and immigrated to Anglophone Western countries 
when they were under ten years of age: Myung Mi Kim, Theresa Cha Hak Kyung and 
Change Rae Lee immigrated from Korea to the U.S. and Kazuo Ishiguro from Japan 
to England. Joy Kogawa was born in Canada but experienced a different sort of trans-
spatiality—relocation and internment in Japanese camps during World War II. In 
their literary works, these writers use or intentionally hide their trans-spatial 
experience. Immigration and unidentifiable identities dominate their lives and works, 
which raises for readers a commonplace question—how can these writers represent 
their trauma produced by exclusion, assimilation, and racism in literary space? I do 
not mean that their works are based on autobiographical narratives or that their life 
experiences determine their fictions; the central issue here is how they are able to 
represent trans-spatial experience within conventional genres by deconstructing these 
conventions.
10
  
Each writer in this dissertation experiments with a particular genre. Chang 
Rae Lee‟s Native Speaker evokes the generic particularity of a spy novel; Joy 
Kogawa‟s Obasan that of a poetic testimony of Japanese Canadian internment; Kazuo 
Ishiguro‟s Never Let Me Go that of a science fiction narrative with a backdrop of 
                                                 
10 Those writers also deconstruct the “autobiographical imperative,” as Huang calls it, of Asians‟ 
writings in Anglophone world Against this conventional style, the writers in this dissertation subtly 
and intentionally deconstruct this imperative to do “genre experimentation” (Huang, Contesting 
Genres in Contemporary Asian American Fiction 5). 
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contemporary England; and Theresa Hak Kyung Cha‟s Dictée that of a multi-genre 
avant-garde artwork. However, these works also deconstruct conventional Western 
genres. Lee‟s Native Speaker is about an ethnic spy, and its plot is not a conventional 
hard-boiled narrative but a postmodern consideration of immigrants and their 
communities. Kogawa‟s Obasan also denies the conventional realistic representation 
of testimonial literature about concentration camps and presents figurative images of 
animal, dream, and memory that poetically illustrate universal violence and trauma. 
Ishiguro‟s Never Let Me Go deconstructs the genre conventions of science fiction and 
expands its horizon to philosophical considerations of humanity and the ontological 
meaning of truth and freedom. Finally, Cha‟s Dictée delves into examinations of the 
relations between her trans-spatial experiences, Western and Eastern names of the 
void, and art; in this work, trans-spatial life, philosophy and art create a constellation 
in a form of a “bowl.” 
Lastly, I uncovered ethico-ontological commonplaces in novels I will analyze 
in other chapters—the animal‟s cry and voices from the dead emerging in Asian 
American literature. Admittedly, this does not mean that these ethico-ontological 
images can be found only in Asian American literature. Kafkaesque animals‟ cries or 
Benjy‟s animal cry in William Faulkner‟s The Sound and the Fury are also instances 
of this literary commonplace. Indeed, this commonplace leads to my overarching 
perspective of ethico-ontology differentiated from socio-political one.
11
 For this 
                                                 
11 These animal voices come from the true ethos of humanity according to Agamben, while Jacques 
Rancière regards it as an origin of the ethics of alterity that has to be replaced by politics as dissensus. 
Their contention in fact originates from the different understanding of a paragraph in Aristotle‟s 
“Politics” which reads: “Nature, as we often say, makes nothing in vain, and man is the only animal 
whom she has endowed with the gift of speech. And whereas mere voice is but an indication of 
pleasure or pain, and is therefore found in other animals” (1129). About this passage, Agamben argues 
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ethico-ontological philosophical framework, in this dissertation, I theoretically dance 
with Western philosophers: mostly Martin Heidegger, Emmanuel Levinas, Jacques 
Derrida, Theordor W. Adorno, and Walter Benjamin. Alongside these engagements 
with Western philosophy, I will also present its relationships with Eastern philosophy 
mostly in the first and the last chapters. The marrow of this dissertation‟s theoretical 
frame is built upon Giorgio Agamben‟ philosophy and Édouard Glissant‟s poetics. 
Their ideas of “potentiality” and “relation” ground the five chapters of this 
dissertation.  
The first chapter as introduction will address Asian (im)migrants‟ animalized 
or Otherized humanity and representations of humanity transposed to animlaity in 
three poets‟s poems (Li-Young Lee, Myung Mi Kim and Édouard Glissant) which 
create a constellation that provides a universal picture of the whole dissertation. I take 
on Heidegger as an example of Western philosopher‟s orientalization, otherization, 
and animalization of Asians and Asian philosophy. By this deconstruction, I propose 
three Agambenian concepts—potentiality, form-of-life, and coming community—as 
commonplaces of two cross-ethnic and cross-aesthetic relations between Myung Mi 
Kim‟s poetics of commons and Édouard Glissant‟s poetics of relation.  
The second chapter is an analysis of Chang Rae Lee‟s Native Speaker. 
Differing from previous Asian American critical attention to this novel‟s general 
                                                                                                                                           
that logos and phone as language and voice respectively in this quote reveals the pairs of “bare 
life/political existence, zoe/bio, exclusion/inclusion” (Homo Sacer 8). The voice is analogous with 
animality or zoe that has to be excluded for being included to the polis or state, while political animal‟s 
logos or language (discourse in modern understanding) verifies its humanity. On the contrary, Rancière 
interprets this passage to mean that “[a] speaking being is…a political being” (The Politics 12). This 
different interpretation shows a different philosophical understanding of humanity; Agamben on 
ethico-ontology and Rancière on aesthetics as politics. This dissertation follows Agamben‟s ethico-
ontological interpretation though not excluding the theoretical importance of Rancière‟s politics and its 
equivalent aesthetics (the conclusion will be my own pedagogical praxis of Rancière‟s dissensus). 
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themes of cultural difference, immigration writer‟s identity, geopolitics and racialogy, 
I discuss the similarity between Herman Melville‟s Bartleby and Chang Rae Lee‟s 
Henry Park to explore his transformation from a scribe in a scripture economy to a 
trans-spatial bard. Along with this analysis, I explore how Henry starts listening to the 
voices of the dead and his deceased son, Mitt, in order to disclose the true trans-
spatial community of (im)migrants.  
In the third chapter on Joy Kogawa‟s Obasan, I analyze three different ethico-
ontological series of signs—animal signs, dream/memory signs, and ontological sign 
of death. This chapter argues that true testimony is not a realistic representation of 
historical atrocity but a poetic representation of the truth of violence and its images. 
Influenced mostly from Deleuzian idea of art sign, this analysis focuses on the animal 
cry from the female protagonist‟s mother, and its ethico-ontological meaning in an 
aesthetic context.  
The fourth chapter shows a shift from trans-spatiality in America-centered, 
contemporary and anthropocentric narrative, to a clone-centered science fiction and 
the critical space created by Kazuo Ishiguro. This chapter regards the clone as a 
metaphor of potential humanity and debates its historical meaning. This future-
oriented speculation leads to inquiries of history and art. The clone as an artist is a 
cornerstone of the piercing issue of the relations between art and life in this 
dissertation, which I explore more specifically in the last chapter. 
The last chapter explores this topic of the relations between life and art via an 
overarching image of a bowl with the void in the center as a form of constellation in 
Theresa Hak Kyung Cha‟s Dictée. This poetic image of a bowl is in fact the universal 
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image of life, death, and rebirth. I will prove that Cha‟s creation of three different 
modes of languages—bodily language, name language, and language of translation—
produce “the poeticized” as the linkage between the trans-spatial writer and her work. 
In turn, I will prove how this linkage has the potentiality to connect the Western and 
Eastern names of the void—Khora and Tao. This last chapter also draws to a close 
the continuous discussion of such ontological moods as homesickness, uncanny, and 
melancholia.  
Indeed, these ontological moods are also mine as the trans-spatial writer of 
this dissertation. I will conclude without summarization but with a brief analysis of 
my own trans-spatial teaching experience in the U.S.  This unconventional conclusion 
is intended as an experiment of trans-spatiality‟s other possible deployment. That is 
also the reason why I use a bowl as the image of trans-spatial literature and the 
dissertation; it has the potentiality for an infinite future input and output that I will 
explore in my future scholarship. As Cho, Seung Hui was a form of life in this 
potentiality, all writers and thinkers in this dissertation form a bowl containing Asian 
noodle for readers‟ thoughts and happiness. Strangely, happiness is the endpoint of all 
the moods and voices in this dissertation. I will usher readers to this trans-spatial 
world suffering from homesickness, but I hope that together we can find a happiness 
in the journey. The following introductory and theoretical chapter will reveal the 
whole philosophical and theoretical map of the dissertation and will function as a 
guiding star of this journey. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
THEORETICAL INTRODUCTION: 
HEIDEGGER’S ASIAN ANIMAL THAT  
THEREFORE I AM AND THE POETICS OF COMMONS 
 
Philosophy has no specificity, no proper territory,  
it is within literature,  
within art or science or theology or whatever,  
it is this element which contains a capability to be developed.  
In a sense philosophy is scattered in every territory.  
It is always a diaspora,  
and must be recollected and gathered up  
(Giorgio Agamben, “What is Paradigm”) 
 
The poem is the answer‟s absence. The poet is the one who, 
Through his sacrifice, keeps the question open in his work. 
At every time he lives the time of distress, and his time is 
Always the empty time when what he must live is the double 
infidelity: 
That of men, that of gods—and also the double absence of the gods  
Who are on longer and who are not yet.  
The Poem‟s space is entirely represented by this and,  
which indicates the double absence 
The separation at its most tragic instant. 
(Maurice Blanchot, The Space of Literature 247) 
 
Animal images in Asian American history have long been prevalent. For 
instance, in Screaming Monkeys, Evelina Galang describes how Filipino Americans 
are compared to “monkey[s]” in “a food review of a Filipino deli called Mango 
Wango Tango” (3). While this incident enraged the Filipino community, it represents 
merely the tip of the iceberg in Asian immigration history, where Asians have been 
compared to vermin or “Yellow Peril”.12 Such hate crimes as the Vincent Chin case,13 
                                                 
12 This racial prejudice is closely related to the history of U.S. international politics given the U.S. 
imperialism and colonization of the Philippines. In this colonization, Filipinos could not gain 
citizenship because it was believed they were “inherently incapable of self-government and that it 
would be a crime to saddle the Filipinos with burdens of citizenship” (Gossett 329).  
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the L.A. riots, and the sequential violence against the Korean community, prove how 
images of Asians as savages (not Rousseau‟s noble savage) paradoxically coexist 
with images of Asians as victims who are passive in response to predators‟ violence.  
 Admittedly, this analogy of animals with Asians is not solely applicable to 
Asian immigrants. For instance, Glen Elder, Jennifer Wolch, and Jody Emel clearly 
show not just how Western anthropocentricism analogizes an animal space with 
immigrants‟ space (i.e. Chinatown, Koreatown and other ethnic enclaves) but also 
how this anthropocentricism stereotypically uses animal bodies to “racialize, 
dehumanize, and maintain power relations” (436). This transcoding of racialogy and 
anthropocentricism has been historically hegemonic in the West. Chicana/o, Native 
Americans, African Americans, and Asian Americans share similar stories. Yet, 
Asians‟ animalization in the West, especially in America, internalizes domestic and 
global contradictions: mute, hardworking, and tamed animal-humans having gone 
through racial animalization. Nevertheless, there have also been Asian immigrant 
writers who have endeavored to deconstruct these racial stereotypes and appropriate 
them in order to problematize the Western construction of humanity that operates to 
exclude Asians from the human landscape. For example, Monica Chiu in Filthy 
Fictions traces animal images and images of filth in Asian American fiction to unveil 
the cultural genealogy of racial discrimination and the degradation of immigrants‟ 
bodies into filthy animal bodies.
14
 A case which brings this to light is “Cleaving” 
                                                                                                                                           
13 Twenty-one year-old Vincent Chin, a Chinese American, was brutally lynched and killed in 1982 by 
two white men who received three years‟ probation. This case enraged Chinese Americans and made a 
nationwide impact to initiate recognition of hate crimes against Asian Americans. For more 
information, see Helen Zia‟s Asian American Dreams (58-81). 
14 An imposing example is Maxin Hong Kingston‟s Tripmaster Monkey where a Chinese protagonist, 
Wittman Ah Sing, uses his animal images as a monkey and narrates Chinese American history.  
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written by Li-Young Lee, a Chinese American poet who immigrated to the U.S. when 
he was young from China.  
According to Wenying Xu, Lee‟s poem in general inhabits the limbo between 
the “quest for Absolute and the necessity to speak from a material place,” which 
makes it possible for Lee to become “a diasporic Asian American transcendental 
poet” (95). As Xu maintains, Lee‟s poetics derives from a combination of visceral 
materiality and transcendental metaphysics. Though Lee is purporting to be a writer 
dealing with universal themes, the materialized metaphors such as food, animals, and 
plants that contain ethnic differences jar with his aim to present a universal and 
transcendental humanity. This contradiction stems from his trans-spatial experience 
and family history, especially his father‟s life: his father‟s political exile from 
communized China, conversion to Christianity while a prisoner in Indonesia, and 
continuous exile before finally settling down in the U.S. as a Protestant minister. His 
father‟s and his own diasporic life induces Lee‟s transcendental view of the world 
championing Western Christianity and the American dream. But this view, at the 
same time, becomes discordant with his personal experience of racial discrimination 
and stereotypes. For this reason, the animal image in Lee‟s poems becomes a 
contradictory image that represents Lee‟s racially animalized self-image, resonating 
with Chinese immigration history and his desire of becoming subordinated into the 
American transcendental spirit. 
Li-Young Lee‟s long poem, “The Cleaving,” begins with his eerie description 
of an Asian butcher in a typical Chinese American grocery store: 
He gossips like my grandmother, this man 
With my face, and I could stand 
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Amused all afternoon 
In the Hon Kee Grocery, 
Amid hanging meats he 
Chops       
(Li-Young Lee 77) 
 
In Lee‟s poetry, the third person pronoun “he” usually stands for the father figure. In 
“The Cleaving,” specifically, “he” designates a butcher and proprietor of a typical 
Chinese grocery store. This butcher who is chopping animals‟ carcasses epitomizes 
every Chinese immigrant such as “[his] grandfather;/ come to America to get a 
Western education/ in 1917, but too homesick to study” (Li-Young Lee 78). Then, 
grotesquely recounting the process of butchering with a vivid image of a “duck” 
dissected in such a way that the butcher cuts the head off and “cleanly halved it 
between/ the eyes,” the speaker “see[s], foetal-crouched/ inside the skull, the 
homunculus, /gray brain grainy/to eat” (Li-Young Lee 79). After this description, the 
speaker asks questions: 
Did this animal, after all, at the moment 
Its neck broke, 
Image the way his executioner 
Shrinks from his own death? 
Is this how 
I, too, recoil from my day?  
… 
This is also how I looked before I tore my mother open. 
Is this how I presided over my century, is this how 
I regarded the murders? 
This is also how I prayed. 
Was it me in the Other 
…. 
The butcher sees me eye this delicacy. 
With a finger, he picks it 
Out of the skull-cradle 
And offers it to me. 
I take it gingerly between my fingers 
And suck it down. 
I eat my man.    
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(79-80) 
 
In the speaker‟s imagination, the duck, while being dissected by the executioner, 
imagines that the butcher recoils from his fear of his own death. Death is a common, 
factual element among living beings, regardless of a being‟s hierarchical position in 
nature. This facticity of life and death amplifies as the speaker also transposes himself 
into the animal‟s position and projects himself to its (the duck‟s) death. Thus, through 
this switch of positions, Lee raises a fundamentally Heideggerian question: “how do 
we live historically” (Large 84)? For Heidegger, the answer might lie in the authentic 
being (Dasein)‟s historicity.15 This historicity is related to beings‟ facticity—being-
toward-death. From a Heideggerian perspective, death is one of two elements—death 
and language—differentiating human beings from animals. In the Heideggerian 
world, an animal‟s death is a mere physical death, namely inauthentic perishing, 
while Dasein dies (Heidegger, Being and Time 229). Although Heidegger admits that 
ontically both humans and animals die in the same way if death means the end of life, 
he claims that Dasein or being-toward-death, a person projecting himself to his own 
death, makes Dasein‟s ending authentic. In contrast, the speaker in the poem implies 
that animals and humans are the same because they all die. Death, to the speaker, is 
commonly relational, contrary to Heidegger‟s claim that “death reveals itself as the 
ownmost nonrelational possibility not to be bypassed” (Being and Time 232). If 
Heideggerian death is authentic, ownmost, and the sole moment of death, to the 
                                                 
15 Indeed, Lee‟s poetical and philosophical universe is thoroughly influenced by Western and Eastern 
philosophies; in an interview, he says: “The whole Universe is humming, is vibrating. It‟s that hum 
that I want to hear…To be a poet is to reveal the hum, which is „logos.‟ It‟s pure mantra, Tao, law, 
whatever you want to call it…And poetry is that frequency” (Dearing & Graber 111). This remark 
clearly shows that his poetic space is a space of encounter between Western and Eastern philosophy 
and a cosmos in which a poet becomes a poet-philosopher who envisions the historicity of the whole 
humanity ontologically. 
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speaker in the poem, death is relational and destructs the hierarchy between animals 
and humans. In the speaker‟s eyes, animals, the butcher, and the speaker are related 
ontologically via death.  
Equally, to the speaker in the poem, birth, considered ontologically, is as 
violent as death. The second stanza starts with the speaker‟s imagination of himself 
when he was born. The speaker “tore [his] mother open” to be “thrown into the 
world” (Li-Young Lee 79). However, this being “thrown into the world” is a violent 
event, regardless of the significance of a human being‟s emergence. The speaker‟s 
imagination moves further back into the origin of his life—the prenatal form of life. 
The speaker imagines a fetus as the prenatal form of his own self and compares it 
with the animal‟s “foetal-crouched inside the skull, the homunculus, / gray brain 
grainy/ to eat” (Li-Young Lee 79). A humunculus is a little full-fledged man that was 
supposed by mystics to live in humans‟ brains. There are three grotesque associations 
in this passage: the mother with the animal skull, the speaker and the Other in his 
mother‟s womb, and a fetus and an animal‟s brain. These associations open 
ontological relations among life, death, origin, and violence. All beings share the 
same origin whether animal, human or prenatal material. By this radical, ontological 
de-hierarchization, the speaker destructs his own human subjectivity and orientation. 
Then, the speaker in the poem leaps to the transcendental images of the butcher, 
history, soul, and body: 
The noise the body makes/ when the body meets 
the soul over the soul‟s ocean and penumbra 
is the old sound of up-and-down, in-and-out, 
a lump of muscle clung-clugging blood 
into the air; a lover‟s heart shaped tongue 
… 
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the butcher working at his block and blade to marry their shapes 
by violence and time; 
an engine crossing, 
re-crossing salt water, hauling immigrants and the junk of the poor. 
(80)  
 
Now, transcending the previous images of “every Chinese” and “executioner,” the 
butcher symbolizes “time and violence” becoming transcendental history, God, or 
Being that ontologically differentiates being from nothing. This transcendental 
butcher violently operates the ontological and historical system that transforms, 
connects, splits, and redeems souls and bodies. A person‟s origin as prenatal form 
corresponds with the origin of historicity. And this corresponds with Heidegger‟s 
philosophical thoughts of the origin of history in one of his writings.
16 
On one hand, 
by eating these origins of history and his life, the speaker in the poem embodies 
homelessness, while history and his life begins toward the end of history or the end of 
his life. On the other hand, through eating his prenatal form of life—the animal‟s 
life—and becoming Other, the machine of divisions between life and death, animality 
and humanity, and materiality and spirituality becomes inoperative. Eating is an 
ontological deconstruction to stop the machine. 
Subsequently, the speaker posits again this imagery of history and 
transcendental Being to physical and spiritual imageries of immigrants. Immigrants 
over the physical (Pacific) and spiritual ocean form “a many-membered/ body of 
                                                 
16 The origin of history and ontological time is violent as Heidegger claims in his controversial 
Introduction to Metaphysics. In this compiled lecture, Heidegger‟s interpretation of the choral ode 
form Antigone poetically discloses how humanity originates from the strange power of “denion” 
(Introduction 160). “Denion” means an overwhelming sway of violence and its forming of the world 
by taking a journey to dominate the earth and nature; in this sense, Heidegger says, “humanity is 
violence-doing” (Introduction 160). By this violent inception of humanity and its historicity, human 
beings become inauthentic beings, losing their ontological homes. Thus, Humanity originally began 
with “homelessness,” and its mood is “un-canny,” which in German (das Unheimliche), means both 
home and homelessness and turn into melancholia as a symptom. 
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love” (81). This “body of love” is not perfect or authentic but consists of “each one‟s 
unique corruption of those texts, the face, the body” (81). In other words, this body of 
love is a space of collective immigrants‟ bodily subjects and their imperfect and 
improper material spirituality, though this space has the potentiality to create a 
collective space of love. In this “flesh” taken as a totality, “All are beautiful by 
variety” (81). This body of love forms a spatial, historical “flesh” where all suffered, 
deformed, and both materially and spiritually separated immigrants can share their 
texts, trans-spatial experiences, and material spirituality.  
This flesh is not just an ontological totality but also a textual one. 
Intellectuality and historical connections through texts are woven into material 
spirituality and ontological “flesh” when the speaker “suck[s] the meat of animals or 
recites 300 poems of the T‟ang” (Li-Young Lee 81). Here, the speaker equates 
reading to eating in that “[his] reading [is] a kind of eating, [and his] eating a kind of 
reading” (83).17 Eating consists of both negative, destructive deconstruction and 
positive nutrient consumption. Discursive texts and material flesh are to be destructed 
and consumed to invigorate the speaker‟s intellectuality and body. However, this 
double act of deconstruction and consumption is violent in both cases. The speaker 
violently engages in this double process, especially to deconstruct Western humanity 
and transform his own ethnic identity into nutrient substance for him; the speaker 
“would devour [Chinese] to sign it, [a] race that according to Emerson managed to 
preserve to a hair/ for three or four thousand years/ the ugliest features in the world” 
(83, emphasis in original).  
                                                 
17 Lee‟s poem corresponds with Frank Chin‟s novels and plays that use Chinese eatery and culture as 
heroic place. But here I focus on pre-culture and philosophical interpretation. 
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By italicizing, Lee quotes Ralph Waldo Emerson‟s letter wherein Emerson 
wonders why “the same dull current of ignoble blood creep[s] through a thousand 
generations in China without any provision for its purification” (Emerson 127). In 
that letter, Emerson‟s diatribe becomes more and more racist as he claims: “Even 
miserable Africa can say I have hewn the wood & drawn the water to promote the 
wealth & civilization of other lands. But, Chin[a], reverend dullness! Hoary ideot! All 
she can say at the convocation of nations must be—„I made the tea‟” (Emerson 127). 
Emerson materializes Chinese civilization and its spirit by emphasizing China‟s 
allegedly “ugliest feature”18; yet his Orientalist essentialization of the whole Chinese 
civilization can in no way stand; it naturally deconstructs itself. In this way, the 
speaker in the poem deconstructs Emerson‟s racism and replies to his obviously 
ridiculous rant by eating “Emerson, his transparent soul, his soporific transcendence” 
(Li-Young Lee 83). The speaker devours Emerson‟s racism and xenophobia textually 
and culturally to deconstruct the violent shadow of Emerson‟s transcendentalism. In 
this sense, “eating” is the process of deconstructing trans-spatial history and its 
violence, but this eating is also a process of consuming Emerson‟s philosophy 
allowing it to be appropriated by the poet.
19
  
                                                 
18 According to Gassett, Emerson is one of the American intellectuals who were “disposed to endorse 
phrenology to one degree or another” (72).  
19 This eating is not just deconstructing but also an integrating process. As Jeffrey Patridge argues, 
Lee‟s eating Emerson indicates mediation “between his own voice and American literary tradition” 
(83). Similarly, Xu also holds that Lee “avenges himself and the Chinese by subjecting Emerson and 
his racist remark to the trope of eating, and with the same trope he simultaneously embraces his people 
and their four thousand years of history” (123).  
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Furthermore, this eating discloses the bio-power Chinese immigrants hold to 
resist the bio-political apparatuses that control them.
20
 The speaker sings, “muscles/ 
insisting resist, persist, exist…the body humming reside, reside…the body sighing 
revise, revise” (Li-Young Lee 85). Persistence and perdurance are Chinese 
immigrants‟ unrepresentable but most powerful bio-power against the American 
system of division and oppression Emerson‟s racism fits into. In regard to cultural 
aspect and identity politics, for Asians, residing in the U.S. entails a violent 
assimilation or a drastic revision of identities. Legally or illegally, while not 
registered administratively due to citizenship restriction and exclusionary laws, 
Asians survive, persist, and prosper. For this reason, Asians‟ ontological presence and 
movements across the Pacific contain such registers as cultural assimilation, 
homelessness, and resistance.  
Immigration history in the U.S. is a history of bio-political exclusion and 
resistance via immigrants‟ ontological presences. The only weapon immigrants have 
is their ability to scream and to “be” “here” and “now” and “move” persistently; they 
cannot communicate properly and fall short of claiming their human rights under the 
condition that their humanity is itself in doubt. They cannot be differentiated from 
animals under the state demographic apparatuses if they are counted as non-
identifiable non-citizens. These Asians become the uncountable “many” animal-
beings. The speaker in the poem ends the poem with his deep thoughts of violence, 
spirit, and possible change through a form of pan-racial community: 
                                                 
20 Admittedly, bio-power is not wholly positive; but bio-power in the most negative form can achieve 
its maximum power though by a being‟s presence and his everyday practice. The bio-politics is also 
not totally negative system but is interwoven to bio-power from the birth; however, in trans-spatiality 
bio-politics loses its meaning because of its incapability to identify an Asian being. 
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No easy thing, violence. 
One of its names? Changes. Change 
Resides in the embrace 
Of the effaced and the effacer, 
In the covenant of the opened and the opener; 
The axe accomplishes it on the soul‟s axis. 
What then may I do 
But cleave to what cleaves me. 
I kiss the blade and eat my meat. 
I thank the wielder and receive, 
While terror spirits 
My change, sorrow also. 
The terror the butcher 
Scripts in the unhealed 
Air, the sorrow of his Shang 
Dynasty face, 
African face with slit eyes. He is 
My sister, this 
Beautiful Bedouin, this Shulamite, 
…this Jew, this Asian, this one 
with the Cambodian face, Vietnamese face, this Chinese 
I daily face, 
This immigrant, 
This man with my own face.  
(Li-Young Lee 87) 
 
In these lines, the speaker, in compliance with Heidegger‟s understanding of the 
origin of humanity from violence, considers that violence as the essence of humanity 
“resides in the embrace of” the active agent of violence (“the effacer” and “opener”) 
and the passive victim (“the effaced” and “the opened”). This “embrace” deconstructs 
the dialectics of “the changer” and “the changed” so that it opens “the open” to all 
forms of beings, regardless of their roles, as a common place of all beings without 
hierarchy. The speaker in the poem “cleave[s] to what cleaves [him]” (Li-Young Lee 
87). Likewise, the speaker immanently cleaves the transcendental Being that cleaves 
him. This cleaving of the cleaving renders the literary space immanent because it 
reveals that “the cleaver,” as a transcendental Being, has the same spiritual materiality 
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as “the cleaved”; thus, “my meat” is in fact the cleaver‟s meat that the speaker in the 
poem eats, deconstructing the hierarchy of the passive victim and the active 
annihilator. This could be possible because of the opposite function of “cleaving,” 
that is, it connects transcendental Being with beings though its result is death. Only 
on the fundamentally immanent plane of life and death, beings and Being can be 
separated and simultaneously integrated. Negativity and positivity in both forms of 
immanence and transcendentality coexist with the rhythm of integrating and 
separating. 
Presenting this radical vision of a space where all beings, through splitting and 
connecting life and death as well as immanence and transcendence, exist immanently 
without divisions between transcendentality and materiality, animality and humanity, 
and subject and Other, Lee‟s poem ends with an image of gathering of all different 
immigrants into a common place where the alterity on their faces calls for ethical 
responses or responsibilities from “each of us” (Li-Young Lee 87). In this way, a 
Chinese‟s suffering face from the ancient “Shang Dynasty” as a materialized spirit, 
can have an “African face with slit eyes.” Every suffering face, like Levinas‟s face 
containing alterity as its content, forms an ethical community of the “flesh” in which 
Others with faces of “Beautiful Bedouin, the Shulamite…this Jew, this Asian” and so 
on, dwell together (87). Here ethnic particularity and universal humanity merge into 
ontological and ethical issues of animality and responsibility.
21
 This common place 
                                                 
21 Xu also discusses this metaphysical combination of universality and particularity in Lee‟s 
“Cleaving,” and says, “Lee‟s interpersonal ethics originates from his transcendentalist impulse to 
render cultural differentiation meaningless. Yet it is precisely his cultural difference that makes him 
fascinating poet” (126). However, I use singularity instead of particularity to note the different 
perspective from Xu‟s more cultural understanding. Singularity does not contrast with universal 
because it is a pre-cultural, ontological register of a person‟s ontological historicity.  
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and its ethical, ontological, and political contexts are the main topic of this chapter 
and the whole dissertation. 
From here, I will trace the connectivity of animality and Others (specifically 
Asians) and their roles in Western thoughts, especially through Heidegger‟s texts. 
The methodology I will take is commentary. As Deleuze says, “in the history of 
philosophy, a commentary should act as a veritable double and bear the maximal 
modification appropriate to a double” (Difference xxi). I will, from my Asian position 
as a “veritable double,” take on and comment on Heidegger‟s texts, especially on his 
differentiation between Dasein‟s world and the animal‟s environment placed in 
equivalence with the Other‟s world; at the same time I will conduct meta-commentry 
on several other scholars‟ commentaries on Heidegger‟s ambiguous exclusion of 
animality from humanity. Then, I will examine how Li-Young Lee‟s images—“body 
of love” as an ontological totality of “flesh,” historicity of violence, and imagination 
of a common place of all suffering minorities—are related to the poetics of commons 
and the poetics of relation proposed by two minority poets—Myung-Mi Kim and 
Édouard Glissant. 
 
Heidegger and Asians’ Animal Spirits 
It is little known that Heidegger collaborated with a Chinese scholar to 
translate Tao Te Ching in 1946, right after WWII, but rescinded the project abruptly 
after their last meeting in the summer
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of 1946. Paul Sih-yi Hsiao, in “Heidegger and 
                                                 
22 To investigate the genealogy of Asians becoming animals without spirit, I take on Heidegger‟s 
oeuvre for several reasons. Heidegger‟s encounters with Asians and Asian thought disclose the hidden 
dilemma Western philosophers had against the presence of other human races. Undeniably, Heidegger 
does not represent all Western philosophers and philosophy in modern times, and he is not the only one 
 31 
Our Translation of the Tao Te Ching,” reminisces and comments on his collaboration 
with Heidegger. Before Hsiao met Heidegger, Heidegger had resigned from his 
rectorship and become a hermit living in the Black Forest.
23 Part of Hasio‟s 
description of his first meeting with Heidegger presents a vivid but uncanny mid-war 
scene: 
On 27 November 1944, the beauty of the city of Freiburg in 
Breisgau, the scenic capital of the Black Forest region, was 
destroyed by an air raid. The air raid was unexpected, since 
Friburg was supposed to have been declared exempt. 
Twelve hours beforehand many animals and people 
became uneasy. Particularly strange was the behaviors of 
an enormous duck in the city park, which for almost twelve 
hours quacked and flapped around wildly. One is generally 
inclined to think that wild animals have premonitions of 
natural catastrophes, prompted by certain atmospheric 
changes “in the air.” But air raids are not natural 
catastrophes, but actions decided upon and directed by 
human beings. The monument to the duck by the lake in the 
Freiburg city park (bearing the inscription: God‟s creature 
laments, accuse and warns) offers food for thought not only 
for paraphychologists but also, I believe, for philosophers. I 
mention these impressions from my years in Freiburg 
because I repeatedly discussed them in my conversations 
                                                                                                                                           
who had a dilemma in admitting Others‟ presence and thoughts. However, the Heideggerian case is 
striking not only because of his popularity in Asia but also because of his status in Western 
philosophy; as many argue and I agree with, Heidegger is the last great philosopher so far in the West. 
Regardless of his notorious collaboration with National Socialism, his philosophy is the deepest, most 
controversial and influential in Western philosophy. I maintain that every post-Heideggerian Western 
philosopher starts their philosophy by opposing or agreeing with him.  
23 When Heidegger was elected rector in1933, he addressed, “The Self-Assertion of the German 
University.” Later this address became a scandal because he explicitly and implicitly had expressed his 
commitment to the Nazis. Heidegger here emphasized the necessity of shaping “those powers of 
human being (Dasein) that press it hard into one spiritual world of the people” (478). Heidegger‟s 
address is full of patriotic zeal and the vigor for reformation of the German spirit under National 
Socialism. When this address became a scandal, he asked for a posthumous publication of his 
justification of this address. In this “The Rectorate 1933/1934: Facts and Thoughts,” Heidegger 
defends his previous position and asserts that he was “neither a member of the party, nor had [he] been 
active politically in any way” (481). In this writing, Heidegger claims that he was a victim of the 
Nazis. Yet, his apology and excuses are elusive. More problematically, he still sees National Socialism 
as “the historical essence of the West” and regarded the fascism as a phenomenon of “nihilism” that 
swept Europe at that time (498).  
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with Heidegger. For I had the same experience as many 
other Asians…What [Heidegger] “brought to language” has 
frequently been said similarly in the thinking of the Far 
East. For example, temporality has always been understood 
differently in China than in the West. For us the duck does 
not need any paranormal powers: everything is connected 
with everything else, and in each moment there is 
concealed the entire past and also the open future. (93-4; 
my emphasis) 
 
In the essay, Hsiao, a Chinese scholar, ends this passage with a lucid vision of 
“relations” of beings and historicity of the whole. Interestingly enough, in this “space 
of relations” and historicity, animals, especially an “enormous duck,” are agitated, 
resonating with the global horror and violence of World War II.
24
 Also, Hsiao, as a 
stranger of an Other in the West, quizzically shares the mood of uncanniness and 
angst with animals as well as Heidegger. The future that makes present in the process 
of “having been” creates a totality of temporality into which animals and humans as 
well as Westerners and Easterners fall equally (Being and Time 326). More than this 
ontological understanding of temporality, Hsiao says that the animal‟s agitation and 
its premonition are more understandable to Asians than to the Westerners. Why and 
how? If animality is more sensitive to historicity than humanity, is this possible 
because Hsiao‟s essence is closer to animality than Heidegger‟s? Hsiao emphasizes 
that something is “brought to language,” vis-à-vis certain methods Hsiao and 
Heidegger similarly employ to philosophize issues related to Hsiao‟s experience of 
                                                 
24 My analysis focuses on later Heidegger compared to the early Heidegger whose philosophy was 
much more Husserlian and phenomenological. This so-called “turn” in 1930s when he switches the 
order of “being and time” to “time and being” is symptomatic because he moved much closer to 
Nietzsche‟s homesickness of the ancient Greek and using poetry as more mysterious and elusive ways 
to think over the end of the modernity and certain future-oriented historicity that he dreamed of. His 
engagement with Asian thoughts and scholars from this time reveal how he tried to set up authenticity 
of the new Occident tradition and authentic linkage of German and the ancient Greek. 
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the animal‟s uneasiness or animal “angst.” Then, how could they find common “ways 
to the languages”?  
Hsiao emphasizes “temporality,” which refers to Heidegger‟s historicity. 
Heidegger‟s historicity is premised on the fact that “existence as ek-sistence” is 
ontologically future-oriented and historical.
25
 That is to say, Heidegger‟s historicity 
focuses on Dasein‟s destiny in the darkness of the world and Dasein‟s future-oriented 
thinking as being-toward-death thus one authentically and resolutely chooses one‟s 
future, projecting herself into authentic death. Given Hsiao‟s description of the war 
and anxiety over the future of Germany as well as China‟s dismal geopolitical 
situation at that time, the commonality of Heidegger and Hsiao‟s positions over 
temporality correlate with both Eastern and Western philosophers‟ similar 
apocalyptic visions of their contemporaries. That is, regardless of Hsiao‟s use of 
German to converse, both Heidegger and Hsiao communicated as if they were 
transposed into “the enormous duck” because the moods over war and violence 
prevail in their worlds. 
 However, this interpretation encounters obstacles due to Heidegger‟s zealous 
nationalism and his ambiguous philosophy about animals. In fact, Heidegger‟s 
solution to escape the darkness of the world and the oblivion of Being, according to 
his Introduction to Metaphysics, is to transpose “Our people,” explicitly Germans, 
“from the center of their future happening into the original realm of the powers of 
Being” (38). If so, aren‟t Hsiao and the duck excluded from Heidegger‟s Dasein as if 
                                                 
25 According to Heidegger, Dasein‟s temporality is historical, and Dasein “temporalizes itself in the 
unity of future and the having-been as the present” (Being and Time 362). I understand his historicity 
as a romantic hero‟s resolute, existential decisions of his or her own future. Heidegger is much more 
close to Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, and Romantic poets than commonly accepted. I argue that Heidegger 
might be the last Romantic thinker, and his destiny has to be tragic as much as his romantic vision. 
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to answer, Heidegger, in a lecture, paradoxically asserts that while all other peoples 
lost their metaphysics as a historical spiritual mission, only the “German people has 
not yet lost its metaphysics…because it does not yet possess it” (Being and Truth 
63)? That is, only Germans could have the unique potentiality to restore authentic 
humanity. Indeed, Heidegger‟s communication with the Chinese scholar Hsiao 
reverberates with Heidegger‟s later notorious remark about postwar tragedy in China, 
where people were executed and many (including Li-Young‟s Lee‟s father) were 
exiled because of their political positions following China‟s adherence to 
communism. Heidegger claims:  
Hundreds of thousands die en masse. Do they die? They 
succumb. They are done in…They become mere quanta, 
items in an inventory in the business of manufacturing 
corpses. Do they die? They are liquidated inconspicuously 
in extermination camps. And even apart from that—right 
now millions of impoverished people are perishing from 
hunger in China. (Leaman 60; italics in original)  
 
Although his remark is ambiguous at best, I argue that it is naïve to say that 
Heidegger‟s remark is entirely racist and fascist. Heidegger‟s remark is, in fact, 
neither racist nor fascist, though his repulsion against communism is easily 
detectable; he seems to merely bemoan the perished people‟s inauthentic deaths owed 
to political inhumanity and the darkness of the world. Notwithstanding his pessimistic 
viewpoint that this tragedy of humanity would not end easily because it is caused by 
the core of modernity—technology and modern rationality—Heidegger‟s perspective 
is utterly ambiguous in the sense that his lament is based upon an enigmatic question 
of “how [the human being] stands with Being” (Introduction 148). From Heidegger‟s 
perspective, to put it poignantly, it seems that those Chinese who inauthentically 
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perish as animals “perish” rather than die authentically cannot “stand with Being” 
because they do not have time to set a journey of thinking before they “perish.”  
On top of that, the inauthentic termination of the Chinese is not an ethical, 
political, or aesthetic issue to Heidegger.
26
 Heidegger argues that (European) people 
have lost humanity not because “they” have destroyed the modern humanity that 
orients from zoon logon echon or animal rationale, but because “they” have 
jettisoned such true meaning of Being as logos or phusis (nature). Even so, are the 
non-European, (i.e. Chinese), not authentic beings, namely Daseins, if they perish 
rather than die? This question is correlative with Heidegger‟s ambiguity about the 
ontological difference between animality and humanity. Yet what causes these 
ambiguities? Heidegger‟s anthropocentric or Occident-centric exclusions are closely 
related to his exclusions of the inauthentic “they” from the German “new spirit”; in 
fact, in another lecture, Heidegger straightforwardly maintains, “national Socialism 
being driven today is the coming to be of a new spirit of the entire earth” (Being and 
Truth 116). How, then, may we understand this “new spirit” in the context of 
Heidegger‟s exclusion of the Chinese from authentic death? 
In Of Spirit, Jacques Derrida argues that spirit is the hidden kernel of 
Heidegger‟s philosophy, and this kernel of darkness contains the sublime darkness of 
the world and the fascistic commitment Heidegger hides, as well as its connectivity to 
the European, Christian and teleological spirit that have in history, under the name of 
                                                 
26 Heidegger clearly renounces contemporary ethics, saying that the contemporaries lost “the shaping 
of the historical Being of humanity, ethos, which under the influence of morality was then degraded to 
the ethical (Introduction 18); in a similar context, he also criticizes politics and aesthetics since 
contemporary politics disinhibits polis too much to make it “innocuous and sentimental,” while 
aesthetics lost its “polemos, struggle in the sense of the confrontation, the setting-apart-from-each-
other” (Introduction 140-141). 
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enlightenment and with the power of technology, manipulated, colonized and 
destroyed other civilizations. In this book, Derrida deconstructively dances with 
Heidegger‟s sporadic use of three words designating “spirit,” connecting this esoteric 
use to Heidegger‟s hesitation in speaking of his commitment to the Nazis.27 Derrida 
proves that Heidegger‟s spirit is not totally free from the shadow of Hegelian Geist28 
or Christian spirituality. However, as Derrida deconstructively analyzes, Heidegger 
flounders on the way to “the new spirit” as if something alien were parasitically 
attached to his “spirit,” while this alien being surreptitiously burrows under his own 
darkened philosophical kernel of the ontological identity of spirit and Being. This 
alien “being” is an animal or a human whose essence is animality.  
Heidegger, in “Letter to Humanism” deals with the conflicting relations 
among life, animality, humanity and spirit in more detail: 
                                                 
27 Derrida wrestles with Heidegger‟s subtle and suspicious uses of three German words (Geist, geistig, 
and geistlich). According to Derrida, Heidegger avows or disavows use of these words. In turn, 
Derrida reads Heidegger‟s connectivity to Hegelian or Christian discourses as well as “Heidegger‟s 
commitment [to] and breaks in affiliation” (39) with the Nazis. Correspondingly, Derrida comments 
that Heidegger‟s argument is full of “equivocation or indecision, the edging or dividing path which 
ought, according to Heidegger, to pass between a Greek or Christian - even onto-theological - 
determination of pneuma or spiritus, and a thinking of Geist which would be other and more originary” 
(82).  
28 This ambiguous connectivity centers on the issue of animality within spirit in both Hegelian and 
Heideggerian philosophies. One of the most intriguing and problematic example in Hegel‟s 
Phenomenology of Spirit is his critique of common sense as an animal feeling; Hegal claims: “Since 
the man of common sense makes his appeal to feeling, to an oracle within his breast, he is finished and 
done with anyone who does not agree; he only has to explain that he has nothing more to say to anyone 
who does not find and feel the same in himself. In other words, he tramples underfoot the root of 
humanity. For it is the nature of humanity to press onward to agreement with others; human nature 
only really exists in an achieved community of minds. The anti-human, the merely animal, consists in 
staying within the sphere of feeling, and being able to communicate only at that level” (43). Hegel‟s 
analogy is critical but ambiguous. Nonetheless, his solution of this problematic common sense is 
obvious; instead of common sense, “True thoughts and scientific insight are only to be won through 
the labor of the Notion” (Phenomenology 43). However, his analogy between animality, feeling, and 
anti-humanity in the abovementioned quote is problematic because, if what he claims is true, human 
feeling is animality, and its anti-humanity disrupts the creation of community.  
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So too with animal, zoon, an interpretation of “life” is 
already posited that necessarily lies in an interpretation of 
beings as zoe and physis, within which what is living 
appears. Above and beyond everything else, however, it 
finally remains to ask whether the essence of man 
primordially and most decisively lies in the dimension of 
animalitas at all. Are we really on the right track toward the 
essence of man as long as we set him off as one living 
creature among others in contrast to plants, beasts, and 
God? We can proceed in this way; we can in such fashion 
locate man within being as one being among others. We 
will thereby always be able to state something correct about 
man. But, we must be clear on this point, that when we do 
this we abandon man to the essential realm of animalitas 
even if we do not equate him with beasts but attribute a 
specific difference to him. In principle we are still thinking 
of homo animalis—even when animal [soul] is posited as 
animus sive mens [spirit or mind], and this in turn is later 
posited as subject, person, or spirit [Geist]. Such positing is 
the manner of metaphysics. But, then the essence of man is 
too little heeded and not thought in its origin, the essential 
provenance that is always the essential future for historical 
mankind. Metaphysics thinks of man on the basis of 
animalitas and does not think in the direction of humanitas. 
(228; italics in original) 
 
In this quote, Heidegger is destructing the Western metaphysical tradition that regards 
humans as rational animals by opposing “animalitas” to “humanitas.” His hidden 
target in this quote is Aristotle‟s categorization of the human soul as animality (“sive 
mens”) in the sense of animal.29 Heidegger critiques this metaphysical heritage as the 
origins of ontic thoughts, and then he veers his argument to the direction of future-
oriented thoughts to save humanity from this ontic-metaphysical tradition. In turn, 
Heidegger argues that his philosophy purports to escape the traditional metaphysical 
ideas of “subject, person, or spirit [Geist]” (Basic Writings 228) because these ideas 
                                                 
29 In Aristotle‟s “The Soul,” Aristotle divides “the soul,” into “(1) local movement and (2) thinking, 
discriminating and perceiving” (586); in Aristotle‟s episteme of the soul or spirit, thinking is 
equivalent with animal/bodily qualities of movements and senses; that is, a human being is a thinking 
animal, not a thinking human. Life and movement are the core of thought and animality in Aristotle‟s 
world. 
 38 
are the foundation of the ontic tradition. In other words, Heidegger claims, German 
Idealism and its spirit as well as its rationality are based on the idea that the essence 
of “humanity” originated from animality.  
Yet, the first sentence and sequential destruction (Heideggerian 
deconstruction) of traditional metaphysical ideas are in conflict with each other. Does 
Heidegger successfully destruct the linkage of life as zoe (bare life) and phusis 
(nature and emergence of life) and animality? Why is locating “man within being as 
one being among others” against human dignity (Heidegger, “Letter to Humanism” 
228)? Is not the ontic difference of life and death more fundamental than the 
ontological difference between animality and humanity? If animality shares “life” 
with humanity and this “life” itself is the foundation of humanity defined as a body 
with soul, by denying animality, Heidegger cannot help but succumb to the Romantic, 
Christian vision that humans must transcend their lives to become spiritual beings. 
Heidegger defends these suspicions and elusively admits that when his words are 
“seen metaphysically, we are staggering” 30 (Introduction 217) because all 
Heideggerian philosophy is easily mistaken as one of ontic metaphysics or 
existentialisms. But to me, Heidegger staggers in his discussion about animality and 
Others. 
Heidegger‟s equivocal philosophizing of animality and its connection to 
humanity as well as “new spirit” becomes more disconcerting in his 1929-1939 
                                                 
30 Reading through this passage, I could not be sure what this pronoun refers to. Does Heidegger refer 
to Germans or general readers? Heidegger‟s staggering gets more symptomatic. I quote his whole 
passage with this doubt: Heidegger says sequentially, “Everywhere we are underway amid beings, and 
yet we no longer know how it stands with Being. We do not even know that we no longer know it. We 
are staggering even when we mutually assure ourselves that we are not staggering, even when, as in 
recent times, people go so far to try to show that this asking about Being brings only confusion, that it 
has destructive effect, that it is nihilism” (Introduction 217). 
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lecture series published under the title of The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: 
World, Finitude, Solitude. This lecture has two parts: the first half is about profound 
boredom as Dasein‟s fundamental mood to open the truth of Being, whereas the 
second half is about ontological differences among the “things without world,” 
“animals as beings that are poor in the world,” and “humans as agents of forming the 
world.” Heidegger‟s search for “the world” in three different modes of beings 
initiates with the meta-philosophical search for the home of Western poetic and 
ontological thoughts before the emergence of the Plato-Christian metaphysical 
tradition; thus, the poet‟s and philosopher‟s journey to home as an origin of Western 
thoughts is to find the forgotten linkage between pre-Plato Greek thought and the 
contemporary German‟s new spirit. In this sense, this lecture series initiates with an 
appraisal of German Idealism and Romanticism such as Novalis‟s homesickness that 
is “an urge to be everywhere at home.” Subsequentially, Heidegger asks such 
questions as the following: 
What is man, that such things happen to him in his very 
ground? What we know of man: the animal, dupe of 
civilization, guardian of culture, and even personality—is all 
this only the shadow in him of something quite other, of that 
which we name Dasein? Philosophy, metaphysics, is a 
homesickness, an urge to be at home everywhere, a demand, 
not blind and without direction, but one which awakens us 
to such questions as those we have just asked and to their 
unity: what is world, finitude, individuation? Each of these 
questions inquiries into the whole.” (Fundamental 6) 
 
Contextualized within this quote, Heidegger‟s underlying presupposition is 
ambivalent: Dasein, as a being-with-others in its world forming world, is at home and 
not at home simultaneously. Heidegger paradoxically claims that “going home,” 
taken as the essence (ethos) of humanity, is a journey to find humans‟ fundamental 
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freedom, being burdened in that fundamental attunement to profound boredom. This 
paradox is “to liberate the humanity in man, to liberate the humanity of man…[but] 
This liberation of the Dasein in man does not mean placing him in some arbitrary 
position, but loading Dasein upon man as his or her ownmost burden. Only those who 
can truly give themselves a burden are free” (Fundamental 166). Heidegger holds the 
paradox that man needs to be liberated from his animality to be free, but finding this 
freedom is also a burden.  
What, then, about those animals enveloped in human forms, namely the “dupe 
of civilization”31or “ape of civilization” (Fundamental 5)? Are they as free as 
authentic humans, Daseins, if they are not burdened with this historical task? If they 
cannot have their “ownmost” individuality, can they be liberated from animality? 
Freedom is a task that individual Dasein to attain desires with the help of its 
propensity to bear the profound boredom in order to attune to Being‟s sayings. A 
collective pack of animals or the “ape of civilization” cannot do so because they are 
not able to bear the profound boredom. Heidegger makes the comparison between 
collective modern men with animality. Subsequentially, in this second part of the 
book, Heidegger onerously tries to prove that humans can find their ontological home 
in Being, through thinking and language,
32 
under the ontological moods of 
                                                 
31 Derrida poses a similar question reading Heidegger and claims, “the city-dweller who has lost all 
sense of country, who has shaken off homesickness, who has lost feelings of nostalgia…the modern 
city-dweller is an ape of civilization” (The Animal 146).  
32 Language is the authentic faculty humans have according to Heidegger. For instance, in his “Letter 
on Humanism,” Heidegger takes on a “scarcely fathomable, abyssal bodily kinship with the animals” 
(Basic Writings 230) and transposes this kinship between animality and humanity to the difference 
between them in terms of language. Heidegger‟s main argument is relatively simple; silence is the 
potentiality of speaking, and only humans can have the potentiality of silence before speaking because 
they can think and gather “disclosedness for the overpowering surge of beings as a whole” (Being and 
Truth 87). An animal‟s vocalization such as “roaring, bleating, barking, twittering” (Being and Truth 
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homesickness or melancholia, but animals, though cohabiting with humans, are the 
destitute of the world because they are tethered to their instinctual urges; they are 
open to the ring of instincts which Heidegger calls “disinhibitive.” In other words, 
Heideggerian animals move freely, but they are slaves to their natural instincts. Only 
humans can form the world because Dasein is able to form its world through a 
fundamental attunement to profound boredom.  
However, Heidegger seems to struggle with the implied other possibilities
33
 
that the essence of humanity is animality and that the authentic status of Dasein is 
exclusionary. He implies that modern men, as “they” or the inauthentic multitude, are 
in-between animals and authentic Daseins because they are acting in consonance with 
natural instincts and mechanical orders. Heidegger bemoans that modern men have 
lost their ability to attune to the emptiness and its profound boredom and philosophize 
their historicity as well as humanity because they fall prey to the inauthentic animal‟s 
“ring.” In short, Heidegger‟s animal metaphor of “ape” implies critiques of modernity 
and its mechanical, speedy, inhuman orders and suggests that humans are animals if 
they inhabit the animals‟ ring (or the open) where animal instincts captivate humans. 
                                                                                                                                           
86) is different from humans‟ speech in this sense for animals cannot keep silent because they don‟t 
have the aptitude to talk, while humans can keep silent because they can think and speak. However, 
some inevitable questions ensue: don‟t humans cry or scream, suffering like animals? What about 
humans (especially Others) who are not able to think or speak? What about silent or screaming beings 
such as savages, barbarians, foreigners, Chinese, or Jews in history whose talking and speaking has 
been regarded as equivalences to animals‟ “roaring, bleating, barking, twittering”?  Heidegger never 
answers these questions any more than he speaks about his commitment to Nazism.  
33 One of these possibilities is Negri‟s commentary on Heidegger‟s “poverty” in Commonwealth. Negri 
interprets Heidegger‟s “poverty” literally as economic poverty, and exemplifies Heidegger‟s criticism 
on communism to show how Heidegger makes an “explicit link between poverty and 
communism[…and] hatred of the poor…as a mask for racism” (49). I do not agree with Negri‟s 
interpretation because, as Derrida proves, Heidegger‟s poverty means cognitive, spiritual poverty, not 
economic poverty. Negri‟s criticism is not distanced from antagonisms against Heidegger‟s anti-
pragmatism. For example, in Nihilism: A Philosophical Essay, Stanley Rosen critiques Heideggerian 
philosophy in terms of nihilism which has brought up a “contemporary crisis of reason” (xiii). 
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The only difference between humanity and animality is hierarchical, spatial 
difference between their ontological openness to different worlds. In other words, 
humans form higher, philosophical, and artistic “worlds,” whereas animals are open 
to their lower, instinctual “environment” because animals cannot have the “as” 
structure (i.e. stone as a material for use or an ax as a tool to use for building a house) 
or humans‟ reflective structure of thinking.34 
To put it another way, humans generally have the potentiality to become 
Daseins because of their capability not to accept the world in consonance with their 
desires and animal instincts, but with the transcendental, reflective faculty of logos. 
What‟s more, though he emphasizes “being-with” in Being and Time, Heidegger 
expresses his repulsion of a collective, unidentifiable multitude, which contrasts with 
Heidegger‟s emphasis of the collective German task to bring forth the new spirit.  
But, as Agamben, a recent philosopher who takes on Heideggerian animals 
and excluded humanity, suspects, the difference between humanity and animality, as 
well as inauthentic mutltidue and authentic Dasein, is not clear. It is more likely that 
“Dasein is simply an animal that has learned to become bored […,] awakened from its 
own captivation to its own captivation. This awakening of the living being to its own 
being-captivated, this anxious and resolute opening to a not-open, is the human” (The 
Open 70, emphasis in original). In other words, if humans are fundamentally 
                                                 
34 Derrida explains this structure of “as” in the structure of language as animal‟s “properly 
phenomenological impossibility of speaking the phenomenon whose phenomenality as such, or whose 
very as such, does not appear to the animal and does not unveil the Being of the entity” (Of Spirit 53). 
Derrida‟s explanation depends on the Kantian notion of difference between the noumenal structure and 
phenomenal structure as well as the possibility and impossibility of the phenomenological horizon 
between humans‟ worlds and animals‟ environment, which also suggests humanity‟s self-reflectivity. 
In this sense, as Derrida deconstructs, Heidegger‟s differentiation between animals‟ environments and 
humans‟ worlds are fundamentally influenced by German Idealism, especially Kant and Husserl‟s 
phenomenology.  
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captivated by their instinctual, animalistic environment (ring) and vulnerable to the 
disinhibitive, why don‟t we say that animality is the essence of humanity? Isn‟t 
Heidegger also accepting this possibility when he says, “the „as‟ is something 
distinctive about that which human Dasein is open for, in contrast to the animal‟s 
being open for…In the case of the animal, being open for…is being taken by…in 
captivation” (Fundamental 333). The ellipses in this quote are original and implicate 
Heidegger‟s intentional omission of the “as structures” to replace them with erased 
spaces for animals and the collective inauthentic multitude. Namely, in the case of 
being deprived of the “as” structure, humanity cannot be differentiated from 
animality.  
In The Animal That Therefore I Am, Derrida also critiques this hidden 
possibility in Heidegger‟s humanity. In this book, Derrida deconstructs Heidegger‟s 
texts to reveal how animality lurks under Heidegger‟s new spirit and humanity. After 
tracing the genealogy of animality in Western philosophy, Derrida deconstructively 
proves how the genealogy of humanity and animality begins with Descartes‟ animals 
since he was the first philosopher who regarded animals as machines separated from 
humanity and spirituality. Later, Derrida suspects that Heidegger‟s discourse, despite 
Heidegger‟s explicit critique of Descartes‟ dichotomy of mind and body in Being and 
Time, “is still Cartesian.”35 This legitimate suspicion is on the same track with the 
suspicion that Heidegger‟s spirit is theological and totalitarian, despite Heidegger‟s 
explicit critiques on onto-theology and modern politics.  
                                                 
35 Heidegger‟s affiliation and explicitly critical approach to German idealism is confusing at best. For 
example, Zižek, in Ticklish Subject, also points out that Heidegger‟s critique of Kant‟s transcendental 
imagination is in fact opaque. According to Zižek, Heidegger hesitates at certain moments in his 
critique of Kant‟s transcendental imagination because Heidegger also realizes his philosophy includes 
Kantian problems of turning monstrous transcendental imagination into discourses.  
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Returning to Hsiao‟s essay one can see how Heidegger encounters Asian‟s 
animality. After first meeting with Heidegger, Hsiao learned the scandal of 
Heidegger‟s commitment to the Nazis. Hsiao confessed that he “[feels] considerable 
empathy [because] Heidegger [is] obviously suffering from injustice” (95). In his 
essay, Hsiao expresses empathy when Heidegger explained to him how the same 
quote from Being and Time was criticized by both the Nazis and the Allies (though 
Heidegger did not say which sentence it was). Hsiao‟s mood, however, grows more 
complex and ambivalent because of Hsiao‟s strong nationalism. Hsiao implores, 
“China was a pitiable victor, in reality only a half-Ally, even if belonging to the „four 
great powers in the world” (95). Hsiao is partly proud of the fact that China is a half-
Ally on the victors‟ side, while he is also partly antagonistic that China does not play 
the central role among the Allies. Regardless of his feelings, Hsiao sent a quotation 
from Mencius‟s famous maxim36 to Heidegger, and claimed that “Heidegger 
appeared to be quite moved by this quotation…[so] It was at this same meeting that 
[Heidegger] proposed [co] translating the Lao-Tzu” (96). 
Though they managed to finish the translation of the first fourteen chapters of 
Tao Te Ching, Hsiao and Heidegger did not continue after 1947, when Heidegger 
suddenly ended the collaboration. When Hsiao visited Heidegger again during the 
1960s to question him about the termination of their collaboration, Heidegger smiled 
and replied that it was Hsiao who did not want to complete the project (Hsiao 98). 
While Heidegger seems to be the one who outwardly broke the collaboration, it is 
                                                 
36 The maxim is “If heaven wants to impose a difficult task on someone, it first fills his heart and will 
with bitterness, rots his sinew and bones, starves his frame, imposes great poverty upon his body.” This 
maxim in fact is related to Mencius‟s famous idea of (天命, Tiānmìng) which can be understood as a 
political maxim that one‟s political destiny is predestined by the heaven, and fateful suffering is a 
springboard to transcend one‟s miserable condition.  
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difficult to know for sure who caused the end of collaboration. Hsiao might have 
caused Heidegger to abort the collaboration due to his nationalistic zeal and 
resentment against Japanese imperial intervention in China.
37
 Or, Heidegger might 
have found something in chapter 15 that deterred his further translation. There is no 
document to confirm either scenario, but I hypothesize that if it was Heidegger who 
quit the project, perhaps he did so because he found something in the fifteenth chapter 
that resonated with the dilemma of his exclusion of inauthentic beings and the 
political scandal in which he was locked. Chapter 15 of Tao Te Ching is about how a 
scholar can help herself to overcome troubles. In Chapter 15, Lao-tzu says: 
Of old those who were the best rulers were subtly 
Mysterious and profoundly penetrating; 
Too deep to comprehend. 
And because they cannot be comprehended, 
I can only describe them arbitrarily: 
 
Cautious, like crossing a frozen stream in the winter, 
Being at a loss, like one fearing danger on all sides, 
Reserved, like on visiting, 
Supple and pliant, like ice about to melt. 
Genuine, like a piece of uncarved wood, 
Open and broad, like a valley, 
Merged and undifferentiated, like muddy water. 
 
Who can make muddy water gradually clear through tranquility?  
Who can make the still gradually come to life through activity? 
He who embraces this Tao does not want to fill himself to 
overflowing. 
                                                 
37 In the essay Hsiao expresses his resentment at Heidegger‟s sympathy with the Japanese people, as 
Heidegger “considered Japanese people innocent and even spoke against reparation” (98). Hsiao 
implies that he might disagree with Heidegger‟s inevitable comparison of Japanese with Germans. In 
fact, at that time, Heidegger was the most famous and significant philosopher in Japan. As Graham 
Parkes claims, “The reception of Heidegger in Japan has been the most enthusiastic of any country—
perhaps even including Germany itself” (9). For example, the Tokyo school, a group of imperialist 
philosophers who were influenced by Western philosophy, tried during and after WWII to connect 
Heidegger‟s philosophy with their Japanese philosophy based on Zen. According to Yasuo Yuasa in 
“Modern Japanese Philosophy and Heidegger,” these Japanese scholars also expressed sympathy with 
Heidegger‟s scandalous predicament reflecting their own.   
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It is precisely because there is no overflowing that he is beyond 
wearing out and renewal. (126) 
 
This aphorism suggests that in order to avoid troubles, the Tao master has to be as 
careful and patient as he can be, waiting until “muddy water gradually clear through 
tranquility” and making “the still gradually come to life through activity.” Ironically, 
according to Hsiao, Heidegger loved these two lines and so “[thought] this through 
farther, in saying that clarifying finally brings something to light, and subtle motion 
in the tranquil and still can bring something into being” (Hsiao 282).38 Perhaps 
Heidegger regarded the Tao as very similar to his idea of truth—a realm of 
concealment and unconcealment—and he thought that the scandal would be cleared 
away as time goes by. Is Heidegger‟s interpretation of the aphorism legitimate, 
though Heidegger‟s interpretation ignores the negativity of the Tao? In general, 
Taoism deactivates any effort to fulfill as the last stanza of the chapter I quote 
suggests; emptiness and potentiality are much more important than fulfillment, and 
any positivity embeds negativity. But Heidegger‟s interpretation seems to imply that 
the end of all his troubles will be tranquil life, without considering the negatives 
results of seeking “fulfillment” of a philosopher‟s historical mission—bringing back 
Dasein‟s new spirit and establishing new humanity without falling into animality. 
Moreover, it is in the chapter fifteen of Tao Te Ching that there are two animals 
hidden in the second stanza. In fact, “Cautious (豫)” and “Being at a loss (猶)” as 
Chinese characters etymologically mean “elephant” and “dog,” and if these two 
                                                 
38 Heidegger even asked Hsiao to “write out these two lines in Chinese as decorative calligraphy” 
(Hsiao 282). 
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characters (豫猶) form a word together, it means “postponement.” Heidegger faces the 
Tao animals he excludes from humanity in these lines.  
As I have tried to deconstruct and discuss, Heidegger‟s hesitations toward and 
disavowals of animality as the essence of humanity is symptomatic because it 
parallels the uncanny responses of “the enormous duck” Hsiao and Heidegger 
converse over. This hesitation opens “the open” where the stranger‟s covert animal-
humanity is crossing through. The thin boundary separating humanity from animality 
obscurely reveals the truth behind Heidegger‟s conversation with Hsiao about 
animals‟ temporality and the hidden reason why he abandoned the project of 
translating Tao Te Ching. As the last example, this inversion of Dasein‟s home from 
humanity to animality haunts Heidegger‟s interpretation of Trakl‟s poems in 
“Language in the Poem: A Discussion on Georg Trakl's Poetic Work.” This inversion 
reveals the unstable ontological ground of a relationship between a Western stranger 
and animals in the Occident. By analyzing Heidegger‟s animality via his 
interpretation of Trakl‟s poems, I will show how, in front of the “darkness of the 
world” which agitates the duck, temporality causes Heidegger to exclude animality 
from humanity. 
In “Language and the Poem,” Heidegger interprets Trakl‟s poem by focusing 
on Trakl‟s enigmatic word choices such as “stranger,” “animal,” and “blueness.” 
Blueness is the color of the dawning world following the darkness of the world and 
the in-between color of the threshold between both hope (light) and destitution 
(night). In this mystic mood of a world of darkness and hope of the “new spirit,” what 
the “stranger” in Trakl‟s poems encounters is a “blue wild game” that receives its 
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blue from „the blueness‟ of the “ghostly twilight dusk” (On the Way 165). According 
to Heidegger, this wild game or blue game “not yet determined in its nature is modern 
man; they, mortals, would think of the stranger and wander with him to the native 
home of human being” (On the Way 167).  
Heidegger‟s reading of Trakl‟s despondency about mediocre modern people is 
melancholic because Heidegger‟s Trakl is, like Sisyphus, dragging his feet in the 
darkness of the world. In the poem, Heidegger reads both Trakl‟s maddening 
resentment against the modern world and hope, which synchronizes with Heidegger‟s 
own mood. Thus, it is not clear whether Heidegger is truly analyzing Trakl‟s poems 
or expressing his own mood and thoughts in the venue of Trakl‟s words.39 Heidegger 
implies that spirit (Trakl‟s spirit, but much closer to Hegel‟s Geist or the Christian 
idea of redemption) has illuminating and destructive aspects in terms of its historicity, 
in that the spirit‟s flame “is the ek-stasis which lightens and calls forth radiance, but 
which may also go on consuming and reducing all to white ashes” (On the Way 179). 
Thus, Heidegger poetically says that the spirit “has its being in the possibility of both 
gentleness and destructiveness” (179)40 and “gathers [living beings] into the One” 
                                                 
39 Karsten Harries, in “Language and Silence: Heidegger‟s Dialogue with Georg Trakl,” expresses the 
same predicament in interpreting Heidegger‟s Trakl essay; he asks, “who is speaking? The poet or the 
philosopher? There is no clear answer; the reader left disoriented” (502). About these questions, 
Harries proposes that the tension between “the language of poetry and philosophy” can be productive 
to elicit genuine thinking (503). 
40 The image of this spirit resonates negatively with the constructive and destructive power of modern 
technology. Considering the fact that this essay first appeared in 1953, it is contextualized with his 
notorious remarks about the Chinese and the comparison of the gas chamber with agricultural industry. 
Heidegger contends, “Agriculture is now a mechanized food industry. As for its essence, it is the same 
thing as the manufacture of corpses in the gas chambers and the death camps, the same as the 
blockades and reduction of countries to famine, the same thing as the manufacture of hydrogen bombs” 
(Manning 20). Heidegger, in this quote, echoing his comments on the Chinese‟s perishing like animals, 
is not mad but melancholic; he deplores the consequences of maddened modernity implemented by 
technology and Western rationality, and which causes Europeans to forget the true meaning of the 
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where “all…belong together” (181). This “one” as a site for gathering is both a poetic 
site and the site of the future to which Dasein is venturing. In the end, Heidegger 
discusses Trakl‟s evening land as “the Occident” (194).  
Heidegger‟s Trakl or Trakl‟s Heideggerian “Occident” as a land of the 
evening of blueness is a utopia Heidegger imagines as a site of the future; that is, this 
Occident is “earlier and therefore more promising than the Platonic-Christian land, or 
indeed than a land conceived in terms of the European West” (Heidegger, On the Way 
194). The Occident is not the contemporary European West, but a utopia Trakl and 
Heidegger perceive coming with historical light (logos) from the true West. From 
Heidegger‟s perspective, Trakl prophesizes that the descent of the world spirit due to 
“the apes of civilization” will switch retroactively to reclaim this utopian Occident by 
going back to the higher ground of true West and authentic history (presumably 
ancient Greece). Heidegger notes that Trakl‟s totalized one generation, taken as a 
coming community, will disclose a totality of true humanity in the Occident. In turn, 
Heidegger provocatively notes, Trakl‟s poem is “one single call that the right race 
may come to be, and to speak the flame of the spirit into gentleness” (On the Way 
195).  
However, “one generation,” one race, or one humanity that dominates Trakl‟s 
Occident has in its shadow fascism, nationalism, xenophobia, colonialism, and 
violence against true “strangers”: immigrants, Levinas‟ Other, and Asians in 
                                                                                                                                           
Greek “techne,” “creation (poeisis)” and “logos (gathering of fourfolds).” Nonetheless, another more 
morbid picture lurks in this romantic melancholy though; the status of human beings (i.e. Jews, 
homosexuals, gypsies, Korean women in sex camps built by the Japanese army, etc.) in gas chambers 
and death camps become tantamount with crops and food. Does he mean that those victims are 
equivalent to maltreated, industrially manipulated, massively produced materials (food)? If stone and 
wheat do not have worlds, could those victims have their worlds? The answer remains buried in a thick 
opacity. All we can see is the blueness of the Heideggerian spirit.  
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Heideggerian world. As an Asian, with a different mood of homelessness and 
melancholy, I can see a different blueness of the dawn than could Heidegger. Western 
philosophers are desensitized to a discursive mechanism that operates to differentiate 
animals from humans, inauthentic beings from authentic beings, and Asians from 
humanity. To me, Heidegger‟s and/or Trakl‟s Occident as utopia looks like dystopia. 
The dawn in the Occident is always already before and after the dusk in the Orient.  
When Heidegger sees the dawning sky in Europe, an Asian sees dusk and 
upcoming night. Hsiao might have surmised the same when he heard that Heidegger 
would not continue the translation of Eastern Tao. Heidegger might have aborted his 
efforts to listen to Asian Tao because it contains an alien animality that reflects his 
own animality. Then, if the exclusionary ontological machine operates in Western (if 
we can call apparatuses machines), even Eastern philosophers‟ thoughts, what is this 
machine?  
In The Open, Giorgio Agamben calls this machine an anthropological 
machine, which is similar to Derrida‟s idea of philosophical anthropology.41 
Agamben implies that Heidegger‟s ontology is interrupted by the ontic knowledge 
and theology
42
 though Heidegger explicitly undermines them. This anthropological 
machine as an ontological-political-ethical machine detects and forecloses animality 
                                                 
41 In “The Ends of Man,” Derrida discusses how Hegelian-Husserlian-Heideggerian philosophy are 
anthropological, namely how their philosophies are limited to “we of the philosopher to „we men,‟ to 
the we in the horizon of humanity” (Margin of Philosophy 116; italics in original).  
42 This corresponds to Derrida‟s discovery of onto-theological aspects in Heidegger‟s theory. Agamben 
claims that “captivation is a more spellbinding and intense openness than any kind of human 
knowledge; on the other, insofar as it is not capable of disconcealing its own disinhibitor, it is closed in 
a total opacity. Animal captivation and the openness of the world thus seem related to one another as 
are negative and positive theology, and their relationship is as ambiguous as the one which 
simultaneously opposes and binds in a secret complicity the dark night of the mystic and the clarity of 
rational knowledge” (The Open 59).  
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from humanity to imbue certain humanity with its authenticity and power while 
excluding others from authentic humanity. This machine undergirds the bio-politics 
that exploit animalized humanity under the disguise of spiritual enlightenment and 
anthropological division between savages and citizens. Meanwhile, in such spaces as 
refugee camps, concentration camps, sex camps, or warzones in the third world, 
animality loses its “life” as its essence while being transposed into the death. Namely, 
the anthropological machine, operating in the total discourses and ideologies of 
humanity, excludes animal-humans and operates as a death machine to bulwark the 
exclusionary mechanism of humanity; under this machine, POWs, FOBs, refugees, 
and so on, lose their humanity.  
How, then, can we stop this operation of the anthropological machine? How 
can we render this machine inoperative? I ask this question because writers I will deal 
in this dissertation ask similar questions and answer differently. These writers‟ 
solutions also function in concert with Western and Eastern philosophies. There are 
three ways to stop this machine, drawing from recent Western philosophies: 
Levinas‟s radical ethics of other, Deleuze and Guattari‟s becoming Other, and finally 
Agamben‟s coming community and form-of-life. These philosophers offer a way to 
imagine a literary space where others‟ negatives create a new aesthetic space.  
First of all, the anthropological machine deprives humans of the capability of 
disclosing the truth that humans‟ ontological “home” does not exist in ancient Greek 
thinking but in Other‟s suffering animal faces. This capability derives from “shame” 
as a fundamental ontological mood. Heidegger may have felt shame from facing 
animality as the essence of humanity and the Chinese people‟s inauthentic deaths, 
 52 
though he could not admit this. Heideggerian animals and the Chinese are the bluest 
animals in Trakl‟s poems, which are not fundamentally different from Heidegger‟s 
authentic stranger. Suffering faces, with or without real faces, are the ontological 
truths of Others as Levinas proposes. Levinas claims, “the epiphany of a face is a 
visitation” (Basic Philosophical 53), though his ethics also excludes certain beings.43 
The Other‟s face with an animal‟s suffering face visits “us.” Hospitality and hostility 
starts from this visitation, and the subject will realize that his or her ontological and 
ethical home is not in his world but in the Other‟s face. In other words, as soon as the 
subject encounters this face of the Other which has alterity as her content, he or she, 
whether he or she is a Westerner or Easterner, will “lose its naïve belief at home in 
the world and discovers itself bound by the other in ethical responsibility” (Peripich 
58).  
Next, it is necessary to admit that philosophy is geographical rather than 
universal. Heidegger, on his journey back to ancient Greece, staggers when he meets 
savages, the Chinese, and animality. The anthropological machine operates as soon as 
Westerners run into the limit of their understanding of these Others, especially 
animalized Oriental Others. A solution to deconstruct this limit might be to conduct a 
                                                 
43 Levinas‟s ethics is fundamental ethics as much as Heideggerian ontology is fundamental ontology 
(Peripich 7). Paradoxically, explicitly opposing Heidegger‟s philosophy and his political commitment 
to the Nazis, as a Holocaust survivor, Levinas also hesitates before animality. Levinas differentiates 
humanity from animality by saying “humanity is not a genre like animality” (Humanism 7). According 
to Diane Peripich, “Levinas and animals” or “Levinas and the environment,” in analogy with 
Heidegger‟s animals, are problematic, because Levinas ambiguously implies that we are not 
responsible for certain animals‟ suffering faces since they do not have faces; Levinas said in an 
interview that “The priority is not found in the animals, but in the human face” (155), and a snake does 
not have a face while an ape does. Peripich finalizes her interpretation of this ambiguity by claiming 
“Why does Levinas give the human face priority?...because it is only in human society that it is 
possible to worry about justice for others, human and others alike” (175). But, I think Peripich‟s 
interpretation is as sympathetic and ambiguous as Derrida‟s about Heidegger‟s animals.  
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virtual (thought) experiment of becoming Others, animals, and so on. This is not the 
same as mere sympathy, but a creative production of universality among people with 
the help of a strategic comportment of each individual‟s singular difference. Gilles 
Deleuze and Felix Guattari in What is Philosophy? bring the notion of shame and 
playing the part of animal in order to “pass into” a zone of potentiality: 
The feeling of shame is one of philosophy‟s most powerful 
motifs. We are not responsible for the victims but 
responsible before them. And there is no way to escape the 
ignoble but to play the part of the animal (to growl, burrow, 
snigger, distort ourselves): thought itself is sometimes 
closer to an animal that dies than to a living, even 
democratic, human being….We think and write for animals 
themselves. We become animal so that the animal also 
becomes something else. The agony of a rat or the 
slaughter of a calf remains present in thought not through 
pity but as the zone of exchange between man and animal 
in which something of one passes into the other. (107-109)   
 
Here Deleuze and Guattari, roaming on Heideggerian Occident, are not only more 
melancholic, but they are also more optimistic than Heidegger. As they claim, the 
way to get over the Heideggerian dilemma is to “become” Other, such as animals and 
Asians. This is a way to virtually imagine a new people that are neither as totalitarian 
nor authentic as Heidegger‟s “one generation” in the Occident. In this fashion, 
Deleuze and Guattari envision “the shadow of the „people to come‟ in the form of art” 
(What 218), and they optimistically argue that this coming people in the form of art 
“can only be created in abominable sufferings, and it cannot be concerned any more 
with art or philosophy. But books of philosophy and works of art also contain their 
sum of unimaginable sufferings that forewarn of the advent of a people. They have 
resistance in common—their resistance to death, to servitude, to the intolerable, to 
shame, and to the present” (What 110; my emphasis). 
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 Then who are these “coming people,” with suffering faces, inviting our 
responsibilities, forewarned by art and philosophy, and formed via becoming others? 
Agamben, in a similar venue, proposes the idea of the “coming community” of 
“whatever singularity.”44 Agamben‟s “coming community” is not a community in the 
future; rather, this community is the most fundamental form of community that exists 
“now” and “here,” though it cannot be represented. Agamben‟s coming community 
cannot be represented because it consists of purely singular beings without identities. 
Besides, this community does not belong to history because it “entails the possibility 
of redemption [and is] construed on the acceptance of irreparable facticity and 
contingency of the world” (Salzani 45). This community is also the extremely 
common
45
 community where all can be included as examples. Agamben proposes this 
idea of the unrepresentable community to make the anthropological machine and 
exclusionary violence inoperative.  
If it can be imagined in ethico-ontological space, how, then, can art, especially 
literature, present this community? Agamben‟s answer to these questions merges into 
                                                 
44 The most definite similarity between Agamben and Deleuze is their highlighting potentiality as the 
positive and real power of life. Still, as Claire Colebrook asserts, the difference lies in method: 
“whereas Deleuze‟s method tends to be ontological—he uses science and problems of the physical 
world to consider life and difference—Agamben‟s method is genealogical and philosophical” (56). 
However, I propose the more accurate difference is that Agamben‟s philosophy is ontological, while 
Deleuze‟s philosophy is ontic.  
45 In Means without End, Agamben enigmatically proposes the idea of common as the most extensive 
political idea of “use” that does not differentiate proper from improper nor appropriation from 
expropriation. He imagines a common political element between unifying totalitarian propriety and 
unrestrained industrial democracy of impropriety. He then proposes such possible common forms such 
as “inoperative community, compearance, equality, loyalty, mass intellectuality, the coming people, 
whatever singularity, or…event of language intended as free use of the common and as sphere of pure 
means” (117-8). These common means without end purport to maximize the potentiality of political 
forms people can imagine and actualize. Indeed, oppression begins with emphasis of “end,” such as the 
Western teleological end of history. “Common,” in this sense, is the rhetorical device to imagine an 
ontological dimension of all-inclusive form of eings without being divided culturally or political aims 
such as international communization, international democratization, commonwealth, and so on. 
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a concept—potentiality. Potentiality is the core of Agamben‟s oeuvre and correlates 
with his ontological ethics that reject any exclusionary violence. These coming people 
in the coming community resist the anthropological machine by their ontological and 
common presences; their bodies in nudity, as bare lives, become full potentiality for 
ethical responsibility.
46
 Agamgen‟s idea of “bare lives” as homo sacer is not to 
express humanitarian pity over these outcast lives. It is rather a philosophical 
speculation of the human condition and its negatives that biopolitics and its 
anthropological machine manipulate; Agamben, as Kishik interprets, “tries to jam 
[the] metaphysical division-machine” (34).47 All exclusionary violence, according to 
Agamben, initiates because we do not think of these negatives and the potential realm 
of our beings with actual beings. Within common and all-inclusive humanity, such 
negatives as Others, homo sacer, animality, or savages coexist with positive form-of-
life and are not sublated into dialectic synthesis; in this sense, “I” am a singular being 
in the community without identities or divisions between my negatives and positives. 
In terms of ethico-ontology, every time we think of humanity, it is ethical to think of 
animaltiy as humanity‟s potentiality, and the reverse is the same. Heidegger‟s 
melancholia will persist, and his animals will bleat, squeak, live, and die in my 
dissertation as in reality. In this fashion, Asians in the “coming community” will 
                                                 
46 In Nudities, Agamben traces the ontological and religious meaning of nudity and compares its 
meaning to Heideggerian truth as “the opening of truth, of „disclosedness‟ (a-letheia, 
„unconcealment‟), without which knowledge would not be possible” (81). 
47 Homo sacer is a concept to divulge the apparatuses of the anthropological machine which 
distinguishes human‟s life into zoe (bare life) and bio (political life) to exclude those homo sacers from 
humanity. Homo sacer is the dark side of legal, state bio-politics. As Kishik aptly states, “our life, with 
its basic rights and liberties, is usually protected by the laws of a state; but it can also easily be 
transformed into what Agamben calls a bare or naked life, which is stripped of its way or form of life. 
With a blink of an eye, a flick of a pen, or a press of a button, any „good citizen‟ from any „respected 
country‟…can be excluded from the state-run „protection plan‟ and thus be exposed to random acts of 
violence” (18).  
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imagine a commons or commonplace they can gather, speak, eat, live, and die. And, 
this commonplace is the literary space I propose.  
Admittedly, there are more than three registers to stop the anthropological 
machine. What‟s more, the weakest part of my application of Agamben‟s ideas such 
as form-of-life and the coming community seems to radically contradict the 
legitimacy of theoretical framework of this dissertation; it can be said that it is 
preposterous to use those most fundamental ontological ideas for Asian American 
studies. This critical flaw in fact is more than a flaw but a Derrida‟s pharmakon, 
which means both medicine and poison. As I briefly introduced in the preface, my use 
of Agamben‟s ideas is for grounding. I do not deny that Agamben‟s philosophy is 
“before” any ethnic studies. Yet, my proposal is that because of the propositions of 
these non-identity-political, non-cultural, absolutely non-ethnic ideas, I can move to 
the discussion of Asian politics, ethics and literature. Without these concepts, 
linguistic and cultural studies on ethnic literature will lose their connectivities to other 
ethnic studies and their potentiality. This is the same with Heidegger‟s philosophy; 
that is, because of Heideggerian philosophy‟s ontological grounding, we can further 
his philosophical ideas into ontic culture, politics, and individual discipline.  
From now, to bridge my commentary and meta-commentary on Western and 
Eastern philosophers to the final vision of an aesthetic space, I will focus on three 
registers appropriated from Western ideas: tarrying with negative, strategic 
nominalism, and creative universals. These registers will reveal a literary commons 
where Asians and animals exist, breaking free from the anthropological machine. 
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Strategic Nominalism and Creative Universals  
 Ethnic writers often run into a question of their agency in writing about their 
ethnic identities and experience. In particular, those who have trans-spatial experience 
while writing about their experiences are prone to fall into such predicament because, 
as Patridge observes, they have to “draw from cultural codes „alien‟ to the codes of 
the established literature, but they likewise draw from the traditions, literary 
influences, and established codes of the major literature” (123).  This dilemma is also 
relevant to their philosophical questions about the contradiction between universal 
form-of-life and ethnically specific forms of life. Then, what kind of form-of-life can 
ethnic writers imagine without losing their ethnic agencies as well as universal 
humanity? Before undertaking this question, we must first consider what form-of-life 
is. 
 Agamben‟s “form-of-life” is a powerful metaphysical tool to think of the 
correlation and difference between the universal and the singular as well as the 
positive and the negative within humanity. If life is a form, regardless of its content, 
one‟s life can have different forms of life; in other words, one‟s present form of life 
has n-1 potential forms-of-life, I mean full potentiality minus the current form of life 
as a graduate student or Asian in the Occident in my case. Appearance and spectacle 
in society hides these n-1 potentialities. However, as soon as this form-of-life is 
fractured and divided into various forms of life—bare life, Dasein‟s life, Asian life, 
Jewish life, animalized life, life in a concentration camp—ontological exclusion 
begins, and a being falls into one of categories: Heideggerian Dasein, animal, 
Chinese, and so on. Inasmuch as the form-of-life sustains its singularity as an 
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example and its universality as a form-of-life, not divided into various forms, the 
anthropological machine cannot operate.
48
  
Thus, to deliberatively sustain the singular form-of-life and avoid the violence 
of division and exclusion, the n-1 potentiality of negatives under the form-of-life has 
to be recognized but hidden from the anthropological machine. Agamben‟s 
philosophy is to contemplate all these possible forms of life and philosophically 
render them examples of an indivisible form of life. In this regard, Agamben finds the 
problems of negatives in Hegel‟s philosophy, but these negatives in Hegel‟s 
philosophy are the foundation of Agamben‟s philosophy. From now, though briefly, I 
will analyze how Hegel takes on this issue of negative and deconstruct his dialectic 
system to show the necessity of strategic nominalism
49 
and the creative universal. 
Together, these can present the form-of-life in a form of literary space as commons 
where the anthropological machine becomes inoperative.  
Hegel‟s notion of “tarrying with negative,” contains snags of animality against 
humanity, the form of community and life, and the role of aesthetics. Hegel says: 
“Spirit is this power only by looking the negative in the face, and tarrying with it. 
This tarrying with negative is the magical power that converts it into being” 
(Phenomenology 19). This passage constitutes the marrow of the Hegelian dialectic 
                                                 
48 The whole argument of form-of-life originates from Agamben‟s most promising and potent essay, 
“Form-of-Life.” In this essay, he defines the term “form-of-life” as, “a life that can never be separated 
from its form, a life in which it is never possible to isolate something such as naked life” (Means and 
End 3-4). This form of life is absolutely immanent life without identities and divisions, such division 
as zoe and bio. This form-of-life is powerful means to stop the anthropological machine because it 
provides a maximum potentiality with zero actualization—such potentiality of “potentiality not to do.” 
In this sense, his philosophy proposes a negative side of the philosophy of human will and its focus on 
ends. 
49I use this term without reference to other scholars, but I have observed several scholars using it for 
different purposes. For example, Thomas Osborne uses this term to analyze Foucault‟s ethics. 
However, my use is not the same as Osborne‟s.  
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and its negative. The basic argument is that our everyday experience consists of given 
common sense and its self-enclosed circle, but at some moment, consciousness 
recognizes otherness because of the power of “Understanding” that defamiliarizes this 
common sense. Difference that emerges from these accidents and negatives produced 
via different otherness is in fact “the energy of thoughts, of the pure 
„I‟”(Phenomenology 19). Just prior to the quotation, Hegel exemplifies “Death” and 
“Beauty” as negatives. Life and understanding tarry with these negatives so that they 
sustain. Thus, Hegel‟s Absolute Spirit (Geist) is able to uphold its power only when it 
continues to tarry with negatives.  
 Returning to the previous arguments, if humanity and reasons are positive, it 
is not preposterous to assume that animality and emotions are negatives. In this 
context, beauty, death, animality, and emotions share the same negativity in Hegelian 
dialectic. This tarrying with the negative is also a process to bring forth universals 
and, dialectically, a community of isolated individual self-consciousness in Hegel‟s 
dialectic. However, this dialectical process of two different self-consciousnesses that 
form a community interestingly excludes certain others in the process of forming the 
state, as the anthropological machine operates under the auspice of spirit, humanity, 
history, Identity, the same, the Occident, or citizenship. For instance, discussing the 
dialectic transition from the ethical order of “Family” to the political “State,” Hegel 
claims, “it is only as citizen that [the individual] is actual and substantial…so far as 
he is not a citizen but belongs to the Family, is only an unreal impotent shadow” 
(Phenomenology 270). That is, though being included in the ethical order and 
community of “Family,” according to Hegel, a non-citizen cannot achieve its potent 
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self-consciousness because it becomes an impotent shadow of the state as the 
completion of Absolute Spirit. In terms of Hegelian dialectic and its negativity, the 
non-citizen status of a human being is consonant with the premature social system—
the Family—before its evolution into a more developed social form of the state.  
 However, here Hegel‟s “tarrying with negatives” persists and opens another 
problematic combination of universal and particular I discussed previously as two 
contradictory registers in ethnic writers‟ creation of universal form-of-life alongside 
singular forms of life. If negatives remain with positives, neither universals nor 
particulars can be solely negatives or positives. In this eternal tarrying moment, what 
a writer needs is to avoid a preposterous situation where one‟s ethnic particulars jar 
with universal themes; in this paradoxical situation, a writer has to choose which of 
universal or particular is negative and positive as well as its vice versa.  
 To avoid this dialectic sublation, rhetorical apposition or conjunction of 
negatives and positives must occur. And, in these appositional “relations,” 
universality and particularity coexist though the universal constantly changing form 
to be a continuum or a totality that preserves particulars‟ differences. The particular 
must be strategically emphasized to create these universals for the totality or the 
continuum. Philosophically, these eternal tarrying moments of negatives and positives 
as well as appositional relations of universals and particulars require creative 
universals and strategic nominalism. Contemporary nominalism
50 
in the geo-cultural 
                                                 
50 Nominalism, according to the Dictionary of Philosophy, generally means “abstract or general terms, 
or universals, [which] represent no objective real existents, but are merely words or names, mere vocal 
utterances” (211).  This disconnection between things and representation opposes realism, which 
hypothesizes the actual existence of universals. According to nominalism, if we use „evil‟ as a 
universal term, it cannot universally exist in reality; what exists are particular events or beings that 
cannot be universalized into „evil.‟ Nominalism, in the context of postmodern, post-structural theories 
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world represents bodies whose particular presences deconstruct the historical progress 
of universals such as justice, spirit, and humanity. As Fredrick Jameson claims, 
modernism or postmodernism can be transcoded as cultural nominalism because in 
globalization, national, racial, gender, local, individual differences implode the 
universals and their authenticity. Aren‟t positive humanity and negative animality 
then universals and thus lose their significance as ontological categories and 
hierarchy? Cultural and political minorities face a dilemma between universals and 
particulars. If we disagree with nominalism, the result can mean the exclusion of 
everything ineffable and indelible in the West determining it as universal negative 
(i.e. animality in Li-Young Lee‟s “The Cleaving” will lose its specific Chinese 
experience and its singularity, undifferentiated from White immigrants‟ experiences); 
on the other hand, if we fully agree with nominalism and emphasize fundamental 
differences that cannot be universalized, it is questionable how we can create a 
totality within which minorities are able to find universal ground or a common place 
to exist with particular others without excluding negatives. Thus, nominalism 
becomes a strategic method to generate a creative universality that has the potentiality 
to contain constant changes of its elements and forms. 
A form of an appositional combination of strategic nominalism and creative 
universality in literary space is Benjamin‟s constellation, in which differences 
maintain their powers while adding, via constant change of form of constellation, new 
particulars without universalizing them into fixed concepts or essences. The 
                                                                                                                                           
and cultures, represents the symptoms Fredrick Jameson calls the “loss of historicity” or “historical 
deafness” because it rejects mapping the general picture of the global culture, politics, and even 
ontology (Postmodernism x-xi). Using nominalism in Adorno‟s philosophical context, Jameson argues 
that aesthetic nominalism is paradoxical in that though it rejects the universal, it also means “reduction 
to the body as such” (Postmodernism 152). 
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constellation does not deny universal concepts or essences, but it denies the 
oppressive universalizing process of identity, universalization, totalitarian politics, 
teleological history, and the general humanity. This constellation has a potentiality to 
actualize certain poetics on literary space that represents the spaces where Asian 
foreigners, strangers without spirit, and human-animals dwell everywhere including 
concentration/refugee/sex camps as well as states of exception. Their voices can 
relate to each other without falling into violent universalization or impotent 
nominalism while keeping every positive‟s potential negatives; likewise, in this 
constellation, form-of-life as a creative universal can contain differential forms of life 
while avoiding form-of-life‟s divisions into various forms of life.  
 Many Western intellectuals are also looking for a way to create a new 
“relation” in literary, political, ethical, and ontological spaces. Agamben, Negri, 
Derrida, Badiou, Glissnat, Deleuze and Guatarri, and others, are similarly attempting 
to find these new universal relations of singularities without excluding negatives in 
philosophical, political, ethical, and aesthetic spaces. They are tarrying with negatives 
using creative universals and strategic nominalism. For example, interpreting Negri‟s 
multitude, which contains differential, nominal positions in the Empire such as 
feminism, nationalism, ecology, the animal right movement and so on, Paolo Virno 
also argues that Negri‟s multitude,51 as political and ontological multitude, is a 
rhetorical “commonplace” because it “is united by the risk which derives from „not 
                                                 
51 In an interview, Negri explicitly criticizes and rejects “„negative thought‟ (from Nietzsche to 
Benjmain and from Rosenzweig to Agamben)‟” (Negri on Negri 38). Following Deleuze‟s and 
Spinoza‟s philosophical ground of immanence and mono-substance, he rejects these thinkers‟ negative 
sides because their philosophies are limited within Western modernity and its nihilism. He also 
criticizes Agamben and Derrida because they are too Heideggerian (Negri on Negri 82). I am not in the 
place of judging if his criticism is legitimate, but his criticism seems to be too biased and ignores the 
negatives he also sees but cannot accept because of his political utopianism.  
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feeling at home,‟ from being exposed omnilaterally to the world” (34). Virno uses 
“common place” as the rhetorical space of the multitude in the sense that “common 
places” are “the apotropaic resource of the contemporary multitude…[and] the 
epicenter of that linguistic…animal which is the human animal” (34-5). As I also 
have maintained, the uncanny ontological mood of “not feeling at home” as a human-
animal is a commonplace “life of mind” (Virno 34). In turn, this “life of mind” as a 
creative universal is “the One which lies beneath the mode of being of the multitude” 
(Virno 37). 
 This use of “commonplace” as a constellation, as a space of multitude, “form-
of-life,” or coming community through creative universals and strategic nominalism 
to disinter the unmediated negatives hidden in (post) modern ontology and its 
aesthetic presentation is not limited to European philosophers. Li-Young Lee‟s poem 
also shows the creative universals of animality and the “not-at-home” mood as well 
as the strategic nominalism of the Chinese experience of his spirituality to keep the 
universal potentiality of becoming negative forms of life such as animal-humans or 
Others. There are two additional, significant, minority, pan-racial intellectuals and 
poets I will discuss—Myung Mi Kim and Édouard Glissant. Insofar as their poetics 
prove commonality between two poets across continents, their experience of negative 
form of life and their endeavors to build a common poetics where all other forms of 
life come together into a common place open a vision of constellation where their 
worlds create “Relation” without being fixated into their particular ethnicities or 
negating negativity or Heidegger‟s Occidental “Being” or “spirit.”  
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A Trans-spatial Voyage between Two Poetics—Myung Mi Kim’s Poetics of 
Commons and Glissant’s Poetics of Relation 
Myung Mi Kim‟s poems are experimental and relational. Not a single poem 
can be understood without considering/understanding the linkages with her own and 
other alluded poems in poems‟ constellational totality, which she calls “commons.” 
Kim‟s frequent uses of fragmentized syllables and intentional insertions of Korean or 
Latin words in English sentences encumber American readers‟ understanding of her 
poems. Using these experimental syntaxes, the speaker in Kim‟s poems intentionally 
stutters
52
 so that the interconnectivities of indelible sounds and images leave 
unfathomable rifts in her texts. Even if readers‟ imaginations and understanding draw 
lines between these monads to create a pattern of a constellation, there is no guarantee 
that they catch the whole image correctly; rather the whole image is a fragmentary 
map which only delivers unclear ideas about global violence, in images of as war, 
animals, cries, melancholia, nostalgia, homelessness, resentment against capitalism 
and inhumanity.  
The center of these global ideas of violence is the speaker‟s trauma from a 
war—the Korean War lived through before she immigrated to the U.S. The postwar 
scene and imagination of the Korean war in Kim‟s memory brings about disruptions 
                                                 
52 Kim‟s poetics corresponds with Deleuze‟s minor literature that Deleuze discusses in “He Stutter” 
because of her use of language and minorization of major languages. Kim‟s poems have “poetic speech 
that actualizes [the] power of bifurcation and variation, of heterogenesis and modulation, that are 
proper to language” (Deleuze, “He Stutter” 108), and she pretends that she “is always like a foreigner 
in the language in which [she] expresses [herself], even if this is [her] native language,” which “gives 
birth to a foreign language within language, a grammar of disequilibrium” (Deleuze, “He Stutter” 109-
110). 
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in her articulation, imagination, and feelings.
53
 These disruptions, however, also 
recount different and particular spaces and times via the universal idea of war; the 
Korean War meets wars in Vietnam, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and so forth to create a 
constellation of violence. Moreover, this constellation does not exclude negatives 
such as animals or all forms of victims. For example, the image of massacre in war is 
juxtaposed with the meat packing industry in her poems. Reading Kim‟s poems, in 
this sense, are like voyaging on the physical and linguistic ocean to come upon 
islands having a singular, but shared climate. In particular, her Commons can be read 
as a manifesto of her poetics connecting the/her Asian experience with poetic 
philosophizing.  
Commons ends with two long poems that are deemed Kim‟s manifesto of her 
“poetics of the commons.” The first of these two is entitled bilingually—“Sawing 
Song/ t’opchil norae,” in which the latter title is an English transcription of the 
pronunciation of the Korean title. This juxtaposition of the two titles signals Kim‟s 
project of relations, as she also clearly articulates in the first two lines of the first 
poem of Commons—“The transition of the stability and absoluteness of the world‟s 
contents / to their dissolution into motions and relations” (13). This transition from 
the world contents, which may refer to Hegel‟s Spirit and its teleological history, to 
the change and flow of motions and relations open the new space where the Western 
“Being” or “Spirit” becomes “Relation.” In this poetics of relations, this epic poem 
opens a new poetic way to create language, thoughts, history, and cultural relations 
                                                 
53 Though Kim was born in 1957 when the war ended, South Koreans were still suffering from postwar 
conflicts, poverty, and intensive local conflicts with North Korea. Though Kim could not experience 
war itself, I assume, experiencing postwar situation, the Korean war itself became the kernel of her 
historical trauma. 
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across the West and the East. Namely, it opens a poetic commons where Asians 
become form-of-life and the coming community on the same ontological level as 
Westerners, and animality and spirituality become the essence of humanity. The 
poem starts with a story of an orphan girl: 
The story of a girl who does not know her name or her age 
Mother who had gone to stay under earth 
Father who had gone to stay under heaven 
(Commons 98) 
 
The story in the beginning of the epic poem is a universal narrative about an orphan 
girl‟s journey to find her parents. This commonality, in turn, expands into humans‟ 
universal situation of poverty and animalization: “There lived millions and millions 
of poor and tired human beings, toiling ants who have built a nest underneath a heavy 
stone. They worked for the benefit of someone else. They shared their food with the 
animals of the fields. They died without hope” (Commons 99). As such, human 
beings on the earth are poor and have to work to the bone in the world. They are 
animalized poor people not just materially, but also spiritually as they work only for 
others. Then, what is the meaning of this “poverty”? 
To put it bluntly, poverty is the universal theme of Kim‟s oeuvre (i.e. one of 
her books is entitled Penury). Alongside war and violence, Kim uses the theme of 
poverty to bring forth a constellation where material, economic poverty and spiritual 
“poverty” resonates with such ontological, ethical, geopolitical and transcultural 
issues as death, violence to Others, war, the destruction of nature, racial 
discrimination, and so on. For example, in another poem she lists words that form 
universal imaginary ideas of violence and captivity: “foundry / mill / warehouse // 
tannery / refinery / central clearing hall // infirmary / barracks / internment camp // 
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auto plant / containment center / refugee camp” (Penury 17). All the facilities Kim 
lists evoke administrative processes, artificial production, globalized violence, the 
darkness of civilization, and massive destruction. Technology and manipulative 
rationality within the bio-political anthropological machine globally operate to 
produce unnatural, inauthentic, and poor people, poor animals, and exploited objects. 
In this sense, Kim‟s poverty reverberates with Heidegger‟s darkness of the world in 
terms of strategic nominalism and creative universals. The next stanza presents 
images of the machine and the poet‟s effort to break free from this machine: “Hold 
this up / Amid listening board and gourd / Were to pipe and fittings / Free from 
function/ To change the position of enunciation and the relations within it” (Commons 
99). Poverty is not just an image but also a universal and global machine that operates 
within a global system. Through the poetic enunciations and the relations of this 
machine, this machine produces the poverty of the world. The next line shows the 
result of this poverty, a wandering orphan on the earth: “Peregrine and Earth / The 
day that makes one an orphan” (Commons 99-100) and this wanderer‟s poetic journey. 
“Peregrine” can mean both a peregrine falcon and a wanderer, a trans-spatial 
being, which leads to the image of “Earth,” resonating with the previous association 
of Earth as the place where people are poor. Thus, if “peregrine” refers to the orphan, 
it signifies the orphan‟s wandering and journey, while the orphan metaphorically has 
an animal form—she is in essence an animal wanderer. In contrast to Trakl‟s stranger, 
this “peregrine” as the orphan girl wanders and sings, containing her animality as her 
essence. Moreover, in contrast to the stranger in Trakl‟s Occident, on the earth the 
girl is as poor as an animal. But a similarity between Trakl (or Heidegger)‟s stranger 
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and the orphan girl intriguingly exists: both of them are wandering to bear witness as 
to how human civilization emerges out of animality and how it destructs nature, and, 
how its system of violence results in the darkness of the world. The people‟s 
collective songs disclose the historicity of humanity from its origin. Meanwhile, 
Kim‟s speaker encounters a ring of people who are proceeding towards a temple and 
singing:  
A wheel 
A place of assembly 
A ring or circle of people 
Belonging to or used in processions 
A solemn procession to a temple with singing and music.  
(Commons 100) 
 
People within this ring are full of elation and enthusiasm inspired by sayings from the 
temple. An ambiguity resides in the movement of a wheel, an image of the machine. 
The next stanza shows that this wheel and procession are related to the formation of a 
nation—a humanized nation where the previous poverty seems to be eliminated.  
Sayings . disturbances 
A nation to be humanized 
Visited by a humble pounding 
The meaning of becoming elated.  
(Commons 100) 
 
In the ring in which people are captivated like Heidegger‟s animals, poetic sayings 
pervade, though the people in the ring face “disturbances” in the poem. Here syntactic 
space and a period between “sayings” and “disturbances” make the poet‟s role and 
people in the ring more ambiguous. If the sayings come from the temple, and so the 
sayings are religious, why would there be “disturbances”?  
The answer is unclear, but the speaker envisages how a nation is formed via 
“humanization” of animal people and she listens to “a humble pounding” in the 
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process of building their civilized nation (Commons 100). Like the movement of a 
saw and “a humble pounding,” this fluctuation is rhythmic but violent. With this 
humble rhythmic collaboration, the nation emerges with the people‟s rhythmic 
movements in history being attuned to the moods of Heideggerian animal ring—
elation and enthusiasm. This exuberance is charged with spiritual energy, which is 
compared to the historic moments of burgeoning nationalism or fascism. The people 
stay in the ring enthusiastically because it nullifies people‟s thoughts in, while it also 
drags them into fanatic, violent actions. Thus, humbleness and humanization are 
hidden below a thick opacity and deep ambiguity, though the speaker admits, “This is 
to be done / This is to be sung” (Commons 102). 
 As Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer observe, rationality has contained 
irrationality from the inception of human history. The inception of a humanized 
community as a nation captivating people into its ring of disinhibitiveness in fact 
conceals a violent, uncanny, and morbid image of animals being dragged into a 
slaughterhouse (remember Lee‟s grocery store); the speaker discloses this by saying:  
Shambling . shambles 
 
That snapdragon‟s crimson 
Understood as a potential sound.  
(Commons 103) 
 
People in the ring are shambling into shambles, namely a slaughterhouse. This 
grotesque image corresponds with the universal history of the world, especially Asia, 
where people have gone through colonization, independence, and nationalistic or 
fascist fervor after gaining independences and before falling victim to series of wars. 
Again, Kim uses punctuation to illustrate her message; she inserts a pause with a 
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period and spaces between “shambling” and “shambles” to reveal the infinite 
examples of these historical, violent, and inhumane events. The period represents 
these infinite examples of violence, and the pause as caesura is saturated with 
ontological moods such as melancholia, homelessness, and, more or less, a feeling of 
animality-humanity. But this building, destruction, and rebuilding are in rhythmic 
movements and repetitious.  
Universal human history is thus formed through repetitious movements of 
building, destruction, and rebuilding. Aesthetics becomes an expression of the will of 
the people. Only within the ontological idea of historicity and humanity, resonating 
with the original sense of the rhythm of creation, can humanity restore itself without 
letting animality be denigrated to cruel violence. Violence discloses how the 
collective song inside the ring of people is both aesthetically beautiful and fanatic 
because it is saturated by the mood of the aestheticization of politics.
54
 The color of 
“crimson” on the “snapdragon” (Commons 103) symbolizes the blood human-animals 
have to spill in “shambles,” which represents another ring of beings, a ring of war 
depriving humanity. However, this slaughterhouse is another form of commons where 
animals, the dead, and humans can come together. Slaughtering and consumption is 
part of rhythm Kim finds in humans‟ historicity. 
The poem ends with a line, “Come at us leapt” (Commons 103). The last 
line is filled with an urge, but the reader cannot identify who the agent of this urge is; 
is the agent rhythm as origin of art and historicity? If so, Kim‟s utopia is in the future 
and in art. Art, though very susceptible to falling into a fascist frenzy, is the true ethos 
                                                 
54 Walter Benjamin categorizes fascism as the aestheticization of politics, and communism as the 
politicization of aesthetics (Illumination 242). 
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of humanity and historicity; likewise, philosophy and politics, though very susceptive 
to totalitarian urges, can lead to the unconcealment of truth or the beginning of 
revolution. Art can be everything because art, through attention to the rhythm of 
historicity, is the space of infinite possibilities. But art is limited too because art, like 
human beings, lives and dies inside history. Art‟s form, in a constellational, radiates 
its original meaning of rhythm, and changes eternally in correspondence with 
historicity.
55
 Kim‟s poem responds to historicity in order to be responsible, changing 
form and screaming with its fragmented forms as the historicity and humanity suffers. 
Therefore, Kim‟s poem focuses on the universal and singular human condition and its 
historicity by employing various broken forms and creating a constellation of 
different fragments. 
 In the next poem, Kim presents a more organized poetics of the commons: 
…. 
Swerves, oddities, facts, miscues, remnant—threnody and 
meditation— 
The perpetually incomplete task of tracking what enters 
into the field of perception 
(the writing act)—its variegated and grating music, 
cadences, and temporalities 
…. 
This book emerges through cycles of erosion and accretion 
 
Commons elides multiple sites: reading and text making, 
discourses and disciplines, documents and documenting. 
Fluctuating. Proceeding by fragment, by incretion. 
Through propositions, parataxis, contingency—
approximating nerve, line, song. 
 
Velocity, the exultant and transitory glimpse of encounter 
…. 
                                                 
55 Delezue and Guattari, in “Of the Refrain,” also analyze this ontological aspect of rhythm and Chaos. 
Analyzing art (music) and chaos, he proposes ideas such as “rhythm-chaos or the chaosmos” (A 
Thousands 313).  
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Released into our moment, shaped as it is by geographical 
and cultural displacements, an exponentially hybrid state of 
nations, cultures and voicings.  (Commons 107) 
 
In this poem, Myung Mi Kim traces Western philosophies, aesthetics, and their spirits 
by forming commons as a literary space of the coming community through the 
rhythm of “erosion and accretion.” Kim‟s Commons is the space of errancy or a trans-
spatial experience produced from “geopolitical and cultural displacements,” 
resonating with “temporalities” (Commons 107). In this rhythm of historicity, Kim 
sees “the exultant and transitory glimpse of encounter” that proceeds by “fluctuation” 
and “fragments” (107). This rhythm resonates with “voicings” from beings. It is not 
clear whose “voicings” Kim refers to, but the agents of these voicings are multiple 
beings that are in the ontological mood of “threnody and meditation” (107). These 
moods echo through the constellation of beings in commons, the utopia Kim desires.  
After presenting the universal form of commons, Kim quotes Adorno‟s 
ambiguous proposition, “The fragment is that part of the totality of the work that 
opposes totality” (Commons 108).56 How can we understand this antinomy? This 
question relates to the paradoxical relations between fragment and totality, semblance 
and truth, utopian desire and painful expression, and spirit and materiality. First, 
integration, coherence, totality, or aura in the artwork is, according to Adorno, 
semblance, and this semblance contains the utopian desire of creating nonviolent 
relations among artworks and their objects. However, in the contemporary 
administrated world, this aesthetic utopia is not possible because every effort to 
                                                 
56 This fragmentary quote in Kim‟s poem is from Adorno‟s Aesthetics (45). Here Adorno critiques 
Walter Benjamin‟s aura because of its potential misuse when it is institutionalized within the cultural 
industry, where aura becomes an “exhibition value.” In this context, Adorno writes that “The category 
of the fragmentary—which has its locus here—is not to be confused with the category of contingent 
particularity: The fragment is that part of the totality of the work that opposes totality” (Aesthetics 45).  
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change is always already mediated by apparatuses. Adorno does not provide any 
compromise for this dilemma; rather, the distintegration and the status of each 
artwork as a windowless monad reveal how monads are related and connected within 
a constellation or a totality. Reflecting Heidegger‟s darkness of the world, Adorno 
claims: “[t]he darkening of the world makes the irrationality of art rational: radically 
darkened art (Aesthetics 19). In Adorno‟s Aesthetics, pain, shudders, 
fragmentalization, and darkness are the honest and truthful responses of the arts 
bearing witness to the irrational violence in the world; yet this does not mean that 
modern arts lose their rationality. Rather, they achieve a different rationality 
expressed via a new art form. Art‟s purpose, although appearing purposeless now, lies 
in the antinomy of the utopia in the arts because “art must be and wants to be utopia, 
and the more utopia is blocked by the real function of order, the more it is true; yet at 
the same time art may not be utopia in order not to betray it by providing semblance 
and consolation” (Aesthetics 32). And, within this utopian desire, art “should 
introduce chaos into order rather than the reverse” (Aesthetics 93). In short, art is the 
space of chaos with utopian desire existing in opacity along with totality on the 
outside; harmony, in turn, is semblance (Aesthetics 100). Therefore, artwork has its 
utopian dream of the redemption of semblance in fragmented and damaged art‟s 
totality and autonomy. But this is an impossible utopian desire now since we have 
lost our ontological home, so much so the art has lost its authentic, original 
semblance.  
Here, Adorno‟s ethico-aesthetic perspective emerges. Artistic expression 
fundamentally has to express objects‟ pain. These objects include animals; thus, 
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Adorno argues, “there is nothing so expressive as the eyes of animals—especially 
apes—which seem objectively to mourn that they are not human” (Aesthetics 113). 
As Adorno explains, expression is art‟s praxis to disclose this materiality of the spirit 
whose dominance brings forth the illusionary semblance of unity, totality, humanity, 
beauty, etc. The expressions of animals‟ faces are sublime since they reflect the 
material truth of humans‟ spirits. Semblance and the utopian desire of totality 
paradoxically disclose this materiality and history of subjects‟ violence towards 
nature and others.  
In this sense, Li-Young Lee‟s collective embodiment of being Chinese and 
sharing the animality as spiritual materiality reveals this paradox. Cannibalism is the 
truth of spiritual communion, but Li-Young Lee never abandons the utopian dream of 
the not-yet-come totality of beings at home. Likewise, Myung Mi Kim never loses the 
dream of totality, but its expression is full of pain and materiality, so the expressions 
become fragments because this totality is in mimetic relations with objects, animals, 
and nature that are destructed via subjects‟ physical, epistemological, and cultural 
violence. This is how the aesthetic forms a constellation with ethics and ontology. 
Kim‟s poems, in fragmented form, contain the painful faces of animals and others as 
in Adorno‟s constellation of the “animal/fool/clown,” which has been ridiculed and 
ignored throughout history.  
 In sum, Kim‟s “commons” and its poetics is about the lived experience and 
the search for the true ethos of humanity in a collective form which resonates with 
“form-of-life” and the “coming community.” The form of this commons also relates 
to Glissant‟s chaos-monde that “reconstitutes the image of the mother planet, an Earth 
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that would be primordial” (Poetics 154). Glissant‟s chaos-monde is a necessary 
commonplace to create a poetics that can reflect the world of poetic relations. Thus, 
chaos-monde secretly embeds its utopian dream in the future perfect tense. About this 
utopian dream, from the standpoint of West‟s Others, Oakley deliberates: 
This commitment to redemption manifests in poetics that 
seek to make common aesthetic-ethical truths and utopian 
agendas rather than universalize these as did prominent 
European Romantic thinkers and writers. (Common Places 
2) 
 
As Oakley observes, Glissant‟s commonplaces (lieux communs) such as “community, 
freedom, and society” (Common Places 2) are formed like Benjamin‟s constellation. 
The thoughts of Glissant, the Caribbean poet and thinker, can be relayed by Kim‟s 
Asian American experience, because both went through similar trans-spatial 
experiences, eternal exiles, postcolonial oppression, and creation of their own 
languages in order to find a way to freedom in chaos-monde. Errancy and exile are 
destined in these writers‟ lives, but these lives share the origins (rhythms) of Kim‟s 
and Glissant‟s voices. Glissant underlines “an awareness of our place in the world and 
our reflection on the necessary and disalienated relationship with Other,” and “new 
form of expression through our combined poetics, and far removed from abstract 
universality, with the fertile yet difficult relationship with our willed, collective need 
for obscurity” (Caribbean 169-170). This commons as poetics of Korean Americans‟ 
trans-spatial experience resonates with the commonplace as a poetics of the 
Caribbean poet‟s different form of trans-spatial experience. I conclude this chapter 
with a brief analysis of a poem by Glissant to compare it with the trans-spatial Asian 
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poems I have discussed. This will concisely disclose the universal picture of the 
constellation of all animalized Others. 
Glissant‟s poem, “Acclamation,” starts with the image of a bowl and the 
darkness of the world, boding well for the future:  
It was the salt in time‟s bowl. Nothing was left but an 
obscure urn of words. Is there a morning? The darkness of 
course bodes well—when words are shining on the step up 
to the house. In this realm of our hands. 
…. 
I 
Fetch me mudflows sheets of metal mangos form the blaze 
Let the limpid word go dry and barrenness be over 
Where the straw was and every uncircled thing 
It is time to halt vast errancy and it is time 
To arm the song with continents 
That hail us in passing in broad midday 
O worry, salt left on death by foam, my black land 
Take me into the summer that has no spring, O cry 
 
II 
It is the town, silent in its clay. It is the green wood, shoring 
up the frame of night. 
It is our own dogs, seen lapping between two winds. Strays. 
Hairless iron dogs, gaunt wizards of our absence, errant 
dogs. It was women, fierece cravings, and men, toothless 
mouths. Factories‟ roux, the year‟s vintages. I have not 
named the sea, married to a black cry, separated from the 
black procession. On this land 
Close down the sea and against the sound of peoples 
coming  
Pull shut its sandy handles, with their rock bolts. 
 
III 
I made such a cry my home, where no earth looms; and no 
shore is by the seas where I have been. 
Twisted by the hurricane, this man sees the mud at the 
door, the path leading to nights where each one gutters on 
the verge of death 
And he hears the earth where more than one name was 
buried. 
 
IV 
 77 
Here the lands, behind the islet. (Black Salt 107-110) 
 
There are several mysteries in the poem. First, what is this “bowl”? The “bowl” 
represents historicity and a diaspora given that the black salt in Glissant‟s poems is 
understood to symbolize Africans‟ diaspora and the pain and suffering they have gone 
through. The bowl contains painful words as if it contains black salt, and these words, 
like Kim‟s sayings, deliver the sayings of historicity, the future of the world because 
the words are “shining on steps up to the house” (Black Salt 109). This house is 
similar to Heidegger‟s language as the house of Being, but the house is proximate to 
the “coming people” because this house is not for Being but for Relation of the 
coming Others. And, as we will see in the last chapter of this dissertation, “Bowl of 
Origins: Naming the Void and the Coming Community: Theresa Hak Kyung Cha‟s 
Dictée,” the bowl becomes the central void of potentiality in Cha‟s Dictée such that 
the uncanny image of a bowl in its formal clarity should encompass the philosophical 
and aesthetic impulse and orientation of the work. 
However, the darkness of the world is full of death and animal cries. On this 
island, stray, iron dogs with poverty-stricken men and women, like the jumbled 
images of Trakl‟s stranger and blue animals, are listening to “a black cry,” a cry 
resonating with “the sound of peoples coming” (Black Salt 109). These people are a 
coming community with a form-of-life. They are moving toward dogs and people 
whose distinctions are blurry because both of them dwell on the land—the Other‟s 
land. The speaker cries like an animal because he also lost his home eternally, as well 
as the shore he could land on. But, the last mystery is unfathomable. What is the 
name buried in the earth? The sequential chapters of this work will address this 
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question. The name cannot be named because of the eternal errantry trans-spatial 
writers, in this case trans-spatial Asian writers, experience. The name is the name of 
the geographical, historical, ethical, political, ontological and aesthetic “home” or 
“commons” of the animals Heidegger would exclude. The home for which I am also 
looking. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
TRANS-SPATIAL METAMORPHOSIS FROM A KOREAN BARTLEBY  
TO A TRANS-SPATIAL BARD IN NATIVE SPEAKER 
 
We know ourselves as part and as crowd,  
in an unknown that does not terrify.  
We cry our cry of poetry.  
Our boats are open, and we sail them for everyone.  
(Glissant, Poetics 9) 
 
The motley community of homeless and helpless and well-intentioned  
ran in terror, surrendered, vomited, cradled the dying.  
And the rising tide of that migration from the South 
—not foreign to the ravages of war—never stopped, clamored 
forward,  
joined the war with both wooden and real weapons, capital, and 
plunder 
(Yamashita, Tropic of Orange 240) 
 
In this chapter, I will show how immigrant melancholy, particularly that of 
Asian Americans, congeals into a voice—unidentifiable and depersonalized—and in 
the dead in Chang-Rae Lee‟s novel Native Speaker. First, I will turn briefly to Myung 
Mi Kim‟s “And Sing Us,” the first poem in her collection Under Flag, because it 
exemplifies the model of voice that permeates Chang-Rae Lee‟s novel. 
 To some extent, several depersonalized characters in Lee‟s novel correspond 
with a mysterious voice in Myung Mi Kim‟s poem that begins with these cryptic 
three stanzas: 
Must it ring so true 
So we must sing it 
 
To span even yawning distance 
And would we be near then 
 
What would be the sea be, if we were near it 
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     Voice 
It catches its underside and drags it back 
What sound do we make, “n”, “h”, “g” 
Speak and it is sound in time. (Under Flag 13) 
 
The poem is mostly about the diasporic experience Koreans had crossing the Pacific, 
as the next stanza confirms: “Depletion replete with barraging / Slurred and taken 
over / Diaspora” (13). The speaker of this poem begins her singing mysteriously 
because a true, echoing “voice” invites the speaker to an imaginary space. The hoped 
for cartographical totality created by such imaginative “spanning” is deemed a porous 
one through which the speaker is inching to a sea, none other than the Pacific. The 
unidentified voice from an unnamed speaker in the poem is physically dragged back. 
Meanwhile, mimicking the rhythm of the ebb and flow of the sea, a mysterious voice 
comes and goes, leaving partial sounds on the beach as if these sounds were material 
remnants of the voice. 
Those remnants are “n,” “h,” “g,” which do not signify anything in English 
individually or collectively. While their significations are shadowed, phonic elements 
remain. These sounds are materialized or impersonated so that they can be dragged 
back from the sea. Yet these individual syllables are different transnational signifiers 
signifying “nation” in Korean: (n)a-ra (the Korean word for “nation” in pure 
Korean), (h)an-gguk (the Korean word for “Korea” in Chinese characters), or (g)ook-
ga (the Korean word for “nation” in Chinese characters). In these connotations, the 
mood of the poem teems with nostalgia and melancholia because the speaker, trying 
to express her desire to go back to Korea, cannot complete the articulation of her 
nationality, which is fragmented into three different Korean words. The fragmented, 
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disabled letters embody this failure linguistically. First, although three Korean words 
containing these letters share the same meaning, the meanings of these letters in 
English will not elicit such understanding from American readers. Second, due to this 
incomprehensibility in Korean and English alike, the phonic differences of the three 
letters represent unfathomable linguistic gaps between Koreans, Americans and 
Korean immigrants. If Koreans cannot conjecture any significant relation of those 
letters in the English pronunciation, neither can Americans. In short, despite the 
“nearness” of the three letters, the meanings of the letters contain linguistic, 
translational, and logical impasses. But on an ontological level, across these linguistic 
gaps and impasses, these incomprehensible letters in English, separately materialized, 
embody unidentifiable, but related bodies of people, specifically the dead. Through a 
circular movement and syntax, the last stanza of the poem engagingly reveals that the 
voice originates from the dead. 
…. 
Not a singular song trundle rondo 
What once came to us whole 
In this we are again about to do 
In the times it takes to  dead dead dead la la la 
Trundle rondo  for a long time it stood marker and marked 
Mostly we cross bridges we did not see being built. (Under Flag 15) 
 
Kim describes echoing voices from the dead singing in a ring. The infinite repetition 
of “not a singular song” resonates with the collective singers who are on the threshold 
between the dead and the living. In this context, the voice in the poem can be 
interpreted as collective voices from this threshold. 
 Thus, the fundamental question posed by the poem concerns the voice. What 
are the correlations between the voice and the cryptic letters? In the poem, why does 
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the voice rather than a speaker speaks? What is the relation between voice and 
language? The voice defies mere translation and transcription in that it precedes 
linguistic articulation. How might we understand the voice in the poem stretching 
across the unfathomable gaps between individual letters as incomprehensible things? 
Agamben‟s Language and Death assists in our understanding of the voice as pure 
language before human understanding.
57
 While Agamben‟s idea of ethos may well be 
too universal to apply to the Asian American experience, his ideas help me to sketch 
out the theoretical, poetic, and philosophical relations among immigrants‟ 
ontological, ethical experiences. Melancholia is the mood of immigrants in 
globalization and the mood permeating the negative grounds of humanity. That mood 
manifests the truth of these unidentifiable immigrants deprived of sovereignty and 
even human dignity, as the recent debates surrounding immigration law in Arizona 
prove. 
Reflecting on the ideas of Heidegger and Hegel, Agamben claims, “„Taking-
the-This‟ and „Being-the-there‟ are possible only through the experience of the Voice, 
that is, the experience of the taking place of language in the removal of the voice” 
(Language and Death 37). The most negatively concealed voice is the animal voice 
(voice without signification) of the dead, “only because the animal voice is not truly 
empty…but contains the death of the animal, [so] human language, articulating and 
arresting the pure sound of this voice…[can] become the voice of consciousness, 
meaningful language” (Language and Death 45). On these ontological grounds, 
meaning is negatively mediated by non-meaning (animal voice) where voice remains 
                                                 
57 Before Agamben, Heidegger also explored this problem but stopped; Heidegger admits, “The 
essential relation between death and language flares up before us, but remains still unthought” (On the 
Way 107-8). 
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as a trace before articulation. Moreover, according to Agamben, this role of voice 
from being-toward-death or “bare life” engenders Heideggerian Stimmung (mood) in 
its negative relation with Stimme (speaking) because “Stimmung is the experience that 
language is not the stimme of man, and so the disclosure of the world that it puts into 
effect is inseparable from negativity” (Language and Death 56).  
 The voice of Myung Mi Kim‟s poem peals with this Stimmung. Only through 
these negativities of death and voice can we consider the ontological difference of 
humanity from inhumanity such as nothing (death). The ontological differences 
between being and death as well as voice and language unfold truth. How, then, can 
this truth be unfolded, and who is the agent of this disclosure? The disclosure of the 
truth is possible only with mystic unconcealment by “the word of poets” where 
“silent experience of the taking place of language in the Voice and in death is 
completed” (Agamben, Language and Death 62). After these ontological, poetic 
speculations, Agamben switches to an ethical inquiry under the lens of the 
etymological understanding of ethos as a “dwelling place” in Greek, stating: 
The place of language is now truly lost forever…In its 
downing, thought compared, that is, led back toward the 
Same, the negative dimensions of the event of language, its 
having-been and its coming to be, its silence and its voice, 
being and nothingness; and in the extinguishing of thought, 
in the exhaustion of the dimension of being, the figure of 
humanity‟s having emerged for the first time in its simple 
clarity: to have always dear as one‟s habitual dwelling place, 
as the ethos of humanity. (Language and Death 81, emphasis 
in original)    
 
The ethos of humanity resides in human beings‟ habitual dwelling place. This place is 
built upon the ontological ground of the unidentifiable voice of the dead that 
fundamentally resembles the voice of the animal that remains as an ethical trace 
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under the transcendent Being. Then, what can the mood (Stimmung) of this dwelling 
place of humanity and its voice or ethos be? If the animal voice is the vanishing trace 
before articulation and death is the factual future of all beings‟ existences, the mood 
about what we have lost and will be losing is melancholia.  
In the era of globalization, bodies in constant movement that cannot find a 
proper place to dwell in the world undergo a different ontological, ethical 
melancholia that is irreducible to a mood of universal human condition. Immigrants, 
including Asian immigrants in the U.S. whose immigration has been marked by 
exclusion and quotas from the very start (i.e. the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Acts and 
the 1924 National Origins Act), suffer from specific melancholia.
58
 The ideal, 
primary object of Asian American loss is whiteness, a property that determines one‟s 
social status in the U.S. As Native Speaker portrays, this loss turns some Asian 
Americans into melancholics since they cannot accomplish identification with that 
object: “[i]n identifying with the lost object, the melancholic is able to preserve it but 
only as a type of haunted, ghostly identification” (Eng and Han 346). The history of 
exclusion from U.S. citizenship, the psychic and communal ambivalence between 
total assimilation and isolation, and the trans-spatial experience of immigration have 
germinated this melancholic split-subject, or a marginal Asian, who becomes a 
nowhere-being rather than a model minority subject. The image of the model 
                                                 
58 Extracting ideas from several parts of Freud‟s complex paper on melancholia and showing their 
interpretation through a racial lens, Eng and Han claim that racial melancholia, against Freud‟s 
pathological understanding, is a depathological understanding of group psychology in which 
melancholia “presents a compelling framework to conceptualize register of loss and depression 
attendant to both psychic and material process of assimilation” (344). Eng and Han also claim that 
racial melancholia is unresolved mourning without end initiated by “unstable immigration and 
suspended assimilation of Asian Americans into the national fabric” (345). 
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minority abuts the image of the monster, traitor, killer, or self-denigrating mourner 
within the ontological rhetoric of racial melancholia. 
Native Speaker is haunted by images of traitors, ghosts, monsters, losses, and 
infinite mourning—all split images of melancholia. From start to finish, Native 
Speaker is narrator Henry‟s melancholic memoir of what he has lost. Such a 
melancholic memoir represents a literary space in which the voices of lost objects or 
dying people or the dead become fragmentary selves in the writer‟s psyche. Voices 
from the negative ground of humanity erupt and ossify, tracing a trajectory of beings 
“displaced from the external world into the internal world of the psyche” (Eng and 
Han 355). Lee‟s world of melancholic memory is littered with moments that resurrect 
lost voices as traces from the Asian American experience. Its violence originates from 
racial history, which is saturated by the mood of the voice of the dead.  
In Native Speaker, Henry, roistering in the world of lost voices in his 
memory—especially that of his dead son Mitt, becomes a dreaming monster or a 
member of Agamben‟s coming community of “whatever” beings that I will explore 
more deeply later. At the same time, Henry also positively undergoes an experience 
of transformation from a scribe (an Asian Bartleby the scrivener) to a melancholic 
bard. Lee‟s melancholic bard resurrects immigrants‟ voices, which disrupt a bio-
politics in which language covers voices and turns being-in-the-house-of-language to 
being-a-renter-with-an-accented-voice. Also, Henry‟s transformation to a memory-
self that attempts to alienate his scribing self becomes the melancholic split ego of an 
immigrant, a symptom of Western modernity. The dreaming self who heeds the 
voices of the dead is identified as a savage or an irrational child whose illegitimate, 
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illegal existence has to be erased by Western discourse. As a philosophical example, 
after he divides our memory into two realms in a schema: pure memory and bodily 
memory for sensori-motor meachanisms (Bergson, Matter and Memory 152), Henri 
Bergson calls people who live in the pure memory “hardly better fitted for action: 
here we have no man of impulse, but a dreamer” (153). Interestingly enough, Bergson 
employs children and a savage as examples (154). Bergson implies that both tend to 
become dreamers or reckless barbarians or echolalia (114). Through Bergson‟s lens 
that represents a Western perspective, Henry can be seen as a child and a savage as 
soon as he begins dwelling in his memory where the Korean language has more 
originality than English. But Henry does not stop listening to the voices from his 
memory. Henry confesses, “[a]nd if I remember everything now in the form of lists it 
is that these notions come to me along a floating string of memory, a long and lyric 
processional that leads me out from the city…back to this place of our ghost” (227). 
The ghosts and their voices become knots of the threads entangled by his memory and 
the previously untold stories. Henry dwells in his singular maze of language, voice, 
and memory; then he becomes a melancholic bard who mourns over the dead he has 
loved by disinterring their muted voices and telling their tales rather than scribing 
their identities.  
In short, becoming a child and savage is analogous to becoming a melancholic 
bard who has the potentiality to dream and investigate the voices from the nether of 
lost beings and things. Correspondingly, Walter Benjamin observes, “all the wisdom 
of the melancholic is subject to the nether world; it is secured by immersion in the life 
of creaturely things, and it hears nothing of the voice of revelation” (The Origin 152). 
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To melancholics, voice from memory and the realm of the dead discloses that 
possibility of redemption or the utopian dream are impossible; in this mood, the 
melancholics desperately endeavor to find the meaning of those voices in vain. 
Infinite frustrations and multi-folded hidden memories ossify melancholics‟ faces and 
change them to pensive, expressionless statutes of savages dreaming and listening to 
fossilized voices.
59
 This melancholia is diasporic melancholia. Immigrants lose 
translatability and transmittability from their original language and history. The only 
way they can find their own true voice and the authenticity of their existence in 
history is to ponder on and pine for what they lost or listen for voices from the dead. 
This is the reason why in art history the images of savages are pensive, stony, and 
melancholic. Because of this diasporic melancholia, ironically, Bergson‟s dreamer 
and savage, immersed in his or her own memory without being enlightened by the 
blazing light from the sun of Western logos, have the potentiality to hear the voices 
from the stygian nether world; because of this potentiality, they become melancholic 
poets or bards Western poetics cannot explain.  
 
Henry’s Melancholy Transformation from a Scribe in Scripture Economy to a 
Mourner 
 Native Speaker begins with Henry‟s experience of loss and gain: “The day my 
wife left me she gave me a list of who I was” (1). Henry has lost intimate 
relationships with other beings, even things, and gained the written identities scribed 
on his wife‟s list. Paradoxically, this list of identities is also “the list of everything of 
                                                 
59 Benjamin explains that stone is the element of melancholia and dreaming dog-face is what 
melancholics look like (The Origin 152).  
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[Henry‟s] that‟s dead” (Lee 124). On one hand, Henry is a human source of the 
categorical representation of death. On the other hand, Henry himself is also a part of 
the scribing apparatus: he is employed by a global spy company (Glimmer and 
Company) based in New York City as an ethnic spy who capitalizes on his ethnic 
identity in order to spy on other ethnic people.  
Furthermore, the less Henry speaks or engages in situations where he can be 
exposed and identified, the more of an emotional alien he becomes. Like Bartleby, in 
Herman Melville‟s short story, “Bartleby, the Scrivener,” Henry, at the beginning of 
his scribal tenure, “never voiced any displeasure” (Lee 1); rather he prefers to or 
prefers not to do what others order of him without expressing his own emotion. Henry 
can express his emotions no more than he can speak like a native English speaker. 
According to his wife, Lelia, Henry is not so much an emotional alien as a “False 
speaker of language” (6), not only because “he is listening to himself” (12) for self-
correction, and his articulation and locution lack emotional quality, but also because 
he is an “illegal alien…poppa‟s boy…stranger/follower/traitor/spy” (5). As Lelia 
points out, Henry‟s interiority and exteriority are severed such that he cannot find 
ways to connect two separate interior and exterior worlds via truthful language. This 
severance effectively erases memory as well as the potentiality (however fictional) to 
change the situation, producing a fundamental melancholia.  
It is through this melancholic fissure that nebulous voices from the collective 
dead speak to Henry. To some extent, Henry listens to internal and external voices to 
record or register them in his memory. However, the scribing function of memory 
causes a split self, dramatically illustrated in Henry‟s interaction with one of his spy 
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assignments, John Kwang, an aspiring Korean American and New York councilman. 
While listening to Kwang, Henry recalls the time when, to get over his own anxiety 
of hiding his Korean accent, he listened to a split self who was literally a mirror 
image or alter ego that could not be integrated into a holistic identity: 
I kept listening for the errant tone, the flag, the minor mistake 
that would tell of his original race. Although I had seen hours 
of him on videotape, there was something that I still couldn't 
abide in his speech. I couldn‟t help but think there was a 
mysterious dubbing going on, the idea I wouldn‟t give quarter 
to when I would speak to strangers, the checkout girl, the 
mechanic, the professor, their faces dully awaiting my real 
speech, my truer talk and voice. When I was young I‟d look in 
the mirror and address it, as if daring the boy there; I would 
say something dead and normal, like, “Pleased to make your 
acquaintance,” and I could barely convince myself that it was I 
who was talking. (Lee 180) 
 
Here, the incommunicability between the memory-self and the present-self results in 
a melancholic fissure between the speaking self and the listening self.
60
 While 
detecting, scribing, and mimicking others‟ voices and gestures as a cultural spy, 
Henry cannot “speak truthfully and not be demonized or made a traitor” (197) due to 
this split ego.  
This melancholic split ego corresponds with Henry‟s job as a cultural spy and 
scribe of immigrants‟ identities, which is in essence a traitor/scribe. In his job as spy-
                                                 
60 Melancholia has its root in Freud‟s cryptic paper “Mourning and Melancholia.” Freud elaborates 
that, immersed in melancholia, the Freudian split ego self-abases its alter ego for its loss in regard to an 
object; specifically speaking, the ego (ego ideal), in terms of morality, criticizes the alter ego which 
represents “a loved object which ha[s] been shifted away from it on to the patient‟s own ego” (248). 
Self-denigrating and fanatically expressing lugubrious criticism of/for their loss, the melancholics tend 
to decry that they are worthless people; but, in a deep psychoanalytic state, as Freud explains, they are 
turning loved object-loss to ego-loss since melancholia is caused by a narcissistic identification with 
the lost object or person. Additionally, the melancholics endeavor to hide their ambivalent feeling of 
hate and love towards their lost objects or people, which causes an ambivalence of love and hate; that 
is, psychologically, melancholia is located in-between narcissism and sadism. Freud suggests that the 
melancholics kill their egos by killing other people they love and hate. Mourning over loss is different 
from melancholia since the latter contains internal violence. 
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scrivener, Henry provides written analyses of other immigrants‟ lives “to extend the 
evening‟s narrative to its logical and fitting end” (Lee 198). In this analysis, Henry 
aims to be “a clean writer, of the most reasonable eye, [who] present[s] the subject in 
question like some sentient machine of transcription,” and he “won‟t employ anything 
that even smacks of theme or moral[ity],” sticking rather to the “uncomplicated task 
of rendering a man‟s life and ambition and leave to the unseen experts the arcana of 
human interpretation. The palmistry, the scriptology, the rest of their esoterica. The 
deep science” (203). Additionally, Henry‟s time consists only in a series of presents 
because he must observe people “in a rigorous present tense, as a subject dynamically 
inhabiting a scene, as a phenomenon of study” (204). Living only in the present 
inhibits any possibility of finding translatability from past memories to the present. In 
turn, Henry intentionally obfuscates the realm of memory and childhood. This split 
ego and the untranslatability between past memory and present-being reflects the 
modern crisis of experience.
61
 At the core of this crisis is a loss of an ontological, 
ethical way of experiencing the death of others.
62
 Unable to experience others‟ deaths, 
Henry becomes a bio-scribing machine, recording and collecting bio-political 
                                                 
61 According to Agamben, this “non-translatability into experience…now makes everyday existence 
intolerable…” (Infant 16). Agamben argues that this split between memory-self and present-self and 
non-translatability into everyday experience is caused by the operation of the modern/postmodern 
authority that “is founded on what cannot be experienced, and nobody would be inclined to accept the 
validity of an authority whose sole claim to legitimation was experience” (Infant 16-17).  
62 According to Agamben, the split egos of (post)modern people whose scientific selves and emotional 
selves are divided prevent them from having an experience of the death of others. Agamben, using 
Greek etymology, also presents how Aristotle differentiated the scientific, intellectual Mind (nous) and 
emotional, experiential soul (psyche); then Agamben demonstrates that the boundary between the two 
areas is death (Infant 21). Though modern science unified these two traditional areas and “makes 
experience the locus—the „method‟; that is, the pathway—of knowledge” in this process of 
modernization, experience became a split ego that “is possible only to undergo, never to have.” In 
other words, modern man can undergo an “infinite process of knowledge” but cannot have an 
experience whose boundary is death (Infant 21). In the same token, Agamben presents the allegory of 
this split ego as follows: “Don Quixote, the old subject of knowledge, has been befuddled by a spell 
and can only undergo experience without ever having it. By his side, Sancho Panza, the old subject of 
experience, can only have it, without ever undergoing it” (Infant 27).  
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information to identify, register, discipline, and punish other people—mostly 
immigrants or ethnic minorities—for the benefit of the global spy company, the state 
and Negri‟s Empire.  
However, against Henry‟s will, voices from the dead attack this Bastille of a 
scribing state apparatus in which Henry is working as a spy and scribe. These voices 
envelop Henry‟s world, and they cause him to suffer from traumatic memories and 
reveal to him the truth that he lacks the experience of speaking in a true voice. In 
contrast to Henry‟s scribing, the voices have an orality that cannot be identified or 
scribed under the registering state apparatus. For example, Henry hears his deceased 
mother‟s voice “always: San Konno san itta. Over mountains there are mountains” 
(Lee 333). The voice from Henry‟s mother erupts in Korean with an accompanying 
translation. Yet the translation cannot deliver the real meaning of the mother‟s voice; 
Henry‟s mother reiterates a Korean saying that means “every time a situation gets 
worse.” The scribed text in English of Mother‟s voice and its literal translation fails to 
transmit the truthful meaning and mood of what the voice from the dead, Henry‟s 
mother, possesses or appropriates. Incapable of translating or forcing signification 
onto his mother‟s voice, Henry feels melancholic over these truthful voices from the 
dead which hide untranslatable or non-transmitted truths—the truth of the deleterious 
experience his Korean parents‟ voice had, namely their experience of immigration 
and racism as well as homesickness.  
Michel de Certeau, a French sociologist and anthropologist, in The Practice 
of Everyday Life, describes modern societies as “scriptural societies” (131). Modern 
discipline and reproduction has scribed and registered people‟s voices in order to 
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control; in this process, de Certeau maintains, “Voices of the people” have been 
scribed and mystified. Instead of delivering pure voices from people, “orality 
insinuates itself, like one of the threads of which it is composed, into the network—an 
endless tapestry—of a scriptural economy” (132). The scriptural economy, similar to 
Foucault‟s disciplinary apparatuses, implements and scribes rules on human bodies to 
create “the great book of our law” (de Certeau 132). In this (post) modern process, 
pre-modern orality or the primordial mode of articulations have been replaced by 
scribing; the scriptural apparatus “separates itself from the magical world of voices 
and tradition” (de Certeau 134). As the state apparatus, the scripture economy63 
registers and brands identities onto people. Even children‟s fates are scribed, 
institutionalized, and written by rules and laws, causing children to lose the chance to 
listen to the traditional cosmos and its voices of their world.
64
 In some respect, 
immigrants, the illegitimate children of history, are new, unconventional entries in the 
scriptural economy. While they must be registered in order to be acknowledged as 
citizens, they remain unfathomable encryptions in this system because of their 
unidentifiable appearances and voices.  
Henry, recording and scribing those identities on which he spies, identifies 
his task as an aspect of scriptural economy; 
And sometimes I will write them out now, again, though for 
myself, those old strokes, unofficial versions of any 
newcomer I see in the street or on the bus or in the demi-
shops of the city, the need in me still to undo the cipher like 
                                                 
63 Michel de Certeau‟s concept, “scripture economy” is not about Christianity. It is, as Jeremy Ahearne 
interprets, “economy of writing” (52) and social apparatus that operates “the relations between the 
dominant practitioners of writing and the social „body‟” (58).  
64 In this scriptural economy, de Certeau claims, “every child is already put in the position of the 
industrialist, the urban planner, or the Cartesian philosopher—the position of having to manage a space 
that is his own and distinct from all others and in which he can exercise his own will” (134). 
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faces scrawled with hard work, and no work, and all troubles. 
The faces of my father and his workers, and Ahjumhma, and 
the ever-dimming one of my mother. I will write out the face 
of the young girl I saw only yesterday wearily unloading 
small sacks of basmati in front of her family store . . . (Lee 
170-71) 
 
Observing these quiet legal/illegal immigrant workers and scribing their lives, Henry 
assumes the position of a panoptic eye and plays a role in scripture economy: 
Hoagland, the owner of Glimmer and Company, orders Henry to “be the scribe. The 
eye” (204; my emphasis). However, a melancholic mood and empathy for these 
unregistered, illegitimate beings saturates his voice because he knows that “[a]ll you 
see will someday fade away. To what chill of your remains” (171).  
 Although Henry “celebrate[s] every order of silence borne of the tongue and 
the heart and the mind” (Lee 171), he also knows that those silences, as another form 
of the voices, are not mute, but linger as beings. Walking urban streets and silently 
hiding in the crowds, immigrants create spaces and erase the registering scripture of 
law-abiding citizenship through their unregistered presences. Against the colonial and 
capitalistic accumulation of information, the immigrants accumulate memories. 
Working, walking, and talking in their foreign individual utterances with their 
undetectable experiences, immigrants transform themselves into the abandoned, 
abused, but free children of history born of globalization and global capitalism. 
Eventually, they will replace the white-dominated world of history‟s adults who have 
registered, colonized, and mystified their unidentifiable bare lives. Yet, their bodies 
exist under the laws of scribing; as de Certeau holds: “From birth to mourning after 
death, law takes hold of bodies in order to make them its text” (139). The 
bureaucratic, technocratic scribing tools, the scribes of laws working on immigrant 
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bodies, and capitalistic/colonial power constitute the scriptural economy where 
immigrants‟ voices are strained, their tongues tied, their bodies scanned, and their 
identities registered without their true presences being counted. In this bio-political 
system, “Every power, including the power of law, is written first of all on the books 
of its subjects” (de Certeau 140). What remains, however, are unfathomable cries.65  
 These crying, moaning voices awaken Henry to critically renounce his role as 
a well-assimilated ethnic scribe and a scribing and registering machine of 
immigrants‟ bodies; he refuses—or prefers not—to generate further material for the 
bio-political operation of the scripture economy. An upsurge of guilt and the 
memories of his bereavement disturb Henry‟s work and life. For example, a moment 
of demystification happens when Henry reveals his trauma with his father. In a 
parody of a scene from Ralph Ellison‟s Invisible Man, 66 Henry sits beside his father‟s 
deathbed, berating his dying father who had been a Confucian tyrant and a capitalist 
whose life “was all about money” (Lee 49). But after this outburst of meager 
execration, a melancholy Henry considers, “I thought he would be an easy mark, 
being stiff, paralyzed, but of course the agony was mine. He was 
unmovable…Nothing I said seemed to penetrate him. But then what was my speech?” 
(49). Henry‟s inquiry leads him to realize that his father has been trying to survive the 
effects of racism, xenophobia, and humility. Watching over his father‟s paralyzed 
body and listening to his last breath, Henry begins to recall how kind, funny, and 
                                                 
65 About this cry, see de Certeau‟s poetical description in The Practice of Everyday Life on page 146. 
66 In many ways, Native Speaker is a parody of Invisible Man. Such themes from Invisible Man of an 
ethnic male as a traitor and a violent invisible being in the whites‟ world are the commonplaces Chang 
Rae Lee deals with in his own novel. The scene of the father‟s death also deeply corresponds with 
Ellison‟s description of his grandfather‟s death: “On his deathbed he called my father to him and said, 
“son, after I‟m gone I want you to keep up the good fight. I never told you…I have been a traitor all 
my born days, a spy in the enemy‟s country ever since I give up my gun back in the Reconstruction” 
(Ellison 16). 
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friendly his father was, and he speaks this recollection to himself: his voice 
reverberating a silent, imminently dead voice.  
To some extent, Henry‟s metamorphosis to a savage/dreamer bard immersed 
in diasporic melancholia is baroque. Baroque, as a mode of poetic relations between 
the world and humanity, penetrates into the core of the melancholia that formally 
creates multilayered masks. Ethnic identities in the world are masks and shams that 
prevent ethnic beings from living truthfully.
67
 Identifying with Kwang, Henry 
narrates, “[t]hrough events both arbitrary and conceived it so happened that one of 
Kwang‟s faces fell away, and then another, and another, until he revealed to me a 
final level that would not strip off. The last mask” (Lee 141). The melancholic masks 
of savages and children hide a truth that all of those beings, regardless of their racial 
identities, are singular beings. As a matter of fact, Henry has been one of those 
unidentifiable beings. However, Henry is not an atypical being; he is also a repetition 
of universal, melancholy, and trans-spatial beings for which Bartleby serves as a 
model in North American literary history. This literary comparison will explain not 
only how Henry becomes universal as well as singular, but also in what condition a 
melancholic trans-spatial being can attain the potentiality to become a trans-spatial 
bard.  
 
Henry as an Asian Bartleby: From the Formula of Dwelling to Movement  
 In Herman Melville‟s “Bartleby the Scrivener,” “I would prefer not to” as a 
formula burgeons and thrives like a rootless, illogical, but powerful germ. Bartleby is 
                                                 
67 According to Benjamin, in melancholics‟ worlds, “The idea of death fills [them] with profound 
terror. Mourning is the state of mind in which feeling revives the empty world in the form of a mask, 
and derives an enigmatic satisfaction in contemplating it” (The Origin 139). 
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a dreamer and becomes an unidentifiable being as soon as he decides to prefer not to 
scribe; in other words, his being dwells in an imaginary space when he erases the 
ability to scribe. And, at this moment, his melancholic, slothful, and 
incomprehensible refusals to scribe ironically grant him freedom, which also 
contradictorily results in his inopportune death. Bartleby‟s “I prefer not to” is strange 
and complex in that the logic in this erratic phrase is “I refuse to operate my ability to 
do something though I have the potentiality to do it.” Bartleby‟s formula has a logic 
that halts the operation of the scripture economy to activate inoperativity (or in 
French desœuvrement). However, this refusal does not mean a total removal of the 
capability to write or a refusal to live; rather, it means to maximize potentiality 
without the operation of scribing and deploying the biopolitical machine. Agamben 
continuously uses Bartleby as the incarnation of inoperativity and potentiality. 
According to Agamben, “Bartleby, a scribe who does not simply cease writing but 
„prefers not to,‟ is the extreme image of [the] angel that writes nothing but its 
potentiality to not-write” (The Coming 37). Bartleby, without identity, becomes an 
inoperative agent who stymies the operation of apparatuses in the scripture economy.  
To some extent, Bartleby is a prototype of an immigrant who reiterates only 
what he or she can express or what he or she has heard before, who lurks in a burrow 
outside of the surveillance of the state, who haunts in unexpected occasions and 
space, who disrupts conversations awkwardly, and who perseveres until he or she 
disappears. In other words, Bartleby, as Deleuze also understands, is “a man without 
references” (“Bartleby” 74) like immigrants whose identities are without reference 
from his former identity. Bartleby‟s seemingly non-sensible and autonomous 
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responses and his stoical, resolute unwillingness to do anything asked for or ordered 
is “very much about deactivating the structure of the law” (Murray 49). Admittedly, 
Henry, at first glance, seems different from Bartleby; he is able to articulate his words 
more specifically than Bartleby, and though his world and his melancholia are absurd 
to the marrow, at least ostensibly he looks like an ordinary Asian American male. 
However, Henry‟s dialogue—different from his well-articulated, poetic narratives—
has some erratic structures; like Bartleby‟s formula, there are several formulaic 
patterns in Henry‟s answers. First, Henry replies to questions without answering, but 
frustrating any further conversation by claiming that he does not know what a 
questioner asks, or he pretends that he cannot understand the context of the question. 
For example, Henry‟s common responses include “You tell me” (20), “I guess I know 
that” (30), “I keep forgetting” (41), “I know enough” (46), “I was just asking” (56), 
“You never know” (89), “It doesn‟t exist…I don‟t have the imagination” (90), “I need 
to know” (125), and “It ought to mean something” (169). Henry does not seem to 
rebut the question; he defers, delays, and demurs deliverance of information or 
opinion within his conversations.  
This formulaic language corresponds with Henry‟s positions, both stationary 
and mobile. Like Bartleby, Henry tends to stay in covert spaces. For example, in an 
apartment he inherited from Lelia‟s uncle, “Lelia and [Henry] tended to dwell in the 
corners, along the periphery” (Lee 24). When working in his office, Henry does not 
seem to have a place to sit; he lurks in corners, secret rooms, basements, and so on. 
After quitting his job, however, Henry becomes a vagabond. Then, do his errant 
movements contradict his dwelling? No. Bartleby, though he hides like a recluse from 
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others‟ eyes and prefers not to move, is called a “vagabond.” Henry also dwells and 
moves, but both acts do not contradict each other because Henry, like Bartleby, 
becomes one example of those unidentifiable beings without ontologically authentic, 
legitimate dwelling places. In truth, Henry, like Bartleby, preferred not to spy and 
scribe in order not to be spied and scribed himself. The state does not have the 
capability to identify these non-stationary vagabonds; in a sense, there is no 
difference between moving and dwelling for those unidentifiable beings under the 
panoptic, bio-politcal, and technocratic scribing of the state. Still, like Bartleby, 
Henry‟s presence increasingly becomes a void. 
 Henry becomes a hollow man as well as an invisible man. On one hand, 
Henry is invisible because the externality of his Asian appearance is culturally 
invisible in the U.S. society; on the other hand, he is a hollow man because his 
interior is full of melancholic split egos that also have a potent potentiality to hear the 
voices of the dead. Voices of the dead echo more deeply and piercingly in that 
Henry‟s melancholic inner world of memory is hollow. No one could understand 
Bartleby because his formulaic responses are echoes of his sublime ethos in which the 
dead letters he worked for became voices. The only difference between Henry and 
Bartleby is that Henry listens to the voices of the dead, while Bartleby listens to the 
voices of the dead letters. Baroque depth, according to Benjamin, originates from this 
hollowness that deters any meaningful actions. After several failures to change his 
situation—the deaths of Mitt and Luzan, a Filipino shrink whom Henry killed 
unintentionally, the collapse of Kwang‟s utopia, his marriage crisis, and so on—
Henry stops reiterating attempts to make things better because every attempt is bound 
 99 
to fail; instead, he prefers not to forget those deaths and not to act to change the 
situation because he finds true freedom in listening to the voices. Though painful, the 
truth concealed in these voices frees Henry.  
Indeed, all these formulas of rhetorical commonplaces (I refuse to collaborate 
and I prefer not to scribe others‟ identities) start from one event—the death of 
Henry‟s utopian son, Mitt. This event opens the concealed relations between the dead 
and living beings as well as the things and the world. This Heideggerian ontological 
“event” creates a moment of epiphany that forces Henry to experience a 
metamorphosis from an Asian Bartleby to a melancholic bard. The epiphany is a 
result of the hidden Korean meaning of Mitt‟s name beneath his overnamed identity.
  
Mitt’s Death and the Pitfall of Onto-Theological Identity 
 Before Mitt died, Henry had remembered Mitt as a persona of his hopes and 
dreams; Henry narrates, “Mitt, the clean and bright one—somehow, miraculously, 
ours—runs off with [white kids in the neighborhood] any way, shouting the praises of 
his perfect life,” with a voice “already so beautifully jumbled and subversive and 
historic. No one, I thought, had ever looked like that” (Lee 100, 103). How can Mitt‟s 
voice be beautifully subversive and jumbled? What is the relationship between 
historicity and aesthetics in this biracial boy‟s voice? Placed in Henry‟s hidden 
memory, Mitt‟s voice is described as something historically beautiful because his 
voice, pealing in Henry‟s memory, seems to envision the utopian space every 
immigrant in history has dreamed of. Plus, Mitt‟s hybrid identity is as beautiful as his 
jumbled and subversive voice, in that his hybrid identity and bilingualism seem to 
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subvert a homogenous space of pure ethnic identity, as well as a monolinguistic 
space, which thus creates a multilingual, heterogeneous utopia.  
For example, recalling the perfect translatability between his Korean father 
and Mitt, Henry narrates, “When [Mitt] played with my father their communication 
was somehow wholly untroubled, perfect in the way, and if there were questions 
between them the boy would simply repeat what the old man said, try to echo his 
pidgin, his story, learn that talk, too” (Lee 239). Even pidgin seems to lose its hybrid 
difference via Mitt‟s universal speaking, and he seems to exist as an avatar of the 
global multiculturalism in which all different voices and cultures coexist peacefully. 
In addition, Mitt‟s ideal translatability comes not so much from mere mimicry as 
from his ability to appreciate linguistically different utterances. For instance, Henry 
narrates, “Mitt was beginning to appreciate the differences in the three of us [Henry‟s 
father, Lelia, and Henry]; he could mimic the finest gradations in our English and 
Korean, those notes of who we were, and perhaps, he could imagine, if ever briefly, 
that this was our truest world, rich with disparate melodies” (240). Henry‟s narrations 
demonstrate that Mitt‟s multicultural ideality and translatability seems to operate in 
Hegelian dialectics—the gradual sublation of all linguistic differences into singular 
ideals—Spirit, Science, Notion, or Identity. But, Mitt‟s univocality is geographically 
limited. For example, on the playground where Mitt plays with other multi-racial 
children, Henry “look[s] at all the children, the many colors of them, listening to the 
shouting music of their mixed-up voice, inflection of a hundred home languages” 
(109-110). Without being identified and influenced by the oppressive scripture 
economy, those children, including Mitt, create a harmonious chorale. Only in such 
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spaces as Henry‟s father‟s house or the playground is Mitt capable of bridging 
linguistic differences and creating univocal harmony. Henry‟s ideological belief in 
Mitt‟s utopian trait, in a sense, is spatially determined.  
Reflecting this spatial limit that represents ethnic enclaves‟ limits, Mitt‟s 
ideal linguistic, cultural role as a cross-cultural, cross-generational bridge 
paradoxically results in his dystopian death; Mitt dies because of the white boys‟ 
“dog-pile,” a so-called game of mobbing an individual. Mitt‟s body is crushed by the 
collective flesh of a white mob. This accident disrupts Henry‟s only hope of attaining 
a solid identity in the U.S. because Mitt represents his desire of achieving “a singular 
sense of his world, a life univocal…. assimilist sentiment, part of [Henry‟s] own ugly 
and half-blind romance with [the U.S.]” (Lee 267). Henry‟s singular sense of the 
world and its univocality of truth has been an ideological illusion. Witnessing Mitt‟s 
death, Henry is disillusioned the ideologies of a model minority or Mitt‟s utopian 
hybridity. In this respect, Lelia admits, “[m]aybe it‟s that Mitt wasn‟t all white or all 
yellow…Maybe the world wasn‟t ready for [Mitt]” (130). Mitt‟s identity has been in 
chiaroscuro, in which utopia shadows dystopia. In truth, Mitt‟s utopian identity is the 
result of Henry‟s projection of his own desire. Differentiated from the utopian image, 
in the vein of the relation between Mitt‟s death and racial history, Mitt symbolizes the 
dystopian “earth.” “Mitt” can be pronounced in Korean as “밑[mit],” which means 
“the bottom” or “beneath” in English; after Mitt dies, Henry deplores, “Listen, now. 
You can hear the attempt of his breath, that unlost voice, calling us from the bottom 
of the world” (107). Mitt suffocated to death beneath a hefty racial history. 
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In this sense, Mitt is a liminal territory on the identity map of the U.S. Mitt 
represents a hybridity that reveals the “bottom” of the “ideology of Identity” itself, 
and the hidden Korean meaning of his name resonates with the unavoidable violence 
drawn to Mitt‟s singular presence that cannot be identified in the social space. Even 
biracial children in suburbia are vulnerable to painful identification via racial terms. 
Mitt screams, “a chink, a jap, a gook…Charlie Chan, face as flat as a pan” (Lee 103), 
and mimics the white boys‟ racial aspersions:“mutt, mongrel, half-breed, banana, 
twinkie” (103). Although Henry tries to convince Mitt that those racial terms are “just 
words” (103), these racial signs keep inscribing him and force him to identify himself 
by these names. Mitt‟s singular, individual presence is marked and branded by too 
many racial names. 
On the liminal territory within the identity map, Mitt is overnamed as are 
reified objects. In “On Language as Such and on the Language of Man,” Benjamin 
takes up the issue of overnaming. Deconstructing the relation of object and subject in 
language, Benjamin claims, “the linguistic being of all things is their language” (63); 
in other words, in Benjamin‟s understanding of language, things have their own 
languages. However, Benjamin asserts that semiotic language is violent and 
engenders “overnaming.” More specifically, Benjamin critiques the arbitrary 
Saussurean relation between things and names. The modern understanding of things 
as objects—designated to be understood, scribed, and labeled by signs (signifiers) by 
human subjects—prompts overnaming, the violent appropriation and reification of 
things: in this way, overnaming has created a violent relation of the subject and the 
object. Benjamin diagnoses this overnaming and asserts that it is “the deepest 
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linguistic reason for all melancholy…”(“On Language” 73). Why is overnaming the 
linguistic reason of melancholy? Because, due to violent overnaming, a person loses 
her or his original name, which cannot be marked by a mere semiotic sign. Mitt is 
overnamed by the many cultural properties of his identity; specifically, his 
complexion, voice, hybrid identity, and even his gestures are identified and named 
with excessive names. Overnaming is the violence of the identity politics, which 
perpetrates naming a being without considering its uncommunicable singularity. 
Because of this linguistic and cultural violence of overnaming, Mitt‟s singular 
presence perishes. Mitt‟s universal translatability becomes obsolete within the context 
of racial violence and its oppressive discourses. The white boys harassed and killed 
Mitt because Mitt‟s difference was not registered or scribed in their cultural texts of 
Identity.  
In this regard, given his overnamed presence in the U.S., Mitt‟s true name as 
“bottom” in Korean is problematic. Mitt‟s death and his voice pose a question about 
the ontological foundation of identity itself. Identity deprives beings of their 
singularities. Identity is a totalitarian, unifying discursive apparatus that culturally and 
discursively gathers and distributes singular individuals into cognitive categories. The 
world is not able to include Mitt‟s existence because Mitt‟s identity as a biracial 
Korean American child contradicts the discursive, cultural dichotomy of two 
mutually exclusive sets—Korean or American. Culture embraces hybridity only 
within the limit that hybridity functions as an essentialist strategy to subvert cultural 
authenticity or purity.
68
 That is, the culturally subversive meaning of hybridity, as 
                                                 
68 In ethnic studies, the significance of hybridity has been a matter of debate. Lowe, for instance, 
regards hybridity as a subversive cultural agent; she claims that in U.S. colonial history, hybridity 
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Mitt‟s jumbled, subversive univocity exemplifies, also causes Mitt to be killed, not 
because he has hybrid individuality but because he was identified as a hybrid being.  
Western culture is founded on the theoretical dogmas of Identity. On one 
hand, the seemingly universal idea of Identity and identification is grounded within 
the limits of Western epistemology; the core of this limit is, according to Adorno, our 
belief in “To think is to identify” (5). Proving that hybridity is the cultural, discursive 
contradiction within identity is not enough and this proving is susceptible to be 
compromised by Identity.
69
 The deconstruction of a hybrid identity must start from 
the deconstruction of an ontological system of identity itself rather than an 
empowerment of the cultural significance of hybridity; in other words, the 
deconstruction of identity politics should start by looking for the means to make the 
cultural dialectics of Identity inoperative. On the other hand, in regard to the 
Heideggerian critique of Western metaphysics and de Certeau‟s scripture economy,70 
                                                                                                                                           
“mark[ed] the history of survival within relationships of unequal power and domination” (Immigrant 
67). On the contrary, Werbner critically reviews the “elusive paradox” of enthusiasm about hybridity 
in cultural politics and asks, “But what if cultural mixings and crossovers become routine in the 
context of globalizing trends?” (1). To this question, one of austere answers the authors of Debating 
Cultural Hybridity present is that there are “limits of cultural hybridity” (Debating 2). According to 
them, the inquiry that he or she has a hybrid cultural identity cannot be free from the entrenched 
questions of “how much are you hybrid? Which position do you want to be at—if you have Asian-
African hybridity, do you want to be categorized in Asian American? Individual singularity and his or 
her individual difference are undermined under the rule of cultural meaning of hybridity. Hybridity is 
meaningless as a description of „culture‟” (Werbner 15). 
69 In the Hegelian system, contradiction is the essence of dialectics, but, though “Identity and 
contradiction of thought are welded together,” “contradiction is nonidentity under the rule of a law that 
affects the nonidentical as well” (Adorno, Aesthetics 6). Although cultural identity has emphasized the 
conceptual superiority of hybridity and its subversive power, it, like cultural difference, has 
conceptually identified hybridity as a mere contradiction or non-identity; accordingly, the limit of 
cultural hybridity lies in the cognitive utopia which “would be to use concepts to unseal the non-
conceptual with concepts, without making it their equal” (Adorno, Aesthetics 10). 
70 Heidegger, in Identity and Difference, has tried to find the meaning of “difference as difference.” 
Heidegger argues that Western metaphysics has been founded on logos which onto-theo-logically 
“ground and gathers everything into the universal, and accounts for and gathers everything in terms of 
the unique”(69); thus, it “contains within itself the essential origin of the character of all language, and 
thus determines the way of utterance as a logical way in the broader sense” (69). The philosopher 
Heidegger exemplifies is Hegel, and the system he attacks is Hegelian dialectics. Though Western 
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the scripture economy and identity politics operates by scribing one‟s identity under 
the Hegelian onto-theology. Even scribing one‟s name to build one‟s identity is to 
foster illusions about the dead.  
Thus, Henry refuses to ossify Mitt‟s presence by mourning, which is also the 
fundamental reason why he cannot get over his melancholia. For instance, Lelia 
builds a monument to mourn and commemorate Mitt by collecting the “stuff” or 
things from Mitt‟s world; Lelia “go[es] out every morning to wander about the 
grounds of [Henry‟s] father‟s house, poking in the bushes and the trees for hours at a 
time, as if to follow [Mitt‟s] last tracts. One morning she returns with objects in her 
hands, pretty rocks and twigs and big oak leaves” (Lee 248) and builds a twig house. 
In contrast, Henry disassembles the twig house Lelia built by “Picking it apart, leaf by 
twig, stone by rock, until [he has] orderly piles of the material,” and he “stand[s] up 
and shout[s] out [Mitt‟s] name…as loud as with [his] meager voice can” (249). Henry 
deconstructs Lelia‟s mourning because he realizes that building a monument to 
commemorate Mitt is to violently identify him. The things in Mitt‟s world lost their 
meanings after Mitt‟s being is gone. Only by dissembling each object in order to 
restore their singular beings is Henry able to call Mitt‟s true name. Henry has to 
                                                                                                                                           
metaphysics has tried to focus on the erudite difference between Being (God, Absolute Spirit, Notion, 
Logos or History) and beings (individual entities), Heidegger argues that the basis/foundation of their 
thoughts, especially within the purview of Hegelian‟s dialectics, is the idea that everything is the same 
on a fundamental level under the concepts of Ideal, Spirit, Science, or Identity. For example, in 
“Preface,” Hegel lucidly says, “The spirit that, so developed, knows itself as Spirit, is science; Science 
is its actuality and the realm which it builds for itself in its own element” (Phenomenology 14). In 
truth, this teleological, linear Hegelian dialectic purporting for the dialectical sublation of differences 
has complemented the ideological belief that hybridity is a culturally subversive property that is 
determined to deconstruct Western homogeneous discourse. Singularity with ontological difference 
destructs this Hegelian dialectic in that singularity, which is ontologically unique, cannot be sublated, 
included or belonged to any particular set of universal Identity.  
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disassemble the heaps of racial names, white bodies, and Mitt‟s overburdened 
identities to let Mitt lie in peace. 
It is not only Mitt‟s true name but other immigrants‟ true names that are 
hidden beneath their scribed identities. Only unidentifiable voices and things in their 
world remain to tell how they existed. For example, after Henry‟s father died, Lelia, 
cleaning out the house, dispatched all her father-in-law‟s possessions and “finds faded 
sheets of lined notebook paper in his desk, completely written over with the American 
name…he‟d given himself but never once used: George Washington Park” (Lee 218). 
The facts that Henry‟s father has not used his American name and that he made for 
the purpose of becoming a true American unconceal his resistance against 
assimilation; Henry‟s father, like Bartleby, preferred to remain unidentified rather 
than to be overnamed by the scripture economy and onto-theology. Yet, the true 
Korean name of Henry‟s father is hidden in a void. Imagining how Lelia felt about 
this, Henry narrates, “And then, [Lelia] begins to shift her consciousness from the 
dead father to the absent son, her husband. Is it the coldness of objects, she wonders, 
that persists?...she tries to think of the things there that might signify him, call his real 
name” (218; emphasis in original). To Lelia, the true name of her Korean father-in-
law is a hidden “cold object” like Henry (Henry‟s true Korean name of Byung-Ho 
once spoken by John Kwang (296)), and like the true meaning of Mitt‟s Korean 
name. Only the things that constituted their worlds testify who they were.  
From this perspective, as a melancholic bard, Henry is not able to be 
estranged from the world of things his father and Mitt left behind; through this 
melancholic attachment and his poetic storytelling of his father‟s life and frustrating 
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efforts to speak aloud his father‟s lost name, Henry discloses his father‟s world.71 
However, this unconcealment is so powerful it results in ruin after Henry‟s singular 
sense of a world collapses. This catastrophe is inevitable because of the unavoidable 
impasses in the cultural world of Identity that forms the scripture economy. Henry 
narrates: 
I will always make bad errors of speech. I remind myself of 
my mother and father, fumbling in front of strangers. Lelia 
says there are certain mental pathways of speaking that can 
never be unlearned…I always hear myself displacing the 
two languages, conflating them—maybe conflagrating 
them—for there is so much rubbing and friction, a fire 
always threatens to blow up between tongues. Friction, 
affliction. (Lee 234) 
 
The friction is material and ontological rather than cultural. The true names of 
Henry‟s father, mother, Mitt and Henry are concealed ontologically and materially 
because their true names and existences are errors in Western onto-theology and 
culture. Henry is not capable of speaking aloud the names because his tongue, due to 
linguistic and cultural difference, causes friction and conflagration and will result in a 
baroque ruin.  
Epistemologically (in the mental pathway of speaking) and linguistically, 
Henry cannot bridge the different worlds of others—his father and mother, Mitt, and 
Lelia, and so on. Instead, in a melancholic mood, he can listen to the voices of the 
dead speaking their stories in a true poetic voice. Hereafter, I will show how Henry 
speaks as a Bartleby—a melancholic bard.  
                                                 
71 Benjamin‟s poetic description of melancholia helps understand this, “Melancholy betrays the world 
for the sake of knowledge. But in its tenacious self-absorption it embraces dead objects in its 
contemplation, in order to redeem them. The poet, of whom the following has been said, speaks from 
the spirit of melancholy…The persistence which is expressed in the intention of mourning is born of its 
loyalty to the world of things” (Origin 156).  
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Mitt, as an Ontological Threshold: Mitt’s Singular Voice and Presence  
Mostly, Mitt is described as a being that dwells on the primordial threshold 
between things and the world and poetically communicates with things. For example, 
a coin transforms from a mere entity to a poetic thing in Mitt‟s world. Henry‟s father 
gives Mitt a coin after Mitt offered him miscellaneous things such as “Dead insects. 
Live slugs, green pennies, bits of faded magazines. Every kind and condition of bark. 
Stuff” (Lee 102); after Mitt died, Henry recalls: 
Mitt liked to carry the coin with him. I knew because he 
would produce it wherever we were and start rubbing the face 
with his thumb. My father always advised him so, told him 
some Bronze Age Korean mythology to go with it, the tale of 
a lost young prince whose magic coin is sole proof of his 
rightful seat and destiny. (102)  
 
The “stuff” Mitt collected and bartered are things in Mitt‟s singular world; Mitt 
names, arranges, and recounts these things to himself “in a small voice” (102). Mitt‟s 
coin contains not only his presence and voice but also a narrative connectivity to 
ancient Korean mythology in which the coin is supposed to be a token of truth that 
has the capability to prove a prince‟s true identity in Mitt‟s world. To some extent, 
this coin, with Mitt‟s voice, also brings forth the ontological mood (Stimmung) of 
nostalgia and unconceals the relation of the coin to Mitt‟s world. Mitt‟s voice gathers 
and brings Korean mythology, earth (Mitt‟s name), sky (Mitt‟s spirit), and Mitt 
himself into Mitt‟s world to turn the mere coin into an ontological thing. This thing, 
on the level of transnational storytelling, is woven in a “story” of Mitt‟s life, and 
relates the mystic life of the prince in the Korean folktale to Mitt‟s life story. 
Ontologically speaking, Mitt‟s presence corresponds with the coin because both of 
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them are poetic thresholds between the Korean world and the American things or 
beings. This “threshold position” originates from Mitt‟s singular, unique presence.  
Meanwhile, mourning over Mitt‟s death, Henry listens to things in the world 
Mitt lived in. What Henry experiences is the way to the ontological language 
Heidegger speculates on and proposes in his oeuvre.
72
 It is the ontological differences 
between things and the world, living and death, and silence/voice and language that 
form a Being‟s world. Applying Heidegger‟s ontological lens, the things and world 
around Mitt even possess traces of his presence after he died and disclose the original 
meaning of being—being-toward-death. Speaking in Heideggerian language, because 
a human being is being-toward-death, he or she can listen to the sayings (or words) 
from things in the world so as to speak. Although Being turns into nothing, things 
possessing the ontological difference of the living and the dead remain as traces of 
Mitt‟s presence so much so that Mitt‟s voice remains as traces of his Being. For 
example, when Henry goes to pick up Mitt‟s remains after the accident, the nurse 
gives him “a plastic bag of his clothes,” and he finds in it “a coin in the back flap 
pocket of his shorts” (Lee 102). Painfully and poetically tracing Mitt‟s vanished 
presence by haptically listening to the sayings from the coin, Henry, in a melancholic 
                                                 
72 From a Heideggerian perspective, men do not speak; in truth, language speaks, and men only come 
into “the opening” that reveals things. Heidegger critiques the idea that language is what human beings 
express or a system of linguistic signs. Language is a creation of relations in a mood between things 
and the world of Dasein by “thinging” things and “worlding” the world, as well as by interpenetration 
between them; in this process, language gives things their Being. Interpreting the Heideggerian 
meaning of mood, David A. White claims, “A feeling is a different and unique kind of state. Once this 
difference is accepted, it will be possible to derive ontological consideration from feeling which have 
remained hidden because of the unexamined belief that feelings are merely instances of some more 
general property of “being human.” (82). In terms of Heideggerian language, this feeling is also a 
silent language since it dwells “between things,” the world, and human beings. Within this mood and 
feeling over the threshold between the world and things, a poet delineates the mood stepping beyond 
the threshold. This stepping over, or poetic speaking, occurs when the poet listens to the saying from 
the entities and names them, which turns these unnamed entities into things; in this process, “the thing 
is gestated by world, and world is only world when a thing is granted from it” (White 65). 
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mood, narrates: “The coin was warm…and I wonder how long the shiny metal could 
hold in a heat, if it could remember something like the press of flesh” (102). The coin, 
in silence, unfolds the truth of Mitt‟s world because the world to which the coin and 
Mitt belong is not so much founded on the onto-theo-logical relation of object and 
subject, which also originates as linguistic, semiotic, and cultural difference; rather, it 
is founded on the primordial relation of things and Mitt‟s world.   
Things and voices gradually change Henry into a melancholic bard or 
dreaming savage. Another agent that unfolds Mitt‟s presence as a threshold between 
the world and things is Mitt‟s voices from a thing—a tape recorder. After Mitt died, 
Henry “wanted to hear [Mitt‟s] voice” and listens to the tapes of Mitt‟s voice telling 
his own stories (Lee 110). On one tape, Henry heard “Mitt saying every bad word he 
knew” (112). On another tape, Henry listens to Mitt‟s story about his violent and 
confusing feeling concerning his friend, Alex. According to Mitt‟s story, he 
abandoned his favorite dinosaur dolls after his friend, Alex, had told him that 
“dinosaurs were dumb…they were no brain” (111) and smashed all the dolls‟ heads 
with Mitt‟s bat. To Lelia, who asks why he abandoned his dolls, Mitt answers, it was 
because “they‟re a-stink” (111). After Lelia corrects “a-stink” to “ex-tinct,” Mitt asks, 
“Will people get a-stink?” and “Will you and Daddy?” (111-12). At the broadest 
level, Mitt‟s traumatic experience reveals the violent situation to which he was 
exposed. Violent images and words thrive in Mitt‟s language and resonate with the 
history of violence against so-called Asian savages who, over time, have been 
suspected by Europeans of not having souls or brains. In this sense, Mitt is one of the 
dinosaur dolls vulnerable to racial violence. Yet, this episode entails a more 
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fundamental question about the difference between linguistic difference and 
ontological difference.  
In a sense, Mitt‟s phonic mistake in pronouncing “a-stink” for “extinct” 
discloses the ontological rift in Mitt‟s world and language. On one hand, this mistake 
occurs because Mitt is not able to discern the phonic, semiotic difference of two 
words. On the other hand, “extinct” connotes the difference between the living and 
the dead, while “a-stink” connotes the difference between meaning and non-meaning. 
With these two words juxtaposed, it can be said that Mitt‟s voice in between meaning 
(“extinction”) and non-meaning (“a-stink”) unfolds his anxiety about death 
(“extinction”). In turn, this juxtaposition unfolds another layer of the deconstruction 
of relations between the two words because it also connotes the mysterious non-
meaning of Mitt‟s voice. The differences between the living and the dead, meaning 
and non-meaning, and language and voice bring up the real meaning of the 
ontological pain of stepping over the thresholds and Henry‟s listening to voices from 
the dead that sound like animal cries. What predominates is the melancholic mood of 
the existential pain and angst in Mitt‟s world; this, in turn, overwhelms and envelops 
Henry‟s world. 
Another instance shows more clearly this role of voice as a threshold between 
language and an animal voice and being and death, as well as the melancholic mood 
and ontological difference between Mitt (the dead) and Henry (the living listener). 
During his lovemaking with Lelia, Henry‟s poetic narration elucidates: 
[Lelia] let herself balance on me until she was no longer 
touching the bed. She knew what to do, what to do to me, 
that I was Mitt, that then she was Mitt, our pile of two as 
heavy as the balance of all those boys who had now grown 
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up. We nearly pressed each other to death, our swollen lips 
and eyes, wishing upon ourselves the fall of tears, that great 
free anger, that great obese heft of melancholy, enough of it 
piling on at once so that sometimes whether we wanted to 
or not we made love so hard and gritty we had to say fuck 
to be telling the very first part of the truth. In the bed, in the 
space between us, it was about the sad way of all flesh, 
alive or dead or caught in between, it was about what must 
happen between people who lose forever the truest moment 
of their union. Flesh, the pressure, the rhymes of gasps. 
This was all we could find in each other, this the novel 
language of our life. (Lee 106)  
 
Erratically, this passage resonates with Henry‟s imagination of the moment Mitt died: 
“You pale little boys are crushing him, your adoring mob of hands and feet, your 
necks and head, your nostrils and knees, your still-sweet sweat and teeth and grunts. 
Too thick anyway, to breathe. How pale his face, his chest. Blanket his eyes” (107). 
Taking this image into consideration, it is on the bed that Henry and Lelia commingle 
into the world of integrated bodies and emulate the moment of Mitt‟s death. In this 
jumbled space of flesh both desiring and desired, Henry imagines that he and Lelia 
become Mitt. By experiencing sadistic lovemaking, Lelia and Henry try to feel in a 
“great obese heft of melancholy” (106) the same pain Mitt felt when he was dying. 
Why are Lelia and Henry possessed by the melancholic mood? The melancholia 
both—or maybe only Henry—feel(s) originates from the impossibility of mourning, 
as I have argued before. However, the hidden truth underneath this pathological 
understanding is that this melancholia in truth originates from the fact that 
ontologically no one is able to become Mitt. This melancholic mood is related to 
ontological ethics. As Levinas clearly claims, the Other is not another “myself.”73 
Namely, the fundamentally ethical truth is that no one can dwell with me in my 
                                                 
73 See Levinas‟s Time and the Other (74-77).  
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singular world built upon a projection towards my own authentic ownmost death. 
Becoming Mitt is a melancholic illusion. No one can be non-being or dead. As such, 
Henry and Lelia can only advance infinitely towards the non-being (death) via 
desperate efforts to mimic and imagine what Mitt really felt. This is also related to the 
ethical impasse of sympathy
74
and mourning. However, as Levinas also holds, this 
impossibility engenders the ethical possibility of Eros: Eros is “possible to infer from 
[the] situation of death, where the subject no longer has any possibility of grasping, 
another characteristic of existence with the other” (Time 76). In other words, from 
this sadistic Eros nearing to the experience of death, a being can no longer grasp at 
any possibility of subjectivity and death, and upon this de-subjectification it is 
possible to derive another characteristic of ethical existence with other.  
For this reason, the truth that no one is capable of becoming Mitt 
ontologically has another hidden truth. This hidden truth is that Mitt‟s voice discloses 
another ontological truth that Mitt is the future of Henry and Lelia.
75
 Pain, both as an 
ontological pain Heidegger termed to explain poets‟ painful speaking of “the saying” 
from the things
76
 and a passion, resonating with Mitt‟s dying voice, dominates and 
envelopes the world of Mitt, Lelia, and Henry. Henry learns that love is tantamount 
with listening to non-linguistic voice from the things and the dead. Pain does not 
                                                 
74 As Susan Sontag, in Regarding the Pain of Others, claims, the mere representation of sympathy 
makes us become callous towards the real pain of others (105). 
75 In Time and the Other, Levinas profoundly claims, “the Other is the future. The very relationship 
with the other is the relationship with the future” (77).  
76 According to Heidegger, ontological pain is the pain of speaking. In Greek etymology, pain (algos) 
and speaking (lego) are closely connected; namely, the endeavor to articulate others‟ pain in one‟s own 
voice is the two-fold act of drawing their pain into one‟s language and removing it from oneself by 
speaking. Heidegger claims: “Pain indeed tears asunder, it separates, yet so that at the same time it 
draws everything to itself, gathers it to itself. Its rending as a separating that gathers, is at the same 
time that drawing which, like the pen-drawing of a plan or sketch, draws and joins together what is 
held apart in separation. Pain is the joining agent in the rending that divides and gathers. Pain is the 
joining of the rift. The joining is the threshold. It settles the between, the middle of the two that are 
separated in it. Pain joins the rift of the difference. Pain is the dif-ference itself” (Poetry 202). 
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belong to the onto-theological linguistic system but to the animal cry from a mortal 
being. Though no one can understand the pain of others through language, as soon as 
we step into a relation with someone in pain, we can feel the pain and listen to its 
voice and cry; then we can speak of others‟ pain. The consideration of a being in pain 
and speaking of that being is ontologically and ethically painful in this sense.  
Musing over Mitt‟s hybridity, Henry confesses:  
The truth of my feeling, exposed and ugly to me now, is that 
I was the one who was hoping whiteness for Mitt, being 
fearful of what I might have bestowed on him; all that too-
ready devotion and honoring, and the chilly pitch of my 
blood, and then all that burning language that I once 
presumed useless, never uttered and never lived. (Lee 285)  
 
Henry‟s ugly dream reveals that he is complicit in the violence that lynched Mitt 
because he hoped to frame Mitt into an ideal identity—a white boy. Henry is not able 
to appropriately grieve over Mitt in that the “burning language” hides the truth that to 
Henry, before beginning to listen to Mitt‟s voice, Mitt was an ideal image without 
bodily presence. Several thinkers have claimed that ambivalent coexistence of hate 
and love is a commonplace of melancholia.
77
 Henry‟s phantasmagorical description 
of Mitt‟s perfect translatability paradoxically reveals this ambivalence. His 
melancholic hatred originates from his hatred against his incapability to become a 
native English speaker who possesses an impeccable identity and whiteness; Henry 
hates Mitt because Henry cannot become a perfect native speaker with a solid identity 
                                                 
77 In this regard, Agamben, his Stanzas: World and Phantasm in Western Culture, discusses the origin 
and ambiguity of melancholia. He says that it “is not so much regressive reaction to the loss of the love 
object as the imaginative capacity to make an unobtainable object appear as if lost” (20). In this vein, 
“In melancholia, love and hate…coexist….” (Stanzas 21). Zižek also adopts Agamben‟s approach and 
claims in his “Melancholy and the Act,” that “In short, what melancholy obfuscates is that the object is 
lacking from the very beginning, that its emergence coincides with its lack, that this object is nothing 
but the positivization of a void or lack, a purely anamorphic entity that does not exist in itself” (660). 
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as Mitt can. Henry has been incapable of saving those who he has loved; in truth he 
could not save Mitt, his father, his mother, Ahjumhma, Dr. Luzan, or John Kwang 
because he has also hated them. Nonetheless, Henry‟s passivity and incapability do 
not mean that his life fell into fatalism without freedom.  
Here is another paradox. Henry‟s incapability originates from both hatred and 
love and improper incapability as hatred is a proper capability as love not to do 
something. Henry loves Mitt, but he prefers not to actively prevent his death because 
he too much “loves” Mitt. Henry‟s incapability has a root in the ontological passion 
of hatred against capability.
78
 The facticity of life is that ethical freedom originates 
from the powerful annihilation of the willful decision to overname and manipulate 
others like reified objects: if incapability originates from hatred, it also originates 
from love. Thus, a melancholic ambivalence of hatred and love towards others or 
things is negative as well as positive because melancholics, who suffer from 
incapability, are free from the desire for power that forces them to perpetrate 
something that can inflict pain on others.
79
 
                                                 
78 Critiquing the idea that Heidegerrian ontology is devoid of passion or affect, Agamben claims that 
the Heideggerian ontological „Da‟ of Dasein” is an ambivalent space of two passions—love and hate 
(Potentiality 198-99). Love and passion are not just passions of beings (das Man); our Being has been 
traversed primordially by love and hate in a mode of thrownness because the facticity of Being is 
ontologically founded on the “impropriety of love” and “human beings are those who fall properly in 
love with the improper, who, unique among living beings—are capable of their own incapability” 
(Potentiality 204; emphasis in original). Dasein‟s Da is the primordial space of impropriety: it is the 
space of hate in which love also emerges. The ethos of humanity, in this sense, is the ambivalent 
coexistence of “possibility, propriety and capability (love)” and “impossibility, impropriety and 
incapability (hate)” (Potentiality 204). Agamben implies that the Heideggerian meaning of freedom is 
this ambivalence of capability and incapability in the venue of ontological passions. 
79 For example, implicitly critiquing Heidegger‟s authentic language, de Certeau claims: “…we can 
distinguish between writing‟s effort to master the ‟voice‟ that it cannot be but without which it 
nevertheless cannot exist, on the one hand, and the illegible returns of voices cutting across statements 
and moving like strangers through the house of language, like imagination” (The Practice 159). The 
mood that dominates Heideggerean language is melancholic since he obsessively fixates his desire on 
what we permanently lost: the absolute resurrection of the origin of Western ideas which is supposed 
to world the world of the pre-Socratic Greek. Heidegger‟s obsession with purity and authenticity in 
language paradoxically founds the violence against different voices and languages. Heidegger‟s idea of 
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For this reason, Henry‟s incapability based on ambivalent passions—love and 
hate—engenders ethical freedom and poetic speaking; here ethics paradoxically 
encounters poetics. The ethical choice of incapability due to the hatred towards power 
opens the possibility of a poetic (phantasmatic) speaking out of the fundamental love 
towards a being‟s ontological dwelling space—voice of the dead, a utterly incapable 
ethos.  
However, this potentiality of the poetic speaking and its ethical implication 
are not ideal, but ambivalent and enveloped in a melancholic mood—the paradoxical 
mood of love/hatred and capability/incapability. Pain is a perpetual mood in the 
ruinous vessel of this poetic relation whose style is baroque; thus, Henry‟s poetic 
saying is a cacophonous, melancholic dirge. On the contrary, in this vessel, the song 
set free those who listen to the hidden voice of the oppressed and the deceased in 
history. In this mood, Henry narrates: 
We will learn every lesson of accent and idiom, we will 
dismantle every last pretense and practice you hold, noble 
as well as ruinous. You can keep nothing safe from our 
eyes and ears. This is your own history. We are your most 
perilous and dutiful brethren, the song of our hearts at once 
furious and sad. (Lee 320)   
 
Singing in the ruinous world of the baroque, melancholics, as a collective “we,” sing 
freely regardless of the oppressive identification of the scripture economy which sets 
                                                                                                                                           
“language is the flower of the mouth. In language the earth blossoms toward the bloom of the sky” (On 
the Way 99) corresponds with his dogmatic belief in the authentic relation of the Greek and Germans. 
For instance, in “Dialogue on Language,” which is a transcription of Heidegger‟s conversation with a 
Japanese scholar, Heidegger implies a caveat that the danger of untranslatability firmly exists between 
two different languages; Heidegger even claims “And so, a dialogue from house to house remains 
nearly impossible” (On the Way 5). In this venue, Nicholas Rand, in “The Political Truth of 
Heidegger‟s Logos: Hiding in Translation,” clearly demonstrates how Heidegger‟s theoretical effort of 
“Discovering that German is a shelter for Greek…” is not theoretically convincing since his writings 
“work with the principle of inter-and intralinguistic homophony, a procedure common to dreams and 
poetry” (443). 
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the linguistic or cultural norms and determines who deserves to live. But Henry‟s and 
Mitt‟s worlds are in a perilous danger as Mitt‟s untimely death exemplifies. Henry 
realizes this danger and becomes one of many immigrant Bartlebys. In what follows, 
I will investigate the poetic relation of multiple Bartlebys in Native Speaker to 
demonstrate how Henry, as a melancholic bard, participates as a member in a chorale 
of a coming community. Édouard Glissant opens a new pathway to understand this 
relation; his ideas of the poetics of relation and the commonplace reconstructs the 
Heideggerian Being and language to show different poetics based on differential 
relations of immigrants. Vis-à-vis Glissant‟s way of transformation, finally, after he 
listens to the multiple voices in relation rather than only obsessively listening to 
Mitt‟s voice, Henry breaks free from his scribing position as well as his melancholic 
obsession with his ambivalent relations. This is another moment when a new 
community emerges and a poetics meets an ethics, and even shows a way to 
politics.
80
     
 
Vessels in an Archipelago of Whatever Beings: From Singularity to Relation 
 Recalling the moment of Mitt‟s death, Henry narrates, “But we are the living, 
remaining on the ground, and what we know is the narrow and the broken. Here, we 
are strewn about in the lengthy expanse of an archipelago, too far to call one another, 
too far to see” (Lee 106). Figuratively speaking, the differences and abysmal gaps 
between singular immigrants or trans-spatial beings are filled with the ocean of 
                                                 
80 Ontological ethics and poetics meet politics via investigating into the animal voice from the dead as 
well. Agamben, in Homo Sacer, implies this new direction by claiming, “a page of the Politics situates 
the proper place of the polis in the transition from voice to language” (7). However, this new path 
starts from a more fundamental relation between poetics and ethics in that politics, according to 
Agamben, that is based on the realms of language and culture. 
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differential relations. This archipelago is an image of the expanse of relations. Setting 
out on errant journeys without a filiation to fixed roots and listening to “the dark side 
of…impossible memory which has a louder voice” (Glissant, Poetics 72) creates the 
commonplace vessels in this archipelago to which Henry and other immigrants in 
Native Speaker belong. In this sense, the vessel is an important spatial imagery in 
Native Speaker, which in several instances unfolds how singularly alienated beings 
are linked without identifiable totalities. Literary space is the totality of differences 
and imaginaries. Also, Glissant called this heterogeneous totality chaos-monde, which 
implies that literary or actual relations are opaque and differential. Glissant‟s concept 
of chaos-monde is a baroque vision of an archipelago of differential relations. This 
mode of the world is filled with voyages of ships or vessels of relations rather than 
bridges because this relation in the chaos-monde envelopes the impassable, 
primordially different, and constantly changing singularities each trans-spatial 
being—namely, nomadic immigrants—possesses. Thus, Glissant poetically 
articulates: 
Relation, that is destroyed, at every instant and in every 
circumstance, by this particularity spelling out opacities, 
through this singularity, becomes once again the experience 
of relation. Its death as generality is what creates the life it 
has to share…Relation exists in being realized, that is, in 
being completed in a common place. (Poetics 203) 
 
Despite its disordered order and opacity, the archipelago of relations among singular 
beings in chaos-monde has the ambivalence of both connection and disconnection to 
immigrants, which is why this relation has a plethora of commonplaces that lead these 
trans-spatial beings to have differential, universal relations.   
In this regard, Jack, Henry‟s colleague and a spy of Greek origin, referring to 
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Mitt‟s death, says,  
Your boy. Your boy was a perfection…Sometimes I 
suspect of us living that we are marred. The unspoiled must 
take leave of the world. I think they must bear the ills of 
their loved ones…But in my heart I fear they are the 
vessels for our failure. We make it impossible for them to 
live in this place. One day they fill up. Then they sink. 
They disappear. (Lee 164-5) 
 
As Jack posits and Henry agrees, Mitt represents not only the utopian dream every 
vessel that transported Asians from Asia to the U.S. in immigration history has 
symbolized, but also the painful deprivation of their identities these nomadic 
immigrants have had to undergo in order to survive. All immigrants share the dream 
incarnated by Mitt in a communal vessel for the future utopia, but this also means no 
one can achieve a solid, legitimate, and wholly constituted identity; they die in this 
errantry due to heartbreaking shipwrecks.  
 Thus, the vessel as a baroque imaginary of chaos-monde is ruinous totality.
81
 
Hoagland, the boss of the spy company, warns, “There is always a picture too big to 
see. No one is safe, Harry [Henry], not in some fucking pleasure boat in the 
Caribbean, not even in Lovely Long Island and Queens” (46). Within the picture or 
the globalized context of the world of Baroque and a chaos-monde that is too big and 
complex to be understood, there is no pleasant utopian vessel; every vessel is in 
danger of a shipwreck or the hostility of strangers in a new land. As the L.A. riots 
prove, living as immigrants ambivalently means “anything American, in impressing 
Americans, in making money, polishing apples in the dead night…being perfect, 
shooting black people, watching [their] stores and offices burn down to the ground” 
                                                 
81 Benjamin investigates “the baroque cult of the ruin” (The Origin 178) and elaborates on baroque 
writers‟ literary obsession with piling up fragmentary materials to look for the miracle of a truth. 
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(Lee 52-3). Spaces of pain-stricken people in the U.S. after these kinds of 
catastrophes disclose the bareness of beings in this vessel in which all these 
unidentifiable immigrants are “wading knee-deep in kerosene” where “suddenly your 
speech is a match” (Lee 285). Even contingent articulation ferociously destructs 
individuals. In fact, Henry‟s belief “„I‟ am safe in this vessel” (265) is an illusion of 
chaos-monde.  
 Indeed, immigrants in a vessel within an archipelago are bare lives excluded 
from legal protection, vulnerable to violent identification only to be expelled or 
branded.
82
 For example, Henry watches news that: 
is about a small freighter that runs aground off Far Rocking 
way in the middle of the night. The Boat carries around 
fifty Chinese men who have paid $20,000 each to 
smugglers to ship them to America….The drowned are 
lined up on the dock beneath canvas tarps. The ones who 
make it, dazed, soaked, unspeaking, are led off in a line 
into police cars. (Lee 246-47)  
 
In another news segment, several illegal immigrants “from the cargo ship…describe 
the conditions on the ship, the lack of plumbing, how some of the passengers died 
during the 12,000 mile voyage and were wrapped in plastic and cast into the ocean” 
(327). This news demonstrates that illegal or legal, trans-spatial nomads are eternal 
stowaways. What‟s more, their non-identities or their beings as thresholds are veiled 
under the spectacle from the scripture economy. Those Chinese in the news verify 
their existences only via the spectacle of the media. A society of spectacle, as Guy 
Debord speculates, is a world where nothing inexplicable, ontologically different, or 
singular exists; everything is under the rules of the scripture economy and onto-
                                                 
82 Glissant also points out this danger and potentiality of the baroque. See Poetics of Relation (77-79).  
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theological identity. There is no more safety, rationality, harmony, or depth due to the 
expanse, contingency, dangerous history, ruinous objects, and insanity of the baroque 
world, as Glissant also claims (Poetics 77). In the vessel, immigrants turn into 
nomads on the sea, making them unidentifiable by the scripture economy.  
To Henry and other immigrants, the ontological angst or melancholy is like a 
seasickness caused by errantry in a global archipelago. Henry, undergoing the 
unexpected experiences of listening to voices from the dead who have been hidden in 
his memory, realizes that he is not different from these bare beings. However, his 
ontological listening and poetic speaking preclude the possibility of communication 
for information based on diasporic semiotics in that “while one can communicate 
through errantry‟s imaginary vision, the experiences of exiles are incommunicable” 
(Glissant, Poetics 20). Despite this incommunicability and the non-identifiable 
presences, those bare lives in the vessel of migration, about whom “ [The New 
Immigrant Survey] has no records of birth or entry or naturalization” (Lee 329), are 
not just a backdrop of the novel, but unfold an unidentifiable, un-unified, unnamed 
community whose incommunicable relations initiate the charged potentiality for 
building a new ethos of humanity. Yet, this community is in thick opacity. 
In Native Speaker, almost all of the female immigrant characters—Helda, 
Henry‟s mother and Ahjuhma—represent this new totality of relations embedding 
ontological opacities. Helda Brandeis, a janitor working at Kwang‟s office, who “left 
her family back in what was the old East Germany to make enough money to send for 
her husband and three grown children”(Lee 61) died “covered in a film of ash” (251) 
due to a bomb attack plotted by Kwang‟s Korean gang. “Ash” is the commonplace 
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figure in the relation of these women‟s tragic lives, while their lives are relayed and 
form an expanse of a differential community. Relations between these trans-spatial 
beings are filled with posthumous “things” that unconceal the ontological relations of 
their singular, trans-spatial worlds; after Helda died, Henry imagines the money she 
earned“[is] air-posted to Germany in a handsomely twined bundle of vellum and silk” 
in her honor (262). Resonantly, Ajhumha‟s cremated ash is “mailed…back to Korea 
in a solid gold coffer finely etched with classical Chinese Characters” (81); likewise, 
ash from Henry‟s mother‟s dead body is sent and “buried in a Korean ceremony” 
(77). Like Myung Mi Kim‟s incomplete letters, all of these women‟s trans-spatial 
dreams of coming back to their home countries come true in the form of a “thing” 
(ash) after they died, though this ash gathers their worlds, spirits, memories, earths, 
skies, and lives.  
Obviously, these women do not know each other; the only commonplace 
among them is that they died without legitimate identities as silent subaltern women; 
Henry even calls his mother‟s death “more [of] a disappearance than a death” (Lee 
77). However, in the poetic thinking of Others is the moment the poetics of relations 
emerges; only at this moment does Being become Relation. Heidegger‟s idea of 
ontological difference is, in this sense, the foundation of this Relation in chaos-
monde. Though Henry is unable to understand Helda, his mother, and Ahjuhma‟s 
singular lives, he realizes that he is related to those beings via their ontological 
differences and related, relayed relations in the expanse—the archipelago of relation. 
Then how can we understand these women‟s relation and their singular, but collective 
lives in terms of community? Is it possible to think of their relations as new 
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phenomena of current globalization? 
Agamben suggests a potential answer to this question. Agamben calls beings 
without identities “whatever beings” in The Coming Community. Agamben, tracing 
back to the original meaning of “whatever” in Latin, suggests that “Whatever” is 
singularity not in “its indifference with respect to a common property (to a concept, 
for example: being red, being French, being Muslim), but only in its being such as it 
is” (The Coming 1). In this sense, Agamben also terms “whatever being” as 
“example”; Agamben argues, “one concept that escapes the antinomy of the universal 
and the particular has long been familiar to us: the example” (The Coming 8). The 
example is a singular being, and its proper place is “the empty place in which its 
indefinable and unforgettable life unfolds” (Agamben, The Coming 10). 
Paradoxically, Agamben also claims that this exemplary, singular being is a pure 
linguistic being. These pure linguistic, singular beings “communicate only in the 
empty space of example, without being tied by any common property, by any 
identity” (The Coming 11). This being can be called anything and belong to any 
group, but it deconstructs any particular, universal names or the generality of a set it 
belongs to.   
In Native Speaker, characters lose their true names and are entitled by 
pronouns. Henry‟s father and mother lost their Korean names and are called by their 
titles. Without identities being captured by the scripture economy, those beings 
become replaceable, and their stories become patterns of a large tapestry. In this 
regard, Henry narrates, “And the more I see and remember the more their story is the 
same. The story is mine. How I come by plane, come by boat, come climbing over a 
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fence. When I get here, I work…I work so hard that one day I end up forgetting the 
person I am. I forget my wife, my son. Now, too, I have lost my old mother tongue” 
(Lee 279). “Whatever beings” dwell in lethe (forgetfulness) in Greek with silent 
foreign (animal) voices; but Being as such discloses how their lives are differential 
and universal. Immigrants came to the new land to become silent strangers without 
names and identities, but these Bartlebys disclose the fundamentally negative locus of 
humanity.  
The most striking example as whatever being is Ahjuhma. In the novel, Henry 
does not articulate Ahjuhma‟s name until the end of the novel. In Native Speaker, 
Ahjuhma, which is the general name for a middle-aged lady in Korean, is just a title 
for an unidentifiable “whatever” woman in Korea. She is mysterious Koreanness 
itself who does not represent anything in English, just as Myung-Mi Kim‟s 
untranslatable syllables and the Korean pronunciation of Mitt do not represent their 
true names in English. Ahjuhma even lost connection to her nationality, so “She 
never called her family in Korea” (Lee 66). Ahjuhma also represents the femininity of 
women in the third world or a subaltern because even white females cannot 
understand her. When Lelia, as “[t]he crazy white lady in the attic” (117), tries to 
communicate with her on an equal gender plane, Ahjuhma frenetically refuses any 
communication. Lelia, within this limit of linguistic communication, describes 
Ahjuhma as “an abandoned girl. But all grown up”(73). Lelia‟s understanding cannot 
help being limited since she does not recognize that her ideological approach based 
on white feminism cannot narrow the gap between her and Ahjuhma. Though she can 
understand Ahjuhma on the level of their gender, Lelia cannot understand Ahjuhma‟s 
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nationality or silenced protest. This limit reflects the colonial relation between Lelia 
and Ahjuhma. No matter how open-minded a white feminist is, what Lelia expresses 
comes out of a condescending, humanitarian sympathy. Though, she is the one who is 
capable of pointing out Ahjuhma‟s “whatever” identity to Henry when she says that 
“If your father switched her now with someone else, probably nothing would be 
different” (70).  
In identity politics, Ahjuhma even becomes an anamorphic being or a 
monster. Henry depicts her as a monstrous creature: “This woman, I could see, had 
deep pockmarks stippling her high, fleshy cheeks, like the scarring from a mistreated 
bout of chickenpox or smallpox [….,]” (62); she is also depicted as the anamorphic 
being of a “zombie” (65) or “huge trout” (Lee 79). When she goes out and acts like a 
child, Henry surreptitiously follows her and views her as a helpless, wild animal. 
Ahjuhma even loses her name. Henry “never heard [his] father speak her name in all 
the years she was with [him and his father]” (68). To Henry, “She doesn‟t seem like 
she‟s anything” (68). But, seen under a different lens, Ahjuhma becomes an 
abandoned girl, a monster, an animal, a nameless non-creature, or a “whatever 
being.” She is an example of all the unidentifiable, oppressed Korean women who 
can belong to any group but cannot be represented, because if representation is the re-
presentation of the reality or the ideal, something or someone that is out of our 
cognition cannot be represented.  
Without a name or any identity, and marked by a general exemplary term as a 
whatever being, Ahjumha‟s voice, without being captured within signification, still 
echoes in Henry‟s memory. Henry narrates; Ahjumha “never whistled or hummed or 
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made any noise, and it seemed to me as if she only partly possessed her own body, 
and preferred it that way” (Lee 65). Furthermore, he reveals that: 
She never laughed…spoke only when it mattered when a 
thing need to be done, or requested, or acknowledged. 
Otherwise the sole sounds I heard from her were the sucking 
noises she would make through the spaces between her teeth 
after meals and in the morning. Once I heard her humming a 
pretty melody in her room, some Korean folk song, but as I 
walked toward her doorway to hear it better she stopped 
immediately, and I never heard it again. (64-65) 
 
Ahjuhma speaks and even sings, but her voice is not signified since her voices are 
located in the vessel or thresholds whatever beings dwell in. Mitt‟s voice is in the 
same venue and forms a community of collective voices from the dead where 
Ahjumhma‟s sucking noise resonates with Mitt‟s voice. Thus, Henry narrates: “And 
yet I can never stop considering the pitch and drift of their forlorn boats on the sea, 
the movements that must be endless, promising nothing to their numbers within, 
headlong voyages scaled in a lyric of search, like the great love of Solomon” (335). 
The vessel of the coming community where whatever beings dwell reveals the truth 
of the ethos of humanity—voices from the dead—is a forlorn boat wrapped in silence 
opening the open for poetical singing. This lyric is errant and full of potentiality of 
non-articulation. In this boat of chaos-monde, all voices and noises from whatever 
beings are in relation, from which a new poetics of relation as a new ethos emerges. 
In this regard, Agamben poetically elaborates: 
[In] extreme negativity, man retrieves a Voice, a “final breath 
of memory”, which returns his past to him and intervenes to 
save him from solitude, forcing him to speak. Philosophy is 
this dialogue between man—the speaking and mortal 
being—and his Voice: this strenuous search for the Voice—
and, with it, a memory—facing death, assuring language of 
its place. The Voice is the mute ethical companion running to 
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the aid of language at the point where it reveals its 
ungroundedness. By remaining silent, with its “breath,” it 
assumes this absence of foundation and makes room for it. 
(Language and Death 95) 
 
However, Henry also realizes that this negative, silent chorale in a forlorn boat is 
raucous. Tuning his own voice to this melancholic choir of whatever beings saturated 
with the ontological mood of angst and nostalgia, Henry narrates: 
Within every echo from a city storefront or window, I can 
hear the old laments of my mother and my father, and mine 
as a confused schoolboy, and then even the fitful mumblings 
of our Ahjuhma, the instant American inventions of her 
tongue. They speak to me…not simply in a new accents or 
notes but in the ancient untold music of a newcomer‟s heart, 
sonorous with longing and hope. (Lee 304) 
 
“The ancient untold music of a newcomer‟s heart, sonorous with longing and hope” is 
the music in the vessel where all trans-spatial immigrants become schoolboys of 
history, forming a community of whatever beings. But this space and this language, 
though captured in the melancholic mood, can show a way to exile from the scripture 
economy where spectacles dominate our judgment of Asians. Henry‟s melancholia 
paves a new way for the understanding of this coming community. On this journey, 
Henry reveals his true and singular name; he is one of the whatever beings in this 
coming community.     
 
Oh, Humanity…. 
 Herman Melville ends his Bartleby story with the end of Bartleby‟s life. The 
end of the short story is telling because Melville enveloped in the narrator‟s voice 
screams with a melancholy voice: “Ah, Bartleby! Ah, humanity” (144). What 
Bartleby leaves behind is just a rumor that he once worked as a subordinate clerk “in 
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the Dead Letter Office at Washington,” and when the narrator thinks of “this rumor, 
hardly can [he] express the emotions which seize [him]” (144). The narrator implores, 
“Dead Letters! Does it not sound like dead men?” (144) Why Bartleby prefers to die 
is unfathomable. Does he prefer to die because he sympathizes with the dead letters 
that contain human lives? Maybe. However, the narrator says, “on errands of life, 
these letters speed to death” (144), and the grubman in the prison claims, Bartleby is a 
“gentleman forger” (142).  
 My hypothesis is that Bartleby prefers not to live and prefers to die because 
his personality as a genteel forger or scribe does not allow him to scribe or eat any 
inauthentic letters or food; like Kafka‟s hunger artist, Bartleby did not want to eat, 
only because he could not find anything that he could eat. Likewise, he could not 
scribe and forge letters anymore because he knows that what he scribes is inauthentic 
and he will inauthentically die; he is an epicure or a bon vivant who cannot bear the 
inauthentic food that would upset his stomach and letters that would upset his 
“gentility” (142). He used to work in the Dead Letter Office with the authority to let 
inauthentic letters be terminated in flame. Bartleby‟s motto might be “let inauthentic 
letters and beings die.” If so, the narrator‟s exclamation, “Ah, Bartleby, Ah, 
humanity!” is ironic; Bartleby prefers to die because he cannot bear the inauthentic 
letters‟ perseverance which corresponds to his own perseverance without authenticity. 
Bartleby is not a humanist; rather he is a scribe in truth, a man of career. The narrator 
is a Western humanist who suffers from belonging to Bartleby‟s truthful world. Yet is 
there an authentic humanity or authentic letters that Bartleby is looking for? The 
narrator is seized not by pity but by horror in regards to Bartleby‟s obsession with 
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authenticity. Life, authentic or inauthentic, has to continue no less than letters, 
authentic or inauthentic, have to continue. For this reason, “Bartleby The Scrivener” 
is an absurd comedy.  
This is the same with an immigrant‟s status and the logic behind his or her 
presence as a whatever being or cultural alien in the land of so-called authentic 
Americans. As “uncounted count” in this set of authentic Americans, immigrants‟ 
humanity is erased, and only their careers remain (Chinese cook, Korean proprietor of 
grocery store, and so on), and their preferences are to be easily ignored (i.e. 
immigrants cannot speak, eat, or live like Americans). Identity politics and cultural 
politics strengthen these fixating immigrants‟ preferences. In turn, these discourses 
manipulated by the scripture economy produce unnamable Bartlebys. Only their 
screams, poetic speaking, and things in their world show ways to escape Bartleby‟s 
comic-tragic formula.  
What, then, about the Asian Bartleby, Henry? Henry “prefers not to be” 
Bartleby or a scribe in the scripture economy anymore and “prefers to be” a trans-
spatial bard and an element in the coming community. After he loses his job, Henry 
starts to drift through the streets in New York, like Benjamin‟s flâneur or Bartelby 
himself, to find out that immigrants “are all here, the shades of skin I know, all the 
mouths of bad teeth, the speaking that is too loud…” (Lee 344). Henry realizes that 
immigrants are the whatever beings of the coming community who have been 
silenced and cannot be fully accepted as citizens. Those whatever beings live and 
move emitting illegible, meaningless, and cacophonous voices. Henry says that 
“[t]his a city of words. We live here. In the street the shouting is in a language we 
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hardly know. The strangest chorale. We pass by the throngs of mongers, carefully 
nodding and heeding the signs…The constant cry is that you belong here, or you 
make yourself belong, or you must go” (344). As Henry walks through New York, he 
feels that he is a part of the heteroglossia that is amplified to produce the 
cacophonous cries from immigrants who speak various languages. But this 
heteroglossia is a collective “chorale,” not an individual cry. Henry and other trans-
spatial immigrants sing together a chaotic global song with other cacophonous voices. 
This global song is a marching song and song of collective movements. They also do 
not stop because “It seems to [immigrants] right now that if [they] stop moving, 
[they] die” (281).  
In this regard, what Henry realizes is that he is a member of the inauthentic 
“whatever beings.” His authenticity is tantamount to Ahjuhma‟s. Henry can survive, 
not like Bartleby, because he is able to appreciate a different authenticity Bartleby 
could not see but he belongs to; Bartleby is a whatever being in truth. The 
authenticity of humanity does not lie in one‟s ontological and ethnic authenticity, but 
it lies in the recognition that “I” am one of “many” in a radical equality or a “coming 
community.” Although this means that Henry will become an Asian monster, at least 
he will survive. Ahjuhma‟s life is not as tragic as Henry once imagined. Ahjuhma 
does have her own happiness, though her subaltern status should not be ignored. 
Moreover, Henry, by becoming a member of the coming community, can become a 
trans-spatial bard. Trans-spatial beings learn and survive like weeds on the barren 
lands. Henry is not a native English speaker, and he cannot become one. However, as 
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a trans-spatial being with transient identities, he will survive like other immigrants 
who speak different languages.  
In the last scene, wearing “a green rubber hood and act[ing] in my role as the 
Speech Monster” (Lee 348), Henry hears his wife says, “Everybody…had been a 
good citizen” (349). All these immigrant children‟s “full names” are spoken loud 
(348). These names might not survive in the U.S. but their names create a coming 
community. He listens to “[Lelia‟s] speaking a dozen lovely and native languages, 
calling all the difficult names who we are” (349). Henry‟s English name is called by 
his wife—who became “Tongue Lady” (347)—and this name interpellates Henry to 
become a good citizen. However, in truth, wearing a costume as the Speech Monster, 
Henry becomes Ahjuhma, a child, an animal, or a monster as a permanent 
minority/foreigner that can become a trans-spatial being. Until the end of the novel, 
Henry prefers not to waste his potentiality as a “whatever” and unidentifiable being in 
the trans-spatial zoo in which Mitt‟s animal cry and Ahjuhma‟s Korean voice peals 
and fades. In the next chapter, I will show how their voices in the form of animal 
cries create ethico-ontological signs. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
AN ETHICAL TESTIMONY OF ANIMAL-HUMANS 
AS THE VOICE FROM THE DEAD IN OBASAN 
 
The law…rests on the circumstance that all law-preserving violence,  
in its duration, indirectly weakens the lawmaking violence represented 
by it, through the suppression of hostile counterviolence  
(Water Benjamin, “Critique of Violence” 300) 
 
that the line drew itself, making its way 
with conviction in the direction it knew 
to be right across the space, on paper, 
 
and yes, yes, the heart, the eye, the mind  
testify this is right, here, Yosh, hold 
up the drawing, behold the mountain, trust 
the judgment upholding truth through time  
as the man, the mountain, the profile make 
a perfect fit in this right place and time 
for Yosh to kneel again, feel again, raise 
his radiant eyes in peace to face the radiant 
mountain, Heart mountain, Heart mountain— 
 
and begin, again, with confidence, to draw the line!  
(Lwanson Fusao Inada, “Drawing The Line: For Yosh Kuromiya” 140) 
 
Joy Kogawa‟s Obasan has been praised as a masterpiece not only for its 
unique portrayal of ethnicity but also for its powerful testimony about the internment 
of Japanese Canadians during WWII in both Canada and the U.S. Yet testimony 
cannot be free from victimizing Japanese Canadians, as the novel is criticized for. 
These divided responses are rooted in different perspectives about Japanese 
Canadians‟/Americans‟ internment. In general, Japanese Canadians‟/Americans‟ 
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relocation and internment in concentration camps have been discussed as a traumatic 
event in history that needs to be healed. In many cases, however, atonement for the 
perpetrators‟ sins results in victimization of Japanese Canadians/Americans because 
healing from and overcoming this kind of atrocity necessitates a recasting of the event 
as a moral example to educate people. Victimization is problematic since it can be 
used as a heuristic strategy to make a people‟s trauma edifying. 
As an instance of this heuristic use of victimization, in The Politics of Racism, 
Ann Gomer Sunahara plainly shows how the Canadian government illegally relocated 
and incarcerated Japanese Canadians in concentration camps. Sunahara‟s approach to 
Japanese Canadian internment is paradoxical; though she compares Japanese 
Canadians who experienced the concentration camps to “rape victims” because of 
how they “responded with silence,” she treats this “rape” as an “ugly episode in 
Canadian history” while maintaining that it‟s clear “time [to] heals most wounds” 
because “many of the remaining victims can now tell their stories” (1). Her argument 
implies that the more the victims‟ testimonies are heard, the better the trauma can be 
healed, and this particular traumatic experience is a historic episode that must inform 
her targeted audience—those “born and raised since the WWII, who have known only 
a tolerant Canada” (vii). In the “Afterword,” Sunahara concludes by emphasizing 
“The importance of constitutional protections for human rights” and the role of 
education in ensuring these rights (153). To achieve this purpose, she acknowledges 
that a more thorough investigation of government documents about the Japanese 
Canadian internment is required for legal justice. As a reader, I am puzzled by her 
arguments because I wonder how letting victims speak out about their trauma 
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publicly can heal an experience equivalent to rape, and I wonder how all that violence 
can possibly be put behind the victims on the assumption that Americans/Canadians 
live in a legal utopia where every victim can restore what she has lost via legal 
reparation. Moreover, history is not just material for heuristic purposes. The mere 
testimony of once silenced stories is never able to cure victims‟ trauma because legal 
justice is limited and conditional.  
One of the great achievements of Joy Kogawa‟s Obasan is its ability to 
disclose a historic atrocity, without implying that the past event is only significant 
because of its didactic and heuristic functions. However, as I argued at the beginning 
of this introduction, to some critics, Joy Kogawa‟s Obasan distorts the historical 
reality because it victimizes Japanese Canadians too much or to some, too little. 
Those critics‟ political and cultural understandings of the novel fall within the 
expanse of two opposite poles. The first group of critics criticizes Obasan‟s 
misrepresentation of Japanese Canadians as victims, as this victimization prevents 
their assimilation into the multicultural utopia. The second group views Obasan‟s 
victimization as a literary strategy to promote the sale of the book. For instance, 
Marlene Goldman alleges that narratives in Obasan emphasize the victimized 
identities of Japanese Canadians. From Goldman‟s perspective, Kogawa‟s Obasan is 
politically incorrect because Japanese Canadians must escape the self-victimization 
she sees in Obasan in order to reshape their identities and accept “multiculturalism 
and hybridity against those of maintaining an insular ethnic identity” (383).  
On the other hand, from a staunch ethnic political position, Roy Miki, in his 
Broken Entries: Race Subjectivity Writing, poignantly argues that the 
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historiographical documents in Obasan “close the novel with Japanese Canadians 
framed as the „other‟ with no voice and language” (139). Miki also points out that in 
the novel, “Japanese Canadians…are identified as silenced, bereft of authority, 
disappeared, assimilated—in other words, as an erased collective that has lost the 
agency of self-representation” (138); in short, Miki criticizes that the novel ossifies 
Japanese Canadians into “The „othered [and] racial object‟” (139). Goldman and 
Miki‟s political understandings of Obasan pertain to the myth that literature about 
concentration camps should pursue a realistic description of historical truth. These 
two critics‟ opposite arguments, regardless of their different political positions, 
together imply that all the literary ambiguities of the poetic images of death and 
victims in Obasan undermine the historic role of Obasan as a testimony about the 
repulsive historical event of Japanese Canadians‟ internment.  
As a matter of fact, literature about concentration camps has recently become 
popular given the expanding contexts of globalization, the increasing number of 
human rights violations, the wars on regional or global levels, and the worldwide 
media sensationalization in the name of humanitarian purposes. But the veracity of 
these abhorrent representations of human miseries has been a point of contention. 
Except for a few cases, testimonial texts tend to be collaborative and tendentious 
products: writers, interviewers, archivists, librarians, publishers, marketing managers, 
etc. collaboratively produce a literary work about concentration camps as a mixture of 
fiction and non-fiction, eliciting a sense of morality from the readers‟ consciences, 
(particularly from those of the first world). For strategic reasons, the literature about 
concentration camps has been rife with accounts of torture, escape, massacre, and 
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humanity in its lowest forms. These explicitly violent representations raise the ethical 
issues of whether it is ethical to represent human suffering without thinking of the 
victims‟ trauma. 
As a counterpoint to this trend and taking this ethical issue of representation 
into account, I argue that the ambiguous images in Obasan strengthen rather than 
weaken its power of testimony. In this novel, one of Kogawa‟s most important 
literary assets is her use of literary figures or series of signs, mostly ontological 
signs
83—animals, dreams, memory, and death—to raze the distinction between 
animality and humanity. This use leaves a no man‟s land where only voices from the 
dead and animal-humans reverberate. In a sense, these animal images and death 
images dominate Obasan to maximize the righteous, visceral anger targeted on the 
pandemic violence of the state against the beings deprived of human rights. For 
example, Obasan ends with the protagonist, Naomi, a thirty-two year old Japanese 
Canadian, imagining an animal cry from her mother: “How thick the darkness behind 
which hides the animal cry. I know what is there, hidden form my stare. Grief‟s 
weeping. Deeper emptiness” (Kogawa 295). This last animal cry from Naomi‟s dying 
mother, after she was radiated from the nuclear bomb in Nagasaki during WWII, 
peals through the whole novel. This cry calls forth the ontological significance of the 
humanity of the Japanese people, which, in the totality of globalized violence across 
different times and spaces, stretches from the Japanese internment camps in Canada 
to Nagasaki in WWII, and even to refugee camps around the contemporary world or 
rape camps in Serbia. Thus, this animal cry and the animal signs in conjunction with 
                                                 
83 I borrow Deleuze‟s understanding of signs as he discusses them in Proust and Signs. According 
Deleuze, art signs are violent signs that affect our affects. Readers‟ contingent encounters with violent 
signs cause violence in their thoughts, which guides readers to find the truth of an artwork.  
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the signs of the dead and the dream/memory signs in Obasan testify to the ontological 
truth of humanity in aesthetic, artistic ways to amplify the novel‟s contemporaneity, 
urgency, and universality. These signs in the literary space of Obasan ethically 
represent concentration camps as the ubiquitous shadows of the state that supposedly 
protect citizens‟ human rights and bio-welfare, without being fettered by mere 
political claims of pro/anti-victimization or conformism.  
In this chapter, I argue that the artistic signs of animals, dreams, and death in 
Obasan are the poetic form of the history of concentration camps, testifying in truth 
and uncovering the truthful ethos of humanity. I employ ideas from several 
philosophers (mostly Kant, Agamben and Derrida) to produce an ethico-ontological 
understanding of the novel. Also, I analyze Obasan as an ethico-aesthetic way of 
representing the unrepresentable humans‟ animalized conditions in concentration 
camps in light of these thinkers‟ theoretical understandings of signs, ethics, ontology, 
and a utopian/dystopian vision of the coming community that consists of trans-spatial 
beings incarcerated in concentration camps.  
 
Aunt Emily’s Testimony and Its Limit 
Obasan is about two Japanese Canadian families‟ past experiences of 
internment. Naomi Nakane, the novel‟s narrator, recalls her experience of childhood 
and relocation when she lived with her maternal aunt Obasan (a general name in 
Japanese for an aunt or other elderly woman in the family, and whose real name is 
Aya Nakane) and paternal aunt Emily Gato, an activist trying to sue the Canadian 
government in order to disclose the truth and bring about justice for Japanese 
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Canadians.
84
 By and large, a large portion of Obasan consists of Aunt Emily‟s 
journals about her experience in a concentration camp juxtaposed with real 
government documents that historically testify how atrocious and absurd the Japanese 
Canadian relocation and concentration camps were. To rebuild the long-gone 
community of Japanese Canadians and restore justice to Japanese Canadians require 
finding legal evidence to right the historic wrongs—relocation and internment in 
concentration camps—perpetrated by the Canadian government. Moreover, 
narratologically, Aunt Emily‟s testimony “provides a historical background to 
Naomi‟s personal memories about the three different places where she has been 
brought up” (Ueki 6). 
Naomi, the narrator, admits that Aunt Emily‟s activism is full of altruistic 
inspiration to help other Japanese victims, and she even acts like an evangelist: “For 
[Aunt Emily], the vision is the truth as she lives it. When she is called like Habakkuk 
to the witness stand, her testimony is to the light that shines in the lives of the Nisei, 
in their desperation to prove themselves Canadian, in their tough and gentle spirit” 
(Kogawa 38). But Naomi refuses to accept Aunt Emily‟s stern belief in justice via 
juridical praxis, and Naomi often renounces Aunt Emily‟s obsession with archival 
evidences. The more weight Aunt Emily puts on “the basic concept of democracy and 
our belief as a nation so far as our belief in the franchise in concerned” (50) as well as 
the legal argument that “Claims Deportation of Japs Violates International Law” (49), 
the less able to find the truth and to truly testify she is. Aunt Emily‟s collection of 
                                                 
84 There are many books that contain testimonies and information about what Erica Harth call “nasty 
story” of Japanese American/Canadian internment. (Last 1). During this internment, around 120,000 
Japanese Americans were relocated and interned (Last 2) and 22,000 Japanese Americans were 
confined in detention centers (Political 1). This history in fact corresponds with Asian immigrants‟ 
status in the U.S. and Canada; they were regarded as enemy and foreigners.  
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past data for historic justice thus falls into an abysmal paradox, deconstructing her 
own ethos or credibility. The limits of Aunt Emily‟s legal activism are consonant with 
the limits of literature about concentration camps. 
Testimonies in the literature about concentration camps are centered on the 
assumption that only writing and recording victims‟ experiences can deliver the truth 
of those experiences. However, this linkage between writing and justice is a product 
of Western discourses mediated by their ideological tradition of justice as legal justice 
in the written form; “Justice,” in the Western tradition, takes the form of writing (for 
example, Moses‟ Ten Commandments) and has at its core written contracts between 
social members. Correspondingly, writing, regardless whether it is fictive, legal, 
mythic, or factual, in the form of scriptural industry as a state apparatus, according to 
de Certeau, “combin[es] the power of accumulating the past and that of making the 
alterity of the universe conform to its models, [this] is capitalist and conquering” (The 
Practice 135).  
Internationally and domestically, this function of writing and its connotation 
with justice as a contract between two parties—those who write and those who are 
written—have created a colonial narrative that, as Homi Bhabha maintains, has 
initiated the formation of post-colonial nationality and its consciousness.
85
 Writing 
has geopolitically represented loci of governances; in this respect, Western literacy 
has its origin in governing others—postcolonial savages, strangers, or immigrants—
                                                 
85 de Certeau also proves how the literature about concentration camps is also a colonial text in 
“Montaigne‟s „Of Cannibals‟: The Savage „I‟.” In this chapter, de Certeau traces how Western 
writings, especially travelogues, have romanticized the “savage‟s utterance and their experiences” (i.e. 
Rousseau‟s “noble savage”) with the thesis: “savage society is a body in the service of saying. It is the 
visible, palpable, verifiable exemplum which realizes before our eyes an ethics of speech” 
(Heterologies 75), while the savage‟s “speech makes [Westerners‟] writing possible by sinking in I. It 
induces it. But the written discourse which cites the speech of the other is not, cannot be, the discourse 
of the other” (Heterologies 78).  
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by inscribing discursive identities on their barbaric, uncivilized bodies. In this 
manner, writing has been used as a symbol of the supremacy of Western civilization 
against those savages who can speak but do not have a writing system.
86
 As a part of 
this (post) colonial system, Westerners‟ beliefs in the power of writing for justice are 
ideological ones determined by (post)colonial discourses. To Westerners, Japanese 
Canadians could be relocated and savagely treated insofar as they were savages and 
thus not “normal” citizens.  
  Thus, Aunt Emily‟s testimony inevitably turns into a hegemonic articulation 
of her (post)colonial belief in the foundations of Western discourses and their 
power—the state, God, democracy, citizenship, and so on. For example, after hearing 
about the Pearl Harbor bombing, young Aunt Emily writes in her journal, “Thank 
God we live in a democracy and not under an officially racist regime. All of us Nisei 
are intent on keeping faith and standing by” (Kogawa 97). To young Aunt Emily, a 
democratic citizenship legitimated by Canadian government documents represents a 
legal shield of justice that will protect her and other Japanese Canadians from 
external oppressions. In a similar way, while collecting data for legal justice for 
Japanese Canadians‟ internment, old Aunt Emily crosses out “Japanese race” on any 
paper and change it into “Canadian citizen” (40). Aunt Emily‟s desperate obsession 
with citizenship as a castle impregnable enough to protect her from irrational racism 
and oppression paradoxically causes her to cross out her own ethnic origin.  
                                                 
86 This is not just for Asians, as similar stories can be found in other ethnic minorities‟ histories. For 
example, history testifies how the U.S. government deceived Native Americans by forcing them to 
sign documents that legally enforced the loss of their land due to a result of constituted gross 
underpayment. 
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Yet parliamentary democracy pertains only to the contractual consensus 
among legal citizens, and not suspicious enemies. For instance, “The newspaper 
clipping from the Toronto Star” in the novel shows how Aunt Emily naively believes 
in Canadian government and citizenship: 
Nearly 20,000 Canadian citizens will be deprived for 
another year of one of the fundamental rights of citizenship, 
the House of Commons decreed last night. They are the 
Canadians of Japanese origin who were expelled from 
British Columbia in 1941 and are still debarred from 
returning to their homes….Defenders of the restrictions 
denied they were motivated by racial considerations….Maj. 
Gen. G.R. Perkes (PC Nanaimo) suggested there would be 
“crimes of revenge” if the exiles were permitted to return 
home now. In war, he said, the innocent suffer with the 
guilty; there was still hatred among the white people of 
B.C., and he thought the government was wise in giving the 
old sores another year to heal. (237) 
 
This historiographical clipping clearly shows the paradoxes of the situation in which 
Japanese Canadians were placed and how naïve Aunt Emily‟s rigid, ideological 
beliefs in democracy and citizenship are under the eyes of Canadian government. 
Under Major Perkes‟ euphemistic explanations lurks the truth that the Canadian 
government is not willing to legally protect the potential enemies, Japanese 
Canadians, anymore because they are not authentic Canadian citizens at all, and 
therefore their citizenships are deprivable. The deprivation of citizenship, in a modern 
nation state, is equivalent to the deprivation of human rights, which consequently 
blurs the zone of distinctions between citizens, humans, and animals. For instance, 
Aunt Emily testifies in a document that “the government has requisitioned the 
Livestock Building at Hastings Park, and the Women‟s Building to house 2,000 „Japs 
 142 
pending removal‟… We are the billy goats and nanny goats and kids—all the 
scapegoats to appease the blindness” (Kogawa 105).  
Under certain legal situations—states of exception according to Benjamin and 
Agamben—Japanese Canadians as animal-humans cannot be sacrificed due to the 
Canadian government‟s “humanitarian purpose,” though they cannot be recognized as 
citizens nor as humans either. In other words, what the Canadian government, as a 
democratic political system, wants for the sake of their moral conscience is not to 
slaughter Japanese Canadians, but to relocate them to concentration camps in order 
for those lives to be neither seen, heard, nor victimized by others except by the 
government. But this is not a unique case. In fact, since the inception of concentration 
camps, all inmates have embodied the paradoxical logic of human rights. 
Concentration camps are built not to deprive humans of their human rights, but to 
fully actualize human rights only by excluding those who are not humans. 
Accordingly, the only moral decision for the government to take toward those beings 
without human rights is to build an enclosed facility to gather up and incarcerate 
those animal-beings. Following this logic, it is logically wrong to say that in the 
camps, the inmates‟ human rights are deprived, for they are not considered human in 
the first place.  
Where does this paradox come from? From where does the idea of citizens 
against immigrants as the enemy of the citizens of domestic and global spaces 
originate? How could the Canadian government be hostile towards citizens while 
celebrating its hospitality? Where does the contradiction of cosmopolitan citizenship 
and war initiate? One of the origins is the Kantian paradox of hospitality and hostility 
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upon which the modern state and the idea of cosmopolitanism as a global rule of 
human rights are founded. Kant proposes in his “Ideas for a Universal History with a 
Cosmopolitan Purpose” that if we can build a cosmopolitan federation of all nations, 
this commonwealth will bring about global peace, and all world citizens will live 
together as citizens of one nation. But is the Kantian cosmopolitan all-inclusive? Isn‟t 
Kant‟s commonwealth exclusive towards foreigners just as Thomas Hobbs‟ 
commonwealth is?
 87
 Is there any restriction on the world citizenship of 
cosmopolitans, for example, Japanese Canadians during WWII? There are hidden 
paradoxes and antinomies in Kant‟s utopian vision. Kant, in discussing 
cosmopolitanism, asserts: “[s]ince men neither pursue their aims purely by instinct, as 
the animals do, nor act in accordance with any integral, prearranged plan like rational 
cosmopolitans, it would appear that no-law governed history of mankind is possible 
(as it would be, for example, with bees or beavers)” (Political 42).  
Here Kant tries to sublate both animality and cosmopolitanity—which is the 
perfectly rational status of a world citizen—to purport the establishment of the 
ontological, political, and ethical space of contemporary humans; however pessimism 
dominates this ideal because Kant knows that this vision is not possible in the 
phenomenal world. This pessimistic vision is related to the European history in which 
Kant lived; during this time, Europe went through violent revolutions, colonialism, 
and constant wars. Yet turbulent history does not exclude the necessity of the 
teleological and transcendental ends in human history from Kantian history that 
progresses towards perpetual peace and cosmopolitanism; Kant implies that wars and 
                                                 
87 In Leviathan, Thomas Hobbs also proposes the “commonwealth” can stop wars and bring forth an 
eternal peace in the world. But he explicitly excludes foreigners from this commonwealth (227).  
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bloody, global conflicts are indispensable steps to achieve a utopian end of history. 
Wars that are inevitable in humanity, Kant implies, are in essence animality. Kant 
puts forth, “all human talents would remain hidden forever in a dormant state, and 
men, as good-natured as the sheep they tended, would scarcely render their existence 
more valuable than that of their animals” (Political 45). Then, Kant sarcastically says, 
“man is an animal who needs a master…but this master will also be an animal who 
needs a master” (Political 46). All men, until they achieve their cosmopolitan status, 
are animals who dominate other animals; Kant is more Darwinian than Darwin is. For 
this reason, Kant proposes the necessity of a noumenal, cosmopolitan law that cannot 
be swayed by phenomena—namely “a perfect civil constitution” for the 
commonwealth as an international federation (Political 47).  
 However, are his federation and its constitution applicable to all humans? 
Here comes the knotty status of strangers in the West. Though this cosmopolitan 
federation is under noumenal laws, there are strangers who do not or are not able to 
have world citizenship. Kant takes on this issue and discusses “hospitability” which 
“means the right of a stranger not to be treated with hostility when he arrives on 
someone else‟s territory” (Political 106), but his idea of hospitality as a moral 
response to strangers is limited because it would be applicable only “so long as [the 
stranger] behaves in a peaceable manner in the place he happens to be in” (Political 
106). Therefore, “the stranger cannot claim the right of a guest to be entertained, for 
this would require a special friendly agreement whereby he might become a member 
of the native household for a certain time” (Political 106). What, then, about those 
strangers who are not guests and cannot be civilized enough to make “a special 
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friendly agreement,” such as the Asians in the concentration camps who had the same 
heritage as the enemy of the state? 
  Derrida targets this paradox in the Western idea of hospitality in his essay, 
“Hospitality.” After investigating the genealogy of the hospitality in Western 
discourses, Derrida maintains that hospitality presupposes two conditions: the host is 
the master of the house, and absolute hospitality is not possible if there is a threshold 
or door. Thereafter, Derrida inquiringly elaborates: “[Hospitality] is [something] to 
come which does not appear and never appears as such, in the present…Thinking 
hospitality starting with the future, this future which does not appear, or which only 
appears there where it is not awaited as present or presentable, this is the thinking 
starting with death no less than birth” (“Hospitality” 261). Hospitality is the master‟s 
concept, so immigration as an invitation to the U.S. or Canada comes to mean 
“custom service and a police control” (“Hospitality” 260). In this fashion, 
hospitability as a future-oriented term is utopian, so it is impossible in the present 
moment because hospitality is “now” the exclusionary logic of the host. In truth, the 
host is bound to enforce exclusionary laws over the borderland as a threshold.  
 In this logic, Japanese Canadians could be treated hostilely though they were 
initially invited to Canada under the auspice of Western hospitality. They were 
Kantian animals that were violent but could be regarded as guests until the others, the 
Japanese in Japan, proved that they were in fact beasts and dangerous animals. 
Hostility was hidden in hospitability under the name of global citizenship, 
cosmopolitanism, and a racism-free Canada. The Canadian government‟s hospitality 
in this case, however, was just a Kantian mask of Hobbes‟ Leviathan.  
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Laws to Exclude and Bare Life 
To top the brutal absurdity and paradox of hostility and hospitality, the state 
believed it was righteous to take away at any time the Japanese Canadians‟ human 
rights because the nature of their citizenship was temporary and tentative from its 
origins. That is to say, there is a quintessential lacuna in human rights in terms of the 
legal system—law is effective only on the condition that it judges whether the 
convicted is guilty or not guilty or legally responsible or not responsible.
88
 The law 
cannot deal with the ethical and ontological question of who is human and who is not. 
This is also related to the limit of bio-politics in which the form-of-life a human holds 
is to be divided into the bare life and the legal life of a registered national citizen, 
which is not applicable to the Japanese immigrants since they are guest-citizens 
without proper identities. In addition to this paradox of human rights and Japanese 
Canadians‟ legality in the state, there are three more paradoxes in Aunt Emily‟s 
testimony that deconstruct the credibility of her claims themselves—the paradox of 
the historic “I,” the responsible “I,” and the speaking “I.” Aunt Emily‟s testimony is 
based on the claim that she, as a representative of historical justice, is responsible for 
others who are oppressed; thus, she is collecting documents to represent them and 
speak for them.  
The first paradox of Aunt Emily‟s position comes from her belief of her role 
as the “speaking I” as the “testifying I.” Compared to Aunt Obasan, Naomi‟s silent 
aunt, who is a typical subaltern woman, and whose “language remains deeply 
                                                 
88 Agamben holds, “As jurists well know, law is not directed toward the establishment of justice. Nor 
is it directed toward the verification of truth. Law is solely directed toward judgment, independent of 
truth and justice” (Remnant 18).   
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underground[…,] Aunt Emily…is a word warrior” (Kogawa 39). Aunt Emily is a 
word warrior as she emphasizes the speaking “I” instead of the living and feeling “I.” 
Her speech is mediated by the writing system and its scripture economy; only rational 
and factual documents and speech based on them are significant. Acknowledging this, 
Naomi says, “All of Aunt Emily‟s words, all her papers…are like scratchings in the 
barnyard, the evidence of much activity, scaly claws hard at work. But what good 
they do, I do not know—those little black typewritten words—rain words, cloud 
droppings…the words are not made flesh. Trains do not carry us home….” (226). 
Aunt Emily‟s words, metonymic chains such as “rain words” and “cloud droppings,” 
lose their content and become empty speech because they lose “the flesh” through 
which her speech can obtain its ethos, which means the ontological dwelling place of 
humanity in Greek. The ontological foundation of words is in a living corporeal 
speaker; without Aunt Emily‟s presence (“flesh”), words lose their material origin 
and become traces of speakers‟ voices.  
Aunt Emily‟s words lose their credibility as soon as she claims “reconciliation 
can‟t begin without mutual recognition of facts” (Kogawa 219). Facts cannot be true 
testimonies because the words cannot penetrate into the truth of the event that only 
the dying person or the dead, disabled to speak, can tell; survivors or who could not 
experience near-death cannot testify exactly how atrocious the experience was. With 
respect to the testimony of concentration camps, Agamben relates the separation 
between the speaking “I” and the living “I” to the affect of shame as the ontological 
foundation of testimony:  
But precisely this impossibility of conjoining the living 
being and language, phone and logos, the inhuman and the 
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human—far from authorizing the infinite deferral of 
signification—is what allows for testimony. If there is no 
articulation between the living being and language, if the 
“I” stands this disjunction, then there can be 
testimony….Testimony takes place in the non-place of 
articulation. In the non-place of the Voice stands not 
writing, but the witness. And it is precisely because the 
relation between the living being and the speaking being 
has the form of shame, of being reciprocally consigned to 
something that cannot be assumed by a subject, that the 
ethos of this disjunction can only be testimony—that is, 
something that cannot be assigned to a subject but that 
nevertheless constitute the subject‟s only dwelling place, its 
only possible consistency. (Remnant 130)  
 
The ethics of testimony initiates as the infinite ethical possibilities of the most 
inhuman situation humanity can be situated in; these negative ethical possibilities, 
according to Catherine Mill‟s interpretation of Agamben‟s quote, are an “ethics of 
survival insofar as what is borne witness to is zoe or the inhuman in every human 
being…Testimony derives from the constitutive desubjectification in every 
subjectification such that there is no final full appropriation in the human being‟s 
having language” (208). Subjectification ontologically embeds desubjectification in 
that the speaking “I” produced by subjectification embeds its other self—the living 
and bodily subject as “I.” Even in dialogue, Othering is inscribed on our speaking 
bodies.
89
 In other words, the division between the speaking “I” and the living “I” 
happens whenever “I” speaks; to speak or testify the experience of the living “I,” the 
living “I” must be excluded in the language, while the living “I” cannot say what it 
experienced without this alienation.  
                                                 
89 In a similar mood, Ian Chamber elaborates, “We need in particular to pay attention to those 
conditions of dialogue in which the different powers, histories, limits and languages that permit the 
process of „othering‟ to occur are inscribed” (12).  
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This paradoxical exclusion of the living “I” from the speaking “I” also 
correlates with the paradox of a person‟s historical responsibility. Recognizing this 
paradox in Aunt Emily‟s testimony, Naomi poignantly critiques Aunt Emily‟s 
naiveté: “What, I wonder, was Aunt Emily trying to accomplish through all this 
correspondence? She was no doubt keeping the home fires burning and shouting 
„Democracy‟ to keep the enemy at bay. But all of this belongs to yesterday and there 
are so many other things to attend to today. All the details of death that are left in the 
laps of the living” (Kogawa 53). Naomi sees the core of the problems in Aunt Emily‟s 
die-hard eagerness to find the facts from history untarnished. History and the past 
make sense only through the venue of the present. However factual Aunt Emily‟s 
historiographical finds are, people are dying around the world, and the camps still 
exist “now” and “here.” Aunt Emily‟s moral prerogative that she is trying to be 
responsible for the past events excludes the living bodies‟ current situation on the 
earth; Aunt Emily‟s ethical stance is instable because her responsibility is limited to 
specific past events and is bound to exclude living bodies and their presences. 
However, this limit is inevitable because testimony and its responsibility are always 
already limited. 
In essence, responsibility is problematic. Responsibility is founded on the 
original sin of Western civilization in that, as Derrida observes, “[s]acrifice, 
vengeance, cruelty, all [are] inscribed in the genesis of responsibility and moral 
conscience” (The Gift of Death 114). This brutal history of responsibility occurs 
because responsibility was originally endorsed by legality. The state‟s legal 
responsibility is essentially established on the exclusion of illegal immigrants, as the 
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government documents on Japanese Canadian internment prove; that is, legal 
responsibility sets the limit on who is responsible and who is not responsible for acts. 
A person can have absolute responsibility, only on the condition that a subject can be 
infinitely responsible for any event in history and for every Other.  
Accordingly, the idea of infinite responsibility is mystic to a large extent.
90
 
Moreover, Aunt Emily‟s ethical position contradicts her legal responsibility. As a 
result, the statement “I am responsible” is essentially paradoxical; legal responsibility 
must be partial, while ethical responsibility is too infinite to be actualized. And, this 
paradox undermines testimony‟s ethical proposition in that it entails infinite (legal or 
ethical) responsibility for justice. All these paradoxes in the foundation of Aunt 
Emily‟s testimony—I, as a historic subject whose essence is a Canadian citizen, 
articulate my testimony in written facts to be fully responsible for the past victims—
exclude truthful testimony. In truth, testimony is the inscription of sacrifice, 
vengeance, and cruelty by those who did not stand in the position of those who die 
bearing witness to these historic atrocities. Against Aunt Emily‟s politics, Aunt 
Obasan‟s silence and age-worn and fatigued body represent ethico-ontological 
perseverance and silent speech with her attendance to others as well as her care for 
                                                 
90 Ethical and religious responsibility, as Levinas claims, is different from legal responsibility because 
ethico-ontological responsibility requires infinite responsibility. But to be absolutely responsible for 
the Other paradoxically means to be irresponsible in reality. Levinas‟ absolute responsibility and duty 
fall into religious, fanatic responses to the Other‟s calling for because, as Derrida posits, “I am 
responsible for any one only by failing in my responsibilities to all the others, to the ethical or political 
generality” (The Gift of Death 71). In this regard, Zižek ironically maintains in Violence that because 
of the ethical illusion of “our emotional-ethical responses…[such as] reactions of sympathy to 
suffering and pain that is witnessed directly,” a killer‟s “shooting someone point-blank is for most of 
us much more repulsive than pressing a button that will kill” Asians in wars (43). Ethics lose its power 
when it confuses a stranger‟s violence with systematic violence towards collective strangers. As Zižek 
poignantly posits, “the claim that I am responsible for others‟ pain infinitely also hides another 
perverse proposition that I cannot be responsible infinitely for others‟ pain, thus I do not need to be 
responsible or I am nothing, so that I do not need to do anything, though I can be infinitely responsible.” 
In this sense, Badiou in Ethics clearly disagrees with the idea of the fundamental responsibility and 
ethics of the Other since this ethics denies the subject‟s will to change the situation. 
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Others. But even Aunt Obasan cannot fully inhabit the fundamental ethico-
ontological realm, because only those who are dying and bearing witness to his or her 
own or others‟ deaths can be infinitely responsible for others‟ pains. 
Given these paradoxes, Agamben claims that testimony of the true experience 
in concentration camps is limited to Muselmann, a derogatory term referring to the 
disabled prisoners dying of starvation in Auschwitz; Agamben notes, “in Auschwitz 
ethics begins precisely at the point where the Muselmann, the „complete witness,‟ 
makes it forever impossible to distinguish between man and non-man” (Remnant 47). 
Muselmann dwells in the third realm of humanity, ethics, physiology, medicine, 
politics, and ontology
91
 to testify to the true ethical realm without intervention from 
legal responsibility or political activism. In this gray zone, legalized significances of 
humanity and morality blur their boundaries in front of this undecipherable chaos of 
ethos in which a human being‟s “Da” is deprived of the Heideggerian authentic 
human ethos, “Dasein.”  As bare lives without legal humanity, Muselmann are 
mutilated, tortured bodies, roaming like zombies with neither consciousness nor the 
ability to speak, waiting for a death scheduled by rational calculation for irrational 
purposes, such as how the cost and guilt for killing a person can be offset by the 
benefit of letting him or her die as Muselmann. Testimony without these subhumans‟ 
voices and presences becomes a testimony with lacuna because it loses the core of 
ethics; that is, as Agamben claims, “no ethics can claim to exclude a part of humanity, 
                                                 
91 Agamben posits, “At times a medical figure or an ethical category, at times a political limit or an 
anthropological concept, the Muselmann is an indefinite being in whom not only humanity and non-
humanity, but also vegetative existence and relation, physiology and ethics, medicine and politics, and 
life and death continuously pass through each other. This is why the Muselmann‟s „third realm‟ is the 
perfect cipher of the camp, the non-place in which all disciplinary barriers are destroyed and all 
embankments flooded” (Remnant 48).  
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no matter how unpleasant or difficult that humanity to see” (Remnant 64). Thus, “The 
Muselmann…is the threshold of a new ethics, an ethics of a form of life that begins 
where dignity ends” (Remnant 69). Namely, Muselmann is the foundation from which 
ontological ethics begins. Without considering this zero point of humanity, ethics 
cannot be all-inclusive, and this ethico-ontological approach would not be entrapped 
in the infinite responsibility or limited legal responsibility because it would show the 
spectrum of humanities and responsibilities from which a subject can determine the 
limit of one‟s responsibility. 
Accordingly, Obasan is not a work written only for the political purpose of 
giving testimony about Japanese Canadian internments, despite what many critics 
think.
92
 In fact, Obasan deals with the global situation of humanity placed in the zone 
of indistinction between animality and humanity. Kogawa‟s extension of historical 
atrocity to the atomic attack in Nagasaki shows this universality in Obasan. Mr. 
Gower‟s molestation of the young Naomi and all other prevalent global violence in 
Obasan reveals the truth that we, all of us, include Muselmanns. Though it is partly 
understandable given her situation, the claim that Aunt Emily‟s testimony is ethical 
because her political and legal protests are ethical is preposterous. Insofar as ethics is 
enclosed within political forums such as legal debates on citizenship, the exclusion of 
some humans is inevitable, as current immigration issues in the U.S. prove. The more 
citizenship is emphasized, the more humans have to be deported and expelled. The 
                                                 
92 Many critics have focused on the question of whose testimony—Obasan‟s silence or Aunt Emily‟s 
legal testimony—is truer between. For example, in “Minority History as Metafiction: Joy Kogawa‟s 
Obasan,” Donald C. Goellnicht analyzes Obasan as a historiographical metafiction. He also targets the 
contrast between Aunt Emily‟s explicit testimony and Obasan‟s silent testimony in the form of a 
postmodern dialectic of speaking, listening, and writing. But, few people have focused on Naomi‟s 
own poetic testimony. 
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logic of concentration camps is the same across times and spaces: Japanese Canadians 
and Jews had to be incarcerated not only because they could not prove that they were 
humans to be treated in humanitarian ways, but also because their speech and 
presences were not classified as elements of humanity endorsed by ethics.  
In this sense, Obasan suggests a new form of ethical testimony. Agamben 
clarifies which type of testimony can be ethical: 
Testimony takes place where the speechless one makes the 
speaking one speak and where the one who speaks bears the 
impossibility of speaking in his own speech, such that the 
silent and the speaking, the inhuman and the human enter 
into a zone of indistinction in which it is impossible to 
establish the position of the subject, to identify the 
“imagined substance” of the “I” and, along with it, the true 
witness. (Remnant 120) 
 
If we are to take Agamben‟s point, then how can we make testimony truthful and 
infinitely responsible for even the lowest form of humanity placed in the zone of 
indistinction between animality and humanity, as well as life and death? Moreover, 
how can we ethically represent this fundamentally ontological humanity in a literary 
work? All these inquiries convolute around Obasan‟s visceral, vivid, and poetic 
image of humanity and its ethico-ontological foundation. For example, against Aunt 
Emily‟s claim that Japanese Canadians are Canadians, so they need justice, Naomi, 
denying Aunt Emily‟s firm belief in the assumption that she is speaking for her 
responsibility as a historical subject, describes the significance of a differential “we” 
with the image of plants: 
Where do any of us come from in this cold country? Oh, 
Canada, whether it is admitted or not, we come from you 
we come from you. From the same soil, the slugs and slime 
and bogs and twigs and roots. We come from the country 
 154 
that plucks its people out like weeds and flights them into 
the roadside. We grow in ditches and sloughs, untended 
and spindly. We erupt in the valleys and 
mountainside…sprouting upside down on the prairies, out 
hair wild as spiders‟ legs, out feet rooted nowhere. We 
grow where we are not seen, we flourish where we are not 
heard, the thick undergrowth of an unlikely planting. We 
come from cemeteries full of skeletons with wild roses in 
their grinning teeth. We come from our untold tales that 
wait for their telling. We come from Canada, this land that 
is like every land, filled with the wise, the fearful, the 
compassionate, the corrupt. (Kogawa 271)  
 
To Naomi, Canada is just a name of a country, and Japanese Canadians are not just 
citizens but minorities who dwell in “ditches and sloughs” like weeds. Japanese 
Canadians are in permanent exile or diaspora because their feet are “rooted nowhere,” 
and they are not genuine plants in Canada but unwelcome, misplaced ones by “an 
unlikely planting.” To the state, Japanese Canadians were as unlikely and 
disagreeable as unwelcomed guests who can turn into a hostile enemy.  
However, this ambivalence hides the fundamentally ontological realm of 
images. In this quote, the weed, the symbol of Japanese Canadians, corresponds to the 
death image of “skeleton” and is parallel to repulsive animal images such as a 
“spider‟s leg.”  By lying with the images of the dead, Japanese Canadians can have 
their “untold tales that wait for their telling” so that their voices, though unheard 
before, toll the knell for the historic violence they endured. Therefore, death, dying 
animals, and traumatic dreams as images and signs dominate Obasan as examples as 
demonstrations of the true testimony. In this context, true communication or 
testimony is possible only on the condition that Naomi plunges into her traumatic 
memory in which the deaths, dreams, and animal signs speak in forms of their images 
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whose center is occupied by Naomi‟s dying mother and her animal cry; Naomi has to 
listen to “the speech that frees com[ing] forth from that amniotic deep” (Kogawa 6) 
where a meek animal being‟s voice spirals up. To begin this journey, she also has to 
run into a cryptic series of these images as signs.
93
  
I call these images signs, following Deleuze‟s idea of the sign. In Proust and 
Signs, Deleuze defines signs not as semiotic signs but aesthetic, creative, and 
generative images filled with unidentifiable affects and their violently deconstructive 
power that razes down readers‟ paralyzed worlds. These signs form a particular series 
in accordance with several series of configured sets of images and repetitively 
pummel readers‟ unresponsive sensitivities. The violent, affective traits of the signs 
from the images in Obasan function in this way. Gradually these series of signs 
reveal the ethics of humanity and the potential domain of true testimony. In what 
follows, I will show how Obasan can present the true testimony through various 
series of signs and their final conflation into an ontological series of signs that 
resonate with the ethos of humanity.  
 
Animal and Dream/Memory signs 
While Obasan is about Japanese Canadian history, the work has been 
acclaimed for its poetic dictions. Magnusson even classifies Obasan into a new 
genre—“proem,” namely, a hybrid of poem and prose, because Obasan‟s 
“characteristic style is poetic and imagist rather than novelistic and discursive” (59). 
                                                 
93 Charistina Marie Tourino, in her “Ethnic Reproduction and the Amniotic Deep: Joy Kogawa‟s 
Obasan,” extensively discuss the overall meaning of “amniotic deep” as the core of ethnicity and 
femininity.  She understands this “amniotic deep” as a metaphor that is “profoundly life-giving and 
even spiritual, but also as destructive” (142). 
 156 
Yet encounters with violent signs in Obasan for both characters and readers are 
painful. Signs force characters to illuminate the traumatic experiences that they had 
latently shrouded in order to hide all Japanese Canadian characters‟ vulnerability. 
Albeit vulnerable and isolated, each sign is linked and located within a different 
series. There are three correlative series of signs in Obasan: animal signs, 
dream/memory signs, and ontological signs of facticity. Animals in Obasan mostly 
represent an allegory of victims and predators. For example, in Obasan, Japanese 
Canadians are described as “a caged bird” (107) and “a special kind of low animal 
able to live on next to nothing” (123).  In concentration camps, the government 
“wouldn‟t let…Jap females into the men‟s building…„to prevent further propagation 
of the species‟”(Kogawa 116). In these quotes, the bio-political logic of eugenics 
prevails on the condition that Japanese Canadians become beings without their proper 
humanity, as I discussed previously. Under this discursive re-categorization, the 
victims‟ vulnerability turns a Japanese internee into “a wounded bird, battering the 
ground in an attempt to balance” (28). On the one hand, these images of caged, 
abandoned, and victimized animals represent young Naomi‟s limited worldview filled 
with loss, fear, and her melancholy over the dead. That is, Naomi, as a young girl, 
sees the world in a mix of fantasy and reality to escape the misery she experiences; 
thus, animals become traumatic signs representing incomprehensible realities. On the 
other hand, imaginary language and phantasmatic worldview is related to “Naomi‟s 
longing for a „living‟ or „freeing‟ or „wordless word,‟ a purer language in which the 
broken mosaic of speech is repaired” (Magnusson 60). In other words, dwelling in the 
interstitial space between the two aunts‟ opposite worlds—Aunt Obasan‟s world of 
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silence and Aunt Emily‟s world of vehemently political words—Naomi finds her own 
poetic or corporeal words in the form of allegorical animals, dreams, and/or the 
images of the dead. 
For example, Naomi‟s father, who died during the relocation, metamorphoses 
into a frog in Naomi‟s world of fairy tale. When Naomi and Stephen, her brother, 
play around in a swamp, she finds a crippled frog which reminds her of her father; 
she “think[s] [she]‟ll call [her] frog—short for Tadpole or Tadashi, [her] father‟s 
name” (Kogawa 246). Naomi‟s association of her father‟s name and “tadpole” is 
ironic because it shows how she regards her father as an immature animal or a being 
in transmutation or metamorphosis. In Naomi‟s fabled, allegorical world, her father, 
separated from Naomi due to governmentally forced relocation, loses his maturity. 
Naomi keeps raising the crippled frog, but when her father dies, it disappears 
magically; Naomi narrates, “Once I find it in a corner of the room covered in fluff.  
And then it is nowhere. The bowl sits empty on the table. My last letter to Father has 
received no answer. When the snow falls and covers everything. I hardly know that it 
is snow. The sky is the underbelly of a fish” (249). After the frog is gone, Naomi 
replaces the image of the frog with the image of a fish to suggest her father‟s return to 
the embryotic form of the fish. This replacement is approximately the devolutionary 
state of the frog.  In contrast to the famous fairy tale “The Princess and the Frog,” 
instead of the frog metamorphosing into a prince, Naomi‟s frog returns to the original 
form of life: the fish form of a fetus. Naomi imagines and plays with this fantasy 
because she cannot accept the truth of her father‟s death during the internment. This 
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is childish but also poetic, thus this is powerful. Naomi accepts this tragic truth by 
poetically transforming the reality into a phantasmatic, poetic space. 
Furthermore, the series of animal signs in Obasan represent power structures 
and their political hierarchies in human society. For example, one day Naomi sees a 
white hen peck yellow chicks to death in a wired chicken coop (Kogawa 70). The 
allegorical configuration of animals in the relationships between the white hen and 
the chicks, at first glance, seems to represent the victim-predator relationships 
between Japanese Canadians and the Canadian government. This allegory via color, 
in the constellation of all-inclusive victimization, is prevalent in Obasan. For 
example, the victim‟s color, yellow, reoccurs throughout Obasan; the color of pawns 
in Stephen‟s game are yellow, and even the name of the game is “The Yellow Peril,” 
which historically referred to the Asian American immigrant influx.  
This allegory includes one more register— motherhood protecting against evil 
predators. After Naomi‟s mother quickly rescues all the live chicks when she sees this 
tragic happening, Naomi is impressed by her mother‟s eyes that “are steady and 
matter-of-fact—the eye of Japanese motherhood” (Kogawa 71). Although Naomi‟s 
mother has the power to rescue the chicks, in the larger picture, she is a victim, 
deprived of such political power to save her own children. Yet, even victims become 
predators. The stereotyped relationships between the yellow, vulnerable chicks and 
the demented white hen change the hierarchy of color in time; Naomi narrates, 
“When the yellow chicks grow up they turn white. Chicken Little is a large Yellow 
Peril puff” (181). The yellow chick will grow up to become a white hen which has the 
potentiality to peck its chicks to death again. The roles of aggressors and victims 
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overlap, and the oppressed can oppress more vulnerable beings. On this potentiality, 
the logic of victimization faces cul-de-sac but open truly fundamental ethos of 
humanity—vulnerability.  
Under the strongest apparatus of violence on the state and/or international 
levels, all humans belong to one single community—the community of victims—and 
they cannot be differentiated from the vulnerability of animals. Glissant‟s 
commonplace suggests this global universality of victimization. Glissant‟s lieu 
commun (a site of community), according to Oakley, comprises an ethics of “a total 
inclusiveness of humanity” (Common Places 39). Glissant‟s commonplace is 
“appositional,” as Glissant puts it, so that it can relay and relate to all forms of 
humanities with the infinite responsibility for those who are in the zone of 
indistinctions between animality and humanity. The general political systems 
aggravate this kind of all-inclusive victimization. As Hobbs, Foucault, and Agamben 
argue, it is paradoxical that the nomos (the system of normal governance) of the state 
is founded on natural order. As Kant‟s aforementioned example of cosmopolitanism 
testifies, in the modern world, to a large extent, global and local legal systems are 
based upon the assumption that human beings are dangerous, irresponsible, irrational, 
and rascal animals who must be controlled by punishments and disciplines regulated 
by the legal systems. For this reason, only legal contracts among the Hobbesian 
animal-humans can sustain legal justice. That is, the law, which is supposed to be 
derived from non-natural, political logic, derives from nature and the natural moral 
system.  
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Correspondingly, in Obasan, two animal signs present two opposite 
omnipotent powers of the ethics of nature and the politics of the state: the “King bird” 
and “a hawk.” The “King bird” is depicted as a magnificent symbol of pre-civilized 
natural harmony, a totemic emblem of Native American heritage and an omnipotent 
spirit that judges human morality. Still, Naomi fears the King bird because it is 
displaced into an image of an ontological calling of conscience: 
King bird was a conductor that called all the birds together 
to some auditorium in the woods where people couldn‟t 
go… By the time we get home, it‟s late afternoon. The long 
shadow is like a giant wing, a mountainous King bird 
hovering over us, listening to our whispers and stories, alert 
for lies. Is it at midnight the King bird will descend to cut 
off our tongues? Which lies, I wonder as I fall asleep, has 
the King bird overheard today. In the night, I dream of a red 
red bird, tiny as an insect, trapped in a whirling well. 
(Kogawa 168) 
 
The omnipotent image of the King bird contrasts with the image of the small red bird 
in Naomi‟s dream. The King bird‟s moral adage is simple—“do not lie.” This simple 
moral code, is so powerful that, under the force of this raw morality, Naomi turns into 
a helpless tiny red bird. In this respect, the King bird‟s “animal call” resonates with, if 
adopting the Heideggerian concept, the call or “appeal” of conscience as an 
ontological call to refresh the idea that we are finite beings tethered by our finitude. 
Likewise, this echoes the possibility of Levinas‟ infinite ethical responsibility of 
staying truthful toward Others always.
 94
 Yet, here the King bird‟s “thou shalt not lie” 
                                                 
94 In “Truth of Disclosure and Truth of Testimony,” denying psychism that objectifies and fixates 
human experience into intelligibility, Levinas connects the ontological relation of truth and freedom 
via testimony; he argues, “[r]esposnibility for the other does not amount to a beginning: my relation 
with another freedom does not fit into a free decision. The two freedoms cannot be gathered in a 
presence” (Basic 103). Therefore, Levinas‟s responsibility “for the other is precisely this relation with 
an unthematizable infinity” (103). Levinas‟ testimony in fact is a testimony toward God, thus it is not 
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commandment has a vehement side; it threatens to cut off Naomi‟s tongue, banning 
Naomi‟s speaking, if she lied. To some extent, the King bird‟s call resonates with the 
transition from a natural ethics to a political, legal system.  
The King bird in this sense represents a latent, collective guilty consciousness 
as the natural origin of human civilization‟s ethical order, which Freud discusses in 
terms of the superego. Naomi‟s guilt is connected to the collective guilt of “becoming 
a member of the human community, and with the help of technique guided by 
science, going over to the attack against nature and subjecting her to the human will” 
(Freud, Civilization 55). The King bird‟s call of conscience in advancing civilization 
becomes a totalitarian desire only to include those who share the guilt of 
victimization into this community. 
In Obasan, this ethico-ontological call from the King bird contrasts with—but 
shares the potentiality of violence—the political call from an animal sign that 
represents the state power: a hawk. The narrator compares the hawk to a state power, 
as Naomi describes: “an order-in-council that sails like a giant hawk across a chicken 
yard, and after the first shock there is a flipping squawking lunge for safety. One 
swoop and the first thousand are on ships sailing for disaster. I can remember the 
chickens in Slocan, their necks and tiny heads thrust low, diving for shelter, one time 
that a hawk came circling down” (Kogawa 225). The hawk symbolizes the law and 
order of the state, the so-called order-in-council that orders the Japanese Canadians‟ 
internment.  
                                                                                                                                           
free from the onto-theological tradition. Here I am on the side of Levinas‟s ethics, but I do not adopt 
his religious context though it is undeniable that Kogawa‟s novel is profoundly based on her 
Christianity. There are significant number of articles dealing with Kogawa‟s Christian ideas in Obasan. 
See Patricia Harrison‟s “Genocide or Redemption? Asian American Autobiography and the Portrayal 
of Christianity in Amy Tan's The Joy Luck Club and Joy Kogawa's Obasan.” 
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To escape this mighty bird-of-prey, small birds like Naomi‟s “red, red bird” or 
chickens, the symbol of victims, hide. The hawk symbolizes, to some extent, that the 
origin of the state power is bio-political power, which means that the state‟s 
constituted power emerged from the constituting bio-elements—namely, people 
placed at the zone of indistinction between nature and the state. In this sense, the 
hawk‟s state political system is as violent as the King bird‟s natural morality, which 
reveals the problematic zone of indistinction between ethics and politics. Naomi and 
the other victims are scared of both the King bird‟s ethical call and the hawk‟s 
political call because both are connected via modern politics. Thus the King bird and 
the hawk reveal how ethico-ontological ideas change into political violence in 
Western history. Examples can be violence against minorities in the form of ethnic 
cleansing such as Auschwitz and Japanese Canadian/American relocation, though 
obviously there are differences in degree and historical backgrounds. In order not to 
be violent and oppressive, the world of ethics and morality the King bird symbolizes 
has to be differentiated from the political order the hawk symbolizes.  
Japanese Canadians were relocated and incarcerated in the concentration 
camps because the ethical imperative that rational beings must treat others not as a 
means but an ends comes from the hidden, dark questions of who decides who is 
rational enough to be treated ethically. Suppose the Canadian government relocated 
Japanese Canadians for humanitarian moral ends. Under the auspice of an ethical 
good, on the one hand, people can be politically excluded; on the other hand, under 
the name of a political decision, certain humans can be ethically framed as evil so that 
they must be massacred. These impasses in the idea of the ethical foundation of the 
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political order in Western discourse cause everyone to become both a victim and a 
perpetrator at the same time. The origin of this paradox is the conflation of ethics and 
politics, which discursively began when Aristotle subordinated ethics to politics as I 
discussed in the preface. 
 This ubiquitous madness, too broad and deep to be recognized by an 
individual, changes everyone into agents of violence, which even changes the purity 
of arts. For example, Stephen, Naomi‟s brother, disappointed by the untidiness of the 
house they are relocated to and the consequential leg injury he suffered, heads out to 
the field and “whacks his crutch into the grasses, scattering the butterflies. Each wing 
bears two round circles of gold…they are infant eyes, staring up at us bodiless and 
unblinking…his crutch like a scythe. Within moments, the ground and grasses are 
quivering, with maimed and dismembered butterflies….‟They‟re bad,‟ Stephen says 
as he wades through the weeds. „They eat holes in your clothes‟” (Kogawa 145). 
There can be two interpretations of this symbolic scene. On the one hand, Stephen‟s 
fury comes from the analogy between the butterfly and himself as a victim; he cannot 
bear the idea that he became a victim or vermin that eats holes in the symbolic 
clothing of Canada. Stephen kills the butterflies to restore his self-confidence and 
escape his own victimization. On the other hand, Stephen‟s fury at his expulsion from 
his hometown and his resulting physical invalidity and mental distress is drawn to the 
butterflies, whose infant eyes on their wings symbolize not only the innocence 
Stephen lost, but also his lost dream of becoming an artist like his father and other 
family members. Gifted with genius in music like his father, Stephen tries to become 
a pianist, but his dream is thwarted by the relocation. In some sense, this pattern on 
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the butterflies‟ wings suggests the crisis of aesthetic representation about the 
traumatic experience Stephen undergoes.   
However, Stephen finally restores his artistic genius to become a world-
famous pianist later; likewise, Kogawa also turns her painful experience into stunning 
artistic signs of death, pain and love. Although ubiquitous violence deteriorates art, 
Obasan gains its aesthetic power from death signs and the painful cries of animals 
and characters. All dying animals give out their last sounds and reveal how “the 
Death angel passes over” (Kogawa 181). These death signs are aesthetic signs that 
violently affect readers‟ emotions under the auspice of an ontological mood of 
melancholy—an eternal mourning over the victims and the dead. Indeed, a thick, 
fuzzy atmosphere hovers around the signs of violence. Violence is an imperceptible 
sign imbued with melancholia. The foggy atmosphere of violence and death in the 
world of signs in Obasan relay another series of signs—the dream and memory signs. 
Naomi‟s dreams and memories are traumatic and symptomatic, and its signs recapture 
the past moments of becoming a victim of violence; in this sense, the narrator claims, 
“The memories are dream images” (132).  
As such, memory images from the past, after being stored in unconsciousness, 
emerge in dreams. Thus, memory images become dream images, with the memory 
images attaining the potency to envision the future. Let‟s start with memory images 
as memory signs. Memory signs in Obasan, like Deleuze‟s Proustian signs, 
involuntarily evoke imagination without conceptualization or voluntary reminiscence, 
unfolding a pure past that is different from the present, but coexists with the present 
and propels the future via dream signs. 
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  In this sense, Naomi in Obasan describes how memory images permeate into 
and capture Naomi and Aunt Obasan:  
All our ordinary stories are changed in time, altered as 
much by the present as the present is shaped by the past. 
Potent and pervasive as a prairie dust storm, memories and 
dreams seep and mingle through cracks, settling on 
furniture and into upholstery…But we‟re trapped, Obasan 
and I, by our memories of the dead—all our dead—those 
who refuse to bury themselves. Like threads of old 
spiderwebs, still sticky and hovering, the past waits for us 
to submit, or depart. When I least expect it, a memory 
comes skittering out of the dark, spinning and netting the 
air, ready to snap me up and ensnare me in old and complex 
puzzles. Just a glimpse of a worn-out patchwork quilt and 
the old question comes thudding out of the night again like 
a giant moth….I notice these days…how the present 
disappears in [Obasan‟s] mind. The past hungers for her. 
Feast on her. And when its feasting is complete? She will 
dance and dangle in the dark, like small insect bones, a 
fearful calligraphy—a dry reminder that once there was life 
flitting about in the weather. (Kogawa 30-1) 
 
While dusting and searching the attic—a reservoir of the past—after the death of 
Uncle (Obasan‟s husband), Naomi and Obasan happen to see a spider web; this 
moment functions as an epiphany causing Naomi‟s memories to resurface 
involuntarily and give her insight into the imagery associations of memory with 
“dust” and the “spider web.” Namely, the dust and the spider web are two signs of 
memory in this passage. Dust, as a memory sign, seeps into the narrator‟s mind in this 
molecular movement. The memory does not dwell in the past, but always waits “for 
us to submit, or depart.” Memory as pure memory in totality, as Bergson argues, 
coexists with the present to change the present. In other words, memory, in the form 
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of dust, internally infiltrates into people‟s presents and fills them, while memory as a 
spider web passively ensnares Naomi and Obasan to make them victims.  
In contrast, the present is a husk or a hollow “insect bone” whose substance is 
an extract of the memory. Correspondingly, humanity would become hollow if not for 
memory, but memory is also involuntarily seeping into us through abysmal cracks of 
dreams or in a moment of epiphany leading to the traumatic past. In this sense, 
memory‟s power of captivity is not just negative. It is also positive because it can lead 
Naomi to find the true freedom and truths in her pure memory—duration—which is 
not just individual memory, but connected to the collective duration, forming a 
network or a poetics of relations with others such as Aunt Obasan. Notably, the one 
who is caught in the spider web is not just Naomi alone; she is captured/taken captive 
with Obasan as well. Through sharing these painful captivities and their trauma, they 
can create relations whose poetic images lead to dream images and their signs. In 
sum, through involuntary memory,
95
 Naomi discovers the network of collective 
memories she and Obasan share—the memory of the dead and Naomi, Obasan and 
other Japanese Canadians‟ painful history.96  
However, this does not mean that there is only pure memory. Alongside pure 
memory, traumatic bodily memory negatively coexists. To Naomi, this spiraling 
down into painful personal memory and the collective history open the humiliating, 
atrocious trauma of being molested by a white male. Mr. Gower, an old white 
neighbor, molests Naomi and “tells [Naomi] not tell [her] mother” (73), and “caresses 
                                                 
95 Involuntary memory and pure memory comes from Bergson‟s theory. My thesis here is based on 
Bergson‟s Matter and Memory as well as Deleuze‟s interpretation in Bergsonism.  
96 This corresponds with Deleuze‟s understanding of Proust‟s “organless body to signs of one nature or 
another” (Proust 182).  
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[Naomi‟s] head as if [she] were a small animal” (Kogawa 75). This trauma shuts 
down Naomi‟s world to protect her vulnerable, exploited body and mind. This 
prohibition renders trauma latent in her dreams and restrains Naomi‟s speech; Naomi 
says, “Speech hides within me, watchful and afraid” (69). This traumatic event 
trapped inside the vulnerable individual unconsciousness emerges in bizarre dream 
signs in association with other moments of victimizations during the relocation. And, 
this reiteration of dream signs leads to the collective memory of history, expanding 
personal trauma into the historical trauma of war and international violence. For 
example, Naomi‟s dream about two couples of men and women and a robot dog 
unfolds an apocalyptic view of history in a science fiction style. Naomi describes her 
dream: 
 I drift back down into white windless dream. The distance 
approaches and the roots of trees are prayers descending. 
Fingers tunneling. Wordlessness. The mist in the dream 
swarms like the foam of dry ice on the weatherless 
mountainside. Together, from out of another dream or from 
nowhere, the man and woman arrive. Their arrival is as 
indistinct as the fog. There is no language…For a flickering 
moment, she appears as she once was, naked, youthful, 
voluptuous. But the mirage fades….Her body, a matching 
squareness, is dense as earth…We do not greet them but the 
man looks at us…His glance is a raised baton. Like an 
orchestra of fog we join them and toil together in the 
timelessness….but at some subtle hour, the white mist is 
known to be gray, and the endless labor has entered our 
limb….There is in the forest huge gentle beast—a lion or a 
dog or a lion dog. It belongs to man. Its obedience is 
phenomenal…I see that the inside of the mouth is plastic. 
The animal is a robot…a house of cards silently 
collapses…One of her arms is now connected to her 
shoulder by four hooks locked to make a hinge…She 
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begins to speak but the words are so old they cannot be 
understood. (Kogawa 33-35)  
 
The narrator tunnels down through the “white,” “windless” dream—her 
unconsciousness—only to find a “worldless” space. This worldless space, 
interestingly enough, is devoid of the “world,” “wind,” “weather,” and “language.” 
This bare stage may well refer to a pure ontological space mediated by nothingness or 
death. In other words, deprived of world and sky, in this purely fertile space, 
humanity dwells with bodies that are “dense like earth.” These humans seem to be 
full of a primitive, innocent life force. Without any trace of the living world, the 
being‟s “ontological place” or “Da” of Heidegger‟s Dasein is unconcealed; in 
particular, the woman‟s body representing pure sexuality and fertility symbolizes the 
origin of life itself. Implicitly, the new-arrived couple who enters this space represent 
Naomi and Stephen‟s parents, who died during their relocation in WWII.” 
Through her dream image, Naomi finds connectivity to the dead and their 
ontological world. But an apocalyptic catastrophe is envisioned. The metallic robot 
dog with a plastic mouth symbolizes not only the nuclear bomb that eventually kills 
Naomi‟s mother, but also the moment when the fabled animal signs shed their fantasy 
and show the ontological situation of humanity and the menace of the state‟s violence 
symbolized by the hawk and Western morality the King bird represents. The 
mutilated body in her dream is, in fact, Naomi‟s mother‟s body, a lost origin insofar 
as her mother‟s body is brutally maimed like the earth is scorched and maimed by 
technology. Through the layers of dream images, Naomi finally bears witness to her 
parents‟ death via series of memory signs and dream signs. This is a moment of 
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revelation of the ontological space of truth. If the first woman is Naomi‟s split ego or 
double, she bears witness not only to the death of her parents, but also to the death of 
herself and maybe her brother. Ironically, Naomi can attain the power of testimony 
only in the dream and pure memory where she both dies and speaks about her future 
and other family members‟ previous deaths simultaneously. In this sense, this dream 
signals the end of paradise and yet, opens a series of signs—signs of life and death 
which have the power of true testimony in the ethico-ontological sense that Aunt 
Emily‟s documented testimony cannot deliver. 
 
Ontological Signs and True Testimony 
One of the most striking, disturbing series of signs in Obasan is the filthy sign 
of the bodies of the dead.
97
 The vivid and visceral messages they contain give rise to 
a new ethical question about the impossibility of the near-death testimony of 
Muselmann. Also, the sonic signs from dying animals call forth readers‟ self-
reflection of their ontological ground. In several instances Naomi hears cries from the 
dying animals that penetrate violently into Naomi‟s world. After Naomi is relocated 
to Slocan, she muses on the association of animal signs and their deaths,  
There it is Death again. Death means stop. All the chickens in 
the chicken coop, dim-witted pinbrains though they are, know 
about it…If anything goes overhead—a cloud, an airplane, the 
King bird—they all seem to be connected to one another like a 
string of Christmas-tree light. Their orange eyes are in unison, 
and each head is crooked at an angle watching the 
overshadowing death. They stop for a moment, then carry on 
                                                 
97 Filthiness has been the general topic in Asian American women‟s literature as Monica Chiu observes 
in Filthy Fictions: Asian American Literature by Women. Chiu‟s analysis, however, mostly focuses on 
the cultural aspects of these filthy images in literature, and I want to extend this discussion to include 
philosophical questions as well. 
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as death passes by…Hospitals are places where Death visits. 
But Death comes to the world in many unexpected places. 
There is that day on the way to school. (Kogawa 183) 
  
Death becomes an overarching sign in Naomi‟s world. Naomi can physically sense 
death; she sees, hears, smells, and even touches death in multiple forms. For example, 
Naomi and Stephen, on their way home from school, see Tak and Seigo, Japanese 
friends of young Naomi‟s, kill a white hen that had pecked her chicks to death. At 
that moment, Naomi bears witness to  “the chicken‟s quivering, the plump body 
pulsing and beating like a disembodied heart…[and then] there is no sound from the 
chicken except a strange squeaking noise from the wings as if they are metal hinges” 
(Kogawa 185). This squeaking sound resonates with another scene when she hears 
“the voice…weak—a faint steady mewing” (188) from a kitten that is killed by a girl 
with white hair though she denies that she did it. Why do these children, regardless of 
their ethnicities, kill animals? Is it just because of the prevalence of violence due to 
war and their internment? Is there something more? Notably, these children kill 
animals because they share vulnerabilities with the animals. In society in general, 
children are at the lowest rung of the social ladder when violence ensues. The 
children in the novel kill the animals because they want to victimize something in 
order to get compensation for their own victimization. The previous example of 
Stephen‟s killing of the butterflies shares almost the same context. Violence prevails 
because it causes vulnerable ones to find more vulnerable beings. Therefore, animals‟ 
cries hit the limit of humanity.  
 Another set of the death signs is the images of animals/humans‟ corpses. The 
ontological signs of death in the novel are morbid, material, and paradoxical. For 
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example, when Naomi goes to a nearby swamp, she describes an image of a dead tree 
in contrast with a living animal sign: “On the far side of swamp…[t]he only tree here 
is dead. Its skeleton is a roost for a black-and-white magpie that I often see angling 
across the sky” (Kogawa 244). This contrast between the sign of the dead (here, the 
tree as a skeleton) and the sign of the living (the magpie) repeats similarly two more 
times. First, it appears more grotesquely in Naomi‟s grandmother‟s dream: 
Grandmother Gato in Japan writes in her letter to her daughters that “as in a dream, I 
can still see the maggots crawling in the sockets of my niece‟s eyes” (Kogawa 281). 
Again, this dream turns out to be the reality and repeats in Grandmother Gato‟s 
experience in Japan; when she roams Nagasaki ruined by the atomic bombing, she 
bears witness to a repulsive scene where:  
a woman was utterly disfigured. Her nose and one cheek 
were almost gone. Great wounds and pustules covered her 
entire face and body. She was completely bald. She sat in a 
cloud of flies, and maggots wriggled among her wound. As 
Grandma Gato watched her, the woman gave her a vacant 
gaze, then let out an animal cry. It was [Naomi‟s] mother. 
(286)  
 
All these images of death and life conflate into Naomi‟s mother‟s last animal cry 
before she dies. These unbearable moments of witnessing the dead bodies or animal 
cries from dying bodies ironically are the ethical moments when the speaking “I” can 
ethically engage in a true testimony from the dying or the dead. Also, this is the 
ontological moment of revelation in that it discloses the ontological truth that “human 
is nothing other than the agent of the inhumans, the one who lends the inhuman a 
voice” (Agamben, Remnant 120). It can be said that the maggot is the living “I” 
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turning into the speaking “I” through Grandmother Gato‟s bearing witness to the 
dying Muselmann, the true witness—Naomi‟s mother. 
In this sense, Aunt Obasan‟s endless repetitive phrase, “Everyone someday 
dies” seems to be too true a commonplace to have specific significance; yet, this 
truism dominates the foundation of philosophy—facticity,98 the ontological truth that 
the essence of our being is time, and this ontological time (Heidegger‟s ek-sistence) 
are meaningful because we all die in the future. This repetitive, differential, and 
grotesque series of the paradoxical coexistence of the living and the dead—e.g. 
creepy maggots eating flesh and crawling up from the dying and the dead, the last 
animal cry from a defaced, disfigured living dead—conflates all previous series of 
signs (the animal signs and memory/dream signs). Despite their grotesqueness, the 
maggots crawling out of the sockets of human eyes and wounds uncover the hidden 
truth beneath the traumatic signs in dream and phantasm-covered reality. When flesh 
is gone and the capability to speak is deprived, this abject being lets out ineffable, 
unintelligible animal cries from the deceasing living “I.” Embodying this animal cry, 
the maggots symbolize the living “I” whose speaking is impossible. The improper 
ethos of dying bodies or the dead has the potentiality of proper testimony.  
To listen to the true testimony, Naomi obsessively replays the squeaking, 
meaningless sound from her mother‟s last animal cry in her imagination. Why does 
                                                 
98 Facticity has been the limbo of the non-philosophical foundation of the lived body upon which 
philosophers transcendentally think and reflect. As existentialists such as Merleau-Ponty and 
Heidegger suggest, the truth of our beings cannot be unconcealed without granting thought into the 
facticity of lived bodies and their immanent world of being (living) and nothing (death) determined by 
their ecstatic characters of mortality. If living is proper and death is improper, facticity possesses both. 
In this sense, Agamben “underscores how facticity entails an irreducible element of non-originality, 
and therefore of nonpropriety. The improper is the very mark of finitude” (Steinbock 4). 
Philosophically, bodies‟ factual existence and their final forms bring up rationally improper moods and 
irrational affects.  
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Naomi replay these sounds in her mind? One answer can be that Naomi is under the 
foggy, ontological mood of “shame” which ironically relates to “love.” 
 
Shame and Love  
In Obasan, the experiences of desertedness, dislocation, alienation, and 
estrangement form the mood of being‟s vulnerability and its facticity. Recalling her 
experience of relocation, Naomi elaborates on her ontological mood via the image of 
a clearing: “There is no beginning and no end to the forest, or the dust storm, no edge 
from which to know where the clearing begins. Here in this familiar density, beneath 
this cloak, within this carapace, is the longing within the darkness” (Kogawa 131). 
Naomi‟s description here is full of ontological anxiety formed from an anxious 
waiting for the unknown, sinister future without Naomi‟s active searching for a way 
out of the destiny the dense forest symbolizes. In some sense, the sign of the clearing 
alludes to the Heideggerian clearing where Dasein unconceals and conceals the truth 
and freedom. The clearing exists under the bright truth, but all geo-political situations 
prevent these vulnerable beings from achieving freedom and unconcealing the truth 
of their world. However, within the dense obscurity caused by zones of 
indistinctions—human and inhuman, law and nature, nomos and state of exception, 
citizen and homo sacer, and non-camp and camp—the identities and subjectivities of 
those relocated surplus-beings become “chips and sand, the fragments of fragments 
that fly like arrows from the heart of the rock. [They] are the silences that speak from 
stone. [They] are the despised rendered voiceless” (Kogawa 132). Japanese 
Canadians become molecular beings and “disappear into the future undemanding as 
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dew” (132). Yet, what about the art signs that Naomi, impersonating Kogawa, is 
creating? 
  Not so much does Naomi become suspicious of legal testimony as she 
becomes suspicious of the power of art. Naomi asks: “After the rotting of the flesh, 
what is the song that is left? Is it the strange gnashing sound of insects with their 
mandibles moving through the bone marrow?” (Kogawa 294).99 Pretentiously 
imagining the pain inmates in camps experience is unethical because it fails to listen 
to the real witness who could not survive. Those so-called vivid representations of 
camps that emphasize forced grief and realistic representations or heroic adventures 
(i.e. Schindler's List) denigrate the meaning of true testimony. Maybe, the best way to 
artistically deliver the pain of those oppressed is to stop sensationalizing with vivid 
representation and instead maximize the artistic imagination and opacity. It is the 
opacity that truly unconceals the facticity of humanity, though opacity belongs to 
impropriety and improper artistic production. Artistic opacity becomes the artistic 
membrane that protects vulnerable memories and the living “I” against violent 
representation. Finally, the art sign becomes “love” about which Naomi says: 
Once I came across two ideographs for the word “love.” 
The first contained the root words “heart” and “hand” and 
“action”—love as hands and heart in action together. The 
other ideograph, for “passionate love,” was formed of 
“heart,” “to tell,” and “a long thread.”  The dance ceremony 
of the dead was a slow courtly telling, the heart declaring a 
long thread knotted to Obasan‟s twine, knotted to Aunt 
Emily‟s package. Why, I wonder as she danced her love, 
should I find myself unable to breathe? The Grand 
Inquisitor was carnivorous and full of murder. His demand 
                                                 
99 Naomi‟s critiques on the artistic representation of human pain correspond with Adorno‟s famous 
dictum that “to write a poem after Auschwitz is barbaric” (Prisms 34). 
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to know was both a judgment and a refusal to hear. The 
more he questioned her, the more he was her accuser and 
murderer. The more he killed her, the deeper her silence 
became. What the Grand Inquisitor has never learned is that 
the avenues of speech are the avenues of silence. To hear 
my mother, to attend her speech, to attend the sound of 
stone, he must first become silent. Only when he enters her 
abandonment will he be released from his own…My 
mother hid her love, but hidden in life does she speak 
through dream? Her tale is a rose with a tangled stem. 
(Kogawa 273-74)  
 
As Naomi describes, the hieroglyphic Chinese ideograph of “Love” (愛) contains such 
morphemic parts as “heart” and “hand” and “action,” and “passionate love” (热愛) is 
comprised of the morphemes of “heart,” “to tell,” and “a long thread.”100 To elaborate 
with philosophical connotations here, the character for “love” implicates affect, care, 
and praxis, while the character of “passionate love” implicates affect, speech, and a 
continuum of relations. The most interesting part in this quote is the image of a long 
thread. In Obasan, the long thread of love connects each individual into an 
amorphous idea of community. This line connects every member of the Japanese 
Canadian community without segregating anyone from the community. This 
community of love encloses and protects vulnerable bare lives from the enforced 
violence and actualizes their potential power to change their fixed identities with 
subtle movements.  
What‟s more, this line in the quote delivers the voice from the dead as the 
ethical testimony by materially linking “Obasan‟s twine, knotted to Aunt Emily‟s 
                                                 
100 Ueki, in her essay “Obasan: Revelations in a Paradoxical Scheme,” understands these characters 
differently. I agree with her interpretation that the first letter refers to Aya Obasan, while the second 
letter refers to Aunt Emily. However, here, I present a different interpretation because I argue that 
Kogawa‟s use of Chinese characters transcends this parallelism.   
 176 
package” (Kogawa 274). The silence of the living being standing as a disabled 
Muselmann before the speaking “I” unconceals the truth that “the avenues of speech 
are the avenues of silence” (274). The silence is also full speech with the ultimate 
potentiality for those who listen, as Naomi demonstrates when she reiterates the same 
sentence multiple times, “Mother, I am listening. Assist me to hear you” (Kogawa 
288). By Naomi‟s attentive listening to her mother‟s animal cry while being 
enveloped in her ontological mood of shame love can finally blossom like “a rose 
with a tangled stem.” Love is not a pleasant affect but a painful endeavor to bear 
witness to these filthy ontological signs. Through connecting via the line of love, 
what Naomi feels is not just grief but shame. 
As such, grief cannot be the rightful mood felt in understanding camps and 
Muselmann. Grief belongs to sentimental judgment, a guise over the deeper 
emptiness that is the shame. Thus, Naomi implores, “Grief wails like a scarecrow in 
the wild night, beckoning the wind to clothe his gaunt shell. With his outstretched 
arms he is gathering eyes for his disguise…This body of grief is not fit for human 
habitation. Let there be flesh. The song of mourning is not a lifelong song” (Kogawa 
295). The speaking “I,” through enunciation, foregrounds his or her subjectivity with 
the background of his or her ethos. The fundamental structure of love is to unconceal 
one‟s facticity and its ethos of a silent Muselmann, as well as ontological shame. 
Then how can we explain this ontological shame? Agamben, quoting Keats‟ letter 
about the relation between the poetic experience of shame and desubjectification, 
maintains, “It is almost as if the shame and desubjectification implicit in the act of 
speech contained a secret beauty that could only bring the poet incessantly to bear 
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witness to his own alienation” (Remnant 113). The poetic power of desubjectification 
under the mood of the shame caused by speaking about the unspeakable position of 
inhumanity paradoxically brings forth a truthful aesthetic world. In this sense, it is 
only in poetic articulation that a person can testify fully and ethically, just as the stem 
of the rose for articulation in a poetics of line emerges from Naomi‟s mother‟s 
maimed body. Instead of Aunt Emily, Naomi, with shame and love, via her poetic 
narratives imparts the signs of non-human beings such as animals, signs from dream 
and memory, and ontological signs of corpse and animal cries. These narratives 
testify truly about her mother and others, a silent community of the oppressed. 
Eventually Naomi prays about her shame:  
Martyr Mother, you pilot your powerful voicelessness over 
the ocean and across the mountain, straight as a missile to 
our hut on the edge of a sugar-beet field. You wish to 
protect us with lies, but the camouflage does not hide your 
cries. Beneath the hiding I am there with you. Silent 
Mother, lost in the abandoning, you do not share the horror. 
At first, stumbling and unaware of pain, your open your 
eyes in the red mist and, sheltering a dead child, you flee 
through the flames. Young Mother at Nagasaki, am I not 
also there?... I hear the screams and feel the mountain 
breaking. Your long hair falls and falls into the chasm. My 
legs are sawn in half. The skin on your face bubbles like 
lava and melts from your bones. Mother, I see your face. 
Do not turn aside….Your leg is a tree trunk and I am 
branch, vine, butterfly. I am joined to your limbs by right of 
birth, child of your flesh, leaf of your bough….Gentle 
Mother, we were lost together in our silences. Our 
worldlessness was our mutual destruction. (Kogawa 290-
91) 
 
In this passage, Naomi invocates her mother in five different ways: martyr mother, 
silent mother, young mother, mother in a tree form, and gentle mother who share 
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Naomi‟s own worldlessness. Each phase signifies a different becoming and goes 
through rhythmical ups and downs in vulnerable images. The first martyr mother is 
the mother endeavoring to protect her children with angelic sacrifice and religious 
devotion, no matter how difficult. But this commonplace version of mother is mute 
and full of white lies; what‟s more, this version of mother is belligerent and 
paradoxically suicidal since the paradoxical image of her protection attends the image 
of a missile. In this sense, the metonymic link between martyr and motherhood is 
fragile because mother hides her painful cry, the animal cry, which cannot be 
mobilized like the powerful missile of voicelessness. Naomi‟s mother‟s martyrdom is 
in essence an illusion because it paints a pretentiously rosy picture of the bare lives 
beneath the concealment as blessed victims; that is, a martyr is a product of an 
ideological apparatus covering the ontological mood of “the shame.” Naomi can share 
her mother‟s suffering not by mourning over her martyrdom but by attuning herself to 
her mother‟s cry of ontological shame.  
Increasingly, Naomi‟s persona, transmuting and transfusing into parts of her 
mother‟s body, senses the worlds her mother bears witness to as a Muselmann; that is, 
the narrator goes through the experience of being thrown into the mother‟s silent bare 
life filled with animal cries and thus gains an ability to give true testimony. In this 
way, “the young mother” in Nagasaki is a mother-daughter transfused by Muselmann 
dwelling in an ethos of humanity. In the end, grafted into a petrified mother, the 
narrator feels safe again.  
 
True Testimony and Poetics of Subtlest Thin Lines  
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Herb Wyile, in “Making a Mess of Things: Postcolonialism, Canadian 
Literature, and the Ethical Turn,” anticipates the ethical turn in literary criticism and 
proposes that “the ethical utility of literary texts may well reside most of all in their 
lack of amenability to clear judgment.” With this anticipation, Herb emphasizes 
literature‟s “fruitful dialogue with life” (831). Thus, the most violent and unethical 
images can be ethical because of their opacity and complexities. Human corpses and 
animal cries can be the most ethical images because they can deconstruct readers‟ 
ossified morality. In the end of the novel, Naomi, after finding the truth of her 
mother‟s life and how she died, narrates: 
What stillness in this predawn hour. The air is cold. In all 
our life of preparation we are unprepared for this new hour 
filled with emptiness. How thick the darkness behind which 
hide the animal cry. I know what is there, hidden from my 
stare. Grief‟s weeping. Deeper emptiness…. Through the 
open doorway I can see the faint shaft of light from the 
kitchen across the living-room floor, straight as a knife 
cutting light from shadow, the living from the dead. 
(Kogawa 295-96) 
 
Naomi is waiting for the dawn from which life will begin, but she knows that the 
night is long, and waiting is filled with emptiness because the memory of her mother 
beyond the darkness is filled with an animal cry that she cannot see or hear directly. 
The thin line between light (life) and darkness (death) is too faint to be seen clearly. 
But this thinness is the aesthetic threshold from which true testimony can be spoken 
through the dying victim‟s animal cry. From this thinness, art and true testimony can 
occur. In a nutshell, because of the creation of Naomi‟s sensitive narrator-body and 
her art-signs, I claim that Obasan can be a true testimony. In the next chapter, I will 
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show another possibility that continues the thin line of distinction between art and 
life, about which I will exemplify by discussing clones‟ lives and their arts. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
CAN TRUTH FREE YOU? 
A CLONE ARTIST’S POST-HUMAN QUESTIONS IN NEVER LET ME GO 
 
The subject…is gone,  
because identical duplication ends the division that constitutes him.  
The mirror stage is abolished by the cloning process—or 
…is monstrously parodied therein.  
(Jean Baudrillard, The Transparency of Evil, 115) 
 
In an aversion to animals the predominant feeling 
Is fear of being recognized by them through contact. 
The horror that stirs deep in an obscure awareness 
That in him something lives so akin to the animal 
That it might be recognized. 
(Water Benjamin, “One-Way Street” 66) 
 
Never Let Me Go, on the surface, seems to be a typical boarding-school 
narrative until the readers suddenly discover that the students in Never Let Me Go 
turn out to be “biotechnological slave[s]” (Carroll 62) or bodies for organ harvests. 
The novel raises interesting questions that lead to thought experiments in the tradition 
of science fiction as a speculative fiction.101 These thought experiments are fertile for 
a mapping of the contemporary world because they unveil critical issues raised by the 
novel and are related to the current issues such as cloning, euthanasia, ethnic 
cleansing, and so on. This critical mapping is possible because of Ishiguro‟s unique 
                                                 
101 According to Darko Suvin, this cognitive estrangement is a core and genetic element of science 
fiction or the speculative fiction. Science fiction is different from the fantasy novel or the fairy tale 
because it is based on cognitive speculation about the actual world by estranging it into a virtual space 
and time where the readers run into the same problems our society has had or is supposed to have. 
Never Let Me Go is in this vein of cognitive estrangement. However, the narrative in the novel goes no 
more beyond the traditional set of realism than the hard SF. The narrative breaks down the 
hermeneutic expectation of the implied readers in order to explore the more problematic untimely 
space and the shaky ground of modern subjectivity. 
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style and literary techniques: a self-deceptive narrator, the appropriation of the 
conventional Victorian novel and gothic setting, an enclosed Kafkaesque space and 
animal-humans, absurd and macabre images and settings, untimely space and 
historical reflection on micro-political fascism, a careful erasure of ethnic, racial and 
gender traits, and an ironic distance between the novel and the narrator and the author.  
Ishiguro‟s literary devices, such as the “fictional landscape of imagination” or 
the “character as a metaphor” substantialize the novel‟s deep philosophical questions. 
First, the “fictional landscape of imagination” creates an unconventional space and 
time out of conventional ones. For example, in an interview, Ishiguro explained that A 
Pale View of Hills is about the very specific time and space (like Baktin‟s 
“chronotope” as a time and space of a novel) of Nagasaki in 1950s. This product of 
the “fictional landscape” of imagination (Sawim 105) possesses universal questions 
about humanity, humans‟ absurd captivity to their destiny, and the uncanny truth of 
human violence. This eagerness to create a universal chronotope may hide Ishiguro‟s 
desire to go beyond his ethnic identity or his immigration experience.  
Ishiguro‟s unconventional use of conventional characters is especially 
unique.102 The clone in Never Let Me Go and its world are metaphors just as is the 
English butler in Ishiguru‟s The Remains of the Day103. The clone as a metaphor is 
deconstructive because “Ishiguro takes away this „as if‟ quality” (Britzman 308). The 
“as if” quality represents the potentiality of a different understanding of the novel in 
                                                 
102 About Ishigruo‟s Never Let Me Go, critics mostly focus on narratological questions. Mark Jerng, in 
“Giving Form to Life: Cloning and Narrative Expectations of the Human,” takes on the connectivity 
between form and life as narratives. Keith McDonald, in “Days of Past Futures: Kazuo Ishiguro‟s 
Never Let Me Go as „Speculative Memoir” discuss narratological element as the autobiographical 
memoir in Never Let Me Go. Reader response criticism and narratology have been central issues in 
Never Let Me Go because of very unique narratological techniques Ishiguro is famous for. I will 
discuss this frequently, but my chapter more focuses on philosophical and ethical aspect of the novel.   
103 See Ishiguro‟s interview in Conversation with Kazuo Ishiguro (100). 
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terms of different times, spaces, and characters‟ identities. The novel becomes more 
and more absurd and uncanny as readers discover how similar the clones are to 
humans and begin transposing themselves and their childhood memories with the 
clones‟ circumstances. As “clone” becomes a metaphor, the metaphorical structure via 
fictional representation saturates the novel‟s literary space with multiple meanings 
and layers that realistic novels cannot achieve.  
As a metaphoric character, a clone has an infinite potentiality of different 
identities that expand and deepen the scope and layers of novel. As soon as a reader 
applies one identity to the clone, the whole novel‟s meaning changes. Although the 
clones act like typical school children and then teenage students, their ontological 
status and the veiled setting of the novel turns a clone‟s life story and those of her 
friends to dystopian science fiction.104 This post-human twist in typical teenagers‟ 
eschatological questions about truth and life (Toker & Chertoff 166) prompts potently 
fundamental questions about humanity, animality, and the origin of human 
civilization in the context of the dialectic between utopia and dystopia, where a clone 
narrator‟s dreamy voice hides the uncanny truth of the world to which she belongs. 
The clone‟s human voice itself asks ethico-ontological questions about our world—
such question as “how can we live with non-human beings that belong to the same 
world we belong to but have a different or better form-of-life?” Did not Westerners 
ask the same question when they encountered savages and animals with suffering 
faces?  
                                                 
104 Mark Jerng considers a similar question of Ishiguro‟s reworking of the form of life: “how might 
human life and cloned persons share a space and context, how might they respond to one another?” 
(391) 
 184 
These ethico-ontological as well as (post)colonial concerns lead to deep 
question regarding the clones in Never Let Me Go: what is meaning of truth and 
freedom? There are four truths in Never Let Me Go that I will explore: the spatial 
truth of utopia and dystopia, the ontological truth of freedom, the ethico-political truth 
of the anthropological machine, and the aesthetic truth of the clone artist as true artist. 
These truths will be disclosed gradually in the novel to relay such questions as: are 
the clones‟ world different from the humans‟ world?; why don‟t those students-clones 
try to escape? If the novel itself is a critical review of human history, what event is 
Ishiguro pointing to? What is the meaning of art if art means creation? And finally, 
how can we explain Ishiguro‟s melancholic tone in the novel? These questions feed 
into the larger question about the significance of an ethnic writer‟s intention in 
erasing his own identity from his novel.  
 
The Unreliable Non-human Narrator and the Dialectics of Utopia and Dystopia 
Never Let Me Go is filled with the narrator‟s nostalgic, romantic recollections 
that contradict readers‟ logical assumptions. Kathy is an unreliable narrator, and her 
fragmentary memories are jumbled and punctured with narrative potholes where truth 
and questions lurk. Kathy‟s intentional lack of explanation about her identity and her 
foggy memory results in an unreliable, skeletal narrative structure which requires 
readers to cognitively participate by asking deeper questions and thereby bringing the 
readers out of the epistemological cave and into the daylight. For example, the first 
page of the novel begins with Kathy‟s curious reflection on her career: 
My name is Kathy H. I‟m thirty-one years old, and I‟ve been a 
carer now over eleven years. That sound long enough, I know, 
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but actually they want me to go on for another eight months, 
until the end of this year….Now I know my being a carer so 
long isn‟t necessarily because they think I‟m fantastic at what I 
do....I‟m not trying to boast….My donors have always tended 
to do much better than expected. Their recovery times have 
been impressive, and hardly any of them have been classified 
as “agitated,” even before fourth donation. Okay, maybe I am 
boasting now…. (Never 1) 
 
Kathy‟s narrative is marked by an ironic mood and is filled with mysteries; she is 
boasting and not boasting at the same time. On the textual level, such terms as 
“donor” and “carer” deepen the mystery of the narrative, calling into questions 
readers‟ logical assumption that Kathy might be a nurse working in a hospital where 
patients donate organs; yet, obviously it is not possible for a human being to survive 
multiple organ donations.105 In addition, Kathy‟s self-analysis of her career masks her 
individual personality and drives readers to consider her identity solely in terms of 
her career; she is more clearly identified as a laborer than as a person. The reason why 
she emphasizes her work as key to her identity relates to her own ontological 
problem: she does not have a true human essence but only functions in the social 
space, not as a human being but as a clone or a product of genetics. However, Kathy 
paradoxically claims that “Carers aren‟t machines” (4), which belies her identity as a 
clone. This apophasis paradoxically reveals the truth that Kathy is in some sense an 
organ-machine. To make the novel more ironic, Kathy uses her narrative to relieve the 
pain of a donor who wants “to remember Hailsham, just like it had been his own 
childhood” though he knows he was close to “completing” (the donation-machine‟s 
                                                 
105 The unreliable narrator is a common literary device Ishiguro uses in his works. In an interview, 
Ishiguro called it “self-deception,” and clearly explained: “I am interested in narrators who are trying 
to evade certain truths about themselves and about their parts. They are, in other words, dealing with 
the language of self-deception” (Conversation 23).  
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jargon for dying) (5). Kathy‟s storytelling functions to ameliorate the pain of dying 
clones. She is a good carer in that she is a good storyteller and a good soother.  
However, it is only because she is good at mixing truths and lies that Kathy is 
a good storyteller. While Never Let Me Go is written in a genre of memoir, Kathy‟s 
obvious unreliability undermines the trustworthiness of the genre. Jerng also points 
out this unreliability and argues Kathy‟s role as an unreliable clone narrator results 
from her inability “to traverse the gap between what she knew and understood in the 
past and what she knows and understand in the present” (385). This gap also 
gradually extends as events in Kathy‟s memory become sporadic and contradictory; 
she even intentionally hides some part of her memory to hide her emotions. Kathy‟s 
narrative is full of details but at the same time elusive and deceptive.  
Kathy‟s narrative describes Hailsham, by and large, as a utopian orphans‟ 
commune, but she does not fully testify to what really happened at Hailsham. 
Descriptions of incidents in Hailsham are porous, concealing uncanny secrets. For 
example, in Hailsham, there is a mysterious activity among students called the 
“Collection.” In truth, the Collection hides the secret that Hailsham is an organ 
factory. Though ostensibly living in a commune-style community, the students in 
Hailsham are permitted to keep their individual collections. The collection itself is, 
Kathy explains, “a “wooden chest with your name on it, which you kept under your 
bed and filled with your possessions—the stuff you acquired from the Sales or the 
Exchanges” (Never 38). In terms of a materialistic analogy, the box full of trinkets 
metaphorically represents the student‟s body. Should the items be thrown away, the 
box will be empty; likewise, the clones‟ bodies become husks without organs after the 
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completion of their donations. As Carroll interprets, the students‟ economic activity 
“underlines the commodified status of their condition” (62). To put it more finely, 
Madame, a mysterious lady who regularly visits Hailsham, collects students‟ artwork, 
which also poignantly reflects the fate of the students whose organs will be 
“collected”—in truth, harvested—in the end. Moreover, the physical collection also 
signifies the psychological recollection—the box is filled with memories. Kathy and 
other students store their items in the box just as they keep their memories in their 
recollection; without this collection/recollection they will lose all of their past, their 
identity, and their precious relationships each other. Contrasted with the students‟ 
emotional attachment to their individual collections, the collection also symbolizes 
the reification and objectification of their bodies as commercial products. This reveals 
the sinister dystopian aspect of the utopian Hailsham.  
To the extent that the students are compared with laborers, “Collection” in 
Hailsham critiques the bio-economy and bio-politics106 of the current world. In 
another morbid example of connectivity between a mysterious word and clone‟s body, 
students describe their injuries as “unzipping.” When Tommy, a boy bullied by other 
students because of his quick temper and bad taste of art, suffers from an accidental 
gash on his arm, students start joking about the accident grotesquely, saying that the 
skin in Tommy‟s body will open to let organs slide out, like “unzipping” a bag. Kathy 
narrates: 
The Reason I was talking about all this was because the 
idea of things “unzipping” carried over from Tommy‟s 
elbow to become a running joke among us about the 
                                                 
106 According to Negri and Hadt in Empire, in global bio-politics and bio-economy, people who possess 
only their bodies for unworthy work live by using their bodies. In many senses, Hailsham hides the 
dystopian side of the current bio-capitalism. 
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donations. The idea was that when the time came, you‟d be 
able just to unzip a bit of yourself, a kidney or something 
would slide out, and you‟d hand it over. It wasn‟t 
something we found so funny in itself; it was more a way 
of putting each other off our food. You unzipped your liver, 
say, and dumped it on someone‟s plate, that sort of thing. 
(Never 87-8)  
 
Perhaps Ishiguro is simply offering a macabre joke by the associating of the clones‟ 
organs with the food we human beings eat every day. This “unzipping,” as a metaphor 
of opening a body stuffed with organs, suggests that a clone‟s skin is analogous to a 
plastic wrapper that protects precious organic products. It also satirically links the 
clones‟ organs with the organs of animals kept in a plastic wrapper that people buy 
and sell in supermarkets. Like executive managers in a meat factory, the guardians 
keep instructing the students to avoid any accident or injury because the main concern 
of the school is to provide a sustainable supply system of fresh intact human organs 
for the world outside Hailsham. The logic behind the utopian idea of providing 
student donors a “democratic” commune in Hailsham is an ideological apparatus that 
veils the dystopian super-capital system in which bodies are products.107 Bio-politics 
is one focus of the novel which also critically reflects and acerbically criticizes the 
current global bio-capitalism; that is, within bio-politics, in the novel, the students as 
bio-objects can be collected, exchanged, and transacted in a similar way to how 
human organs cross the borders of the third world to the first world in the current 
global space. In truth, Hailsham is an organ factory or a camp where living products 
are raised for commercial purpose by human beings. This bio-politics in the form of a 
                                                 
107 I call this system super-capital since it goes beyond the modern capitalistic system. In fact, within 
this bio-economic system, even human organs are valued as equivalent to corporeal capital whose 
significance is superimposed on the traditional meaning of capital established on the idea of the labor 
rather than the body. 
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bio-farm or bio-camp in an untimely space reflects our world in which objectification 
and reification have been critical terms to define the ontological situations of human 
beings in capitalism. In fact, Hailsham is not the utopia of Kathy‟s narrative but 
dystopian bio-camp.  
Etymologically “Utopia” is “no-space” in Greek, which implies that utopia 
does exist in reality. In this sense, it can be said that utopia cannot be the space of 
truth, but just a space of untruth, provided that truth signifies the reality of dystopia. 
Hailsham is in the dialectics of dystopia and utopia based on the two-fold spatial 
essence of truth and untruth; the students believe that Hailsham is a utopia, but in 
truth it is a dystopian organ-farm. In turn, even if Hailsham is a dystopia in truth, it is 
also a utopia for human beings because human beings can live better and longer than 
before due to the systematic supply of fresh organs. Thus, the students can see the 
truth as beings-in-the-clones‟ world, but it will be concealed as soon as disclosed 
because they are subject to epistemological, ontological limits within the human 
beings‟ world. Initially, the world of clones coexists but contrasts with the world of 
human beings. Like Hailsham, the novel‟s illustrated “Norfolk” is a striking example 
of this coexistence of two different worlds within the dialectics of utopia and 
dystopia. 
In a sense, Norfolk seems to be more utopian than Hailsham in that it does 
not seem to conceal a dystopian aspect. During Miss Emily‟s class about “different 
counties of England,” (Never 64) Kathy, along with other students, gets curious about 
“a gap in Miss Emily‟s calendar collection” because “none of them had a single 
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picture of Norfolk” (65). Norfolk is mysterious space to both the students and the 
readers. Kathy narrates: 
[Miss Emily] wave her pointer over the map and say, as a 
sort of afterthought: “And over here, we‟ve got Norfolk. 
Very nice there …. [people] bypass it altogether. For that 
reason, it‟s a peaceful corner of England, rather nice. But 
it‟s also something of a lost corner.” A lost corner. That‟s 
what she called it, and that was what started it. Because at 
Hailsham, we had our own “Lost Corner” up on the third 
floor, where the lost property was kept; if you lost or 
found anything, that‟s where you went. Someone—I can‟t 
remember who it was—claimed after the lesson that what 
Emily had said was that Norfolk was England‟s “lost 
corner,” where all the lost property found in the country 
ended up. (Never 65-66) 
 
Why does Miss Emily call Norfolk a “lost corner” and depict it as “peaceful corner of 
England”? And, why do clones believe that this is the space where they will “find” 
what they have “lost” but cannot recover right now? On one hand, Norfolk seems to 
be a childish fantasy; Kathy confesses, “Sure enough, by the time we were twelve or 
thirteen, the Norfolk thing had become a big joke” (Never 66). Or, it might be the 
generic fantasy land because “at that stage in [the students‟] lives, any place beyond 
Hailsham was like a fantasy land” (66). On the other hand, the students 
problematically believe in Norfolk “in the most literal way” because they believe that 
anything “left behind in fields” would be collected in Norfolk. Because of this 
function of Norfolk as a utopian lost-and-found, Ruth recalls later, “when we lost 
something precious, and…we couldn‟t find it, then we didn‟t have to be completely 
heartbroken. We still had that last bit of comfort, thinking one day, when we were 
grown up, and we were free to travel around the country, we could always go and find 
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it again in Norfolk” (66). Norfolk signifies to the students that the freedom “lost” in 
Hailsham and may be “found” in the world out of Hailsham.  
Interestingly, Norfolk is the space that signifies two different series of 
meanings for Miss Emily (or human beings in general) and the students. What is just 
a “lost” corner to Miss Emily is the space where “lost” objects can be “found” to 
clones; in the human beings‟ world, Norfolk is just a nostalgic space. On the contrary, 
to clones, Norfolk is a liminal space in that its signification embeds both the utopian 
fantasy of “found” and the dystopian reality of “lost” at the same time; indeed, 
Norfolk signifies the students‟ hidden desire for freedom. More ironically, what are 
found in Norfolk are not originals but replicas. For example, in the real Norfolk, 
when Kathy and Tommy “found another copy of that lost tape of [Kathy‟s],” and 
Tommy asks whether what they found is “the actual one” or not, Kathy answers, “I 
have to tell you, Tommy, there might be thousands of these knocking about” (Never 
172). There is no “actual one” that Kathy lost. But, Kathy also paradoxically narrates, 
“[the tape] was mainly a nostalgia thing, and today, if I happen to get the tape out and 
look at it, it brings back memories of that afternoon in Norfolk every bit as much as it 
does our Hailsham days” (173). Paradoxically, the lost items reemerge and are found 
as replicas in real Norfolk, but their untruthful essence as a sham also contains the 
truthful lost memories of Hailsham. 
Given that ontologically the students are tantamount to reproducible 
commercial objects without essence, Norfolk as a lost-and-found in Hailsham 
represents the morbid reality that the students as well as their memories and 
childhoods are objects that can be “lost” and later “found” as replicas. And, from this 
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perspective, the students ironically would not be free until they die. Through an 
inverted lens, Norfolk in truth can be seen as a landfill to which everything that is 
“left behind” or “completed” is delivered; likewise, the students‟ wishes and hopes as 
well as their bodies without organs are destined to be abandoned like their precious 
items. Though they look forward to finding what they lost, they will find only 
replicas. Norfolk embeds several paradoxes in terms of existence and knowledge. It is 
the space of objects and the space of memories; it is also the space of truth as well as 
the space of false copies. It is the space of truth and the space of illusion; but, it is the 
destination where clones will discover at last that they cannot be free until they die. 
Why does Norfolk open only to clones? Is it because this space belongs to clone‟s 
world? Why is the clone‟s world different from the human beings‟ world? All these 
questions center on the uncanny encounter of the human being and clone worlds. This 
question leads to the question of true humanity. 
 
Paradoxes of Uncanny beings and Uncanny Truths 
Much science fiction compares aliens to social outcasts. And, most of these 
instances of science fictions have asked the same questions—what is true humanity 
and what will the future of humanity be? How can we determine who is human and 
who is not human? A possible answer is that humanity depends on a representational 
system, according to what kinds of beings can be categorized as humanity.108 But this 
categorization is always arbitrary and violently exclusive. Reflecting these aspects of 
                                                 
108 To deconstruct these systems of discriminative humanity, Donna Haraway, with an ironic intent, 
wrote “A manifesto for cyborgs: science, technology, and socialist feminism in the 1980s,” and attacks 
an ontological representation system that discriminates humanity from inhumanity through a “science” 
that deems some privileged groups as true human beings. See Haraway, especially 13.  
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a representation system of humanity, Never Let Me Go reveals differential relations 
between humanity and inhumanity. For example, to surprise Madame, the students 
make a plan to suddenly rush up to her. As soon as Madame sees them, she “was 
afraid of [students] in the same way someone might be afraid of spiders” (35). After 
the students witnessed this unexpected reaction from Madame, they burst into tears. 
This scene critically shows that the students were disappointed not only because they 
realize their ontological difference but more painfully that such difference is bad to let 
Madam to be scared. Kathy muses upon the reason of Madame‟s fear: 
So you‟re waiting, even if you don‟t quite know it, waiting 
for the moment when you realize that you really are 
different to them; that there are people out there, like 
Madame, who don‟t hate you or wish you any harm, but 
who nevertheless shudder at the very thought of you—of 
how you were brought into this world and why—and who 
dread the idea of your hand brushing against theirs. The 
first time you glimpse yourself through the eyes of a 
person like that, it‟s a cold moment. (Never 36).  
 
Kathy speculates that Madame, like other human beings, shudders because she 
happens to gaze into students‟ origin or essence. Madame may consider touching 
these unnatural beings as taboo. Human beings might not hate or wish to do any harm 
to the clones, but they feel ontological anxiety as soon as they truly gaze at these 
beings whose origin and essence is unnatural. If so, is Madame‟s fright merely due to 
the difference of their origin, the idea that they are unnatural creatures unnaturally 
created, as Kathy supposes? Maybe or maybe not. To Madame, clones may be 
dangerous “animals” not because they might attack her but because they are a taboo 
that must not be touched. And, they are taboo precisely because they represent 
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something too “akin” to humanity. Ontological unfamiliarity on the surface hides an 
abysmal ontological familiarity.  
In his writing on uncanny, Freud lays out the etymological ambivalence of 
the word: uncanny, in German das Unheimliche, means secret and unfamiliar but it 
also paradoxically shares the meaning of the antonym— das Unheimliche (familiar, 
tame). Upon this etymological explanation, Freud, interpreting Hoffmann‟s story, 
“The Sand-Man”, claims that an uncanny feeling emerges when a familiar infantile 
wish for an inanimate object to become animate comes true in reality or in fiction. In 
some sense, clones replace human beings‟ unactualized childhood fantasy of animated 
objects posing as their double.109 Clones are animate dolls in a sense. But, ironically, 
human beings feel anxiety or angst when they really encounter something revived 
after it was “lost” and was forgotten a long time ago.  
Paradoxically, just as human beings wish to live as permanent children,110 
clones do because they die before they get old. In this regard, Kathy narrates, “I‟m 
sure somewhere in your childhood, you too had an experience like ours that day; 
similar if not in the actual details, then inside, in the feelings” (Never 36). As she 
narrates, Kathy represents human beings‟ lost childhood. It is possible that the world 
outside Hailsham is a dystopia where children do not exist at all, given that all human 
characters in the novel are adults. Regardless, clones represent what has been 
forgotten and lost—the innocent childhoods of human beings. However, this 
similarity brings about das unheimlich (unfamiliarity, mystery)which is also heimlich 
(familiarity) because, by this comparison, the threshold of humanity and inhumanity 
                                                 
109 See Freud, “The Uncanny,” (141).  
110 Interestingly, Ishiguro in an interview points out how children are “almost worshipped as precious 
things and everything must be done for them” (Bigsby 17). 
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becomes blurred. Subsequently an uncanny mood reverberates throughout whole 
novel, raising existential questions about clones and human beings and the meaning 
of the epistemological, ontological truth itself; that is, are clones just false beings? 
Are they the incarnation of the uncanny dreams of human beings? If utopia hides 
dystopia and familiarity hides unfamiliarity, doesn‟t truth also hide untruth?  
From a philosophical perspective, Heidegger claims that the essence of truth 
for Being is freedom, and the mood or attunement for Being is uncanny angst, which 
sheds light on the obscure world of Never Let Me Go. Heidegger, in his “On the 
Essence of Truth,” says, “the openness of comportment as the inner condition of the 
possibility of correctness is grounded in freedom. The essence of truth is freedom” 
(123). Why freedom? Because the essence of freedom is “Letting-be” beings, which 
is etymologically linked with the term aletheia—truth in Greek—that also means 
disclosure (Heidegger, Basic Writings 125). For free beings, truth is the disclosure as 
what they are. However, “because truth is in essence freedom, historical man can, in 
letting beings be, also not let beings be the beings which they are and as they are. 
Then beings are covered up and distorted. Semblance comes to power. In it the 
nonessence of truth comes to the fore” (Heidegger, Basic Writings 127).  
What Heidegger claims is complex, but it is clear that historical man 
intervenes in the disclosure of the truth by concealing it under semblance or sham. 
More paradoxically, though unfamiliarity and mystery are the nonessence of truth, 
truth is not only the familiar whole of beings but also the unfamiliar mystery that 
“points to the still unexperienced domain of the truth of Being (not merely of beings)” 
(Heidegger, Basic Writings 131). Historical man is susceptible to untruth primordially 
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since he is erring and “astray in errancy” (Heidegger, Basic Writings 133), which 
suggests that this man is always on a journey to find the truth out of errancy. Only 
through this condition of errancy can Dasein be free to disclose the truth. The truth is 
not only epistemological but ontological enough to let beings be themselves. Men 
always try to understand the truth in the world in terms of correctness and are always 
subject to error, yet this errancy is paradoxically the chance for men to renew their 
standards.  
In the novel, Kathy and Tommy pursue the truth like detectives, but their 
journey for the truth starts from mystery and errancy. For example, Kathy doesn‟t 
understand when Tommy discloses to Kathy what he heard from Miss Lucy—the 
ontological truth that they are clones. However, recalling Tommy‟s revelation later, 
Kathy observes, “if these incidents now seem full of significance and all of a piece, 
it‟s probably because I‟m looking at them in the light of what came later—
particularly what happened that day at the pavilion...”(Never 79). What Kathy does, 
as the narrator, is also to recall her fragmentary memories and present a big picture of 
truth. Truth remains undisclosed until the epiphany of “letting beings be,” which in 
the novel means letting clones be clones themselves without being captivated under 
errancy and mystery, is manipulated by the organ-harvesting system.  
Notably, truth is to be concealed as soon as it is disclosed, and this is part of 
reason why the students cannot achieve the essence of truth—freedom. For example, 
when Miss Lucy discloses the truth, students did not react because they were afraid of 
being awakened from their utopian dream. Miss Lucy discloses: 
“The problem, as I see it, is that you‟ve been told and not 
told. You‟ve been told, but none of you really understand, 
 197 
and I dare say, some people are quite happy to leave it that 
way. None of you will go to America, none of you will be 
film stars….You were brought to this world for a purpose, 
and your futures, all of them, have been decided….If 
you‟re to have decent lives, you have to know how you 
are and what lies ahead of you, every one of you.” (Never 
81) 
  
Miss Lucy reveals the truth that all students‟ wishes for their future are shams and that 
the students are destined to donate organs and then to be terminated; nonetheless, the 
students endeavor to dismiss these truths. Rather, the students respond to Miss Lucy‟s 
appalling revelation listlessly and “were pretty relieved when she turned to look out 
over the playing field again” (Never 81). After the disclosure, among the students; 
“there was surprisingly little discussion about what she‟d said. If it did come up, 
people tended to say: “Well so what? We already knew all that.” (82). Why does Miss 
Lucy say that the students are “told and not told” the truth and why do the students 
pretend not to listen to the truth? Why do the students ironically say that they already 
knew the truth? In answer to these questions, Tommy explains later “[I] thought it 
possible the guardians had, throughout all years at Hailsham, timed very carefully and 
deliberately everything they told, so that we were always just too young to understand 
properly the latest piece of information. But of course we‟d take it in at same level, so 
that before long all this stuff was there in our heads, without us ever having examined 
it properly” (82).  
As Tommy speculates, the truth might have been distorted and manipulated 
too systematically and sophisticatedly for students to realize its signification. 
However, if what Kathy recalls is correct, students might have been afraid of the 
truth. The truth is like the glaring sun which everyone avoids looking at directly in 
 198 
fear of going blind, even though it gives freedom as a reward. Though the students 
dimly know that they are destined to be butchered for the sake of human beings, they 
do not commit suicide or resist the system, not only because they have been 
indoctrinated to the guardians‟ ideas, but also because they don‟t want to wake up 
from their mystified dreams and illusions. The students, including Kathy, decide to 
remain intoxicated to the utopian dream of the world where they become movie stars 
or supermarket workers, avoiding discovering the truth that all these dreams are false. 
The more they deny facing the truth, the less free they become, and the more students 
remain captivated under the power of untruth. However hard the clones try to live 
under untruthful illusions, the truth waits in the open to be disclosed at any moment.  
Another event of mystery and errancy make it possible for Kathy and Tommy 
to look for truth. This mystery stems from Kathy‟s uncanny encounter with Madame. 
One day, a young Kathy, alone in her dormitory, dances to the music while pretending 
to cradle an imaginary baby. Sensing the gaze of a person behind her, Kathy finds 
Madam standing outside in the hallway, watching her dancing. Kathy glimpses in 
Madame‟s eyes “something else, something extra in that look I couldn‟t fathom” (72). 
Confronted with this gaze, Kathy feels as though she is being scrutinized by 
omnipresent eyes that “can see right inside” (73). Kathy narrates: 
I froze in shock. Then within a second or two, I began to 
feel a new kind of alarm, because I could see there was 
something strange about the situation. The door was 
almost half open…but Madame hadn‟t nearly come up to 
the threshold. She was out in the corridor, standing very 
still, her head angled to one side to give her a view of 
what I was doing inside. And the odd thing was she was 
crying. (Never 71) 
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Kathy feels uncanny when she sees Madame crying in front of her. At this moment, 
Kathy feels that she wakes up from the dream and faces the truth. Also, Madame does 
not come across the threshold. The threshold signifies the thin line that separates two 
different worlds of two different kinds of beings. Crossing the threshold is dangerous 
and intimidating to both Madame and Kathy because crossing can compromise and 
eradicate the anthropological, ontological differences that make it possible for their 
two different worlds to exist at the same time and in the same space. The structure of 
the gaze between Madame and Kathy is interactive, not unilateral. In response to 
Madame‟s reaction, Kathy also feels an uncanny shudder against Madame and 
speculates on the reason for Madame‟s fear. Interestingly, in this exchange, each party 
sees something in the other‟s gaze. And, this interaction serves to “jerk [Kathy] out of 
[her] dream,”—the moment of (un)canny disillusionment which discloses the truth 
across the threshold between two different worlds. Madame‟s shudder and Kathy‟s 
feeling of strangeness happen simultaneously because of this moment of truth.  
However, the truth is prone to be veiled by limited knowledge. For example, 
when Kathy shares this occurrence with Tommy, he presents his version of truth; 
“Madame‟s probably not a bad person, even though she‟s creepy. So when she saw 
you dancing like that, holding your baby, she thought it was really tragic, how you 
couldn‟t have babies. That‟s why she started crying” (Never 73). Tommy assumes 
Madame felt sympathy for clones‟ infertility. But, when Kathy and Tommy visit 
Madame years later, Madame reveals her truth of what she felt: 
I saw something else. I saw a new world coming rapidly. More 
scientific, efficient, yes. More cures for the old sickness. Very 
good. But a harsh, cruel world. And I saw a little girl, her eyes 
tightly closed, holding to her breast the old kind world, one that 
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she knew in her heart could not remain, and she was holding it 
and pleading, never to let her go. (Never 272) 
 
Madame‟s elaboration of her truth resounds with Benjamin‟s understanding of 
Angelus Novus in “On the concept of History” (392). Benjamin allegorically 
interprets Klee‟s angel of history as resisting the wind from the past and looking to 
the past with eyes opened wide with sadness. Correspondingly, Madame envisions 
Kathy standing against an upcoming apocalypse with nostalgic affection for the 
former, kind world. In Madame‟s imagination, Kathy, like the angel of history, is 
forced to move from the lost paradise—Hailsham—into the future, though her own 
future is already destined. Madame speculates that Kathy, like Madame herself, must 
irresistibly detach herself from the fragmented memories of the past, while gazing at 
the heap of “lost” friends, love, childhood, etc. This is the truth of Madame‟s 
shudder—she shudders and feels uncanny when she encounters a clone dancing to 
nostalgic music because she envisions the future of the clones‟ world as more human 
than the world of human beings. Kathy is bound to misunderstand Madame‟s uncanny 
reaction because of the errancy in their relationship in the ontological representation 
system itself. Still, truth is uncanny and Kathy‟s misinterpretation furnishes a way to 
find the truth. As soon as Madame‟s secret is revealed, familiarity changes into 
unfamiliarity just as Benjamin‟s angel of history changes into a clone that is a 
futuristic, scientific being.  
In other words, Kathy is a non-human Dasein who can project herself into the 
future and death. Kathy is also a permanent child who, as an animate doll, encounters 
human beings as an incarnation of the lost wishes they once had. The paradox of the 
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uncanny mirrors the paradox of truth and untruth. Reflecting on the news that 
Hailsham is closed, Kathy recalls a foreboding incident: 
Then after a while a van pulled up, maybe thirty yards 
ahead of me, and a man got out dressed as a clown. He 
opened the back of the van and took out a bunch of helium 
balloons, about a dozen of them, and for a moment, he 
was holding the balloons, while he bent down and 
rummaged about in his vehicle with the other. As I came 
closer, I could see the balloons had faces and shaped ears, 
and they looked like a little tribe, bobbing in the air above 
their owner …So we just kept walking, the clown and me, 
on and on along the deserted pavement still wet from the 
morning, and all the time the balloons were bumping and 
grinning down at me. Every so often, I could see the 
man‟s fist, where all the balloon strings converged, and I 
could see he had them securely twisted together and in a 
tight grip. Even so, I kept worrying that one of the strings 
would come unraveled and a single balloon would sail off 
up into the cloudy sky. Lying awake that night… thought 
about Hailsham closing, and how it was like someone 
coming along with a pair of shears and snipping the 
balloon string just where they entwined above the man‟s 
fist. Once that happened, there‟d be no real sense in which 
those balloons belonged with each other anymore. (Never 
212-13) 
 
First and foremost, why does Kathy worry about a balloon? The meaning of this 
allegory is not obvious, but Kathy‟s nightmare thoughts suggest the balloons are 
clones whose lives are under the clown‟s control. As plastic bodies without organs, 
the balloons represent clones‟ bodies without organs. The balloons smile artificially 
and disappear once they deflate; likewise, the clones die after they are disemboweled. 
Hence, the balloons are interpreted as clones/objects without spiritual essence or 
organs, simulacra whose ontological foundation is merely to copy human faces. The 
clown may represent Hailsham or a bio-economic system that uses them for 
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commercial purposes. In this context, the parking lot is a Kafkaresque space in which 
utopian wishes turns into sick jokes.  
However, in this allegory, Kathy‟s position is paradoxical. Kathy emotionally 
sympathizes with the balloons in two ways. On the one hand, Kathy, sympathizes 
with “a” balloon, worrying if “one of the strings would come unraveled and a single 
balloon would sail off up into the cloudy sky”; she worries or feels anxiety over the 
situation in which only “one” balloon is set free. On the other hand, Kathy 
sympathizes with all balloons collectively, and worries that all the balloons remain in 
captivity without having a chance to be free. With such conflicting sympathies, Kathy 
reveals that she fears being the one free balloon left alone; thus, she hopes that the 
whole bio-economic system, including Hailsham, will not let her go free alone or die 
alone. On the other hand, she also wishes that she, together with all the other students, 
would be set free from captivity. In this regard, Kathy knows well that the time of her 
own existential choice is at hand. Death is set for her; thus, she knows that she has to 
make a resolution to die alone or live alone with all her friends gone. In other words, 
she has to choose between the two-fold wishes of “never let me go,” which hides 
paradoxical wish of “let them go” and “never let them go,” which hides the third 
meaning of “let me go.” The threefold allegory reveals that the truth for Kathy is 
paradoxical; Kathy can choose to become donor and die like the other friends for 
whom she has cared, or she can choose to live to see others dying. The paradox 
deepens because of paradox of freedom; Kathy can be free only to the extent that she 
chooses to die. In the end, Kathy chooses to die and become free to reveal the truth; 
her narrative is a testimony before she dies.  
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Heidegger explains this uncanny relation of freedom, truth, and resolution in 
his “What is metaphysics?” This short philosophical essay starts with questions about 
the relations between (human) beings and science. Heidegger, claiming that (modern) 
“Man—one being among others—“pursue science,” elaborates that, “What should be 
examined are beings only, and besides that—nothing; beings alones, and further—
nothing; solely beings, and beyond that—nothing” (Basic Writings 95). Heidegger‟s 
ontological questions start from “nothingness” which science cannot explain. 
Heidegger suggests that such fundamental moods, such as boredom or angst, irrupt 
because of this nothingness and whole of beings in indistinguishability (Basic 
Writings 101). “It” which makes a person feel uncanny is nothing‟s world. While 
nothing hides every being under it, things “turn toward” human beings; in this 
existential event, Dasein, as an errant being that lost his or her home, faces 
nothingness and reveals the truth. 
This idea of the uncanny anxiety of Dasein in terms of nothing clarifies the 
stakes of the allegory of the clown and the balloon. More or less, if the clown lets the 
balloons go, they will hover free in the air as pure Dasein. This is the authentic way 
Dasein achieves its freedom; freedom originates from disclosing the truth that “Being 
itself is essentially finite and reveals itself only in the transcendence of Dasein which 
is held out into the nothing” (Basic Writings 108). Truth, at the first glance, though 
painful to accept and causing anxiety, is uncanny and makes it possible for a being to 
be free. Kathy sympathizes with the free balloons, and then feels anxiety about the 
possibility that she will be left alone. Kathy does not have a home or the origin of her 
childhood memories. In the allegory, clones are entangled under the control of the 
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clown where they “linger in tranquillized familiarity” enchanted by shams, running 
away from their ontological situation of “not-being-at-home,” ignoring the uncanny 
situation (Being and Time 177). However, though artificially “grinning down at” 
Kathy, the balloons secretly wish to be set free and remain in the uncanny 
nothingness in the air. Now, it is time to be disentangled from the clown‟s grip and to 
be set free to hover in the air facing nothingness—namely, death and truth. Therefore, 
Kathy realizes that she also “might now have to act on pretty soon or else let them go 
forever” (Never 213). Kathy ultimately decides to accept becoming existentially alone 
by accepting the scheduled death in order to be free.  
At the second glance, another irony intervenes into this authentic, existential 
resolution because Kathy is a product of science—namely, a scientific creature 
without an ontological foundation of existentiality or any possibility of becoming 
Dasein, technically speaking. In this paradoxical context, all the questions that 
Heidegger asks of uncanniness and nothingness reveal the truth of the scientific 
existential meaning of non-human Dasein. Heidegger concludes his article by 
reflecting on the first question he asked about scientific existence and emphasizes the 
need for the metaphysical study of Being, nothing, and truth.111 This claim gains an 
uncanny mood when it is applied to the clone‟s world, because clones, which exist on 
the same level as animals and soulless objects in the Heideggerian world, cannot “be” 
Dasein since they have different world, and are not authentic beings. Both Kathy‟s 
existential decision to become a donor and Tommy‟s quest for the truth are 
meaningless in the Heideggerian world. It is because they are beings without an 
                                                 
111 Heidegger claims, “The presumed soberness of mind and superiority of science become laughable 
when it does not take the nothing seriously…Only because the nothing is manifest can science make 
beings themselves objects of investigation.” (Basic Writings 109) 
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origin/original. Undeniably, clones are the “scientific existence” par excellence. They 
are, at best, just commercial products or copies without original. This paradox 
deconstructs the hidden contradiction between original and copy that has been 
prevalent from the beginning of Western metaphysics, Plato‟s hierarchization of 
Being, copy, and simulacra. 
 
The Original and the Simulacra 
Never Let Me Go parodies the allegorical parable in the Republic: Hailsham 
is Plato‟s cave where prisoners are chained so that they cannot see the truths outside 
of the cave but are instead forced to accustom their eyes and ears to see and hear only 
images and words, namely simulacra, from the shadows within the cave. For instance, 
when the students moved to the Cottages after graduating from Hailsham, they went 
through adolescence pretending that they were normal human beings by doing what 
they learned by TV programs. Kathy narrates how the veterans there imitated what 
they observed human actors doing on TV: “I began to notice all kinds of other things 
the veteran couples had taken from TV programs: the way they gestured to each other, 
sat together on sofas, even the way they argued and stormed out of rooms” (Never 
121). Obviously, the students have no access to any information about what human 
adolescents are doing in the real human world except through media.  
Like the prisoners in the Republic who believe that the shadows on the wall 
are real, the images and stories on TV become reality and set guidelines for students‟ 
behaviors. Kathy points out how they are just mimicking shadowy images by 
claiming, “Anyway that‟s not how it works in real families. You don‟t know anything 
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about it” (124). Ruth, like other prisoners in the parable, does not want to open her 
eyes wide and denies Kathy‟s claim. However, the students are not just looking at the 
shadowy images like prisoners in Plato‟s cave but they are also as shadowy beings, 
simulacra themselves; clones live “back in the shadow” (265). In Plato‟s hierarchical 
system of representation of originals and copies, there are differences between copies 
and copies of copies that are bad copies or bad pretenders because they are too far 
distanced from the original essence. Plato calls the bad copies simulacra; they do not 
have an ontological foundation since they badly pretend to be good and beautiful.112 
Simulacra are ephemeral, false, and immoral. This is related to the students‟ mixed 
feeling about their “original” or “possibles” 
The students refer to their gene-parents as “possibles”; and Kathy relates, 
“when you saw the person you were copied from, you‟d get some insight into who 
you were deep down, and maybe too, you‟d see something of what your life held in 
store” (Never 140). The students, including Kathy, cannot help but be curious about 
their gene-parents just like orphans who wonder about the identity of their true 
parents. During a discussion with other students about their “possibles”, Kathy 
explains, “since each of us was copied at some point form a normal person, there 
must be, for each of us, somewhere out there, a model getting on with his or her life” 
(139). The students regarded these possibles as the normal models, and themselves 
implicitly as copies from these originals. Hearing a veteran‟s rumor that Ruth‟s 
possible looks exactly like her and exists in Norfolk, Kathy, Ruth, and Tommy 
                                                 
112 In Plato‟s philosophical sphere, “ it is superior identity of the Idea which found the good pretension 
of the copies, as it bases it on an internal or derived resemblance …[simulacra] pretend to 
underhandedly, under cover of an aggression, an insinuation, a subversion, “against the father, and 
without passing through the Idea” (Deleuze, Difference 257). 
 207 
accompany veterans to Norfolk to look for Ruth‟s possible. There they find a woman 
who looks like Ruth‟s double working in an office. The possible seems to come 
straight out of Ruth‟s dream in which she is working as an office clerk; thus, Ruth 
gets really enthusiastic about what they have found. But, “the more [the students] 
heard her and looked at her, the less she seemed like Ruth” (163); in fact, eventually 
they realize that the office woman was not Ruth‟s possible. Feeling depressed and 
abject, Ruth deplores, “We‟re modeled from trash. Junkies, prostitutes, winos, 
tramps. Convicts, maybe, just so long as they aren‟t psychos. That‟s what we come 
from. We all know it, so why don‟t we say it? A woman like that? Come on…If you 
want to look for possible, if you want to do it properly, then you look in the gutter. 
You look in rubbish bins. Look down the toilet, that‟s where you‟ll find where we all 
came from” (166). According to Plato‟s representational system of ideals and copies, 
though clones “exist” as simulacra, they do not “exist” as beings with essence in the 
world of human beings. As Ruth claims, the students might be bad copies of the 
unprivileged social minority; and, they might be non-existent habitants in the world 
of simulacra. Besides, as Britzman asserts, this conversion of simulacra and the 
originals corresponds with the untimely space of Hailsham because the students 
believe that their gene-parents determine the future of their lives (316).  
Ruth‟s claim casts ontological questions about the raison d’être of clones, 
specifically the relation between original and copy. In accordance with Ruth‟s 
hypothesis, the clones are rubbish entities in the ontological hierarchy since they are 
bad copies of bad models. Maybe, their memories and existential meanings lie in 
heaps of junk. Even that which constitutes their identities and memories is regarded 
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as rubbish. For example, when Ruth arrives at the Cottage, she decides to throw away 
her collection because she finds out that the veterans do not have their own 
collections any more. When Ruth throws her items in a bin bag, she “couldn‟t stand 
the idea of putting them out with rubbish.” So, Ruth asks old Keffers, who is a human 
groundkeeper of the Cottage, to take the bag to a charity shop instead. But, later Ruth 
says that those items should be in “some bin somewhere” (Never 131). Ruth‟s 
collection symbolizes her precious memories and even her body without organs; by 
extension, Ruth‟s body and memories are on the same level as rubbish.  
On the contrary, Kathy argues that models of simulacra do not exist. Kathy 
disagrees with the idea of possibles as their models because “Our models were an 
irrelevance, a technical necessity for bringing us into the world, nothing more than 
that” (Never 140). Kathy fundamentally challenges Plato‟s ontological hierarchy and 
poses an anti-Platonic ontology some postmodern philosophers have proposed. For 
example, according to Gilles Deleuze or Jean Baudrillard, the non-existence and non-
ontological-foundation makes it possible for simulacra to have subversive power. 
Deleuze especially argues against Plato‟s ontological hierarchy of Ideal, good copy 
and bad copy (simulacra), saying that “the copy of the copy, cut off from reference to 
a model, puts into a question about the model-copy system as a whole, and confronts 
it with a world of pure simulacrum” (Roffe 241). Deleuze claims that Plato‟s 
ontological hierarchy is founded on a representation system that determines the worth 
of something by how similar or the same it is as the Idea; but, the simulacra do not 
have any reference to the world or the model; rather, they constitute the reality.113 For 
                                                 
113 Deleuze interprets that the models or Ideas do not exist but only simulacra come up to the surface to 
form identities of beings. In the same vein, emphasizing power of simulacra to subvert the Plato‟s 
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this reason, Deleuze posits that simulacrum has potentiality enough to subvert Plato‟s 
ontological hierarchy, not only because it cannot be reconciled by the categories of 
the same or the similar which inevitably downgrade simulacra to rubbish, but also 
because it is based on the world of Others. Without similarity to the model or 
originals, existing only within the world of Other, simulacra escape from Plato‟s 
ontological hierarchy and remain free. Ruth‟s idea of bad copies of bad models, 
which represents Plato‟s ontological system, contrasts with Kathy‟s arguments that 
the students are clones without any relation to the originals; that is, no student can 
find his or her original in the world. Kathy and other students acknowledge that in the 
world of simulacra without models, “it was up to each of us to make of our lives what 
we could” (140). Ironically, the most primordial being is someone who is at the 
lowest position in the ontological hierarchy.  
Correspondingly, Tommy also says: “I don‟t see how it matters. Even if you 
found your possible, the actual model they got you from. Even then, I don‟t see what 
difference it makes to anything.” (Never 165). Nothing matters since they are 
simulacra in the world of simulacra. Thus, if they can be free from the idea of model 
or original within the Plato‟s representation system, clones will be free entities—like 
balloons in the air set free from any representational system or ontological hierarchy. 
Only by reaching this condition can the clones get out of their nostalgic wish and 
wake up from their dreams. The subversion of the Platonic ontological hierarchy is 
significant in the actual world as well because it reflects the contemporary world 
                                                                                                                                           
ontological system, Deleuze claims, “The simulacrum is built upon a disparity or upon difference. It 
internalizes a dissimilarity. This is why we can no longer define it in relation to a model imposed on 
the copies, a model of the Same from which the copies‟ resemblance derives. If the simulacrum still 
has a model, it is another model, a model of the Other (l’Autre) from which there flows an internalized 
dissemblance” (Difference 258).  
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where Others are regarded as non-humans or inhuman beings, such as prisoners in 
concentration camps or clinically-defined vegetables on life support. However, the 
clown, a system, holds the strings and prevents the students being set free. Systems in 
which Hailsham exists and Madame and Miss Emily manipulate the students‟ 
memories, wishes, and ideas sustain Plato‟s ontological hierarchy in terms of 
humanity.  
All in all, clones, in accordance to this ontological hierarchy, are things 
without origin/originals—ontologically homeless beings. Their thingness itself is 
uncanny since it emerges in “nothing.” With the standard slipping away, the clones—
balloons—will hover free in nothing. But, this freedom does not guarantee happiness 
to Kathy and the students because it leaves them alone to face nothingness, in other 
words death. Kathy‟s decision reveals the truth of the world where the 
anthropological machine operates. The truth is not only in Kathy‟s wish of “Never Let 
Me Go” as the dilemma of truth and untruth as well as freedom and captivity. Broader 
social truth of an anthropological machine that embeds colonialism and imperialism 
is the second level of this chapter.  
 
Anthropological Machine and Apparatus of Clone-cide 
Post-graduation, Kathy and Tommy seek out Miss Emily and Madame at a 
Victorian house to ascertain the truth of rumors that clone couples may secure a 
deferral. If their artwork proves that they are a true love match, they may postpone 
their donations. Here, Kathy and Tommy discover another side of the truth. Miss 
Emily reveals that their education, including art education that has been to prove the 
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clones‟ humanity, a similar premise of colonial education apparatuses. When Kathy 
and Tommy state their desire for a deferral, Madame calls them “poor creatures,” and 
explains that she has no power to grant it. Outraged at her hypocritical answer, 
Tommy cries out, “Why did we do all of that work in the first place? Why train us, 
encourage us, make us produce all of that? If we‟re just going to give donations 
anyway, then die, why all those lessons? Why all those books and discussions?” 
(Never 259).  
 In response, Miss Emily reveals a partial history of Hailsham and her 
initiative of a pseudo-humanitarian movement. The clone business started in the early 
fifties when “there wasn‟t time to take stock, to ask the sensible questions because it 
provided new possibilities…to cure so many previously incurable conditions” (Never 
262). At that time, “people preferred to believe these organs appeared from nowhere, 
or at most that they grew in a kind of a vacuum” (262). For the clones‟ sake, Miss 
Emily and Madame endeavored to change the idea that clones are less human than 
human beings. Miss Emily adds, “Hailsham was considered a shining beacon, an 
example of how we might move to a more humane and better way of doing things” 
(258). They built Hailsham and other camp systems under the camouflage of 
educational facilities not only to prove that these creatures had the capability to learn 
and possess souls, but also to find a way to harvest organs from clones in a more 
humane way than previously. Miss Emily and Madame were leaders of this clone-
tarian movement.  
Yet Miss Emily also confesses that she was afraid of the students: “We‟re all 
afraid of you. I myself had to fight back my dread of you all almost every day I was at 
 212 
Hailsham…But I was determined not to let such feelings stop me doing what was 
right. I fought those feelings and I won” (Never 269). Interestingly, in her confession, 
such emotional reactions as pity and knowledge contradict each other; though Miss 
Emily has tried to suppress her dread and fear of the clones in order to prove her idea 
of clones as beings with souls, she could not suppress uncanny feeling in response to 
these living dolls. Miss Emily represents the radical idealistic demagogue/intellectual 
who tries to disregard the hypocrisy that is latent in her movements in history. For 
example, a young Kathy recalls witnessing Miss Emily, in a classroom alone, “pacing 
slowly, talking under her breath, pointing and directing remarks to an invisible 
audience in the room” (45). Though Miss Emily recognizes that Kathy is gazing at 
her, she naturally “turned away to fix her gaze on some other imaginary student in 
another part of the room” (45). Miss Emily‟s gaze reveals the truth of her world. In 
Miss Emily‟s world, the clones are non-existents; they are primordially invisible. 
Miss Emily only idealizes clones as an uncivilized tribe that is supposed to need the 
humanitarian help and education to prove their souls. Miss Emily‟s blank eyes in 
response to Kathy standing before her reveal that she does not have any interest in 
actual clones‟ lives; at best, she has just tried to prove that her idea is right. In 
Heidegger‟s scheme discussed earlier, she is the scientific modern man who 
perpetrates errancy via her reason and science.  
Indeed, Miss Emily is a prototype of an anthropologist who treats real clones 
not as live beings but as a control group for her experiment. Miss Emily‟s idealistic 
stance reflects the modern discourses of the humanities and social sciences, especially 
modern anthropology. Humanities and social science have tried to differentiate 
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themselves as more ethical than the hard sciences such as biology or physics. 
Nonetheless, soft sciences have been complicit with the hard sciences for political 
purposes, as the case of eugenics during the early twentieth century illustrates.  
However, given the more miserable conditions in which the clones were 
situated before Hailsham opened, has not Miss Emily‟s project at least been helpful to 
the students? According to Madame and Miss Emily, clones from Hailsham were in a 
much happier situation than other clones in the world. The students in Hailsham are 
just a control group for the social experiment that represents other clones in the 
world. Miss Emily, after her project turns out to be a failure and the schools she had 
run closed, defends her initial intentions by saying that “we challenged the entire way 
the donations program was being run. Most importantly, we demonstrated to the 
world that if students were reared in humane, cultivated environments, it as possible 
from them to grow to be a sensitive and intelligent as any ordinary human being” 
(Never 260). Miss Emily‟s ideas reflect and therefore challenge the modern idea of 
education as a system that aims to enlighten insensitive and unintelligent bare lives to 
make them civilized, sensible beings.  
Besides, Miss Emily and Madame have been part of the anthropological 
machine that works to discern the human from inhuman. Though the students‟ 
situation is better than that of the other clones, they are deprived of a chance to resist 
the system. Form an ethical standpoint, Miss Emily‟s project was bound to fail from 
the first because she tried to prove the existence of the clones‟ soul not to free them 
but to use them. In applying to the clones criteria that have been used to determine 
who possesses humanity, they could not avoid failure. Miss Emily and Madame, with 
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or without intention, have inhibited the clones from discovering the truth of the 
system; their knowledge is complicit in the power generated by operating the 
anthropological machine. If Miss Emily and Madame tried to convince people of 
clones‟ humanity, they disprove that clone essence is similar to the essence of 
humanity, as I argued before. All these propositions are shams if the quality of 
humanity cannot be determined by the presence of a soul. Maybe, one‟s will and 
material conditions determine the essence of humanity and the arts. 
Finally, Miss Emily acknowledges this paradox and reluctantly admits, “We 
were virtually attempting to square the circle. Here was the world, requiring students 
to donate. While that remained the case, there would always be a barrier against 
seeing you as properly human” (Never 263). Regardless of their initial intentions, the 
“humanitarian” guardians run Hailsham as a way of isolating those unnatural 
creatures from human world. In the outside world, visible and invisible fences were 
built around clones to protect not only clones but also human beings. Inclusion is at 
the same time exclusion in that clones are excluded from human society while 
becoming obsessive about living together with other clones; thus, clones never let 
other clones go. The system has kept the collectivity of clones by incarcerating them 
in enclaves to prevent collective revolts against human society. The anthropological 
machine teaches clones to learn to not demand that they be treated equally as human 
beings. They are educated to accept that they are essentially different from human 
beings and to resign themselves to their fates.  
In this sense, the idea of the fair treatment of clones is just an ideology for 
maintaining inhuman operations. By and large, the Hailsham guardians have never 
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been managers of the system or revolutionaries; they are at best gatekeepers rather 
than lords of the castle. Thus, Tommy was right when he said, “[t]here‟s probably 
people higher up than [Madame], people who never set foot in Hailhsam” (Never 
177). This relation between knowledge and power creates the discourse used to justify 
various oppressions of minorities throughout history. With help of such 
activists/scientists, colonizers collected artworks and cultural products from the native 
tribes, and then they held exhibitions to show that these bare lives are not animals. 
Missionaries and anthropologists tried to prove that people of “exotic cultures” 
needed civilization, without which their bare lives could not attain their humanity. 
Though Miss Emily claims that her project is innocent and ethical because she and 
her colleagues tried to save those unnatural beings from “existing only to supply 
medical science” or as “shadowy objects in test tubes” (Never 261), it is questionable 
whether there is much difference between Miss Emily‟s project and systems before 
and after her movement. From the beginning, clones have been guinea pigs in the test 
tube under the utopian excuse of a humanitarian project.  
 Yet, there is a moral lesson in this, so to speak, as Miss Emily explains the 
public‟s support and attention for Hailsham was “swept away” because of the 
Morningsdale scandal. A typical crazy scientist, Morningsdale, “offer[ed] people the 
possibility of having children with enhanced characteristics… [he]‟d taken his 
research much further than anyone before him, far beyond legal boundary” (Never 
264-5). The idea that “a generation of created children who‟d take [people‟s] place in 
society…[c]hildren demonstrably superior to the rest of [human beings]” (265) scared 
people, who feared the eradication of difference between inhuman clones and 
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humans. If clones were able to reproduce, the anthropological machine that operates 
to differentiate human from inhuman grinds to a halt. Though educating the 
colonized, slave, and lower classes in actual history, the colonizers, slaveholders, and 
elites never believed that those inhuman animals could be better than themselves. 
These beliefs came, however, not so much from the belief in the colonists‟ own 
superiority as from a fear of similarity. In this regard, eugenics scientifically disguised 
the fear that minorities might assume the power the social majority possessed. The 
seemingly unreasonable, inhuman idea of ethnic cleansing originates from the 
reasonable fear that those inhuman beings might have humanity.  
 Analogously, after Hailsham closes down, a more brutal future than Miss 
Emily claims awaits the clones. The anthropological machine now deprives the clones 
of even utopian fantasy. But as we have seen in the allegory of clown and balloon, it 
is also possible that the future will open better chances of change. Given the allegory 
of Plato‟s cave, the closedown of Hailsham destroys the cave. The clones “escape,” 
opening two future possibilities—they go blind like the long incarcerated in Plato‟s 
cave or they find ways to resist the system. Modern humanitarian projects prove that 
ideological fantasy gives way to revelations which offers the potential for revolutions 
and changes. As Miss Lucy claimed, clones need to face the truth for better, freer 
futures. When Tommy protests with this issue, Madame admits: “Yes, in many ways 
we fooled you…but we sheltered you during those years, and we gave you your 
childhoods…knowing what lay in store for each of you…You would have told us it 
was all pointless, and how could we have argued with you” (Never 268). Madame 
cannot let go the idea that they gave the clones decent lives and the chance to become 
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human even temporarily. But clones might not need to be limited to humanity. Clones 
have a chance to build their own community with different ideas. The pedagogical 
ideals of Madame and Miss Emily are to enchant the students with the ideological 
fantasy of utopian self-development rather than to let them face the truth. As Miss 
Lucy claims, what intellectuals and activists had to do is to demystify the students‟ 
fantasies, let open their eyes to the truth, and let them be free.  
Significantly, Kathy and Tommy realize that their privileged selection 
concealed elsewhere those “students being reared in deplorable conditions, 
conditions…Hailsham students could hardly imagine…living in “vast government 
„homes,‟ which if a clone saw, he or she will not sleep for days” (Never 261, 265). 
There are real Others in the world that the Hailsham students cannot represent, those 
Other clones raised and butchered like animals more brutally. The muted voices of 
real Others underlie the voices of students.  
 Kathy and the other students could not let their memories and friends go since 
they were “fearful of the world around” (Never 120) them. To be outside Hailsham 
means to awaken to the fearful nightmare where real Others, real Agamben‟s 
Muselmanns, are dying and bearing witness. Only when they lie on their deathbed do 
they face the truth. Nonetheless, while Kathy and other students survive long enough 
to testify, the true Others who bear witness to the systematic clone-cides under the 
juridical authority of the State die without the chance to tell their stories. After 
hearing Madame and Miss Emily‟s stories, Tommy, dejected and disappointed, reverts 
into the young Tommy who used to go into fits of frenzy, who could not “speak” 
coherently. On a field, Tommy was “raging, shouting, flinging his fists and kicking 
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out” (274) because his last hope, that of a deferral for himself and Kathy, has 
vanished. Yet, Kathy, observing a calmed Tommy, says, “I was thinking…about back 
then, at Hailsham, when you used to go bonkers like that, and we couldn‟t understand 
it…I was thinking maybe the reason you used to get like that was because at some 
level you always knew” (275). Tommy admits, “Maybe I did know, somewhere deep 
down. Something the rest of you didn‟t” (275). Tommy, who expresses his anger and 
tries to peer into the truth, is the only one who veritably knows the truth, and this 
reflects that he is a true artist who reveals another dimension of truth related to art.  
 
Poiesis and Tommy as a Clone-artist in Clone’s World 
Tommy dies as a tragic hero who ends up finding truth but has to face his 
destined death nonetheless. Primordially, he has been a clone-doll but, ironically, he is 
also the artist. Tommy recalls Pygmalion who fell in love with what he created—an 
animated doll. His drawings present the answer for the last but the most abysmal 
questions in the novel—why does Tommy draw imaginary animals with mechanical 
organs and what is the signification of this artwork? Why does Ishiguro present artists 
and artwork continually in the novel? What is the truth of art education for the 
clones? More curiously, what is meaning of creation, original, and copies as 
simulacra, in terms of art and what does art critique? These questions also lead to 
meta-fictional question of why Ishiguro write this novel. Tommy is an artist-persona 
Ishiguro in the other novels deliberately creates to represent his own perspective of 
the contemporary roles and relations of art, artwork and artist. 
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Never Let Me Go parodies of Plato‟s utopia in light of not only ontology but 
also art. In Plato‟s world, art is perilous in his utopian republic in that art can 
perpetrate untruth and immorality. Agamben argues that beneath Plato‟s lies anxiety 
because “the power of art over the soul seemed to him so great that he thought it 
could by itself destroy the very foundations of his city.” Thus, for Plato, art has the 
uncanny power of destruction and the creation of new unnatural beings. And this 
relates to the guardians‟ mysteriously uncanny reaction to Tommy‟s artwork. In 
Hailsham, the students are evaluated by “how good you were at „creating‟” (Never 
16). Creativity is the barometer of humanity in Hailsham. On the contrary, what 
guardians taught was not how to be creative but how to follow the instructions and 
produce artwork according to standard. Only Tommy resists the standards and truly 
“creates” what he really feels, which leads guardians to reproach his uncreative 
activity and his classmates to bully him. The Guardians get mad because they think 
that Tommy intentionally tries to downgrade his capability for painting; from their 
perspective, Tommy produces “work that seemed deliberately childish, work that said 
he couldn‟t care less” (Never 20). His intentional distortion makes it possible for him 
to cross the line of humanity set by the anthropological machine. He is even treated 
like a naughty animal-being. Even Miss Lucy, who at first attempts to appease 
Tommy by dismissing the ultimate value of creativity later admits that creativity 
matters: “Listen, Tommy, your art, it is important. And not just because it‟s evidence. 
But for your own sake. You‟ll get a lot from it, just for yourself.” (108). What Miss 
Lucy asserts goes beyond the idea that art proves one‟s humanity and soul, but why 
does Miss Lucy then say that art means more than evidence for Tommy?  
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This question relates to the paradox of the truth and untruth of the Gallery. 
From the beginning, the Gallery has been veiled under mystery and what Heidegger 
calls errancy among the students. However, no one except Tommy asks the questions, 
“What is this gallery? Why should she have a gallery of things done by [the 
students]?” (Never 30). About the whole mystery, later, Tommy presents a theory to 
explain the signification of the gallery, “We never got to the bottom of it, what the 
Gallery was for. Why Madame took away all the best work. But now I think I 
know…. [Miss Lucy] said they revealed what you were like inside. She said they 
revealed your soul” (174-5). And, Tommy claims that artwork functions as evidence 
for Madame to determine “what‟s a good match and what‟s just a stupid crush” (176) 
for clone couples.  
Tommy‟s explanation almost hits the target but something remain amiss—the 
gallery is not for collecting evidence to prove the existence of the soul and compatible 
love but only the soul. Artwork functions to prove non-human beings can have human 
souls in their unnatural bodies. Madame wonders if “art bares the soul of the artist” 
(Never 254). In other words, does art disclose the truth of a being‟s essence whether 
the agents of creation of artworks are human beings or non-human beings? This 
question relates to the question of the origin of art. Heidegger asks this question 
through the phenomenological reduction of three agents—art, artist, and artwork. 
Circling these three agents in art, Heidegger discloses that the origin of the artist and 
artwork is art. According to Heidegger, the truth of artwork does not dwell in 
exhibitions or museums, but in setting up a world (“The Origin” 43).  
 221 
But the Gallery is not the place where work can set up a world since it does 
not “open the Open of the world” (“The Origin” 44). Scientific understanding via 
reason cannot disclose the truth of art since the earth that brings forth and brings back 
artwork should “remain undisclosed and unexplained” (“The Origin” 45). The strife 
between these two forces, which constitutes art, is not possible in the artwork placed 
in an exhibition or a gallery since art does not have its origin in spectators‟ aesthetic 
judgment. The gallery is a space for spectator‟s enjoyment, not for artist‟s creation. 
According to Agamben, aesthetical judgments based on Kant‟s paradoxical theses of 
subjective aesthetic judgment114gives art away from the artists‟ power of creation to 
the problematic judgment of spectators. In this sense, the gallery becomes a place for 
the spectator, a “fully” human one such as Madame who is presumed to have the taste 
to appreciate art.  
The spectators who visit Madame‟s gallery might have appreciated clones‟ 
artwork not to appreciate the art in those pieces but to relieve them of their guilt of 
using clones for their organs by hypocritically praising the works of art, marveling at 
how much those unnatural creatures have been enlightened, thereby proving the 
power of education for animal-beings. Thus, in the world of gallery and spectators, art 
is forced to go through a radical separation between no-longer-being and not-yet-
being. On the one hand, in the gallery, the artwork is deprived of its original power, 
trapped in the past, and, on the other hand, the gallery is a space devoid of potentiality 
                                                 
114 Opposing an artwork as imitation, Kant in The Critique of Judgment emphasizes the spectator‟s 
aesthetic judgment and tries to show that the beautiful is not even concerned with whether the object of 
an artwork exists or not. He claims, “now when the question is if a thing is beautiful, we do not want to 
know whether anything depends or can depend on the existence of the thing, either for myself or for 
anyone else, but how we judge it by mere observation (intuition or reflection)” (47). And he also said 
that “we easily see that, in saying it is beautiful and in showing that I have taste, I am concerned, not 
with that in which I depend on the existence of the object, but with that which I make out of this 
representation in myself”(47; emphasis in the original).  
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for future creation. For example, artwork extorted from African people in the 
eighteenth century and displayed in New York‟s Metropolitan Museum no longer has 
its world and origin. The clones‟ artwork does not have its world but is placed in the 
human spectators‟ world where artwork exists merely for collecting more money to 
run Hailsham. 
On the surface level, Madame never collected Tommy‟s artwork because it 
was regarded as rubbish. Deeply seen, only Tommy is able to produce real artwork in 
his clone world. Human beings are not able to accept Tommy‟s artworks because they 
exist outside of their perception and appreciation in accordance with the spectator‟s 
aesthetic judgment. Madame cannot display Tommy‟s artwork in the gallery because 
Tommy‟s artwork reveals the violent truth of his world and himself. And, this is also 
the reason why only Tommy can disclose the truth of their beings and world. While 
other students just depict the world of human beings following the standards 
established by the anthropological machine, Tommy discloses his own world by 
presenting the essence of truth—the creation of his own world and his freedom. As a 
spectator, Kathy cannot fully appreciate Tommy‟s animals: “What I was looking at 
was so different from anything the guardians had taught us to do at Hailsham, I didn‟t 
know how to judge it” (Never 187). Kathy cannot judge Tommy‟s drawings because 
she does not have capability for judgment insofar as the drawings are out of the realm 
of judgment because they present something that cannot be represented and 
appreciated by spectators.  
Though misunderstood and undermined by everyone else, Tommy‟s artworks 
contain truth and are signifiers of freedom. Tommy‟s drawings or sketches consist of 
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descriptions of animals, his first portraying an elephant in the grass. If Tommy is an 
animal-being, the truth is hidden under the veil of the background of the drawing. The 
elephant signifies Tommy himself who is situated in grass that symbolizes the 
mysteries that hide truth. Indeed, Tommy, like an animal, cannot escape from 
captivity in the human beings‟ world. He does not try to escape but devotes himself to 
artistic creation instead. Tommy is an animal-clone-artist. This analogy between the 
animal and Tommy makes his imagined animals more problematic in the context of 
the meaning of art itself. Showing his sketches of imaginary animals which were 
inspired by an old children‟s book, he elaborates: 
The thing is, I‟m doing them really small. Tiny. I‟d never 
thought of that at Hailsham. I think maybe that‟s where I 
went wrong. If you make them tiny, and you had to 
because the pages are only about this big, then everything 
changes. It‟s like they come to life by themselves. Then 
you have to draw in all these different details for them. 
You have to think about how they‟d protect themselves, 
how they‟d reach things. (Never 178) 
 
According to Tommy‟s interpretation, the animals have to be tiny because the world 
these animals are dwelling in is not big enough for these imaginary animals to be 
animated and live free. In other words, the animals have to be tiny because the world 
in which they are dwelling is too big, which also means that beings are not just beings 
but beings-in-the-their world, which means that those beings are captivated in their 
world. The imaginary animals refer to clones in the world. However, in whose world 
do these imaginary animals and clones dwell—the world of clones or the world of 
human beings or the world of art? Why does Tommy say that bringing these beings to 
life does not make sense in reality?  
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 Agamben‟s critical work on aesthetics, The Man without Content, insightfully 
contributes to this discussion. Broadly speaking, Agamben‟s aesthetics aims to 
destruct (or deconstruct) the foundation of aesthetics. Simply stated, Agamben 
destroys aesthetics because it renders contemporary people dissociate from the 
transmissibility of the original meaning of art, namely poiesis. Discussing the Greek 
meaning of pro-duction, Agamben regards poiesis (ποίησις) as the origin of art. 
Poiesis, as Heidegger also points out in his writings, means bringing into being115 and 
disclosing truth (ἀ-λήθεια).  In accordance with Heidegger‟s arguments, Agamben 
concurs that the ancient meaning of producing artwork is to bring forth truth or 
disclose the truth. However, contemporary people have lost this meaning, which 
leaves contemporary artists producing or creating artwork in terms of praxis as 
practice, forgetting the energy of poiesis. But, Agamben‟s position does not dismiss 
the signification and difference of contemporary art but forces readers to consider a 
new understanding of modern, contemporary art in terms of reproducibility, and 
paves a new way out of the tradition or origin, even though his mood is 
melancholy.116 All Agamben‟s arguments begin from Plato‟s antagonism towards art. 
In a sense, what Tommy wishes is to actualize this forgotten power of art 
which makes it possible for him to unveil truth and create artworks to bring forth 
                                                 
115 “The Greeks, to whom we owe all the categories through which we judge ourselves and the reality 
around us, made a clear distinction between poiesis (poiein,“to pro-duce in the sense of bringing into 
being”) and praxis (prattein, “to do” in the sense of acting). As we shall see, central to praxis was the 
idea of the will that finds its immediate expression in an act, while, by contrast, central to poiesis was 
the experience of pro-duction into presence, the fact that something passed from non-being to being, 
from concealment into the full light of the work. The essential character of poiesis was not its aspect as 
a practical and voluntary process but its being a mode of truth understood as unveiling, ἀ-λήθεια” 
(Man without 68).  
116 Toker and Chertoff point out that readers‟ sympathy with clones generates melancholy of the 
reader‟s self-reflection on his or her life—namely, “the melancholy of the brevity of ordinary life, its 
transience, the transience of the truest of true love, and the inevitable transformation that recycle 
another classical topos—that of the three ages of man: leaner, „carer,‟ case” (178). 
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beings on canvas.
117
 The animation of imaginary animals is uncanny since it is 
mysteriously untruthful as well as truthful. Truth as an ontological and aesthetic event 
happens in creation; it brings forth a being from imagination into presence. As a true 
artist, Tommy discloses the truth of his world and his own being as an animated doll 
that is a copy of a human being. The imaginary animals do not represent Tommy or 
the clones, though; they do not “re” present to mimic the original because there is no 
original in the world of simulacra. Imaginary animals are just beings in the world 
Tommy has created. They have the power to disclose the truth; the grotesque 
appearance of the imaginary animals discloses the grotesque truth of the world where 
human beings exploit inhuman beings (animals, savages or clones). More 
interestingly, the animals have mechanical organs. Kathy appreciates Tommy‟s 
drawing and narrates; “In fact, it took a moment to see they were animals at all. The 
first impression was like one you‟d get if you took the back off a radio set: tiny 
canals, weaving tendons, miniature screws and wheels were all drawn with obsessive 
precision, and only when you held the page away could you see it was some kind of 
armadillo, say, or a bird” (Never 187). 
Yet, why does Tommy depict mechanical organs? This closely relates to what 
Agamben argues about the crisis of contemporary artwork. Contemporary artwork 
reveals the truth of the world where technology and industrial division of labor allows 
artists to produce ready-made works or pop artworks. Agamben ascribes these 
                                                 
117 Heidegger also relates truth and art with uncanny; “At bottom, the ordinary is not ordinary; it is 
extra-ordinary, uncanny. The nature of truth, that is, of unconcealment, is dominated throughout by a 
denial. Yet this denial is not a defect or a fault, as though truth were an unalloyed unconcealment that 
has rid itself of everything concealed…Truth, in its nature, is un-truth” (“Origin” 53). 
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phenomena to the crisis of poiesis.118 Because of this loss of original energy of art as 
poiesis, the artist in modernity “has now definitively lost his content and is 
condemned forever to dwell, so to speak, besides his reality” (Man without 55). 
Tommy‟s artworks cannot satisfy the spectators since they disclose the truth that the 
spectators, human or clone, cannot accept in terms of their aesthetic standards, which 
have been mediated by anthropological machine. Tommy‟s drawings reveal that not 
only clones but also human beings are machines with mechanical organs. Thanks to 
the technological supply of clones‟ organs, it is obvious that human beings can 
replace their organs whenever they wish. Human beings become in true sense 
machines. If the origin of art is the disclosure of truth, Tommy discloses the truth of a 
world in which technology dominates and bio-capitalism operates the anthropological 
machine to artificially use living beings as a means rather than an end. 
Paradoxically, in this sense, the world of clones and the world of human 
beings commingle to produce the world of machine that Tommy unveils through his 
imaginary animals with mechanical organs. The world of machine is also the world of 
simulacra. Tommy‟s drawings consist of different copies of the same animals or the 
same pattern of entities. Kathy narrates, “It came to me that Tommy‟s drawings 
weren‟t as fresh now. Oaky, in many ways these frogs were a lot like what I‟d seen 
back at the Cottages. But something was definitely gone, and they looked labored, 
almost like they‟d been copied” (Never 241). Kathy says that Tommy‟s artwork is a 
copy of the previous ones, repeated but with differences. Reproducibility is possible 
                                                 
118 “If the death of art is its inability to attain the concrete dimension of the work, the crisis of art in our 
time is, in reality, a crisis of poetry, of ποίησις. Ποίησις, poetry, does not designate here an art among 
others, but is the very name of man‟s doing, of that productive action of which artistic doing is only a 
privileged example, and which appears, today, to be unfolding its power on a planetary scale in the 
operation of technology and industrial production” (Man without 59).  
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because of the crisis of originality in contemporary art. This is closely related to what 
Benjamin argues in his essay “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical 
Reproduction.” Benjamin asks what happens when we place a copy in new situations 
when the aura of art decays. Benjamin‟s answer is positive.119 Tommy‟s works then 
linger on threshold between poiesis and techne because they are reproductions with 
and of difference without an original. If someone reproduces again and again with 
difference in each replica, the original will be erased and only act of creation—
poiesis—remains to create the world of replicas or simulacra. Moreover, this 
reproduction with difference, in the context of art, discloses the external truth of the 
world and the internal truth of artist.  
Benjamin argues that the contemporary filmmaker penetrates reality like a 
surgeon, while painters touch reality like a magician. Tommy has both positions; he 
penetrates the inner truth of clones and human beings by depicting mechanical 
organs; also, he can touch the world he dwells with distance.120 Tommy reveals the 
truth of the internality and externality of the clone‟s world; he reveals not only the 
internal world of mechanical organs, which reveals the truth of human organs, but 
also the external world where bio-politics dominates to exploit these living beings. 
Tommy‟s paintings, regarding his two-fold artistic power, present “difference” from 
                                                 
119 In comparison, Agamben lingers in the limbo of both the stances of Heidegger, who only 
emphasizes the authenticity of art as poiesis, and of Benjamin, who proposes a new perception attuned 
with new technology and base structure. Rather than maintaining a strict stance about the loss of origin 
in contemporary art, Agamben tries to reveal all controversial aspects of the relation of originality and 
reproducibility. As Agamben maintains, the reproducibility of artwork deconstructs the originality of 
artwork and belongs to the techne. In this sense, Agamben argues, “Reproducibility (intended, in this 
sense, as paradigmatic relationship of nonproximity with the origin) is, then, the essential status of the 
product of technics, while originality (or authenticity) is the essential status of the work of art” (Man 
without 61; italics in original). 
120 “Magician and surgeon compare to painter and cameraman. The painter maintains in his work a 
natural distance from reality, the cameraman penetrates deeply into its web. There is a tremendous 
difference between the pictures they obtain. That of the painter is a total one, that of the cameraman 
consists of multiple fragments which are assembled under a new law” (“The Work of Art” 233-34).  
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the reality. What he creates does not remain in his world but expands into a different 
presentation of different objects. Kathy narrates: 
[Tommy] showed me three separate sketches of a kind of a 
frog—except with a long tail as though a part of it had 
stayed a tadpole. At least, that‟s what it looked like when 
you held it away from you. Close up, each sketch was a 
mass of minute detail, much like the creatures I‟d seen 
years before. “These two I did thinking they were made of 
metal,” he said. “See, anything‟ s got shiny surfaces. But 
this one here, I thought I‟d try making them rubbery….” 
(Never 241) 
 
The frog is reproduced from the previous one but contains different shape and 
surface. The frog with long tail as in-between being of frog and tadpole refers to the 
clones who remain as children without the chance to become adults. More strangely, 
even Tommy, as an artist, cannot fully control the artwork; after he creates, he realizes 
that one of two frogs has a rubbery surface. What Tommy does corresponds with what 
human beings have done; they created clones but cannot totally control them. 
Creation and poiesis is to bring forth beings, not representation of originals; but, the 
creation is also ethically problematic since what artists produce does not guarantee 
the ethical truth. However, Tommy opens a new territory of art—the clones‟ art, 
which raises question Agamben asks targeting contemporary art; “how is it possible 
to attain a new poiesis (ποίησις) in an original way?” (Man without 64). This is 
Ishiguro‟s hidden meta-question in the novel that I will try to answer and conclude 
this chapter. 
 
Truth and Art—Art for Truth, Artist for Happiness 
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In the end, Kathy decides to become a donor and die. She finally realizes that 
she does not want to be left alone, and that her life as animal-clone does not have any 
significance in human world. The novel ends with a beautiful and intriguing image of 
a piece of plastic rubbish that symbolizes the clones. Kathy narrates: 
I was thinking about the rubbish, the flapping plastic in the 
branches…and I half closed my eyes and imagined this was 
the spot where everything I‟d ever lost since my childhood 
had washed up…the fantasy never got beyond that—I 
didn‟t let it—and though the tears rolled down my face, I 
wasn‟t sobbing or out of control. (287-88)  
 
In fact, this is the first moment Kathy honestly expresses her emotions and cries 
though she cannot entirely abandon her restraint and accept the fact that she has 
emotions. Yet her restrained, elusive and stilted voice changes into melancholy one, 
delivering her imagination of “the flapping plastic” captured in the branches. Kathy 
finally achieves one final element of humanity besides emotion—imagination. 
Perhaps this plastic is a part of deflated balloon the clown held or this plastic 
represents the body as a husk that remains after Tommy‟s “completion.” If so, this 
plastic rubbish represents clone‟s body without organs abandoned and stuck in “the 
branches,” which also symbolize the anthropological machine and apparatuses that do 
not let clones free. Kathy lost everything; she lost her childhood, memory, her friends, 
and even her illusions. However, through her half-closed eyes and imagination, she 
suddenly sees “a tiny figure [that] would appear on the horizon the field, and 
gradually get larger until [Kathy would] see it was Tommy, and he‟d wave, maybe 
even call” (288). Tommy is resurrected through her imagination. Kathy restores 
emotions and imagination when she admits her future death. She finally becomes a 
clone-Dasein who can find its own freedom by projecting herself into her death. For 
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this epiphany, Kathy needs the imagination she did not have, though Tommy and 
Ruth did. Kathy‟s narrative proves that only imagination for phantasmatic creation 
can make her an authentic being.     
 With Kathy‟s restoration of her authenticity via imagination, Tommy becomes 
a fantasy that is running to Kathy hailing “sham” or “fantasy.” This is the moment 
when Ishiguro as a creator of these creatures intervenes with the question of fantasy 
in literature. Literature is about fantasy only through which readers can find truth. In a 
sense, fantasy is the interstice between philosophy and art. Through this interstice of 
fantasy, truth can finally be revealed; correspondingly, the philosophical ground of 
Never Let Me Go is unveiled.  
As a way to explain this aesthetic meaning of fantasy and truth, Alain 
Badiou, in Handbook of Inaesthetics, discusses the process of disclosing truth in art. 
Badiou basically classifies “the linkages between art and philosophy” into three 
schemata (the didacticism, romanticism, and classicism) and proposes that all these 
schemata shares the “common” of “the relation between art and truth” (8); in this 
way, according to Badiou, “art itself is a truth procedure” (9; italics in original). 
Namely, art coexists with the truths and it is a singular way to find the truths, not truth 
itself. Badiou claims that a work of art is not a truth, but “an artistic procedure 
initiated by an event” or artistic configuration is a truth (Badiou 12). Therefore, it can 
be said that artistic truth is the process of artistic creation or poiesis. The end of 
creation means the end of truth.  
Tommy becomes a fantasy that contrasts with the plastic caught in the 
branches. Only by becoming a fantasy can Tommy himself escape the material 
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confinement of a plastic body and become a truthful event from which truth emerges. 
Tommy is not just a clone-artist but also an artistic truth itself, and in this truth 
Tommy attains his ultimate freedom. Kathy, as an observer, a spectator and the 
narrator, delivers this story to other clones before she dies. In some sense, if Tommy 
is a clone-artist, Ishiguro is a human artist who create fantastical clone characters to 
make them live, die, and resurrect, while Kathy is a medium between them.  
This Tommy as an artistic truth and its essence as freedom vis-à-vis 
becoming a fantasy can answer the last question I raised in the beginning of this 
chapter—why does Ishiguro omit his ethnic identity in his writing? In Conversation 
with Kazuo Ishiguro, a collection of interviews from 1986 to 2006, almost all 
interviewers ask the same question—how Ishiguro‟s Japanese ethnic identity and his 
immigration experience have affected his writing. His answers are metaphorical or at 
best elusive. Interestingly, in the 2010 movie, based on the novel and directed by 
Mark Romaneck, all three characters are white. The fact that all characters are white 
and that it is hard to find any Asians in the movie is disturbing because in Never Let 
Me Go characters‟ ethnicities and skin colors are not specified. In the movie, these 
colorless clones are painted white and Ishiguro‟s ethnicity is also erased. Admittedly, 
Ishiguro intentionally erases any specific information about the clones to make them 
figures only with outlines and without content. But again, why does he erase 
characters‟ ethnicities? 
My hypothesis is that Ishiguro erases any personal traits including ethnicity 
because that is the best way to reveal the truth of beings. This is partly because of 
Paul Gilroy‟s argument in Against Race that race should be renounced in nano-
 232 
political world. In a nano-biological spectrum, race becomes obsolete. A more 
substantial reason is that by this intentional erasure, Ishiguro casts more 
fundamentally the ontological and ethical questions about humanity, animality, and 
beings. The fundamental ethics of fiction is not to actualize poetic justice, but to 
present those beings‟ ontological nudity by creating their worlds and form-of-life and 
showing how this creation in itself is a way to find a truth of art. Truth lies in a 
person‟s process of creation, and this creation goes beyond ethnic particularity 
because it is immanent and full of ontological questions of life, death, and rebirth. 
That is why Ishiguro‟s novels can gain universality and how his clones are more 
Japanese than any Japanese character created by a Japanese or Japanese English 
writer. To Ishiguro, Japanese does not mean a race but the signifier of suffering 
beings. My last chapter will reveal how this truth can be actualized by a trans-spatial 
writer‟s image of the bowl.   
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CHAPTER 5 
 
BOWL OF ORIGINS: NAMING THE VOID AND THE COMING 
COMMUNITY: 
THERESA HAK KYUNG CHA’S DICTÉ E 
 
It was her voice that made 
The sky acutest at its vanishing. 
She measured to the hour its solitude. 
She was the single artificer of the world 
In which she sang. And when she sang, the sea, 
Whatever self it had, became the self 
That was her song, for she was the maker. Then we 
As we beheld her striding there alone, 
Knew that there never was a world for her 
Except the one she sang and, singing, made. 
(Wallace Stevens, “The Idea of Order At Key West” 130) 
 
I was born in this world to live a poor and lonely, lofty and solitary 
life.  
And as I go on living in this world,  
my heart fills up with many things  
blazing or desolate, with love and with sorrow.  
And once again, this time, as if comforting me or urging me to join 
them,  
these words come and go, signaling me with their eyes and shaking 
their fists—  
When Heaven let this world begin, to all those he cherished and loved 
the most,  
he granted a life of poverty and loneliness, loftiness and solitude,  
full of love and sorrow—    
like a crescent moon, a wild flower, a mountain bird, and a donkey,  
and like Francis Jammes, T‟ao Yuan Míng, Rainer Maria Rilke.   
  (Paek Sok, “On the White Wall” 86) 
 
For all of the talk and appraisals of difficulties and lyrical obscurities of 
Theresa Hak Kyung Cha‟s Dictée, it is strange that the uncanny image of a bowl in its 
formal clarity should encompass the philosophical and aesthetic impulse and 
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orientation of the work. For decades, Dictée has been the center of debates and 
contentions within Asian American literary studies as well as experimental poetry 
studies. Critics tip the balance of their inquiries either towards history and politics at 
one end of the spectrum or aesthetic innovation at the other end, producing a field 
polarized largely by politicized aesthetics
121
 versus aesthetic politics, or identity 
versus subjectivity. After Cha‟s tragic death and the posthumous publication of 
Dictée and a long period of scholarly neglect, many critics attempted to edge to the 
core of this black hole through Cha‟s biography or historical contexts (Japanese 
colonization and political upheaval in Korea, etc.). The identity politics that influence 
these critiques have largely determined the theoretical sphere in Asian American 
studies, and they necessarily entail a tactical simplification of the complexity of the 
work. These critics fail to reckon that Dictée is not a book of representation or 
                                                 
121 For example, Elaine Kim, who first founded Dictée scholarship, emphasizes Cha‟s national identity 
and the heritage of Korean American nationalism. To her, Cha‟s “exile space” is “a kind of third 
space” which “foregrounds a highly specific cultural context, inserting Korea, Korean women, and 
Korean Americans into the discourse, thereby opening the space for an individual search for selfhood 
as well as a non-reified, non-essentialized collectivity” (8). I agree with Kim mostly, But as a Korean, I 
doubt that her national, ethnic identity is a key to understand Cha‟s exile and Dictée‟s experimental 
form. The first half of Dictée, mostly a collage of historical events and Japanese colonization, match 
with Kim‟s observation, but the second half, mostly consisting of Cha‟s poems and philosophical 
fragments about memories, theater, and other writings about Cha‟s inner life cannot be understood by 
Kim‟s identity politics. Against this trend, a group of scholars in Asian American literary studies 
started to claim that Dictée deserves more aesthetical approaches. Anne Anlin Cheng, in formalistic 
perspective, interprets Dictée as a text of anti-documentary desire. Cheng argues, Cha challenges “the 
documentary impulse underlying the ethnic or post-colonial Bildung” and disturbs “the academic 
tendency to conduct corrective re-readings and to have faith in the history lesson” (123). Cheng praises 
Cha‟s text which discourages any traditional prejudices about Asian American literature as 
autobiographical or historical writings that need to be interpreted by Westerners. Patti Duncan‟s Tell 
This Silence also interprets Dictée as the “third space”, where “narratives of both Korean nationalists 
and Western feminists are refused (162)”. More significantly, Shelley Sun Wong in “Unnaming the 
Same: Theresa Hak Kyung Cha‟s Dictée,” criticizes that Asian American identity politics have focused 
on representativeness and authenticity. Then, she claims that Dictée is not representative work. In her 
perspective, Dictée “with formal experiments and its insistent undermining of generalized 
understanding of representation and authenticity presented itself as enough of an anomaly within the 
context of the political and cultural orthodoxy of Asian America that it was never drawn into public 
debate” (103). With formalistic reading, Wong tries to rescue Dictée from cultural nationalists‟ 
interpretation based on “representation.” Indeed, Dictée‟s fertile spectrums cause readers not only to 
feel entrapped in an abysmal ineffability and renounce logical understanding of the work. 
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verisimilitude of Cha‟s life experience.122 Indeed, Cha‟s life experience confuses 
Dictée and produces unfathomable opacity. But postmodern or avant-garde poetic 
criticism also struggles to come to terms with Cha‟s difference as epistemological and 
as racial or ethnic. Shirley Wong claims that the impenetrable opacity in Dictée 
comes from Cha‟s trans-spatial experience of “dislocations and border-crossing that 
physical movement and state of mind become indistinguishable” (120). 
In fact, as I argue, Cha‟s trans-spatial experiences cannot be represented using 
conventional literary techniques, given its aims to encompass the immeasurable 
spectrum of time and space the trans-spatial being (Cha) lives through. While 
recognizing the key insights produced by such lively and sometimes antagonistic 
debates, I propose that we go beyond the published scholarship precisely by 
scrutinizing the more elemental and basic, and heretofore unaddressed—the formal 
simplicity of the bowl as void. I will speculate on the poeticized—a concept also in 
Heidegger and Benjamin—and show how Cha poetically creates language as a trans-
spatial being. I will focus on two dimensions, the first being language (body, names, 
translation) and the origins of those languages (Khora and Tao).  In turn, the Khora, 
Tao, and the image of the bowl name the void that Cha perceives in both Western and 
Eastern philosophical origins as the commonality or “commonplace” across the West 
and the East.  
                                                 
122 For example, Mukherjee utilizes Cha‟s biographical facts to look for commonplace themes of Asian 
American immigration such as “dislocation, hybridity, and the notion of an endangered Korean 
identity” (200). Mukherjee‟s clunky act of forcibly linking Korean nationalistic theme (Yu Kwon Soon 
as its female martyr) to Korean immigrants‟ status in the U.S. testifies how this kind of interpretation is 
exhaustive because Cha‟s identity as Asian American and Cha‟s past memories about her mother as 
the colonized may be connected loosely but cannot fully signify her utterly universal approaches to the 
issues such as humanity and aesthetic newness. 
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All the ideas in Dictée move erratically like stars, the same words—name, 
void, memory, and dream—twinkling in the different sky regions of the work with 
difference and parody each other to create a form of new language and a form of 
life—trans-spatial life. But this is not a cosmological phenomenon but instead chaotic 
and pulsates with the coextension of body and Dictée. Dictée is the poeticized linking 
body‟s life and language‟s life. The constellation aims to restore a kind of redemptive 
power to invoke the forgotten dead‟s voices and presences and to resurrect the dead 
language (Cha‟s mother tongue, Korean, Ancient Greek or Latin as well as poets‟ 
forgotten languages during exiles) as a new language of freedom. Cha looks for a 
pure, life language within dead languages to resurrect its world and origin. By 
translating her own writings into English, French, and Latin, she delves into the origin 
of all these languages to deconstruct their authorities and reshape them into her new 
language. This new language is the language of redemption to happen as the 
poeticized of Cha‟s life. And the void with the two names of Khora and Tao takes 
shape in the form of a bowl. 
 
The First Moment: Therese Hak Kyung Cha’s Trans-spatial Experience and the 
Poeticized 
A composite of lyric, prose, drama, and visual media, Dictée is an artwork 
about language as such rather than a mere critique of national, linguistic, ontological 
demarcations. Mostly Cha‟s language renounces an easy interpretation and 
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understanding
123
; its language deters simple signification, even semiotic approach 
because it deconstructs the fundamental assumption of modern semiotics that 
language aims for communication and its system is arbitrarily contextualized in 
linguistic relationships between the addressee and the addresser via speech acts such 
as illocutionary, locutionary, and perlocutionary acts. This assumption ignores 
different languages that a literary work, especially a non-linear, non-informational, 
and non-unified experimental work, employs. Moreover, Dictée aims not to 
communicate with readers in the present tense but rather the future perfect tense of 
reading that requires readers‟ active participation in creating meaning out of 
transcending the limits of modern linguistics.  
Nonetheless, this chaotic form and its opaque relation with Cha‟s life are 
productive because they present Cha‟s voice in multilayers which produce enormous 
potentiality. Dictée itself consists of a meta-commentary on Cha‟s experience of 
writing about her trans-spatial life experience. Meta-commentarial writing style 
relates to the first formal connotation of the title; Dictée is not Cha‟s personal memoir 
but rather positions Cha as medium or muse who dictates or transcribes others‟ words 
in order to create a poetics of relation across different times and spaces and the dead 
and the living. Cha‟s life and her writing about her life become two texts to be 
transcribed. Meta-textually, Cha is describing the phenomenological progression of 
her thought, reminiscence, and articulation that takes place as she writes.  
In Dictée, this meta-cognitive process of Cha‟s self-reflection while moving, 
reminiscing, thinking, speaking, reading, and writing ensures plasticity in the mimetic 
                                                 
123 In this sense, Frost points out that “Dictée‟s pages are crowded with such instances of language that 
impedes signification; images whose figural content belie their hermeticism. Such impasses reveal the 
degree to which image and text in Dictée fuction as unreadable signifiers” (183). 
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relationship with, and not the representation of, Cha‟s life. The form of the poeticized 
is as plastic as life because it “render[s] all the elements of the universe plastic as the 
poem progresses” (Jennings 549). This meta-commentarial writing is possible 
because Cha speculates on her body‟s responses and inserts them into her writing to 
make her text physically alive.  
Dictée creates its own languages and responses to Others‟ voices, and the 
medium between this life experience and language in Dictée is the conceptually 
interstitial space of body and book, which results in the form of a body-book or 
corporeal book, as Frost also observes.
124
 Paradoxically, Dictée, as a body-book of 
life experience, is autonomous as well as mediated by the world around it. Dictée 
achieves its aesthetic autonomy by its highly sophisticated distance from the 
phenomenal world and its ultimate plasticity; in turn, it is mediated by and tied to 
Cha‟s moving body and its world. This ambivalent position creates a new poetics. 
The new and secret poetics of Dictée‟s unconventional form is shrouded by the 
second formal connotation of the title. Dictée can be translated as “dictation” or 
“dictator” in English, but this translation hides a secret origin of the word, dictée in 
Latin, which Giorgio Agamben exposes. According to Agamben, “The Italian word 
dettato has kept, apart from the meaning dictation, a meaning deriving from the Latin, 
dictare, which towards the end of the Latin culture, had denoted to „compose a 
literary work‟…the Italian dettato corresponds almost exactly to the German das 
Gedishtete, the “Poematized” that both Heidegger and Benjamin use…to indicate the 
                                                 
124 Frost explores the interrelation between body and text in Dictée and claims “Dictée is replete with 
verbal and visual image of body: Western and Chinese medical diagrams; accounts of political acts of 
bodily self-sacrifice; narratives of physical illness and healing; and detailed examples of materiality of 
speech and writing” (182).  
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essence of the poem” (Idea of Prose 51). As Agamben also references, “das 
Gedishtete” influences Heidegger‟s Dicthung125 and Walter Benjamin‟s idea of “the 
poetized.” Benjamin‟s “the poeticized” refers to relationship between poet‟s life and 
his poetry. According to Benjamin, the poeticized is the limit-concept placed in-
between life and poem as concepts. Also, it is an epistemological concept that makes 
it possible for critics or readers to understand the poem because it discloses “a life-
context determined by art” (“Two Poems” 21) corresponding with the mythos126 
hidden in a poem.  
By and large, Dictée is a plastic universe of life, art, and philosophy, and its 
world is created by Cha‟s metacommentaried search for a language that can produce 
the poeticized.
127
 This does not mean that there is no political aspect in Dictée; in 
truth, Dictée is a postcolonial text that subverts the core of Western discourse and 
languages to reveal the meaning of third world history. Yet this political aspect is not 
superimposed over the poetic aspects, nor does it focus on disclosing contradictions 
in Western discourses via its hybrid, postcolonial, postmodern structure. Rather, 
Dictée shows how a-political texts can be political insofar as it deals with political 
aspect of “life” per se. As Agamben argues, in bio-politics, “life,” which has been 
                                                 
125 Watkin explains about Heideggerian influence of Agamben‟s idea of dictation: dictare in Latin 
corresponds with Heidegger‟s Dichtung, originating from “poiesis (bring forth a being, creation) in 
ancient Greek, meaning “making, shaping, invention, etc.” Through these origins, “dictation” signifies 
the “ontico-experiential basis of a work of poiesis describing, say, the events that led to the dictation of 
a poem, [which] is always written after the fact and so is obviously dictated by the already existent 
presence of the poem” (Watkin 35). The Heideggerian idea of Dicthung is a dictation or a poetics that 
reserves the ancient Greek meaning of giving birth to a form of writing as a poetics. However, as 
Agamben explains, Heideggerian origin pairs with Bejaminian origin.   
126 The poeticized, as a concept, is a way to find a mythic truth because it is about a form “within 
which the larger, metaphysical relationships which obtain in the world may be understood” (Jennings 
548). 
127 Here I want to clarify about the genre of Dictée. Many critics tend to regard this work either as a 
novel or a mutli-genre artwork. I follow the latter side, but I argue that Dictée, because of its specific 
form of poetics, is closer to a long poem or artwork embedding bodily performance.  
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traditionally a-political subject, becomes a political realm. In the poeticized of Dictée, 
its form, as a container, mimetically corresponds with life, death, and rebirth of 
language, whereas its a-political life, in its veiled connectivity with the external 
world, reflects the world where minorities‟ lives are appropriated and their presences 
and collective voices lie dormant under the ruin of history.  
In this respect, a form of art, as a form of life, presents a spectrum wherein the 
seemingly unconnected words and life experiences form a constellation. This reading 
does not romanticize Cha‟s trans-spatial experience of exile or diaspora; her 
experience of “diaspora,” which connotes “scattering” from its Greek origin, is 
fragmentary and painful. The constellation in Dictée contains this fragmentary, 
“scattering,” and melancholy experience of pain, loss, and nostalgia devoid of a hope 
to find her home. However, as Gilroy in his The Black Atlantic: Modernity and 
Double Consciousness suggests, this kind of diasporic consciousness also has its 
positive side because it transcends national boundaries and creates a new language, a 
new poetics, and a new network of post-colonial spaces. The language of the network 
reveals its utopian dream of freedom and true communication via a new language and 
its poeticized.   
In this sense, the poeticized as a form in Dictée resonates with Édouard 
Glissant‟s poetics of relation, in which, as Oakley in Common Places well observes, 
Heideggerian Being becomes Glissant‟s Relation in an allegorical constellation which 
purports to regain the redemptive function of Relation as a poetics. Cha‟s collages 
open a constellation not to build a contradictory hybridity but rather a poetics of 
“Relation” which relays differential languages and their worlds as well as a hidden 
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ethico-ontological foundation of this Relation. As Oakley understands, Benjamin‟s 
“allegory prefigures the redemption of the world, which presumably arrives at a 
future time relative to the allegory‟s composition. Specifically, redemption is an event 
of the future perfect tense: redemption will have arrived. Thus allegorical signs are 
actually retroactively assigned their status as signs” (63). The desire in Dictée is for a 
language of freedom and redemption that trans-spatial poets always dream of during 
their exiles, and this language is also the language of the origin which is veiled, only 
to be disclosed by the poeticized. But the fragmented words and unfathomable chaos 
in Dictée show that this dream will have been actualized, not actualized now. The 
utopian dream in the past at its origin implants a seminal seed of change in the present 
to bring forth a utopia in the future because the power of the origin must be always 
already in full potentiality, never to be actualized “now.”  
Benjamin‟s allegory and constellation represent the search for the lost origins, 
but the origin is always in constant change so that it cannot be found “now” but has a 
potentiality to be found in the future. In this sense, the poeticized‟s redemptive power 
is simultaneously found with and against history. It renders Cha‟s life and other 
dead‟s past lives to redeem in history, but it also deconstructs the teleological 
worldview that the past is gone and the present is making the future. This is possible 
because origins are shaped in the forms of lost names. In Cha‟s case, the names, as 
ontological marks of the presences and the voices of the forgotten, are deleted in 
Western, colonial history, and cannot be found now; nonetheless, their hidden origins 
may be resurrected in the future by the invoking the dead and forgotten names. It is 
not possible to invoke others into one‟s writing and speaking if the invoker‟s world is 
 242 
filled with herself; she shamanistically has to empty out her writing and speech to 
invoke others. Invocation is a way to create the constellation of forgotten voices and 
presences, and this invocation must name those being‟s true names and their worlds. 
Thus, the ontological mood is melancholic over this nameless void in the present and 
lost connectivity to its origin as well as the hidden utopian dream of redemption of 
the freedom from “now.”  
In this context, Cha creates two ideas of the name and the void, the most 
frequent words in the work. These two words correspond with Cha‟s trans-spatial 
experiences and her dream of freedom during her exile from Korea and the U.S. 
Because language becomes a void, it can invite, invoke, and communicate others‟ 
voices and life experiences; the void is not nothingness but a space of full potentiality 
for the future actualization. At the core of Cha‟s poetics of spectrum, the void in the 
form of bowl stretches and contains the mysterious names of collective women in 
resonance with Cha‟s trans-spatial life experience. This is how the image of bowl as 
the aesthetic form of Dictée differs from John Keats‟s “Ode to a Grecian Urn” or 
Wallace Steven‟s American “Anecdote of a Jar,” which emphasize their presences, 
beauty, and space around it rather than the void inside the container and its 
potentiality.  
 
The Second Moment of Body-Language: Deconstruction of Dictation and Trans-
spatial Dream 
On the surface level, Dictée is a multilingual work; though primarily written 
in English, Cha seems to build a Babel in which French, English, Latin, and Korean 
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communicate with each other and are translated without demolishing the borderlines 
among those languages or ratifying these borderlines‟ national origins. By this 
linguistic palimpsest, Cha tries to express her trans-spatial feeling rhetorically as the 
narrator “begins the search the words of equivalence to that of her feeling. Or the 
absence of it. Synonym, simile, metaphor, byword, byname, ghostword, 
phantomnation, In documenting the map of her journey” (Dictée 140). But the 
transnational use of languages and translations cannot deliver her feeling due to the 
fixed nature of language systems within their national origins. The national languages 
she was forced to learn are irreconcilable
128
. Borderlines between languages are 
drawn rigidly and their linguistic agents require Cha, who crosses national, linguistic 
borderlines, to verify her linguistic, national identity. Cha refuses this identification 
and subjectification; this is also “an attempt to reveal and strip away the many 
ideological layers of language and fashioning a less alienating voice with which to 
speak and tell her stories” (Kang 78). Cha looks for her own new singular language 
with a less alienating voice. But Cha‟s onerous struggle to create a new language is 
exhausting and often confusing; as Kang points out, “to achieve some mutuality 
between enunciation and communication in language…language of Dictée is multiple 
and ever-shifting—words and voices are decentered, recalled from the margins, 
exclusive, unclaimed, indecipherable and then again viscerally clear” (78).  
For example, Cha uses the meta-cognitive analysis of the language acquisition 
process as a way to find her own language. As a form of the poeticized, this relates to 
                                                 
128 Naoki Sakai argues that in Dictée there is an irreconciliation between utopian desire of reclaiming 
national language—Korean and Korean history as her origin and efforts to foil “configuration of 
languages (38-9). Alongside Sakai‟s idea of “The irreducible ambivalence,” Lamm understand this 
irreconciliation as “a manifestation of the exile‟s displacement, her continual status as an immigrant, 
both at home and away” (50).  
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Cha‟s own trans-lingual experience; emigrating to the U.S. from Korea, she had to 
learn English and French and, in doing so, forget her mother tongue—Korean. This 
also corresponds with her mother‟s experience when she was coerced to learn 
Japanese during Japanese colonization in Korea. Reflecting these experiences, Cha‟s 
treatment of the language acquisition process is philosophical and subversive. Cha 
scrutinizes language‟s bare registers—reading, speaking, thought process, and bodily 
expressions, which are immanent and transcendental to the semiotic exchanges of 
signifiers. She creates non-linear and chaotic language by mincing, dicing, and 
reshaping images and words to build a new language-world. The purpose of this 
reshaping is not an “intent on „penetrating‟ the read, to double it and re-cite it, but 
rather entails an attempt to extend, disrupt and rework it” (Chambers 10).  
By no means is the invocation of voices and presences didactic, for Cha 
denounces the didactic and heuristic functions of language for communication 
because these functions in truth are disciplinary. As Deleuze and Guatarri argue, in A 
Thousand Plateaus, language in terms of speech acts consists of essentially 
disciplinary commands; people use language to accomplish their tasks by ordering 
and commanding. Only poetic language escapes this normal function of language, 
and Cha aims mostly to deconstruct that control, order, and discipline.  
Cha deconstructs didactic language in the first chapter of Dictée with the 
inclusion of a language worksheet for a French language class activity where an 
ostensible student does dictation (dictée or transcriber) from a paragraph in French to 
the one in English: 
Aller a la ligne    C‟était le premier jour   point    Elle Venait 
de loin    point    ce soir au  diner    virgule les familles 
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demanderaient    virgule    ouvre les guilemets    Ç a c‟est 
bien passé le premier jour    point d‟interrogation     ferme 
les guilemets    au moins    virgule    dire le moins possible    
virgule   la réponse serait   virgule    ouvre les guillements    
Il n‟y a q‟une chose    point    ferme les guillemets    ouvre 
les guillements    Il y a quelqu‟une    point     loin    point    
ferme les guillements 
 
Open paragraph it was the first day period She had come 
from a far period tonight at dinner comma the families 
would ask comma open quotation marks How was the first 
day interrogation mark Close quotation marks How was the 
first day interrogation mark close quotation marks at least 
to say the least of it possible comma the answer would be 
open quotations marks there is but one thing period There is 
someone period From a par period close quotation marks. 
(1)  
 
In this quotation, the student translates and transcribes each punctuation mark spoken 
in French into English. Given that is not a mere word-to-word translation and 
transcription, awkwardness comes from her misunderstanding of the dictator‟s 
intention. Strangely enough, by this dictation, “content falls away and what emerges 
is the spoken quality of exercise” (Park 133). One of the most common theoretical 
understandings of Cha‟s awkward dictation is that it purports a subversive textual 
practice.
129
 This interpretation emphasizes post-colonial, post-structural aspects in 
Dictée by regarding this dictation as a politically subversive act against national 
language system and discursive power in which the dictator holds sway.  
Yet, as I argue, a richer interpretation of this deviated form of dictation is 
possible; the student in the passage problematizes the boundaries among different 
registers of language—spoken and written languages in both French and English— as 
                                                 
129 Lisa Lowe‟s argument is the epitome of this interpretation. She argues, “For not only does the logic 
of dictation itself provide a critique of the model of identical equivalence—in that the founding 
premise of dictation recognizes an initial incommensurability between the oral and the written, 
revealing the purported aim for that identical reproduction to be internally contradictory—but Dictée 
further exploits this contradiction through manifold deviations from the model” (“Unfaithful” 39).  
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well as the boundary between language and “ontological presence and its voice of a 
being” by awkward translation and transcription. Let‟s imagine the hidden 
prepositions of this dictation as a linguistic activity. In general, only written language 
needs punctuation marks to indicate something ineffable in written language, such as 
emotions, facial expression or gestures. Punctuations marks, being unnecessary in 
spoken language, are supplementarily added to the written texts to imitate such 
ontological traits of a speaker as the actual voices, emotions and bodily gestures 
during the writer‟s writing or citing other texts into a text. But the punctuation marks 
cannot fully embody the speaker‟s interrogative expressions on her face or mood. As 
such, punctuation marks‟ names and presences are hidden in writings. As soon as 
those punctuation marks are translated from French names and transcribed in English 
as names instead of symbols (i.e. !, ?,etc.), their names become “overnamed” and 
excessive in the sentences to disrupt an easy reading of the translated and transcribed 
passage. Moreover, the transcription of punctuation marks aggravates the confusion 
of dictation, which undermines the authority of translation itself. Deconstructing the 
normal language activities such as translation, transcription and dictation, this passage 
reveals the ontological foundation of language—voice as well as the bodily presence 
of the unnamed speaker, the dictator, and even the student, their voices untranslatable 
and inscribable in writing. In this sense, punctuation marks in this dictation are the 
ontological spaces of those voices and presences. 
Ontological presences and the voices of beings erupt in a sentence in the form 
of overnamed, overflowing punctuation marks. Thus, the narrator says, “[the student] 
would take on their punctuation. She waits to service this. Theirs. Punctuation. She 
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would become, herself, demarcations. Absorb it. Spill it. Seize upon the punctuation. 
Last air. Give her. Her. The relay. Voice. Assign. Hand it. Deliver it. Deliver” (Dictée 
4; italics in original). Here, punctuation, as the speaker‟s presence and voice, come 
into the writer‟s space. As a receptacle or a medium, the writer accepts their 
presences and voices and passes them out to regain potentiality—to invite the coming 
others. That is, writing becomes a space of deliverance and relay, shunning the 
writer‟s thoughts and ideas. But this writing is not just for deliverance of different 
agents in different syntax at the syntagmatic level; it also delivers agents at the 
paradigmatic level across different times. The invocation across times is correlative to 
speaking quotation marks in the quotation; in other words, state “quote” prior to 
reciting words. About this function of quotation mark, Agamben explains, “What 
does it mean, in fact, to put a word between quotation marks. . .The term put in 
quotation marks is suspended within its history; it is weighted—and therefore, at least 
embryonically, thought” (Idea of Prose 103). A sentence between quotation marks, 
once told thousands years ago by someone totally forgotten, can be inserted in a text 
and thus keeps its historicity and veiled presences as well as the voices of the 
writer(s) by indicating that the quote between quotation marks has a different 
orientation in textual history. Through creating a heterogeneous space in a sentence, 
this insertion is capable of sustaining trans-temporal communication or a poetics of 
relation with other historical texts embodying writers‟ ontological voices and 
presences in writings.  
In this way, forgotten voices and their bodily presences from history are 
relayed by this function of quotation marks, and its overnamed presences form a 
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bodily, material totality that swarm “Insider [diseuse’s] void [though] It does not 
contain further. Rising from the empty below, pebble lumps of gas. Moisture. Begin to 
flood her. Dissolving her. Slow, slowed to deliberation. Slow and thick” (Dictée 5; 
italics in original).  Here, the forming totality and writing‟s void space, engendered by 
the limit of writing itself, become analogous to the articulation of condensing and 
slowly exhaling air with sound from body organs for articulation. This may also 
suggest giving birth to beings through laboring. In other words, these punctuation 
marks and their excessive names dissolve the speaker‟s subjectivity and identity to fill 
the consequential void with such material elements as flowing, amorphous moisture 
and gas, simulating both articulatory and reproductive organs that are ready for 
articulation or a fertile womb waiting to give birth to beings.  
As this comparison of the linguistic act of articulation with ontological act of 
giving birth to a being or word implies, this desubjectification and invocation of 
others‟ voice presences is “gender-specific” as Trinh T. Minh-ha argues (27). Cha‟s 
language of dictation for invocation of presence and voices is gender-specific because 
she, like Minh-ha, understands general history as the teleological process of veiling 
women‟s ontological voices and their presences. In this way, this language does not 
so much function within the past as it bears and will have borne a life-form, the 
poeticized, and its utopian future as a female form of a history in the future perfect 
tense. Through agony and urgency engendered by symbolic laboring and articulating 
foreign languages, the poeticized of trans-spatial women‟s writing like Dictée gives 
birth to and restores ontological elements of collective voices and presences of those 
beings.  
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Let‟s return to the quotation about the dictation. When punctuation marks are 
used normally, the story is simple but erratic: the story without interruptions of 
translated names of punctuation marks reads, “It was the first day. She had come from 
a far. Tonight at dinner, the families would ask, „How was the first day?‟ „How was 
the first day‟ at least to say the least of it possible, the answer would be „there is but 
one thing. There is someone. From a far‟.” (Dictée 1) The narrative is about a 
person‟s trans-spatial experience when she, “From a Far” crosses the borderline to 
come to the U.S. and meets a family, maybe an American family. To the family‟s 
hypocritical hospitality and concerns about her first day in the foreign land is, she 
erratically answers, “There is someone…From a far….” Cha‟s persona refuses to 
answer the question; instead, she starts her own story, renouncing any dialogic 
relationship with the family. 
The dispersal of the speaker‟s authority as a speaker is related to Cha‟s denial 
of her role as the narrator of Dictée; she is the narrator only insofar as she becomes 
“someone” in multiple unnamed narrators. As Sue J. Kim points out, the effort to 
“identity the narrator as Cha” is not fruitful because “nowhere in the novel are we 
told that the narrator is named Theresa or that there is even a singular narrator”; 
rather, as Kim argues, “the text does not necessitate the union of its voices into one 
narrator” (“Narrator, Author” 164). This de-authorization and de-subjectification of 
the narrator corresponds with the anonymous woman in the story as well as the title 
of Cha‟s narrator in Dictée—the diseuse, which is French for a dramatic speaker—a 
stage actress. 
130
 
                                                 
130 This use of the diseuse as an unidentifiable mask of Cha is closely related to Cha‟s career as an 
avant-garde visual artist and performer as well as the element of performance in Dictée. Timothy in his 
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The diseuse describes her dream of coming to a ultimately free space that is 
devoid of any fixed identity and language after exile; the diseuse sings, “From A Far / 
What nationality / or what kindred and relation / what blood relation / what blood ties 
of blood / what ancestry/ what race generation / what house clan tribe stock strain / 
what lineage extraction / what breed sect gender denomination caste / what stray 
ejection misplaced / Tertium Quid neither one thing nor the other /Tombe des nues de 
naturalized / what transplant to dispel upon” (Dictée 20).131 Here, the diesuse bluntly 
blurs any boundary, whether imaginary, symbolic or real, between nationalities, blood 
relations, classes, genders, humanities, etc. by the total negation of systems of 
demarcation or dichotomies, from the individual to the international level as well as 
across history and personal experience, in terms of the logic of double negation—
“neither one thing nor the other.” But this double negation does not lead to 
affirmation; rather, this double negation turns the demarcated or territorialized spaces 
into a differential space in which everything can be relayed negatively conserving 
their differences. This rhetorical negation of any demarcation or categorization for 
identity is a de-colonial effort, corresponding with the dictation of women‟s 
sufferings under and resistance against colonialism and patriarchy. In this space, any 
“thing” or any “person,” which is “transplanted” or inserted heterogeneously into 
state apparatuses of identities and differentiation, must go into exile because it has to 
“dispel upon” these assimilations in reality; likewise, punctuations marks, which are 
                                                                                                                                           
Race and the Avant-garde, traces the orientation of multi-genre in Dictée from language poetry and 
visual art and contextualizes Dictée with 80s literary landscape.  
131 Russell II regards this poem as “pivot for the text‟s numerous linguistic divisions”; and she points 
out, “[t]he deliberate division of “afar” into “a far” on several occasions enhances the myriad chasms 
that exist between migration/native, home/away, and divided/united, although these fractures are rarely 
simple binaries” (182).  
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translated, inserted, and are dispelled from the process of signification in the 
dictation. This double bind of transplantation/expellation creates a third space.  
In addition, Cha in this quotation uses a Latin word, “Tertium Quid” meaning 
“the third space” or “the third estate” in English. This “Tertium Quid” is a liminal 
space that postcolonialist critics like Bhabha claim opens a deconstructive gate 
through which subversion happens and truth is revealed—Cha‟s trans-spatial utopia 
in Dictée. This third space, on one hand, in Dictée is a utopian “from a far” where no 
demarcation as source of subjectification and identity is possible. On the other hand, 
this space of “from a far” is a utopia in future perfect tense that connects to seminal 
origins in the past whose potentiality resides in a heterotopic space in the present, and 
will have redeemed the forgotten beings‟ voices and presences to produce a poetics of 
relation where everyone relays and relates while conserving differences.  Though 
having a void form, this interstice between national languages and their apparatuses 
opens a way to create a new language. The first new language is a name language that 
can be attributed to pure, dream, and life language. 
 
The Third Moment of Language: Name Language  
After the introductory chapter in a form of a language workbook, three 
different phrases are arranged on page twenty-one in a form of repetition with 
difference: “IN NOMINE / LE NOM / NOMINE.” “NOMINE” and “IN NOMINE” 
in Latin means “name” and “in the name of,” while “LE NOM” in French means “the 
name.” Each phrase or word encapsulates “name” in different languages, and “IN” 
functions as the designator of the “origin” of the name; that is, these phrases 
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juxtapose “a name” in Latin without origins, a name in French, and a name in Latin 
with its origin. Thus, name in French and name in Latin without origin are names 
deprived of their origins; these names without “IN” as indicator of “origin” are 
fixated within their names. Why does Cha problematize “names” with or without 
origins in different Western languages?  
The first answer relates to the shamanic, magical function of speaking original 
names. Many fairytales or shamanic tales share the assumption that speaking the 
original names of things or beings has the magical power of giving life to things or 
resurrecting the dead; yet, in these stories, the protagonists experience a lot of 
hardships to find the original, mystic, and encrypted names of those beings or things. 
Likewise, in shamanism, the shaman, by speaking the original name of those beings 
and things, gains the power to look into their past. In this Shamanic context, Cha 
invokes names of people or things she wants to resurrect or incarnate via shamanic 
naming.  
In Dictée, Cha obsessively invokes the proper names of the dead in history in 
order to reveal their names as pure language, which is purified from discursive 
structures. There are two kinds of names in Dictée. The first kind is comprised of 
names from Korean and Western history—Yu, Kuan Soon (a female leader of anti-
colonial revolt against Japanese imperialism), Ahn, Joong Kun (the Korean who 
assassinated Ito Hirobumi, the first prime minister of Japan during colonization), and 
Joan of Arc. Contrasting these historical names, a name is continuously recalled from 
Cha‟s personal memory; the name of Cha‟s mother—Hyung Soon Huo. Through the 
invocation of these names, general history conflates with personal memory without 
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overshadowing the former‟s priority and generality. By this conflation, their names 
achieve their historical universality and personal singularity. Besides, this conflation 
occurs because of the similar backgrounds of these names that have all been deleted 
from male-dominating or phallus-centric history, with the exception of Ahn Joong 
Kun, a male anti-imperialist. Regardless, they fall prey to the martyrdom perpetrated 
by the state or patriarchal systems under the auspice of the general names and their 
discursive systems—such as the state, God, the nation, and justice.  
So why call out these names? On the surface, calling names interpellates their 
subjectivities, but this interpellation is what Cha deconstructs. At the deeper level, 
Cha calls these names for the purpose of shaping her own pure language, thereby will 
she save the universal, singular substance of those names without their codification in 
national languages and systems that interpellate them so as to make them the mere 
names of national heroes or heroines. In this sense, pondering her mother‟s 
experience of abhorrent Japanese colonization and Cha‟s own experiences of the 
massacres perpetrated by two dictators in South Korea history, Cha says: 
Her name. First the whole name. Then syllabus by syllable 
counting each inside the mouth….Mere names only names 
without the image nor hers hers alone not the whole of her 
and even the image would not be the entire her fraction her 
invalid that inhabits that rise voluntarily like flint pure 
hazard dead substance to fire. Others anonymous her 
detachments take her place. Anonymous against her. 
….Suffice Melpomene. Nation against nation multiplied 
nations against nations against themselves. Owns. Repels 
her rejects her expels her from her own. Her own is, in, of, 
through, all others, hers. Her own who is offspring and 
mother, Demeter and Sibyl. Violation of her by giving 
name to the betrayal, all possible names, interchangeable 
names, to remedy, to justify the violation. Of her. Own. 
Unbegotten. Name. Name only. Name without substance. 
The everlasting. Forever. Without end. (Dictée 88). 
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Though confusing at the first glance, two categories of names do emerge here: “mere 
names” and “unbegotten” names. The mere names are “not her names,” but names 
analogous to “flint pure hazard dead substance to fire.” These “mere names” ignite 
national, international conflicts; they are the names of macro-political systems that 
identify and register a person‟s subjectivity. Cha‟s imagination stretches from her 
mother‟s Japanese name during colonization, to the names of divided nations in the 
Korea peninsula (The Republic of Korea and The Democratic People‟s Republic of 
Korea), and the names of state apparatuses controlling people. These names are 
pretentious and oppressive because the institutions under these names claim they 
remedy the conflicts “to justify the violation;” what‟s more, these names are 
“interchangeable” because these names share one signifier—the master signifier.  
In terms of poststructuralist, postcolonial theories, all signifiers are sutured to 
the master signifier or the pure signifier, meaning “a signifier without signified” 
(Zižek, Sublime 93). Taking on naming to explain the role of the pure signifier, Zižek 
demonstrates how “naming is necessary but it is, so to speak, necessary afterwards, 
retroactively, once we are already „in it‟” (Sublime 93); that is to say, a name can be 
given to an object or a being without any substance that correlates with that being, 
and this name retrospectively changes the properties of the being by suturing all other 
properties or signifieds into that meaningless pure signifier. For example, the name of 
a nation-state such as “The Republic of Korea” is a pure signifier “which gives unity 
and identity to [Korean] experience of historical reality itself” (Sublime 97). Other 
signifiers such as justice, freedom, humanity, etc. get sutured to this master signifier 
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only to call forth vicarious substitutions, instead of revealing the true substance of 
these names.  
Against these mere names sutured into an master signifier for interpellation 
which constitutes one‟s discursive and bio-political subjectivity and identity, Cha 
discloses the hidden networks or a constellation between historical names of 
women—Yu Kuan Soon, Jean d‟Arc, or Hyung Soon Huo—by calling their pure 
names. By this invocation of names, Cha endeavors to reclaim a “name” “of her. 
Own. Unbegotten,” which contains the dream of life and rebirth. In general history, 
Cha‟s or other women‟s name(s) are constantly repelled, rejected and expelled from 
history and national languages. Ironically, only through these trans-spatial 
experiences of rejection and expellation can Cha and other women restore the origin 
of their names—Demeter and Sibyl. Sibyl is a mythical Greek prophetess. On one 
hand, Cha alludes to Heraclitus‟s reference132 to Sibyl in order to show the name‟s 
subtext of the indelible voices of women poets or shamans; on the other hand, she 
alludes to T.S. Eliot‟s “The Waste Land” 133 in which Sibyl, doomed to live eternally, 
cries out her desire “to die.” Her desire for the proper death contrasts with the symbol 
of Demeter—rebirth—in Greek myth; Demeter set out on a journey to the underworld 
to save her daughter caught by Hades. This association of life, death, and rebirth via 
the mythical origins of names restores the power of the heritage from women‟s 
history and mother-daughter relationships; this retroactive restoration and 
reorientation, in opposition to mere names‟ orientation from the state apparatuses, 
                                                 
132 “Sibyl was first introduced by Heraclitus who says, “The Sibyl, with frenzied mouth uttering things 
not to be laughed at, unadorned and unperfumed, yet reaches to a thousand years with her voice by aid 
of the god.” 
133 “The Waste Land” is prefaced by, “"I saw with my own eyes the Sibyl at Cumae hanging in a cage, 
and when the boys said to her 'Sibyl, what do you want?' that she replied 'I want to die'” (67) 
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aims to restore these women‟s common pure name. The pure name does not have 
meaning but can bridge other names without oppressive intepellation from various 
systematic apparatuses. Pure name is pure communicability as the full potentiality to 
open a zone of infinite invitations to forgotten names. 
By the pure name, Cha‟s name language has the potency to reestablish the 
connection to the origin of the name and its power to communicate with beings and 
things in the world, which partly corresponds with Benjamin‟s idea of name language 
and pure name. Admittedly, there are disparities between Cha‟s and Benjamin‟s name 
languages because Benjamin‟s name language has its foci in the mystic function of 
names in terms of his redemptive criticism and exegesis of Bible, influenced by the 
Jewish tradition of Kabala. Cha‟s names are gender-specific and more historic as well 
as politically subversive. However, at its core, Benjamin‟s claim that “the language of 
poetry is partly, if not solely, founded on the name language of man” (“On Language 
as Such” 73) resonates with Cha. Benjamin‟s naming is not just calling one‟s proper 
names or words referring to objects in the world; rather it is metaphysical, 
philosophical, or, more specifically, ethico-onological disclosing of things, and the 
dead‟s hidden substance—their dream of freedom and resurrection. Naming one‟s 
true, pure name is to free it or her from the system of mere name and its master 
signifier of state apparatus and therefore resurrect them from patriarchal history 
stained by blood shed during war and colonization. This naming in Dictée is ethico-
ontological because it can emancipate beings from the enthralling power of 
subjectivities.  
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Besides naming the dead, naming happens through portraits. The photos of 
portraits of women in Dictée require pure naming. In Dictée, photographs of 
historical figures (Yu, Guan Soon, St. Therese de Lisieux, a film still of Maria 
Falconetti as Joan of Arc ( in La Passion de Jeanne d’Arc) parallel with young and 
old portrait photos of Cha‟s mother. All these portraits share several similarities. Each 
portrait of women reflects each other‟s suffering during their physical, spiritual exiles 
as well as their hope of dialogism and resurrection. And, these photos represent 
different local locations and histories and create a global constellation of martyrdom 
as well as exiles. Geopolitically, these women‟s photos represent medieval and 
modern France (St. Therese de Lisieux and Joan of Arc) and colonized Korea in 
1920s (Yu, Guan Soon and Cha‟s mother). This photographic parallel signifies the 
inter-women coalition of lives of suffering and resistance. Looking through the 
photos, viewers may perceive an aura that intimates sublime connections.  
These effects originate from the gesture of the women in photos. In all these 
black-and-white photos, women‟s faces, except Joan of Arc, stare at readers. 
Agamben understands these photographs of staring people in terms of Benjamin‟s 
idea of naming and resurrection: 
Even if the person photographed is completely forgotten 
today, even if his or her name has been erased forever from 
human memory—or, indeed, precisely because of this—
that person and that face demand their name; they demand 
not to be forgotten…The photograph is always more than 
an image: it is the site of gap, a sublime breach between the 
sensible and the intelligible, between copy and reality, 
between memory and a hope. (Profanations 25-6) 
 
Here Agamben rereads and interprets Benjamin‟s essay, “A Little History of 
Photograph.” In this essay, Benjamin traces the aura in portrait photos which leads 
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the viewers with an “unruly desire to know what [the person in the photo‟s] name 
was, the [one] who was alive there, who even now is still real and will never consent 
to be wholly absorbed in “art” (“Little History” 510). What cannot be absorbed in art 
is the life within the still life of the person in the photo who demands that her own 
name be called forth to be resurrected in our memory and history. This invocation is 
“covert enough to find a hiding place in waking dreams, but which enlarged and 
capable of formulation, make the difference between technology and magic visible as 
a thoroughly historical variable” (“Little History” 512). Cha‟s women in photos 
create an aura which is “a strange weave of space and time: the unique appearance of 
semblance of distance, no matter how close it may be” (“Little History” 518). This 
strange weave of space and time creates a montage or a constellation to deliver the 
meaning of naming and history in Dictée.  
 For example, Yu, Gown Soon‟s faces, whose photos are so time-worn that 
her faces are smudged mostly, confront viewers as if Miss Yu demands something 
from them. Likewise, in Cha‟s mother‟s two photos, the faces stare at viewers with 
“unmistakable historical index[es],” such as Japanese colonization and its oppression 
of Koreans, and demand viewers to remember their names and their worlds “thanks to 
the special power of gesture” (Profanations 25). But their faces and gazes do not just 
confirm their sacrifices and martyrdom. Rather, they ask what significance their 
sacrifice could be in the future; indeed, Cha‟s questions, “Why resurrect it all now. 
From the past. History, the old wound. The past emotions all over again. To confess 
to relive the same folly. To name it now so as not to repeat history in oblivion. To 
extract each fragment by each fragment from the word from the image another word 
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another image the reply ” (Dictée 33). Those photos reveal the wound and trauma 
caused by exile and historic atrocities, which is the main purpose of resurrecting those 
women through their face images and names: “name it now so as not to repeat history 
in oblivion” (Dictée 33). The anonymous but pure name of “it” is an empty signifier 
through which memories of their lives can be disinterred, and this resurrection 
inhibits the viewers from repeating violent history. The empty signifier is different 
from the master signifier in that the former does not operate for apparatuses but just 
opens an empty venue to bridge these names. Also, by calling for one‟s name into 
each other‟s photos, each photo is relayed, facing not only the viewers but also each 
other in the oblivion of history. This relay creates a poetics of relation via 
congregations of faces demanding their original names. 
Yet interestingly enough, a white woman‟s portrait poses a different gesture. 
The life of Joan of Arc is represented by a famous movie still from The Passion of 
Joan of Arc (1928) directed by Carl Dreyer. It corresponds with Yu‟s life because 
both sacrificed their lives for the emancipation of their nations from the imperial 
powers of England and Japan, respectively. Yet, the portrait of Joan of Arc is 
problematic since it is overcoded by Western faciality created by Christianity. 
Regarding this movie still, Deleuze and Guattari  assert that “the face is Christ. The 
face is the typical European…Jesus Christ superstar: he invented the facialization of 
the entire body and spread it everywhere (The Passion of Joan of Arc, in close-up)” 
(A Thousand 176). According to Deleuze and Guattari, the still of Joan of Arc 
simulates the European prototype of a face that is Christ‟s face in accordance with his 
typical gesture of looking up the sky waiting for salvation. Joan of Arc‟s in this photo 
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looks up to the sky instead of looking at viewers. In some sense, she solicits naming 
from God rather than from the viewers. Her face is reflected by light from the sky, 
which shows how her subject is interpellated by Christianity. Joan of Arc‟s demand 
of her name and her salvation is limited to Christianity, an apparatus of “mere 
names.”  
However, in spite of this deviation, the women‟s faces share the hope of 
resurrection or redemption by the articulation of their pure names. Furthermore, this 
constellation of names expands into broader set of names of anonymous people in 
history. In Dictée‟s portrait photos, women‟s faces are juxtaposed with photos of 
multiple people: Yu, Kown Soon‟s photo begins the chapter, “Clio/History” and ends 
with three anonymous men who are supposedly about to be executed by Japanese 
soldiers; in another example, the chapter, “Elitere/Lyric Poetry” begins with a photo 
of multiple Koreans from supposedly from mass demonstration in Korea against 
Japanese colonization (3.1 Uprising which Yu, Kown Soon participated as a leader of 
the revolt). In this sense, Cha‟s naming extends, in a broader sense, to the names of 
all “people” in permanent exiles or suffering from the state, national, imperial, and 
colonial violence, to revive the histories of those who have fought against these 
nation-state systems. This also relates to Cha‟s shamanic exorcism, purifying the 
brutal history of Korea: Japanese colonization and the 3.1 uprising in1919; the 4.19 
revolution against Korean dictator, Seung Man Rhee in 1960; and the 5.18 massacre 
in 1980 perpetrated by the General Chun who killed thousands in Kwang-Ju area.
134
 
                                                 
134 According to her biography, when she went back to Korea, Cha and her brother, James, “were 
harassed by suspicious South Korean officials who thought they might be North Korean spies” 
(Lewallen 10); this reflects the political situation in South Korea at that time; the old dictator, Park, 
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 Names relate across history, ontological historicity of life and death, and 
individually and collectivity. But to resurrect the disconnections between bodies, 
memories, and history, name language requires another dimension of language—
translating language. Translation, alongside name language, deconstructs national 
boundaries and opens up a zone of true conversations among Cha‟s multilingual 
experiences and pure language hidden under the national language.  
 
The Fourth Moment of Language: Translation and Language of life, death and 
rebirth  
Paolo Bartoloni, in his On the Cultures of Exile, Translation, and Writing, 
extensively explores the philosophical spectrum of translation and its connection to 
exile. According to him, ontology parallels translation because both focus on 
“potentiality” that  also lies at the threshold of being and nothing, two different 
languages, two geographical points. Linguistic translation, as Benjamin in his “The 
Task of the Translator” argues, has its potential threshold, namely pure language, 
through which a word become another word; thus pure language is both origin and 
becoming (Bartoloni 10). Analogously, a body  crosses borderlines into exile, and 
being moves from “being thrown to the world” to “being-towards-death.”   
In Dictée, translation occurs on three levels: bodies, different national 
languages, and ontological language of life and death. First, Dictée contains multi-
lingual and multi-directional translations of French, English, Latin, and Korean. 
These translations share an analogy with bodily transfusions. In the chapter, 
                                                                                                                                           
had died but political uprisings and the people‟s demonstration for the hope of establishing democratic 
government was suppressed by another dictator and his atrocious massacre in Kwang-Ju in 1980.  
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“Urania/Astronomy,” ostensibly, Cha analogizes blood donation with writing. She 
says that the purposes of both activities are: 
To contain. Made filled. Be full….Something of the ink 
that resembles the stain from the interior emptied onto 
emptied into emptied upon this boundary this surface. 
More. Others. When possible ever possible to puncture to 
scratch to imprint. Expel. Ne te câche pas. Révele toi. Sang. 
Encre. Of this body‟s extention of its containment” (Dictée 
64-65)  
 
In this bilingual passage, the human membrane symbolizes a boundary or borderline, 
and bloodletting becomes a way to make the interior of the body “emptied onto, into, 
and upon” this symbolic skin, in which filling happens simultaneously with emptying. 
This paradoxical coexistence of emptying and filling corresponds with another 
possible interpretation of this scene: tattooing. Tattooing and blood donation share an 
instrument—a needle. The penetrating needle for extracting blood can conversely be 
used to infuse ink into skin. In other words, across the boundary of skin, the needle 
penetrates skin not only to extract blood but also to “puncture to scratch to imprint” 
(Dictée 64) ink below the boundary. By this comparison of bloodletting and tattooing, 
“something of the ink” resembles “the stain from the interior”—the blood. Alongside 
these parallel bodily registers of bloodletting and tattooing, a body translation 
unconceals of wordplay and “the emergence of body as pure language” in the passage 
about blood donation—“Sang. Encre. Of this body‟s extention of its containment” 
(Dictée 65). In French, sang is “blood,” and encre is “ink.” Then, diseuse calls forth, 
“Révele toi,” which can be translated into “unconceal you” in English. Cha show how 
this unconcealment discloses “an anatomy of the body of exile trapped between 
English and French” (Dictée 136).  
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On the geopolitical level, bloodletting and tattooing become parallel 
transfusions in opposite directions and symbolize trans-spatial beings‟ exiles and 
returning. Namely, if immigration, crossing a borderline, is to transfuse immigrant‟s 
body to another country, it also means scripting identity on one‟s body, while one‟s 
memory and language is to be taken away.  On the philosophical level, Cha discloses 
the similarity and difference between textual inscription and bodily transfusion. 
Blood can connect two people by transfusion; likewise texts can connect the reader 
and writer. But this comparison is disrupted by an intentional neologism, “extention,” 
(Dictée 136) which might be a combination of “extension” and “intention.” In the 
philosophical tradition, “extension” has been associated with Descartes‟s term that 
refers to the space a body occupies, and “intention” has been the central topic of 
epistemology, especially phenomenology. Thus, “extention” is the philosophical 
hybrid term that mixes materialism and epistemology. Cha intentionally uses this 
neologism to deconstruct traditional philosophy‟s separation of mind and body as 
well as its containment that signifies the inhibition of flow. Therefore, “extention of 
its containment” implies discursive, philosophical restraints that limit the free flow of 
blood, thoughts, texts, and life. 
Furthermore, the flow itself is reciprocal. Minh-ha explains “the association of 
blood, saliva, and ink [is] intensified in French by the resonance between sang and 
encre and sans encre (without ink)” (“White” 38). Bodily sang and textual encre has 
its potentiality of sans encre. Resonating with the philosophical association of 
“extention” as the deconstructed relation between body and mind and “containment” 
as restriction, the co-existence of “Being” and “emptiness” in both “ink” and “blood” 
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reveals the relation between “concealment” and “unconcealment.” If something is 
concealed within containment, it will look like “emptiness,” But if something is 
unconcealed, its truth or Being will be revealed. The transfusion of blood between 
two bodies and the transition of texts via ink share this philosophical correlation of 
“being” and “emptiness.” In other words, this set of French words is paradoxically 
related to the double bind of “fulfillment,” maximizing potential for future 
fulfillment, and “emptying out,” making a space void. This parallels the process of 
translation as readers translate French into English or English to French, which in turn 
parallels the transfusion of blood and geopolitical movement of trans-spatial being.  
Indeed, words do not flow between languages. We are not able to see the 
transitional phases between two languages during translation. Only through 
translation from French to English can the English speaker understand the implication 
of this word play as well as other phrases in French. We tend to think that words can 
be transferred across boundaries of national languages and keep their original 
meaning, but most post-Benjaminian translation theories deny this possibility. For 
example, the mere translation of “Sang, Encre” to “blood, ink” does not account for 
homonyms of “sans encre (without ink),” which unconceals a paradoxical space of 
words, bodies, and trans-spatial experience across linguistic, geopolitical, and 
ontological boundaries. Like ink and blood flowing between body and the needle for 
inscription on body, translation as the transition of something original between two 
languages hides the real process of translations. The role of translation is related to 
the emancipation and disinterment of the origin and its dream of freedom. In this way, 
translation is the mode of finding the origin of language or pure language because “if 
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on the one hand pure language is the essential, the origin, on the other it is also 
becoming, the fluid, the incessant, and the indistinct” (Bartoloni 10). After Cha‟s 
description of her blood donation experience, a lyric appears on the right page with its 
translation on the left page in French:  
J‟ecoutais les cygnes 
Les cygnes dans la pluie. J‟ecoutais. 
J‟ai entendu des paroles vrai 
Ou pas vari 
Impossible a dire 
 
La. Des annees après 
Impossible de distinguer la Pluie 
Cygnes. Paroles souveus. Deja dit. 
Vien de dire. Va dire. 
Souvenu mal entendu. Pas certain. 
 
La pluie fait rever de sons 
Des pauses. Exhalation. 
Des affirmations toutes les affirmations. 
…. 
 
La langue dedans. La bouche dedans 
La gorge dedans 
Le poumon l‟organe seul 
Tout ensemble un. Une. 
…. 
La. Plus tard, peu certain, si c‟etait 
La pluie, la parole, memoire. 
Memoire d‟un reve 
Comment cela s‟eteint. Comment 
l‟eteindre. 
Alors que cela 
S‟eteint. 
I heard the swans 
In the rain I heard 
I listened to the spoken true 
Or not true 
Not possible to say. 
 
There. Years after 
No more possible to distinguish the rain. 
No more. Which was heard. 
Swans. Speech. Memory. Already said. 
Will just say. Having just said. 
Remembered not quite heard. Not 
certain. 
Heard not at all. 
 
Rain dreamed from sounds. 
The pauses. Exhaltation. 
Affirmations. All the affirmations. 
…. 
  
Tongue inside the mouth inside 
The throat inside 
The lung organ alone. The only organ. 
All assembled as one. Just one. 
…. 
There. Later. Uncertain, if it was  
the rain, the speech, memory. 
Re  membered from dream. 
How it diminishes itself. How to Dim 
 266 
  
The first stanza is made up of synesthetic signs. Here swans are objects not 
seen bur rather heard. An obvious reference is that Cha is listening to Saint-Saens‟ 
“swan,” thinking about her memory. Alternatively, as several scholars point out, 
“cygnes” in French has two meanings: “swans” and “signs.” From this viewpoint, the 
diseuse hears “signs in the rain” rather than “swans in the rain.” Strangely enough, the 
diseuse is actually reminiscing about “the spoken” by someone, hearing these “signs” 
or “swans,” and wonders if what was spoken is true or not; she then confesses that 
she cannot decide. This wonder and doubt occurs through time. “Years after,” still the 
diseuse cannot distinguish the rain from swans/signs, the speech from memory 
because it was “Already said. Will just say. Having just said. Remembered not quite 
heard” (Dictée 67). The rain is a cue that triggers the intentional association of 
swans/signs and someone‟s speech from her own memory. Because everything except 
“rain” dwells in imagination or memory, time loses its demarcations between the past, 
the present, and the future; thus, “rain dreamed from sounds. The pauses. Exhaltation. 
Affirmations. All the affirmations.”  
 
Morder la langue. 
Avaler profondement. Plus 
profondement. 
Avaler. Plus encore. 
Jusqu‟a ce qu‟il n‟y aurait plus. 
D‟organe. 
Plus d‟organe. 
Cries 
Inish itself. As 
It dims.  
 
To bite the tongue. 
Swallow. Deep. Deeper. 
Swallow. Again even more. 
Just until there would be no more of 
organ. 
Organ no more. 
Cries    (Dictée 66-69).  
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This mysterious passage deconstructs the marked differences between national 
languages (English and French) and affirms something that transcends boundaries 
between national languages. For example, a word is inserted in this passage, 
“exhaltation.” “Exhaltation” is not a word per se, but a typo of exhalation or 
exaltation. “Exhaltation” can be pronounced as either “exhalation” or “exaltation.” 
Those “h” or “t” functions like “a” in Derrida‟s différance, which shows how 
meaning is always deferred, and writing hides subversion against speech in both 
cases. Does this deconstruction operate as Derrida‟s différance to reveal the 
superiority of writing over the speech?  
 Partly yes and partly no, because there is another logic in these 
deconstructions. As Derrida claims, deconstruction creates a new language.
135
 
“Exaltation,” “exhalation” and “affirmation” do not need to be translated from 
English to French or vice versa because these words are the same in English and 
French. French and English becomes one identical language at this time, which 
deconstructs the purpose of Cha‟s translation: to find a conduit to the pure language 
between two languages. “Exhaltation” may mean an “exalted exhalation” or happy 
articulation, in context with “affirmation.” In this sense, Cha does not intend to reveal 
the hidden privileges of writing but to deconstruct the system of national language 
itself and show the equivalence and gaps between writing and bodily speech. The 
purposes of this double deconstruction and Cha‟s search for a pure language leads to 
two significant motives of this lyric: to restore and reveal a pure language that 
                                                 
135 Derrida claims, deconstruction is to invent one‟s “own new language if you can or want to hear 
mine; invent if you can or want to give my language to be understood” (Monolingualism of the Other 
57). 
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transcends the demarcations between writing and speech and the revelation of her 
mother tongue.  
In addition, Cha employs parody and pun. This lyric parodies Baudelaire‟s 
poem, “Le cygnet.”136 In fact, the diseuse‟s “the spoken” refers to Baudelaire‟s poem, 
and Cha remembers his poem while listening to the rain and associating Baudelaire‟s 
swans/signs. This reference hides Cha‟s connectivity to Baudelaire‟s dream in exile. 
In the lyric, Baudelaire, as a flâneur, roams Paris and spots a swan drenched in filth. 
It symbolizes the disgraced poet in modern Paris. The swan‟s desperate but futile 
efforts to escape disgrace stretch Baudelaire‟s poetic imagination to an epic figure in 
a Greek myth who tried to exile herself—Andromache. The sound of the rain 
instigates Baudelaire‟s association of Greek myth and swan, and his dream of 
freedom; similarly, the diseuse imagines Baudelaire‟s swan listening to the sound of 
rain at a different time and place. Rain connects the two worlds of the diseuse and 
Baudelaire where swans become conjunctive signs sharing the same ideas—freedom 
and redemption.  
By this parody hidden in translation, the diseuse‟s melancholic mood over the 
dream of freedom from her exile points to Baudelaire‟s across time and space. But the 
diseuse does not just identify herself with Baudelaire. The “affirmation” is not an 
affirmation of the repetition and the communicability between two worlds across 
different spaces and times (19
th
 century Paris and an unknown place in 20
th
 century), 
                                                 
136 According to Park: “„[i]n French, langue‟ denotes both tongue and language equally; the poem goes 
on to demonstrate the swallowing of sentences, paragraphs, and ultimately, all speech…the exact echo 
of sound between „cygnet‟ and „sign‟ locks the swan into a devastating muteness; it is forced to 
become an image. The English, however, cannot register the homonym of swan and sign in French. 
Cha does add a couple of words to the line English („Remnants. Missing.‟), yet she does not attempt to 
compensate for the lost connection between swan and sign in French” (Apparitions of Asia 140).  
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but a stage for presenting another question about language itself and the 
communicability between languages. Why does Cha resurrect Baudelaire‟s swan and 
its world? Why does Cha translate her own lyric in English parodying Baudelaire‟s 
“swan” into French on the facing page? 
The answer centers on “redemption,” and “freedom” which are also 
Baudelaire‟s themes in the poem. Translation is redemptive act, which can be 
compared to breathing life into the body of a literary work. It is redemptive because it 
transmits something in the original that cannot be transmitted by a national language. 
It requires something that is immanent to and at the same time transcendental to the 
national languages, which Benjamin calls the pure language. According to Smerick, 
this pure language “lies at the heart of creation,” and is analogous with Heidegger‟s 
“Being in beings” (49). In fact, parody is a mode of translation if it shares this pure 
language. The pure language in Cha‟s lyric is hidden under the dream of freedom 
which is the essence of the translation because “freedom proves its worth in the 
interest of the pure language by its effect on its own language” and “it is the task of 
the translator to release in his own language that pure language which is exiled among 
alien tongues, to liberate the language imprisoned in a work in his re-creation of the 
work” (Benjamin, “The Task” 261). But by erratic translations and deconstructions, 
Cha emphasizes that the rebirth of language has to precede the death of language that 
corresponds with the life/language cycle of life, death, and rebirth of life. The death 
of language is hidden but related to the pure language. The dead language is her 
mother tongue. 
 270 
In this sense, the diseuse sings, “Both time hollowing. Cavity. And 
germination. Both times. From death from sleep the appel. Both time appellant. 
Toward the movement. The movement itself. She return the word. She returns to 
word, its silence. If only once. Once inside. Moving.” (Dictée 151). In this quote, 
“appel” and “appellant” are French words, meaning “call,” and “calling.” Without 
these translations, the meaning of this quote becomes ambiguous. Translation 
resurrects by calling “death from sleep” to resurrect and to return to its pure language. 
Translation takes the dead word (already written) in one language to resurrect in the 
translator‟s mind. In truth, the translator writes down the pure language in the 
different words of the future—as if translation awakes the dead to be resurrected. 
Now collective resurrection via ontological language—name language and 
translation—becomes chaosmological language to disclose the origins of these names.  
 
The Fifth Moment: Creolization and Language of Redemption 
As a multi-genre collage of letters, images and movie-stills, Dictée starts with 
a photo: a desert with rocks shaped like human faces. This photo as visual preface 
contains the core ideas of memory, writing and origins in Dictée. The photo of the 
desert depicts rocks in the shapes of human heads. This series of rocks shows that 
Dictée will consist of the repetition of similar themes and representations of those 
themes with qualitative difference. Yet, what else does this petrification of human 
forms signify? The answer lies in the meaning of “thingness” of “things/rocks” in the 
shape of humans within nature. In fact, the desert and the rock in a shape of a 
pyramid in the photo does not “mean” anything at all; they are just unnoticeable 
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background as voids filled with an unrepresentable, mysterious something, but these 
voids in fact foreground the rocks to create a constellation. This constellation 
suggests how humanity is a small part of “things” in universe. Then, what does the 
“things,” the series of rock with human shapes, mean? These things correlate with a 
ring of people and their congregation for resurrection of the dead in the shape of 
constellation. Constellation changes as if it were women congregating and their 
circular dances. 
 For instance, in the chapter, “Terpischore/Choral Dance,” Cha associates the 
image of choral dance as a rite for redemption or resurrection and a scene of genesis 
mixed with the scene of articulation. This connection between genesis and 
articulation counters Western logos because it spouts from the earth, commingling 
cosmological four elements (earth, air, sky and human); it also alludes to a register of 
ancient Eastern cosmology—“Ng Hang,” meaning “Fifth, the five elements, Metal, 
Wood, Water, Fire, Earth” (173). The chapter starts with ten registers of Eastern 
cosmology in Chinese characters (154) and moves to a renunciation that “you remain 
dismembered with the belief that magnolia blossoms while even on seemingly dead 
branches and you wait. You remain apart from the congregation” (Dictée 155). The 
diseuse regrets that she did not believe in the rebirth and redemption in the future, and 
therefore remains apart from the congregation.  
 After this renunciation, the diseuse waits until “[she] can see through the dark 
earth the beginning of a root, the air entering with the water being poured dark earth 
harbouring dark taken for granted the silence and the dark the conception seedling” 
(Dictée 156). Darkness of the earth symbolizes silence, and the root symbolizes the 
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diseuse‟s tongue/ language (langue) that waits to articulate. This analysis of speech 
and genesis continues to the total darkness as nothingness or a void without time and 
space; the diseuse sings, “Affords no penetration. Hence no depth. No disruption. 
Hence no time. No wait. Hence. No distance. Full. Utter most full. Can contain any 
longer…Fulmination and concealment of light…The time thought to have fixed, 
dead, reveals the very rate of the very movement. Velocity. Lentitude. Of its larger 
time” (Dictée 156-57). As the diseuse sings, the darkness as a void space conceals 
light, which moves slowly (lentitude „slowness‟) and indiscernibly. This transition 
from chaos to light is also a passage “to core. In another tongue. Same word. Slight 
mutation of the same. Undefinable. Shift. Shift slightly. Into a different sound. The 
difference” (Dictée 157). The passage from chaos to the open associates body and 
language as well as brings forth Glissant‟s totality where “difference in and the 
difference of similarity are brought to light” (Oakley, Common Places 35).  
 This relay of differences for the genesis and articulation of body-language is 
possible not only because of the diseuse‟s communication with things or fundamental 
elements on the earth but also the earth‟s potentiality to spout life and language. The 
diseuse sings:  
You seek the night that you might render the air pure. 
Distillation extending breath to its utmost pure. Its first 
exhale at dawn to be collected…You stand a column of 
white luster, atoned with tears, restored in 
breath….Maimed. Accident. Stutters. Almost a name. Half 
a name. Almost a place. Starts. About to. Then 
stop…exhale swallowed to a sudden arrest…Earth is dark. 
Darker…Cry supplication wail resound song to the god to 
barter you, your sight. For the lenience. Make lenient, the 
immobility of sediment. Entreat with prayer to the god his 
eloquence. To conduct to stone. Thawing of the knotted 
flesh. Your speech as ransom…And you wait. Still. Having 
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bartered away your form, now you are formless. Blind. 
Mute…Waiting. Scribe. Diving. In whiteness beyond 
matter. Sight. Speech. (Dictée 158-59)  
 
This passage shows the constellation of the ideas of void, name, body, earth, writing, 
and speech. Here Cha‟s language initiates as “maimed” half a name, but its other half 
has potentiality to start from the dark earth, chaos-monde. The poet in the eternal 
exile “entreat[s] with” mystic language for the redemption of presences and voices of 
the dead buried under the earth. Ironically, the poet can restore the power of language 
for redemption because her language is made up of “the name, Half a name, 
Forgotten word leaving out a word,” and this pure, earthlike, and corporeal language 
is “being broken. Speaking broken. Saying broken. Talk broken. Say broken. Broken 
speech. Pidgon tongue. Broken word…As spoken, To be said. Then speak” (Dictée 
161). Significantly enough, Cha intentionally replace “pigeon” with a typo, “Pidgon.” 
In “Pidgon” a letter “e” is missing; this lost “e” becomes a hidden caesura or a void of 
creolized language in which all beings lost in the diaspora abide and wait for the 
future redemption. This replacement or intentional typo correlates to Glissant‟s 
creolization. 
 Glissant‟s creolization originates from melancholy as the mood of trans-
spatiality (exile and errancy); this mood emerges because “the exile readily admits 
that [trans-spatial being] suffers most from the impossibility of communicating in his 
language. The root is monolingual…the call of Relation is heard, but it is not yet a 
fully present experience” (Poetics 15). Glissant‟s creolization is not the denial of the 
root of language, a pure, name language of trans-spatial beings‟ redemption and 
freedom. “Pidgon” hides this creolization to retain its full potentiality under the veil 
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of a typo. That is to say, Cha‟s “beginning of a root” (Dictée 156) is thus the language 
of the origin which is creolized and presents a void and name as its ideas. The 
creolized void relates to the poeticized; Glissant‟s poetics of relation is in truth a 
philosophical speculation about the relation between his life experience as a trans-
spatial being from the third world and his critical and philosophical theorization of 
ontological “Being” as poetic “Relation.” Aesthetics and philosophy, as Heidegger 
also claims, are neighbors. The poeticized is the totality where aesthetics abuts 
philosophy and engenders its ethico-onological questions of the world and humanity. 
Language of the origin, in the context of name language, dream language, life 
language, and pure language are thus the borderline between life, philosophy, and art. 
All these are related, and all create poetics of relation as a constellation.  
Cha is a trans-spatial poet, always in exile like the ancient Greek poets 
expelled from Plato‟s political utopia, the trobar, middle ages European bards, 
Baudelaire, who dreamt of freedom from filthy modernity, and all other trans-spatial 
poets in exiles. All these origins convolute around a concept—the name of a void or a 
“bowl.” One of the primary forms of this new language in Dictée is mystic language 
and its writing which purports to create a void as a third space of desubjectification 
and the invocation of other forgotten women‟s presences and voices. 
 
Sixth Moment: The Names of Void: Khora and Tao 
As Bartoloni argues, Heidegger and Benjamin delved into the meanings of the 
origin deeper than other philosophers; yet, what they found is the “impossibility of 
returning”. We lost our origin eternally, not because the origin cannot be found with 
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the help of archaeology or genealogy, but because it is either future-oriented (in case 
of Heidegger) or “philosophical mediator” (in case of Benjamin) (Bartoloni 39). 
Therefore, the origin becomes a future space of potentiality. Agamben argues in his 
“Absolute immanence” that potentiality is the subject of the coming philosophy 
where contemplation without knowledge can occur because “there will be little sense 
in distinguishing between organic life and animal life or even between biological life 
and contemplative life and between bare life and the life of the mind” (Potentiality 
239). Life is a space of thoughts and a living body; thereby it is the space of infinite 
potentiality to make something new happen in its future. But this life as a space of 
potentiality must be void because nothing has to happen now. This space is also a 
potential poetic space where new language emerges corresponding with the living 
body and finally becomes the living space itself. Creative writing emerges from the 
mixture of mood, relations with things in the world, gathering of thoughts and 
inspiration to germinate something new. Ancient people in the West and the East 
knew this potent potentiality by naming them as Khora and Tao, and Cha‟s literary 
space is the Khora and Tao that also possess the form of a receptacle or bowl with a 
void inside.  
In Dictée, this mysterious origin of void and name emerges in a cryptic 
passage: 
Dead time. Hollow depression interred  invalid to 
resurgence, resistant to memory. Waits. Apel. Apellation. 
Excavation. Let the one who is diseuse. Diseuse de bonne 
aventure. Let her call forth. Let her break open the spell cast 
upon time upon time again and again. With her voice, 
penetrate earth’s floor, the walls of Tartaurus to circle and 
scratch the bowl’s surface. Let the sound enter from without, 
the bowl’s hollow its sleep. Until. (123; italics in original)  
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Tartaurus, as both a deity and a space, represents the chaos before the cosmos 
emerge. Mostly described in Hesiod‟s Greek classic, Homeric Hymns, Epic Cycle, 
Homerica, and briefly mentioned in Plato‟s Phaedo and Gorgias, Tartaurus is both 
the name of the deity who marries Gaea,
137
 the great mother of the earth, and the 
space of chaos in which the sinner will be judged. Tartaurus relates to the mysterious 
object in the quote—the bowl. As Cha‟s allusion to Tartaurus proves, the well of the 
origin in Dictée corresponds with Greek myths. The whole structure of Dictée is 
significantly influenced by the Greek gender-specific name of void—Khora.138 Like 
Plato‟s chaotic space of becoming, Khora is the name of rebirth as well as void on 
which Dictée‟s poeticized centers.  
Cha contemplates on the meaning of the void of the bowl obsessively because 
it contains every memory and its future. The diseuse sings,  
All rise. At once. One by one. Voices absorbed into the 
bowl of sound. Rise voices shifting upwards circling the 
bowl‟s hollow. In deep metal voice spiraling up  wards to 
pools   no visible light lighter   no audible higher quicken 
shiver the air in pool‟s waves to raise all else where all 
memory all echo. (162)  
 
                                                 
137 Gaea marries Tartaurus and gives birth to Uranus, who becomes her second husband. After betrayed 
by Uranus, Gaea‟s other sons are incarcerated in Tartaurus, a dungeon, so that Gaea attacks and 
castrate Uranus to revenge. Cha intentionally appropriate this Greek mythology to connect literary 
space, creation, violence, suffering and redemption.  
138 In Timaeus, Plato talks about the mysterious space of Khora which means both receptacle and void. 
Timaeus, as the book of cosmology, is written in a form of dialogue, and its content is a mixture of 
mythos (myth) and logos (science). In Timaeus‟ cosmos, everything is in contradictory: “being” and 
“the same” coexist but contradict and sublate “becoming” and “difference.” In this dialogue, Plato‟s 
being is also a permanently unchanging form of necessity and intellect (nous) as much as becoming is 
the changing form of the sensible. Yet, different from these two categories, Khora is something 
epistemologically incomprehensible but has a figure of “receptacle of all becoming—its wetnurse, as it 
were” (38); that is, Khora is an undefinable name with an attribute of femaleness. More strangely, 
Plato says, Khora cannot be named because “it is not correct to refer to…by their usual names” (Zeyl 
lviii). It contains other things but is also a space where “they perish” (Plato 39).  
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The image of “bowl” and its “hollowness” has its origin in Khora in the West. But 
whose voices are echoing in this Khora but the diseuse‟s which echoes all other 
women‟s voices. These collective voices from the diseuse‟s collective memory 
require the void within this bowl for full potentiality. Every woman‟s voice can be 
put in and put out simultaneously because this void is the space of pure taking-place. 
To maximize the potentiality, Khora must be a space of the void where everything 
can happen because nothing dwells in it but rather in transit.  
Derrida also suggests the idea of Khora as trans-spatial poet‟s space. Derrida 
interprets Khora as the space of trans-spatial poets‟ songs and holds that trans-spatial 
poets resemble Khora because, like Socrates, one “situates [oneself] or institutes 
[oneself] as a receptive addressee…as a receptacle of all that will henceforth be 
inscribed” (On the Name110;italics in original).139 Khora is the name of those trans-
spatial beings‟ experience that cannot be transferred or contained but can be imitated. 
Khora only happens as “as if”—“a series of mythic fictions embedded mutually in 
each other” (113). It is a receptacle of “all stories, ontological or mythic … but … 
Khora herself, so to speak, does not become the object of any tale, whether true or 
fabled” (On the Name 117).  
                                                 
139 After discussing the paradoxical aspects of Khora, Derrida, in the analysis of the structure of 
Timaeus in resonance with the meaning of Khora, moves to its meaning of absolutely erratic, errant 
Otherness. Othereness dominates not only a part of Khora but the whole narrative structure and 
identity of the narrator in Timaeus. The main speaker of this dialogue—Timaeus—is a trans-spatial 
philosopher; he is not a Greek citizen but an Italian. This corresponds with the fact that this dialogue 
starts with a story of a journey of Solon, a Greek politician, to Egypt. Solon‟s journey to a mysterious 
land resonates with Timaeus‟ story of pre-cosmos as a receptacle or a bowl that connotes chaos or 
space for “erratic, hence unintelligible and unpredictable” contents (Zeyl xxv). In reality, 
corresponding with its unnamable proper name and the female figure of receptacle as well as its full 
potentiality and Otherness, as Derrida claims, Khora is in lieu of those trans-spatial beings as erratic, 
wandering bards (genos) who do not have their race (ethnos) and so becomes Others. The diseuse‟s 
voice turns into trans-spatial poets‟ songs echoing forgotten women‟s voices in history. 
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The Bowl in Dictée also has another name in the East—Tao. Some Dictée 
scholars have argued that Dictée is immensely influenced by Eastern philosophy in its 
mystic writing style. In Poetics of Emptiness, Jonathan Stalling explores poetics of 
emptiness in Dictée by delving into influence from Taoism. Stalling argues, Dictée 
“makes available distinct cultural spaces conditioned by unique shamanic and Taoist 
cosmogonies left unaddressed by the growing field of Cha scholarship” (158).140 One 
ostensible example is Cha‟s use of a Taoist diagram in Dictée “that traces the 
universe‟s cosmogonic origins from (and back toward) the void/emptiness” (Stalling 
163). Like Khora, Tao does not have its specific name, while it holds a pure name for 
creation and redemption by its symbolization of female body
141
. In chapter eleven of 
Tao Te Ching, the bowl image is also compared with the ultimate potentiality: 
“[t]hirty spokes are unived around the hub to make a wheel, but it is on its non-being 
that the utility of the carriage depends” (119). In the image of a wheel, Tao is fully 
potential and potent because its emptiness is ultimately useful for future use; likewise 
the wheel can sustain its weight because it consists of thirty spokes with the void 
between them. Therefore, “Tao is empty (like a bowl). It may be used but its capacity 
                                                 
140 The void or “Emptiness” is the core of Taoism no less than it is the center of Buddhism. In case of 
Buddhism, “emptiness” or “the void” “designates deprivation, in another fulfillment” (Conze 60). The 
connection via emptiness across these two Eastern religions happened; according to Conze, “when 
China Buddhism fused with Neo-Taoism, „emptiness‟ became the latest potentiality from which all 
things come forth, and it beame usual to say, in cosmological sense, that all things go out of emptiness 
and return to it” (61).  
141Like Khora, Tao has its name but this name is in its pure sense chaotic. In fact, Tao (or Dao) 
primarily means “the way” which is truth or law of the world. Tao does not have specific meaning, but 
it can be everything and nothing; like Khora, Tao is mystic from its beginning because it is not the 
name or word that has universality. The first four lines of the first stanzas of the Tao Te Ching shows 
mysterious “way” of Tao and why it is non-universal name; “The Tao that can be told of is not the 
eternal Tao; The name that can be named is the origin of Heaven and earth; The named is the mother 
of all things (道可道 非常道, 名可名 非常名.無名 天地之始, 有名 萬物之母)” (97). Oxymoron plays an 
important role here. Tao is name of universe or thing that does not have it specific name, but it is 
constantly changing its forms and naming everything in the world. More interestingly, the sexuality of 
Tao is not male but female. Tao is in some sense is like a womb or a receptacle that is able to contain 
and name everything, simultaneously emptying out and erasing the names of everything.  
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is never exhausted. It is bottomless, perhaps the ancestor of all things” (Lao Tuz 105). 
And this bowl is female like “The spirit of the valley […which] is called profound 
female” (Lao Tuz 110). Tao is a feminine bowl and has the Bartleby‟s logic of full 
potentiality; the oxymoron that the weakest is the strongest is possible because Tao is 
ethical ground of animal cry. The image of this bowl as full potentiality leads to the 
last chapter of Dictée that also repeats Western Tao—Khora.  
The Last Moment: On My Way Home 
Dictée ends with a chapter of “Polymia/Sacred Poetry.” Polymia in Greek 
means literary “many hymns.” This polymia make the bowl of the constellation peal 
with collective hymns. In this chapter, a storyteller relates the story of when she went 
back home after her adventure to find medicine to save her parents and met a silent 
woman who dips water out of a well. The sound of dipping water out of the wall 
“becomes audible. The wooden bucket hitting the sides echoes inside the well before 
it falls into the water. Earth is hollow. Beneath”(Dictée 167). This hollow, void earth 
as the most extensive bowl has the full potentiality for making lives germinate. This 
image of Gaea as the bowl resonates with the image of the silent woman‟s “small 
porcelain bowl.” The diseuse describes how the bowl with “chipped marks on it were 
stained with age, and there ran a vein towards the foot of the bowl where it was 
beginning to crack” (Dictée 168). This cracked bowl containing water alludes to the 
valley in Tao Te Ching that symbolizes the receptacle of life and female fertility: 
“The valley spirit never dies, / It is the mysterious female./ The gate of the mysterious 
female,/ Is the root of Heaven and Earth. /It exists forever in continuum, /And using 
it, it is inexhaustible” (61). Tao is the name and not name of the female body whose 
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metaphor is the valley and this valley is an “inexhaustible” “continuum” that 
“manifests the immanence of humankind” (Dictée 140). The concave form that holds 
infinite forms of lives is full of the potentiality that only women are able to sustain. 
The girl drinks water from the mute woman‟s bowl and is invigorated in a 
pose:  she “hugged her knees and her small palm wrapped perfectly the roundness of 
the bowl.” Then, the woman instructs the girl that to save her parents the girl “must 
serve the medicines inside the bowl.” The bowl is a shamanistic instrument to save 
the parents. With the bundle containing the bowl and ten pockets that symbolize 10 
chapters in Dictée, the girl went back home and she sees “through the paper screen 
door, dusk had entered and the shadow of a small cradle was flickering” (Dictée 170). 
This dusk, sweeping back to the first chapter of this dissertation, echoes with the 
dawn in Heidegger‟s Occident. “I,” the writer of this dissertation, is on the way home. 
Home, the home of my soul and my future. Dictée will accompany me in my trans-
spatial journey.  
  
 281 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
MY TEACHING STORY  
AND THE TRANS-SPATIAL DREAM OF A HAPPINESS 
 
I have achieved what I set out to achieve.  
But do not tell me that it was not worth the trouble. 
In any case, I am not appealing for my man‟s verdict, 
I am only imparting knowledge, 
I am only making a report.  
To you also, honored Members of the Academy, 
I have only made a report. 
(Kafka, “A Report to an Academy” 259) 
 
The contemporary is not only the one who,  
perceiving the darkness of the present,  
grasps a light that can never reach its destiny;  
the contemporary is also the one who,  
dividing and interpolating time,  
is capable of transforming it and putting it  
in the relation with other times.  
(Agamben, Nudities 18) 
 
Have you ever said Yes to a single joy? O my friends, 
Then you said Yes too to all woe. 
All things are entangled, ensnared, enamored;  
if ever you wanted one thing twice, if ever you said,  
“You please me, happiness! Abide, moment!” 
then you wanted all black. 
All anew, all eternally, all entangled, ensnared, enamored—oh, 
Then you loved the world. 
(Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra 323; emphasis in original) 
 
 In 2012, five years after Cho Seung Hui‟s massacre on the campus of Virginia 
Tech, another Korean killer initiated a slaughter on a university campus. This Korean 
immigrant, according to the New York Times, killed seven people at “Oikos 
 282 
University, a Christian college affiliated with a Korean-American church, Praise to 
God Korean Church…near Oakland International Airport where there are many 
Korean-American businesses” (Wollan & Onish). The killer is identified as “One L. 
Goh,” which ignores the Korean naming system insofar as there is no middle name 
(his original name is Goh, One-Il but I could not find any media that name him 
correctly). This shooting shows an uncanny repetition of a Korean loner‟s monstrous 
transformation into an American gunman, the consequence of longtime suffering 
from alienation and others‟ ignorance. However, unlike the Virginia Tech massacre, 
this time most of the victims were Korean Americans or immigrants. Perhaps due to 
the ethnicity of its victims, this case did not catch Americans‟ attentions as much as 
Cho‟s case. But I feel more uncanniness than ever before. Maybe it is because I am 
ethnically closer to these victims and the killer.  
 Here is one unsolved contradiction of my dissertation: though I propose 
throughout this dissertation the necessity of the philosophical ideas of form-of-life 
and coming community as the fundamental philosophical and aesthetic approach to 
life and community, my dissertation is about Asian immigrants‟ experiences. 
Likewise, as I have been in an identity politics that defines me as a stranger during 
my time in the U.S., how can I solve this paradox? My answer is that this 
fundamentally ethico-ontological proposition is just the foundational work for future 
tasks. The limit of my dissertation is the starting point for future research on other 
possibilities of trans-spatiality and its potentiality. To this extent, rather than 
summarizing and cramming the whole of my dissertation into a small conclusion 
here, I will suggest one possibility for trans-spatiality via a narrative about my 
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teaching and learning in the U.S. My teaching experiences show how I Otherized 
myself in order to escape the identity politics in which I was entangled, while at the 
same time, demonstrate how I rethought the fundamental ground of my identity as a 
trans-spatial teacher facing and creating dissensus. This narrative mostly comes from 
the collaborative paper “Deconstructing Whiteliness in the Globalized Classroom,” 
which transcribes my conversations with a white female teacher. This concluding 
narrative has a very personal voice in order to deliver my own story without being 
dubbed by others‟ voices, though I include several theoretical voices in order to 
connect my narrative experience with broader ideas. 
So, in this narrative, I am asking self-reflectively: who am I? What am I doing 
in this Midwest city? My hypothesis is that what I am and where I am located share 
one similar discourse—I am an Other.142 This “otherness” is a cultural, racial, 
linguistic, and even ontological discourse that defines the significance of my presence 
as a teacher and as a learner. I use the word “ontological” because here my presence 
itself becomes highly problematic, and on this foundational instability, discourses of 
race, nation, and globalization are embedded. Pivoting on the question of the 
connections between a teacher‟s linguistic, national, and cultural identities and 
pedagogy, my voice and presence also saunters around an untraditional experience. 
I am testifying here what I experienced as a desubjectified (racial and 
national) Other meeting Others (American/other international students and 
colleagues) in the swamp of unexpected conflicts mostly related to racism and 
                                                 
142 As Homi Bhabha claims in the introduction of Nation and Narrative, “The other is never outside or 
beyond us; it emerges forcefully, within cultural discourse, when we think we speak most intimately 
and indigenously „between ourselves‟” (4); the “other” in my discussion does not refer to someone 
outside or beyond “me,” “us,” or “them.” Rather, Others are ontological otherizations happening in-
between ourselves.  
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globalization. The best analogous example that represents a similar experience to 
mine is Entre les Murs (The Class) directed by Laurent Cantet. In this movie, a 
French teacher is struggling with his internalized prejudices and racism, only to be 
locked in his own racial, gendered, and national wall by insulting and punishing an 
African student and a rude but dauntless white female student. Each time the 
instructor tries to avoid racism, classism, and other discrimination, he falls into a trap 
of self-righteousness. However, this movie is not stuck in blaming one‟s self or 
others. The best scene in the movie is when the teacher tries to keep a heated and 
precarious discussion, aimed for disagreement, going with his students. Though his 
position is unstable and his arguments get slippery and sloppy, he denies ending his 
endeavor to engage in discussion with his students.  
In this respect, the movie presents a hard but positive truth that the classroom 
can be a space not of consensus but of dis-consensus and radical equality. The radical 
equality happens when a teacher courageously abandons his assumptions about his 
own authority and students‟ unrecognized unstable identities to get in a debate off 
guard with students. This can be possible only when the teacher discovers/realizes 
how his position is ultimately (over)determined by prefabricated layers of oppressive 
(racial, national, gender, etc.) formations on the state and global levels. Disorientation 
is a necessary pedagogical step in this sense, especially in the globalized classroom 
where culture shock, misunderstanding, misrecognition, alienation, and dislocation 
happen regardless of a teacher‟s assumed position.   
In truth, I have experienced these kinds of quandaries several times while 
teaching in the U.S. and have had unexpected learning moments in these classes. I at 
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first felt disoriented because this radically shook the foundation of my being‟s “there” 
that I had thought I belonged to nationally, racially, linguistically, culturally, and 
ontologically. When I was in Korea, I was a racially and nationally unproblematic 
being; I was one of “we,” namely, an ordinary Korean speaking Korean among other 
Koreans. Though I experienced class or regional discrimination sometimes, I was 
never exposed to racial issues and never thought of myself as a racial Other in Korea. 
But here in the U.S., walking, talking, sulking, and eating, I feel disoriented and 
sometimes discriminated against. It takes time to bear people‟s suspicious looks, 
pretentious kindness, hospitality hiding hostility, and the racial assumption that I am a 
shy, sly, and effeminate Asian male, the most prominent stereotypes of Asians. Yet, 
this disorientation and estrangement is not a negative experience. No, this was, is, and 
will be a positive trans-spatial experience. Going through this experience, I have been 
able to attain authenticity because of my experience of being an Other without a solid 
identity. In fact, I have been able to find a real “I” under the “otherization” that put 
my identity into more complex (racial, national, gender) discourses. Also, 
heterogeneosity and becoming an Other has uncovered my hidden ethos (dwelling 
place in Greek) where globalization is embodied. If I kept living in Korea as a being 
in a nationally, racially homogenous space, I could not have had this chance to 
speculate on potential alterity in my presence because I was inured to colorblindness 
and internal racism in Korea. 
 For the most part, my experience is a result of globalization. I can be here 
because I am a body moving across borders—a trans-spatial being. But, as Negri and 
Hardt posit, “Globalization must be met with a counter-globalization” (Empire 207). 
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In fact, the U.S. town where I belong to now is an un-global space, though it is slowly 
globalizing. In this Mid-West town, whiteness was and is dominating, albeit going 
through an influx of gaining more ethnically and nationally diverse people. For 
example, when I arrived, I inevitably noticed that my foreignness, like pollen from 
Asia, caused some to have allergic reactions such as “Why are you here? Studying 
English?” I tried to explain, but in many cases, those explanations did not satisfy 
questioners‟ curiosity since my position was recognized as an unconventional one.  
Moreover, after I started teaching, all the contextual positioning of my 
presence in the classroom became more complex. Always, becoming an “Other” as a 
teacher in the classroom was not easy. For example, when I first entered the 
classroom to teach a first-year composition course, students looked at me, but they 
did not pay attention. One of them loudly said the instructor must be late. When I 
walked to the front seat and sat on the supposed instructor‟s chair, students stopped 
talking and looked at me with puzzlement. When I opened my mouth and spoke to 
introduce myself, one of the students loudly said, “Can you say that again?” I felt 
intimidated, though I knew (hoped) that she only wanted to catch clearly what I was 
saying. The hierarchical relations between students and me seemed to be reversed; I 
felt like I was an ELL student in front of all native English speaking teachers. Then, 
one of the students vividly asked, “When did you first come to the U.S.?” I answered 
without hesitation, “Five years ago.” Facing a doubtful expression on her face, and 
sensing awkwardness in the class, I declared, “But you don‟t need to worry too much 
about communication with me. I can understand what you say mostly.” I knew that 
“mostly” would not be convincing, but that was the limit of confidence I could have 
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offered. I perceived that this linguistic otherness determined my linguistic identity 
which led to determinations of my other national and racial identities. I was marked 
as a foreigner whose English was not his mother tongue. 
From then on, while teaching a few classes, I sometimes could not resist the 
tempting desire to gain, amplify, and stabilize my authority in the classroom to escape 
from the unstable position I held. I tried to stand tall and speak with authority, which 
negatively disoriented me from my own pedagogical idea to create a democratic 
classroom. Not only did I try to articulate like a white teacher, but I also tried to erase 
my foreignness, clunky accent, and different facial expressions to show that I was 
qualified as a teacher in the context I was in. But the more I pretended, the less I felt 
confident and secured. My Otherness would not go away easily. Rather, what I found 
out, through painful self-reflections, were really devastating results. I endeavored to 
gain authority as if I were a white teacher. Clearing this mesmerizing effect of 
pretension was painful but revealed that I was an Other, which is truly problematic as 
well as fruitful.  
By and large, I learned that I was an Asian Other in a classroom of American 
Others, but I failed to learn how to reflect on my own position in terms of others‟ 
positions. Among what I learned, related to my learning of the significance of the 
instability of my teaching identity as a (racial and national) Other in the U.S. 
academy, the most interesting things for me while teaching have been the moments 
when I have engaged with issues related to my quandaries—race and nationality.  
To my surprise, many white students--and even some non-white students and 
colleagues I have met--told me that race or racism is played-out in the U.S. because 
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racism was a phenomenon of a historical phase that has since died out. For example, 
most of my colleagues in a class I took for first-year composition teachers said that 
they were avoiding racial issues in their classes because they did not know how to 
continue discussions, and it was awkward for them, as mostly white teachers, to 
discuss in their classes. Thus, when I said that I had tried to bring up issues of racism 
and xenophobia in my classes, they looked shocked and worried. One colleague even 
said that when she raised a racial issue, students, who were mostly white, stayed in a 
dead silence, showing embarrassment. As a result of her experience, this teacher 
doubtfully asked me how students could actively participate in discussions about race 
and racism in my class. The professor who led this class guessed that students might 
have actively spoken out their opinions about racism freely in front of me because I 
was a foreigner and an Asian.  
Frankly speaking, I felt confused by these reactions. I thought the intentional, 
unintentional omission of discussions about race and racism in the classroom denied 
the possibility that each student has different perspectives about race and racism. My 
colleagues easily presupposed that students were ignorant because “they” looked 
hesitant to speak about race or racism. My experience tells that it is not true. The 
problems lie on how to approach these issues. As soon as a teacher holds on to a 
common belief that race is indifferent to him or her so that he or she can teach 
impartially, he or she falls into a deception and an unintentional complicity to 
systemic racial formation. Indeed, the differentiation of an authoritative subject 
position as a teacher with authority gained via his or her racial whiteness and nothing 
else is a constantly on-going deconstruction of unity and consensus; even difference 
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itself has to be differentiated in order not to be forcibly integrated into conceptual, 
ideological unity. Speaking in the voice of Jacques Rancière, a French philosopher, I 
claim that equality and difference, for this reason, is dissensus. And, dissensus is a 
way to actualize democratic justice in a racially hierarchical global classroom. 
Race and racial issues are subject to dissensus,
143
 which Rancière coined to 
explain how consensus is detrimental to political efforts to create a more democratic 
space. Rancière argues instead that disagreement as dissensus is important to make a 
real difference in politics
144
. Dissensus deconstructs the ideology of consensus and 
germinates radical equalities that deconstruct hierarchical, hegemonic structures; it 
destructs the hierarchical ideology in the classroom of  “you have to agree with my 
idea because you are students, and I am the teacher.” This does not mean that teachers 
are unnecessary, nor can Rancière‟s arguments be universally adaptable. Rather, the 
lesson I learned by my teaching is that most students already “know” TOO MUCH 
about race and racism in terms of consensus, and their racial experiences are already 
too realistic and unified to be discussed in the classroom only via fixed textbooks. 
What students and teachers need is to first unlearn their knowledge manipulated by 
media that promulgates racial prejudices so that they are able to explore the meaning 
of their own experiences in terms of whiteness and structural racism. Differentiation 
and dissensus presupposes unlearning in the classroom. And, this is a way to create 
                                                 
143 Steven Corcoran‟s introductory explanation of Rancière‟s terms in Dissensus: On Politics and 
Aesthetics, states that “Consensus…is defined by „the idea of the proper‟ and the distribution of places 
of the proper and improper it implies…By contrast, the logic of dissensus consists in the demonstration 
of a certain impropriety which disrupts the identity….” (2).  
144 Rancière‟s idea is simple but powerful. He claims that politics in itself is dissensus or disagreement 
against wrongs. Consensus, which founds the idea of a consensus democracy, is a state apparatus 
which Rancière calls the police. Rancière claims that modern politics is meta-politics that perpetually 
create radical equality in political spaces. This effort to create equalities entails acts to make the unsaid 
to be said, the unseen to be seen, the unheard to be heard, and so on. See Rancière‟s Disagreement. 
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radically democratic equality in the class so that everyone realizes they all are in the 
same position—“I don’t know, but I need to learn how I have a potentiality to 
become racist easily and how to disagree with these potentialities.”  
Along with this theoretical frame of the linkage of difference and equality for 
desubjectified teachers‟ roles and their engagement with students‟ dissensus to bring 
up race and racism in the classroom, henceforth I also reflect on my own experience. 
These experiences demonstrate the endless search for ways to unlearn my prejudices 
and learn new perspectives about my trans-spatial position as an Other in the 
classroom and the complexity of creating a new space of equality. Class discussion 
was not easy in these moments. Sometimes, going through these moments, I felt 
vertigo, as if I was standing on a precipice looking down to the abyss of ambiguity of 
my positions and identities as a teacher. For example, in my second semester writing 
class, there were two African American students in the class and a Chicana student; 
the rest of the students were white. In this class, I read a paper written by Jewel
145
, an 
African American female student. The assignment was a rhetorical analysis about a 
text students chose. Reading through Jewel‟s paper about rap culture in the U.S., I 
was dumbfounded by her African American English vernacular. The content of the 
paper was great; she intelligently analyzed the significance of rap culture as a 
resistance against the majority. However, based on my knowledge of prescriptive 
English grammar, her writing seemed to have too many grammatical “errors,” and 
sentences were confusing and sloppy from my perspective. I, who had learned 
grammar in high school and struggled with mastery of my command of English, 
could not help but doubt my ability to grade her writing.  
                                                 
145 Pseudonym 
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Though I learned about African American vernacular and its difference from 
so-called “standard” English and why this is historically relevant to racial justice in 
the classroom, I did not know how to handle Jewel‟s paper. Eventually, I decided to 
talk about this with her, but she, mostly shy and quiet in class, said she had not 
thought before that her writing used African American vernacular. I gave her a better 
grade than I thought I should at first, but still I am confused whether I did the right 
thing or not. Did I Otherize her because of my linguistic incapability to recognize 
vernacular differences? Did I racialize her? In another class, we discussed Fredrick 
Douglass‟s essay, “How I Learned to Read and Write.” I asked an African American 
male student his opinion about racism and racist history several times, but he rejected 
talking about that issue and just said that the U.S. does not have racism today. I was 
also embarrassed.  
Then I realized that it was “I” in the subjective, dominant position as a teacher 
that embarrassed these students; in truth, I could not abandon and unlearn my 
prejudiced belief that those students would like to talk about their ethnic identity and 
culture in a white-dominated, but globalized classroom where an international teacher 
was talking about race and racism based on his own prejudice. The realization 
happened when I was also Otherized. A few weeks later, while discussing Asian 
Americans‟ experiences in an essay by Amy Tan, a student asked me, out of 
curiosity, to speak Korean. This was another embarrassing moment to me, though I 
could not pinpoint exactly how and why I felt embarrassed. After a long hesitation, I 
finally translated part of the essay from English to Korean and spoke out loud (even 
though, in fact, Amy Tan is a Chinese American writer). Students listened carefully 
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and said that the sounds and pronunciation were much different from those in 
English. Then, one student asked whether I felt more comfortable speaking in Korean 
or in English; I said absolutely I felt comfortable whenever I spoke in Korean because 
it was my mother tongue. Discussing the meaning of mother tongue, I wondered in 
my deep heart why I had to feel awkward when I spoke in my mother tongue in front 
of these native-English speakers.  
After I left school that day, I thought about my experiences with my African 
American students and my own experience, and I finally realized why I felt 
embarrassed and why they did also. I felt embarrassed because I had to declare my 
national identity in front of mostly white and almost all American students, 
uncovering my foreignness and Otherness. I felt naked because it made me self-
realize that I was different. The cases with my two African American students and my 
own reversed situation revealed that I did not recognize that asking those questions 
created a hierarchical structure of assuming teacher‟s authority, which prevented 
further discussion and learning. I unintentionally endeavored to create a consensus, 
forcing those two African American students to articulate their thoughts about race 
and racism in front of their white classmates; I acted as if I had been a white teacher 
in a white students‟ class. In truth, I held firmly to an authority of racial dominance 
over those African American students—so that my position was overdetermined by 
whiteness, which is racial consensus in the classroom.  
Denying my assumptions, those two African American students created 
dissensus against my hegemonic consensus. By their reactions, I could realize I did 
not go through unlearning my prejudices, and I was counting on my whitely authority 
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in the classroom. I had to unlearn those assumptions and engage with these issues by 
deconstructing my internalized racism, recognizing how my own lacks turned those 
two students into Others so as to conceal my own Otherness in the classroom. At the 
moment when I thought that I could pose those questions to these two African 
American students, I held on to the seemingly neutral position I assumed I held—
Asian, foreigner, and a middle-aged male teacher. In fact, I painfully had to 
acknowledge that I became a racist at those moments and could not deconstruct my 
seemingly safe, neutral position. But this is not self-blaming. Self-blaming is a way to 
ascribe structural polemics onto an individual situation, which is bound to result in 
losing the chance to scan and map the constantly changing and heterogeneous global, 
racial discourses of whiteness my Otherized, and sometimes Otherizing, presence is 
situated in. My feeling was much closer to “shame,” a shame that I could 
fundamentally feel. 
 All in all, in the broadest sense, all of us are singular, different beings in a 
globally racial system. I mean we are all trans-spatial beings in particular, but on the 
other hand, we are equally vulnerable, and we are on the verge of becoming Others 
and the victim of various systems. In the racial system—which is the framework for 
every social space in the U.S. formed throughout racial history—I am as vulnerable 
as my African American students who also possessed different positions. Those 
vulnerable positions also uncovered the ontological equality in race and national 
discourses.  
Then, how can I create equality and dissensus in the classroom by 
deconstructing my position in the global context? All of my experience as a teacher 
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and a student convolutes around the problems of worldviews. Assigning biased 
readings and writings, ignoring different writing styles and arguments, or putting 
racial difference into judgments about students in my classes (as I did) are common 
mistakes instructors make. Not a single space can be a racism-free safe zone not only 
in the U.S., but also in the world. Trans-spatial classes are global classes since all of 
us are connected to other spaces in the world where a more pandemic global, 
differential racism works, regardless of our race and national origins. What is going 
on in Korea, Tibet, France, and Africa are connected to seemingly insular classrooms 
where teachers are teaching with the presence of international students, second or 
third generation students from immigrant families, first or second generation 
refugees, or from an international body like me. Global racism is equally prevalent as 
much as each of us and our ontological, linguistic, and cultural positions are equally 
different. Global racism is a trans-spatial phenomenon. Thus, “equally different” 
opens a possibility to create dissensus and unlearning to prepare for true learning.  
…. 
 Up to this point, I, a trans-spatial Korean teacher, have speculated on my own 
trans-spatial experience of teaching racism in the U.S. This narrative, like the whole 
dissertation, might sound like a monologue that I cannot escape. But I claim that I can 
create a community of trans-spatial writers, their characters and animals, and myself 
in the classroom. This community is possible because of my homelessness and 
solitude, ideas that are the foundation of my dissertation. For me in the literary space 
of dissertation “[t]his solitude is a grasp of the future, but a powerless grasp: 
prophetic isolation which, before time, ever announces the beginning” (Blanchot 
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247). But that‟s it. I am suffering from fatigue; the fatigue that causes me to listen to 
Kafka‟s grandfather who, in “The Next Village,” used to say: “Life is astonishingly 
short. To me, looking back over it, life seems so foreshortened that I scarcely 
understood, for instance, a young man can decide to ride over to the next village 
without being afraid that—not to mention accidents—even the span of a normal 
happy life may fall far short of time needed for such a journey” (404). My trans-
spatial journey to this next village is almost over, but I am sure that there will be more 
villages like Kafka‟s grandfather was afraid of venturing to. Yet, alas, the trans-
spatial life I had, have, and will have will not end until I die, though trans-spatiality 
will persist telling a story of a happiness.  
  
 296 
Bibliography 
 
Adorno, Theodor W. Aesthetic Theory. Trans. Robert Hullot-Kentor. Minneapolis: U 
of Minnesota P, 2006. Print.  
---. Negative Dialectics. Trans. E. B. Ashton. New York; London: Continuum, 2005. 
Print.  
---. Prisms. Trans. Shierry Weber Nicholsen. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1981. Print.  
Agamben, Giorgio. Infancy and History: On the Destruction of Experience. Trans. 
Heron, Liz. London: Verso, 2007. Print.  
---. The Man without Content. Trans. Albert Georgia. Stanford: Stanford UP, 1999. 
Print.  
---. Means without End: Notes on Politics. Trans. Vincenzo Binetti and Cesare 
Casarino.  Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 2000. Print.  
---. The Open: Man and Animal. Trans. Kevin Attell. Stanford: Stanford UP, 2004. 
Print.  
---. Profanations. Trans. Jeff Fort. New York: Zone Books, 2007. Print.  
---. Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive. Trans. Daniel Heller-
Roazen. New York: Zone Books, 2002. Print.  
---. The Coming Community. Trans. Michael Hardt. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 
2007. Print.  
---. Language and Death: The Place of Negativity. Trans. Karen Pinkus and Michael 
Hardt. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1991. Print.  
---. Stanzas: Word and Phantasm in Western Culture. Trans. Ronald L. Martinez. 
Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1993. Print.  
---. The End of the Poem: Studies in Poetics. Trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen. Stanford: 
Stanford UP, 1999. Print.  
---. Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. Trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen. 
Stanford: Stanford UP, 1998. Print.  
---. Idea of Prose. Trans. Michael Sullivan and Sam Whitsitt. Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1995. Print.  
 297 
---. Nudities. Trans. David Kishik and Stefan Pedatella. Stanford: Stanford California 
P, 2011. Print.  
---. Potentialities: Collected Essays in Philosophy. Trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen. 
Stanford: Stanford UP, 1999. Print.  
---. What is an Apparatus? And Other Essays. Trans. David Kishik and Stefan 
Pedatella. Stanford: Stanford UP, 2009. Print.  
---. "What is a Paradigm." The European Graduate School. The European Graduate 
School, Aug. 2002. Web. 13 May 2012. 
http://www.egs.edu/faculty/agamben/agamben-what-is-a-paradigm-2002.html 
Ahearne, Jeremy. Michel De Certeau: Interpretation and its Other. Stanford: 
Stanford UP, 1995. Print.  
Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism. London: Verso, 1993. Print.  
Aristotle. The Basic Works of Aristotle. Ed. Richard McKeon. New York: Modern 
Library, 2001. Print.  
Badiou, Alain. Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil. London; New York: 
Verso, 2001. Print.  
---. Handbook of Inaesthetics. Trans. Alberto Toscano. Stanford: Stanford UP, 2005. 
Print.  
Bakhtin, Mikhail M. The Dialogic Imagination. Ed. Michael Holquist. Trans. Caryl  
Emerson and Michael Holquist. Austin: U of Texas P, 1981.  
Bartoloni, Paolo. On the Cultures of Exile, Translation, and Writing. West Lafayette: 
Purdue UP, 2008. Print.  
Baudelaire, Charles. Paris Spleen, 1869. Trans. Louise Varèse. New York: New 
Directions Pub. Corp., 1970. Print.  
Baudrillard, Jean. The Transparency of Evil: Essays on Extreme Phenomena. 
London; New York: Verso, 1993. Print.  
Benjamin, Walter. Illuminations. Ed. Hannah Arendt. Trans. Harry Zohn. New York: 
Schocken Books, 1969. Print.  
---. "On Language as such and on the Language of Man." Selected Writings. Vol. 1, 
1913-1926. Eds. Marcus Paul Bullock and Michael W. Jennings. Trans. 
 298 
Edmund Jephcott. Cambridge; London: Belknap Press of Harvard UP, 1996. 
62-74. Print.  
---. “On the Concept of History.” Selected Writings. Vol. 4, 1938-1940. Eds. Howard 
Eiland and Michael W. Jennings. Trans. Harry Zohn. Cambridge; London: 
Belknap Press of Harvard UP, 2006. 389-400. Print. 
---. "The Task of the Translator." Selected Writings. Vol. 1, 1913-1926. Eds. Marcus 
Paul Bullock and Michael W. Jennings. Trans. Harry Zohn. Cambridge; 
London: Belknap Press of Harvard UP, 1996. 253-63. Print.  
---. "Two Poems by Fridrich Hölderlin: "the Poet's Courage" and "Timidity"." 
Selected Writings. Vol. 1, 1913-1926. Eds. Marcus Paul Bullock and Michael 
W. Jennings. Trans. Stanley Corngold. Cambridge; London: Belknap Press of 
Harvard UP, 1996. 18-36. Print.  
---. "On the Image of Proust." Selected Writings 2,1, Vol. 2, Part 1, 1927-1930. Eds. 
Michael W. Jennings, Howard Eiland, and Gary Smith. Trans. Harry Zohn. 
Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. P, 2005. 237-47. Print.  
---. The Origin of German Tragic Drama. Tran. John Osborne. London; New York: 
Verso, 2003. Print.  
---. Reflections: Essays, Aphorisms, Autobiographical Writings. Ed. Peter Demetz. 
Trans. Edmund Jephcott. New York: Schocken Books, 2007. Print.  
Bergson, Henri. Matter and Memory. Trans. Nancy M. Paul and W.S. Palmer. New 
York: Zone books, 1991. Print.  
Bhabha, Homi K. The Location of Culture. London; New York: Routledge, 1994. 
Print.  
Blanchot, Maurice. The Space of Literature. Trans. Ann Smock. Lincoln; London: U 
of Nebraska P, 1989. Print.  
Britzman, Deborah P. "On being a Slow Reader: Psychoanalytic Reading Problems in 
Ishiguro's Never Let Me Go." Changing English 13.3 (2006): 307-18. Print.  
Bromley, Roger. Narratives for a New Belonging: Diasporic Cultural Fictions. 
Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 2000. Print.  
Caldwell, Elizabeth. "A Purely Spoken Monologue: The Poem and Heidegger's Way 
to Language." Journal of Speculative Philosophy 23.4 (2009): 267-84. Print.  
 299 
Carroll, Rachel. "Imitations of Life: Cloning, Heterosexuality and the Human in 
Kazuo Ishiguro's Never Let Me Go." Journal of Gender Studies 19.1 (2010): 
59-71. Print.  
Cha, Theresa Hak Kyung. Dictée. Berkeley: U of California P, 2001. Print.  
Chambers, Iain. Migrancy, Culture, Identity. London; New York: Routledge, 1994. 
Print.  
Cheah, Pheng and Bruce Robbins, eds. Cosmopolitics : Thinking and Feeling Beyond 
the Nation. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1998. Print.  
Cheng, Anne Anlin. "Memory and Anti-Documentary Desire in Theresa Hak Kyung 
Cha's Dictée." MELUS 23.4 (1998): 119-33. Print.  
Cheung, King-Kok. Articulate Silences: Hisaye Yamamoto, Maxine Hong Kingston, 
Joy Kogawa. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1993. Print.  
Chin, Frank. Donald Duk: A Novel. Minneapolis; St. Paul: Coffee House P, 1991. 
Print.  
Chiu, Monica. Filthy Fictions: Asian American Literature by Women. Walnut Creek: 
AltaMira P, 2004. Print.  
Chong, Sylvia Shin Huey. “„Look, an Asian!‟: The Politics of Racial Interpellation in 
the Wake of the Virginia Tech Shootings.” Journal of Asian American Studies 
11.1 (2008): 27-60. Print.  
Colebrook, Claire. “Deleuze, Gilles.” The Agamben Dictionary. Eds. Alex Murray 
and Jessica Whyte. Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 2011. 55-7. Print.  
Conze, Edward. Buddhist Thought in India: Three Phases of Buddhist Philosophy. 
London: Allen & Unwin, 1962. Print.  
Dash, J. Michael. Édouard Glissant. Cambridge [England]; New York: Cambridge 
UP, 1995. Print.  
de Certeau, Michel. Heterologies: Discourse on the Other. Minneapolis: U of 
Minnesota P, 1997. Print.  
---. The Practice of Everyday Life. Berkeley: U of California P, 1988. Print.  
Dearing, Laura Ann, and Michael Graber. “An Interview with Li-Young Lee.”  Crab 
Orchard Review 4:1 (1998): 107-21. Print. 
 300 
Deleuze, Gilles, and Félix Guattari. A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia. Trans. Brian Massumi. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 2005. 
Print.  
---. Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature. Trans. Dana Polan. Minneapolis: U of 
Minnesota P, 1986. Print.  
---. What is Philosophy?. Trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell. New York: 
Columbia UP, 1994. Print.  
Deleuze, Gilles. "Bartleby; Or, the Formula." Essays Critical and Clinical. Trans. 
Daniel W. Smith and Michael A. Greco. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 
1997. 68-90. Print.  
---. Difference and Repetition. Trans. Paul Patton. New York: Columbia UP, 1994. 
Print.  
---. "He Stuttered." Essays Critical and Clinical. Trans. Daniel W. Smith and Michael 
A. Greco. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1997. 107-14. Print.  
---. Proust and Signs: The Complete Text. Trans. Richard Howard. Minneapolis: U of 
Minnesota P, 2000. Print.  
Depue, Roger L. “Appendix N: A Theoretical profile of Seung Hui Cho: From 
Perspective of Forensic Behavioral Scientist.” In Mass Shootings at Virginia 
Tech: April 16, 2007. Report of the Review Panel Presented to Governor 
Kaine, Commonwealth of Virginia 13 August 2007. Web. May 2012. 
www.governor.virginia.gov/TempContent/techPanelReport.cfm. 
Derrida, Jacques. "'Hospitality'." Jacques Derrida: Basic Writings. Trans. & Ed. 
Barry Stocker. London; New York: Routledge, 2007. 237-64. Print.  
---. The Gift of Death & Literature in Secret. Trans. David Wills. Chicago: U of 
Chicago P, 2008. Print.  
---. "The Ends of Man." Margins of Philosophy. Trans. Alan Bass. Chicago: U of 
Chicago P, 1982. 109-36. Print.  
---. Of Spirit: Heidegger and the Question. Trans. Geoffrey Bennington and Rachel 
Bowlby. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1991. Print.  
---. Monolingualism of the Other or the Prothesis of Origin. Trans. Patrick Mensah. 
Stanford: Stanford UP, 1998. Print.  
---. On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness. Trans. Mark Dooley and Michael Hughes. 
London; New York: Routledge, 2001. Print.  
 301 
---. The Animal that therefore I Am. Ed. Marie-Louise Mallet. Trans. David Wills. 
New York: Fordham UP, 2008. Print.  
---. On the Name. Ed. Thomas Dutoit. Trans. David Wood. Stanford: Stanford UP, 
1995. Print.  
Dreyfus, Hubert L. Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger's being and the 
Time, Division I. Cambridge; London: The MIT P, 1997. Print.  
Duncan, Patti. Tell this Silence: Asian American Women Writers and the Politics of 
Speech. Iowa City: U of Iowa P, 2004. Print.  
Elder, Glen, Jeniffer Wolch, and Jody Emel. “La Pratique Sauvage: Race, Place, and 
the Human-Animal Divide.” The Spaces of Postmodernity : Readings in 
Human Geography. Eds. Michael J. Dear and Steven Flusty. Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishers, 2002. 431-41. Print.  
Eliot, T. S. Collected Poems, 1909-1935. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1936. 
Print.  
Ellison, Ralph. Invisible Man. New York: Vintage Books, 1990. Print.  
Emerson, Ralph Waldo. The Letters of Ralph Waldo Emerson Vol.7: 1807-1844. Ed. 
Eleanor Marguerite Tilton. New York; Chichester: Columbia UP, 1990. Print.  
Entre les Murs [The Class].Dir. Laurent Cantet. Haut et Court, 2008. Film. 
Eng, David L. and Shinhee Han. “A Dialogue on Racial Melancholia.” Loss: The 
Politics of Mourning. Eds. David L. Eng and David Kazanjian. Berkeley: U of 
California P, 2003. 343-71. Print.  
Faulkner, William. The Sound and the Fury. New York: Vintage Books, 1990. Print.  
Freud, Sigmund. “Mourning and Melancholia.” The Standard Edition of the Complete 
Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud vol. XIV. Trans. James Strachey. 
London: Hogarth P and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1917. 237-58. Print. 
---. The Uncanny. Trans. David McLintock. New York: Penguin Books, 2003. Print.  
---. Civilization and Its Discontents. Trans. & Ed. James Strachey. New York; 
London: W.W. Norton, 2005. Print.  
Frost, Elisabeth A. “„In another Tongue‟: Body, Image, Text in Theresa Hak Kyung 
Cha's Dictée.” We Who Love to be Astonished: Experimental Women's 
Writing and Performance Poetics. Eds. Laura Hinton and Cynthia Hogue. 
Tuscaloosa: U of Alabama P, 2002. 181-92. Print.  
 302 
Galang, M. Evelina, ed. Screaming Monkeys: Critiques of Asian American Images. 
Minneapolis: Coffee House Press, 2003. Print. 
Gilroy, Paul. The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness. Cambridge: 
Harvard UP, 1993. Print.  
Gilroy, Paul. Against Race: Imagining Political Culture Beyond the Color Line. 
Cambridge MA: The Belknap P of Harvard UP, 2001. Print.  
Glissant, Édouard. Poetics of Relation. Trans. Betsy Wing. Ann Arbor: U of 
Michigan P, 2010. Print.  
---. Black Salt : Poems. Trans. Betsy Wing. Ann Arbor: U of Michigan P, 1998. Print.  
---. Caribbean Discourse: Selected Essays. Trans. J. Michael Dash. Charlottesville: 
UP of Virginia, 1999. Print.  
Goellnicht, Donald C. "Minority History as Metafiction: Joy Kogawa's Obasan." 
Tulsa Studies in Women's Literature 8.2 (1989): 287-306. Print.  
Goldman, Marlene. "A Dangerous Circuit: Loss and the Boundaries of Racialized 
Subjectivity in Joy Kogawa's Obasan and Kerri Sakamoto's the Electrical 
Field." Modern Fiction Studies (MFS). 48.2 (2002): 362-88. Print.  
Gossett, Thomas F. Race: The History of an Idea in America. New York: Oxford UP, 
1997. Print.  
Haigh, Sam. An Introduction to Caribbean Francophone Writing: Guadeloupe and 
Martinique. Oxford; New York: Berg, 1999. Print.  
Haraway, Donna. The Haraway Reader. New York: Routledge, 2004. Print.  
Hardt, Michael, and Antonio Negri. Empire. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2000. Print.  
---. Commonwealth. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard UP, 2009. Print.  
Harries, Karsten. "Language and Silence: Heidegger's Dialogue with Georg Trakl." 
Boundary 2 4.2 (1976): 494-511. Print.  
Harrison, Patricia Marby.“Genocide or Redemption? Asian American Autobiography 
and the Portrayal of Christianity in Amy Tan's The Joy Luck Club and Joy 
Kogawa's Obasan.” Christianity-and-Literature (C&L). 1997 Winter; 46(2): 
145-68. 
 303 
Harth, Erica. "Introduction." Last Witnesses: Reflections on the Wartime Internment 
of Japanese Americans. Ed. Erica Harth. New York: Palgrave for St. Martin's 
P, 2001. 1-18. Print.  
Hayot, Eric. "The Asian Turns." Publications of the Modern Language Association of 
America 124.3 (2009): 906-17. Print.  
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. Phenomenology of Spirit. Trans. Arnold V. Miller. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977. Print.  
Heidegger, Martin. Basic Writings: From being and Time (1927) to the Task of 
Thinking (1964). Ed. David Farrell Krell. San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 
1993. Print.  
---. On the Way to Language. Trans. Peter D. Hertz. New York: Harper & Row, 1971. 
Print.  
---. Being and Time: A Translation of Sein Und Zeit. Trans. Joan Stambaugh. Albany: 
State University of New York Press, 1996. Print.  
---. Being and Truth. Trans. Gregory Fried and Richard Polt. Bloomington: Indiana 
UP, 2010. Print.  
---. The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude. Trans. 
William McNeill and Nicholas Walker. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1995. 
Print.  
---. Identity and Difference. Trans. Joan Stambaugh. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 2002. 
Print.  
---. Introduction to Metaphysics. Trans. Gregory Fried and Richard Polt. New Haven: 
Yale UP, 2000. Print.  
---. Poetry, Language, Thought. New York: Perennical Classics, 2001. Print.  
---. "The Self-Assertion of the German U: Address, Delivered on the Solemn 
Assumption of the Rectorate of the U Freiburg the Rectorate 1933/34: Facts 
and Thoughts." Trans. Harries,Karsten. The Review of Metaphysics 38.3 
(1985): 467-502. Print.  
Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968. Print.  
Hsiao, Paul Shih-yi. "Heidegger and our Translation of the Tao Te Ching." Heidegger 
and Asian Thought. Ed. Graham Parkes. Honolulu: U of Hawaii P, 1990. 93-
101. Print.  
 304 
Inada, Lawson Fusao. Legends from Camp. Minneapolis: Coffee House Press, 1992. 
Ishiguro, Kazuo. Never Let Me Go. New York: Vintage International, 2010. Print.  
---. The Remains of the Day. New York: Knopf, 1989. Print.  
---. A Pale View of Hills. New York: Vintage Books, 1990. Print.  
Jameson, Fredric. Postmodernism, Or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism. 
Durham: Duke UP, 1991. Print.  
Jerng, Mark. “Giving Form to Life: Cloning and Narrative Expectations of the 
Human.” Partial Answers: Journal of Literature and the History of Ideas. 6.2 
(June 2008):369-93. 
Kafka, Franz. “The Next Village.” Trans. Willa and Edwin Muir. Franz Kafka, the 
Complete Stories. Ed. Nahum N. Glatzer. New York: Schocken Books, 1971. 
404. Print.  
---. “A Report to an Academy.” Trans. Willa and Edwin Muir. Franz Kafka, the 
Complete Stories. Ed. Nahum N. Glatzer. New York: Schocken Books, 1971. 
250-9. Print.  
Kant, Immanuel. Kant: Political Writings. Ed. Hans Siegbert Reiss. Trans. H. B. 
Nisbet. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge UP, 1991. Print.  
Kim, Elaine H. "Poised on the in-between: A Korean American‟s Reflections on 
Theresa Hak Kyung Cha‟s Dictée." Writing Self, Writing Nation: A Collection 
of Essays on Dictée by Theresa Hak Kyung Cha. Eds. Norma Alarcón and 
Elaine H. Kim. Berkeley: Third Woman P, 1994. 3-30. Print.  
Kim, Myung Mi. Commons. Berkeley: U of California P, 2002. Print.  
---. Penury. Richmond, Calif.: Omnidawn, 2009. Print.  
---. Under Flag. Berkeley: Kelsey St. P, 1991. Print.  
Kingston, Maxine Hong. Tripmaster Monkey: His Fake Book. New York: Knopf, 
1989. Print.  
Kishik, David. The Power of Life: Agamben and the Coming Politics (to Imagine a 
Form of Life, II). Stanford: Stanford UP, 2012. Print.  
Kogawa, Joy. Obasan. New York: Anchor Books, 1994. Print.  
 305 
Lamm, Kimberly. "Getting Close to the Screen of Exile: Visualizing and Resisting 
the National Mother Toungue in Theresa Hak Kyung Cha's Dictée." 
Transnational, National, and Personal Voices: New Perspectives on Asian 
American and Asian Diasporic Women Writers. Eds. Begoña Simal González 
and Elisabetta Marino. Münster: Lit, 2004. 43-65. Print.  
Laozi. The Way of Lao Tzu (Tao-Te Ching). Trans. Wing-tsit Chan, Upper Saddle 
River: Prentice-Hall, 1963. Print.  
Lazenby, Roland. April 16th: Virginia Tech Remembers. New York: Plume, 2007. 
Print.  
Leaman, George. "Strategies of Deception: The Composition of Heidegger‟s 
Silence." Martin Heidegger and the Holocaust. Eds. Alan Milchman and Alan 
Rosenberg. Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press International, 1996. 57-69. 
Print.  
Lee, Chang-rae. Native Speaker. New York: Riverhead Books, 1995. Print.  
Lévinas, Emmanuel. Humanism of the Other. Trans. Nidra Poller. Urbana; Chicago: 
U of Illinois P, 2006. Print.  
---. Emmanuel Lévinas: Basic Philosophical Writings. Eds. Adriaan Theodoor 
Peperzak , Simon Critchley, and Robert Bernasconi. Bloomington: Indiana 
UP, 1996. Print.  
---. Time and the Other and Additional Essays. Trans. Richard A. Cohen. Pittsburgh: 
Duquesne UP, 1987. Print.  
---. Ethics and Infinity. Trans. Philippe Nemo. Pittsburgh: Duquesne UP, 1985. Print.  
Lewallen, Constance. "Introduction: Theresa Hak Kyung Cha—Her Time and Place." 
The Dream of the Audience: Theresa Hak Kyung Cha (1951-1982). Ed. 
Constance Lewallen. Berkeley: U of California Berkeley, 2001. 1-13. Print.  
Li, David Leiwei. Imagining the Nation: Asian American Literature and Cultural 
Consent. Stanford: Stanford UP, 1998. Print.  
Lowe, Lisa. Immigrant Acts: On Asian American Cultural Politics. Durham: Duke 
UP, 1996. Print.  
---. “Unfaithful to the Original: The Subject of Dictée.” Writing Self, Writing Nation : 
A Collection of Essays on Dictée by Theresa Hak Kyung Cha. Eds. Norma 
Alarcón and Elaine H. Kim. Berkeley: Third Woman P, 1994. 35-69. Print.  
 306 
Lukács, Georg. The Theory of the Novel: A Historico-Philosophical Essay on the 
Forms of Great Epic Literature. Cambridge: MIT P, 1993. Print.  
Ma, Sheng-mei. Diaspora Literature and Visual Culture: Asia in Flight. London: 
Routledge, 2011. Print.  
---. Immigrant Subjectivities in Asian American and Asian Diaspora Literatures. 
Albany: State U of New York P, 1998. Print.  
Manning, Robert John Sheffler. “The Cries of Others and Heidegger's Ear: Remarks 
on the Agriculture Remark.” Martin Heidegger and the Holocaust. Eds. Alan 
Milchman and Alan Rosenberg. Atlantic Highlands: Humanities P 
International, 1997. 19-38. Print.  
Manuel, Dolores de. “Imagined Homecomings: Strategies for Reconnection in the 
Writing of Asian Exiles.” Ideas of Home: Literature of Asian Migration. Ed. 
Geoffrey Kain. East Lansing: Michigan State UP, 1997. 39-47. Print.  
McDonald, Keith. “Days of Past Futures: Kazuo Ishiguro's Never Let Me Go as 
„Speculative Memoir‟.” Biography 30.1 (2007): 74-83. Print.  
Melville, Herman. "Bartleby the Scrivener." Great American Short Stories : From 
Hawthorne to Hemingway. Ed. Corinne Demas. New York: Barnes & Noble 
Classics, 2004. 109-44. Print.  
Mignolo, Walter. Local histories/global Designs: Coloniality, Subaltern Knowledges, 
and Border Thinking. Princeton: Princeton UP, 2000. Print.  
Miki, Roy. Broken Entries: Race, Subjectivity, Writing: Essays. Toronto: Mercury P, 
1998. Print.  
Mills, Catherine. The philosophy of Agamben. Stocksfield: Acumen, 2008. Print. 
Minh-Ha, Trinh T. "White Spring." The Dream of the Audience: Theresa Hak Kyung 
Cha (1951-1982). Ed. Constance Lewallen. Berkeley: U of California 
Berkeley Art Museum: U of California P, 2001. 33-50. Print.  
---. Woman, Native, Other:Writing Postcoloniality and Feminism. Bloomington: 
Indiana UP, 1989. Print.  
Miyoshi, Masao. “A Borderless World? from Colonialism to Transnationalism and 
the Decline of the Nation-State.” Global/local: Cultural Production and the 
Transnational Imaginary. Eds. Rob Wilson and Wimal Dissanayake. Durham: 
Duke UP, 1996. 78-106. Print.  
 307 
Mukherjee, Srimati. “Nation, Immigrant, Text: Theresa Hak Kyung Cha's Dictée.” 
Transnational Asian American Literature: Sites and Transits. Eds. Shirley 
Lim, et al. Philadelphia: Temple UP, 2006. 197-218. Print.  
Murray, Alex. Giorgio Agamben. London; New York: Routledge, 2010. Print.  
Negri, Antonio. Negri on Negri: In Conversation with Anne Dufourmantelle. Trans. 
Malcom B. DeBevoise. London; New York: Routledge, 2004. Print.  
Never Let Me Go. Dir. Mark Romaneck.  DNA films, 2010. Film. 
Nguyen, Viet Thanh. Race and Resistance : Literature and Politics in Asian America. 
New York; Oxford: Oxford UP, 2002. Print.  
Nizza, Mike. “Seung Hui Cho: Who is This Man?” New York Times, 30 Aug. 2007. 
Web. 13 May 2012. 
Oakley, Seanna Sumalee. Common Places: The Poetics of African Atlantic 
Postromantics. Amsterdam; New York: Rodopi, 2011. Print.  
Okada, John. No-no Boy. Seattle: U of Washington P, 1981. Print.  
Osborne, Thomas. "Faith, Philosophy, and the Nominalist Background to Luther's 
Defense of the Real Presence." Journal of the History of Ideas 63.1 (2002): 
63-82. Print.  
Paek, Sok. “On the White Wall,” The Columbia Anthology of Modern Korean Poetry. 
Ed. MacCann, David. New York: Columbia UP, 2004. 86. Print 
Park, Josephine Nock-Hee. Apparitions of Asia: Modernist Form and Asian American 
Poetics. New York: Oxford UP, 2008. Print.  
Parkes, Graham. “Introduction.” Heidegger and Asian Thought. Ed. Graham Parkes. 
Honolulu: U of Hawaii P, 1990. 1-14. Print.  
Partridge, Jeffrey F. L. “The Politics of Ethnic Authorship: Li-Young Lee, Emerson, 
and Whitman at the Banquet Table.” Studies in the literary imagination. 37.1 
(2004): 101. Print.  
Pensky, Max. Melancholy Dialectics: Walter Benjamin and the Play of Mourning. 
Amherst: U of Massachusetts P, 2001. Print.  
Perpich, Diane. The Ethics of Emmanuel Lévinas. Stanford: Stanford UP, 2008. Print.  
Plato. Timaeus. Trans. Donald J. Zeyl. Indianapolis: Hackett Pub. Co., 2000. Print.  
 308 
Pöggeler, Otto. “West-East Dialogue: Heidegger and Lao-Tzu.” Heidegger and Asian 
Thought. Ed. Graham Parkes. Honolulu: U of Hawaii P, 1990. 47-78. Print.  
Rancière, Jacques. The Politics of Aesthetics: The Distribution of the Sensible. Trans. 
Gabriel Rockhill. London: Continuum, 2004. Print.  
---. Dissensus: On Politics and Aesthetics. Trans. Steve Corcoran. London; New 
York: Continuum, 2010. Print.  
---. Disagreement: Politics and philosophy. Trans. Julie Rose. Minneapolis: U of 
Minnesota P, 1999. Print. 
Rand, Nicholas. “The Political Truth of Heidegger's „Logos‟: Hiding in Translation.” 
PMLA. 105.3 (1990): 436-47. Print.  
Rieder, John. "Life Writing and Science Fiction: Constructing Identities and 
Constructing Genres." Biography 30.1 (2007): v-xvii. Print.  
Robbins, Bruce. “Introduction Part I: Actually Existing Cosmopolitanism.” 
Cosmopolitics : Thinking and Feeling Beyond the Nation. Eds. Pheng Cheah 
and Bruce Robbins. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1998. 1-19. Print. The 
Social Text Collective.  
Roffe, Jonathan. “Simulacrum.” The Deleuze Dictionary. Ed. Adrian Parr. New York: 
Columbia UP, 2005. 250-251. Print.  
Rosen, Stanley. Nihilism: A Philosophical Essay. New Haven: Yale UP, 1969. Print.  
Runes, Dagobert D. The Dictionary of Philosophy, New York: Philosophical library, 
1942. Print.  
Russell II, Keith A. “„From a Far‟: Unifying Divisions in Theresa Hak Kyung Cha's 
Dictée.” Moving Migration: Narrative Transformations in Asian American 
Literature. Eds. Johanna C. Kardux and Doris Einsiedel. Münster; 
Piscataway: LIT Verlag, 2010. 181-97. Print.  
Russon, John Edward. Reading Hegel's Phenomenology. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 
2004. Print.  
Sakai, Naoki. Translation and Subjectivity: On Japan and Cultural Nationalism. 
Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1997. Print.  
Salzani, Carlo. “Coming Community.” The Agamben Dictionary. Eds. Alex Murray 
and Jessica Whyte. Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 2011. 44-6. Print.  
 309 
Swaim, Don. “Don Swaim Interviews Kazuo Ishiguro.” Conversations with Kazuo 
Ishiguro. Eds. Shaffer, Brian W. and Cynthia F. Wong, Jackson: UP of 
Mississippi, 2008. 89-119. Print.  
Shih, Shu-mei. “Global Literature and the Technologies of Recognition.” PMLA. 
119.1 (2004): 16-30. Print.  
Smerick, Christiana. “„And G-d Said:‟ Language, Translation, and Scripture in Two 
Works by Walter Benjamin.” In Shofar: An Inter-Disciplinary Journal of 
Jewish Studies, West Lafayette: Purdue UP, Spring 2009; 
Song, Min Hyoung. “Communities of Remembrance: Reflections on the Virginia 
Tech Shootings and Race.” Journal of Asian American Studies 11.1 (2008): 1-
26. Print.  
Sontag, Susan. Regarding the Pain of Others. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 
2003. Print.  
Spahr, Juliana. Everybody's Autonomy: Connective Reading and Collective Identity. 
Tuscaloosa: U of Alabama P, 2001. Print.  
Spencer, Nicholas. After Utopia: The Rise of Critical Space in Twentieth-Century 
American Fiction. Lincoln: U of Nebraska P, 2006. Print.  
Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty. Other Asias. Malden: Blackwell Pub., 2008. Print.  
Stalling, Jonathan. Poetics of Emptiness: Transformations of Asian Thought in 
American Poetry. New York: Fordham UP, 2010. Print.  
Steinbock, Anthony J. “From Phenomenological Immortality to Natality” Rethinking 
Facticity. Eds. François Raffoul and Eric Sean Nelson. Albany: State U of 
New York P, 2008. 25-40. Print.  
Stevens, Wallace. The Collected Poems of Wallace Stevens. New York: Vintage 
Books, 1990. 
Sunahara, Ann Gomer. The Politics of Racism: The Uprooting of Japanese 
Canadians during the Second World War. Toronto: Lorimer, 1981. Print.  
Suvin, Darko. Metamorphoses of Science Fiction: On the Poetics and History of a 
Literary Genre. New Haven; London: Yale UP, 1980. Print.  
Toker, Leona, and Daniel Chertoff. “Reader Response and the Recycling of Topoi in 
Kazuo Ishiguro's Never Let Me Go.” Partial Answers: Journal of Literature 
and the History of Ideas 6.1 (2007): 163-80. Print.  
 310 
Tourino, Christina. "Ethnic Reproduction and the Amniotic Deep: Joy Kogawa's 
Obasan." Frontiers: A Journal of Women Studies 24.1 (2003): 134-53. Print.  
Ueki, Teruyo. “Obasan: Revelations in a Paradoxical Scheme.” MELUS 18.4 (1993): 
5-20. Print.  
Virno, Paolo. A Grammar of the Multitude: For an Analysis of Contemporary Forms 
of Life. Los Angeles; Cambridge: Semiotext(e), 2004. Print.  
Watkin, William. The Literary Agamben: Adventures in Logopoiesis. London; New 
York: Continuum, 2010. Print.  
Werbner, Pnina. “Introduction: The Dialectics of Cultural Hybridity.” Debating 
Cultural Hybridity: Multi-Cultural Identities and the Politics of Anti-Racism. 
Eds. Pnina Werbner and Tariq Modood. London; Atlantic Highlands: Zed 
Books, 1997. 1-26. Print.  
White, David A. Heidegger and the Language of Poetry. Lincoln: U of Nebraska P, 
1978. Print.  
Wollan, Malia and Onishi Norimitsu. “Gunman Kills 7 in a Rampage at a Northern 
California U.” New York Times, 2 Apr. 2012. Web. 13 May 2012. 
Wong, Shelly Sunn. “Unnaming the Same: Theresa Hak Kyung Cha's Dictée.” 
Writing Self, Writing Nation: A Collection of Essays on Dictée by Theresa 
Hak Kyung Cha. Eds. Norma Alarcón and Elaine H. Kim. Berkeley: Third 
Woman P, 1994. 103-40. Print.  
Wu, Frank H. Yellow: Race in America Beyond Black and White. New York: Basic 
Books, 2002. Print.  
Wyile, Herb. “Making a Mess of Things: Postcolonialism, Canadian Literature, and 
the Ethical Turn.” University of Toronto Quarterly 76.3 (2007): 821-37. Print.  
Xu, Wenying. Eating Identities: Reading Food in Asian American Literature. 
Honolulu: U of Hawai'i P, 2008. Print.  
Yaeger, Patricia. “Editor‟s Column: The End of Postcolonial Theory? A Roundtable 
with Sunil Agnani, Fernando Coronil, Gaurav Desai, Mamadou Diouf, Simon 
Gikandi, Susie Tharu, and Jennifer Wenzel.” PMLA 122.3 (2007): 633-51. 
Print.  
Yamashita, Karen Tei. Tropic of Orange: A Novel. Minneapolis, MN; Saint Paul: 
Coffee House P; Distributor, Consortium Book Sales, 1997. Print.  
 311 
Yu, Timothy. Race and the Avant-Garde: Experimental and Asian American Poetry 
since 1965. Stanford: Stanford UP, 2009. Print.  
Yuasa, Yasuo. “The Encounter of Modern Japanese Philosophy with Heidegger.” 
Heidegger and Asian Thought. Ed. Graham Parkes. Honolulu: U of Hawaii P, 
1990. 155-74. Print.  
Zia, Helen. Asian American Dreams: The Emergence of an American People. New 
York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2000. Print.  
Žižek, Slavoj. “Melancholy and the Act.” Critical inquiry 26.4 (2000): 657-81. Print.  
---. The Sublime Object of Ideology. London; New York: Verso, 1989. Print.  
---. Tarrying with the Negative: Kant, Hegel, and the Critique of Ideology. Durham: 
Duke UP, 1993. Print.  
---."The Ideology of the Empire and its Traps." Empire's New Clothes: Reading 
Hardt and Negri. Eds. Paul A. Passavant and Jodi Dean, New York: 
Routledge, 2004. 253-64. Print.  
---. The Ticklish Subject: The Absent Centre of Political Ontology. London; New 
York: Verso, 2000. Print.  
